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This thesis addresses issues of analysis and representation of the meaning of human
language on computers.
The notion of adaptable representations, which are designed to encode ambiguity
implicitly, is introduced, and placed in a context of related work on representation and
reference analysis.
A parsing formalism is presented which allows the analysis and translation of a subset of
English into a representation language which encodes not only the truth-functional
semantics of the input discourse but also some of its surface form. The parsing algorithm
works strictly word-by-word, always maintaining a self-contained partial representation
of the entire discourse so far, in order to provide a stringent framework for examination of
the idea of adaptability. It is shown that the use of adaptable representations which
implicitly encode local lexical ambiguity can improve the efficiency of parsing by reducing
non-determinism.
A basic noun phrase reference analysis algorithm is presented, which allows inferences to
be made about the reference of the input discourse. Following the common belief that
noun phrase reference analysis in humans takes place as information is received,
processing is performed word-by-word, in parallel with parsing. Part of the reference
analysis algorithm constitutes a new view of the distinction between restrictive and non-
restrictive noun phrase modifiers. It is shown that this new view and the adaptability of
the system in general does not compromise the ability of the reference analysis algorithm
to produce correct results.
Finally, a new approach to the generation of readings of sentences containing many-ways
ambiguous or vague set reference is presented. The approach relies heavily on
adaptability, and it is suggested that without (an equivalent of) adaptability any approach
is likely to be combinatorially explosive and therefore in general computationally
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This document is a statement and discussion of the theory and implementation of the
George Parsing and DeReferencing system. As such, as well as a problem statement and
literature survey, it covers three main headings: the George Parser; the George
Representation Language; and the George Noun Phrase DeReferencer.
These three parts of the George system form a unified and closely linked whole; they are
not intended to work independently of each other, neither practically nor theoretically.
This should be borne in mind when reading the explanations in this document. The closely
linked structure has necessitated a certain amount of forward referencing, which has been
planned so as to minimise distraction to the reader.
2. Abbreviations
The only common abbreviations used in this document are "FOPC" for "First Order
Predicate Calculus" and "GRL" for "George Representation Language" Otherwise, terms
are in general spelled out in full.
3. Notation and Special Symbols
There are three kinds of text in this document: explanatory text, program output and
theoretical statements. Explanatory text will be printed like this, in plain Classic font.
Program output will be boxed, labelled and pr in ted in titan font, like this.
Important theoretical points will be emboldened, in particular in the specification of the
George System's reference analysis rules. Specially defined terms appear in italic, where




The following non-alphanumeric symbols are used in this document, but do not appear in
the George Representation Language.
+; —operation—» combines with, under operation, to give (eg 3 + 2 -multiplication—» 6)
2S power set of S
{x:P(x)} set of all x such that P(x) is true
U,n,C,D,C,D,€ the conventional set relations
3 the conventional existential quantifier
<, = ,>, > the conventional arithmetic relations
0, {}. H the conventional parentheses/braces/brackets
|S| modulus: the number ofelements in set S
* at the left margin marks an ill-formed sentence in English or logic
© logical exclusive or
-1. A, V. the conventional logical not, and, inclusive or, implies
The following non-alphanumeric symbols are used in this document, and have a special
meaning in the George Representation Language, given in the righthand column.
V universal quantification index quantification
< arithmetic less than index bounding
X cross product weak index application
The following non-alphanumeric symbols are used in this document to denote concepts
specific to the George Representation Language.
~
(tilde) sort application
<8> strong index application
! definiteness
► context extension
Where quotes or variants on quotes from other researchers' work appear in this document,
the symbols are to be read as appropriate to the original work; where necessary,
definitions will be given.
PhD Thesis
The Problem of Reference to Underspecfied Sets
Chapter 1
Introduction:
The Problem of Reference to
Underspecified Sets
Abstract
The central problem at which this thesis is aimed is outlined. It is the problem of reference by
noun phrases, quantified or otherwise, to sets of individuals in the discourse which have not
been fully specified. The particular underspecification discussed here is in terms ofnumber.
1. Introduction
Consider this simple puzzle.
"Some men own some donkeys. Five donkeys escape. The three donkeys who do
not escape stay in the paddock. Each man owns one donkey. The men who own the
donkeys who escape are angry.
How many men, how many angry men and how many donkeys are there?" 1
The solutions are not hard to calculate. The numerical inference required to arrive at the
answers is well within the scope of existing reasoning systems designed by researchers in
the fie'd ofArtificial Intelligence.
The more interesting aspect of the puzzle is the understanding of the reference in it. In
particular, there are references to sets of objects (viz men and donkeys), but the whole
point of the puzzle hinges on the fact that these sets are not fully specified - the number of
elements in each is left deliberately undefined.
The pattern of events is this. First, two uniform sets, say M and D (for "men" and
"donkeys") are introduced Because the sets are uniform, their elements are not mutually
discriminable. There is a relation (ownership) between the members of the two sets, the
details of which are not given. Next, the set D is divided into two subsets, say Descape and
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Drest. A cardinality is specified for Descape, the members ofwhich can now be distinguished
from those of Drest, whose cardinality is still unknown. In the third sentence, such a
cardinality is supplied. Finally, the relationship between M and.D is specified more fully,
to the extent that reasoning about the cardinality of D, based on Descape, Drest and the
connection between them and D, allows us to reason also about the cardinality ofM.
This document is about a computational solution to the problems raised in the attempt to
emulate the behaviour of the human language understanding mechanism as it processes
reference of this underspecified kind, focussing on the human ability to represent and
reason about such reference as it becomes more specified.
2. The Problem of Reference to Underspecified Sets
Many researchers have considered the general problem of noun phrase reference (see
[Hirst, 1981] for a comprehensive survey up to 1980). Even so, it is generally agreed that
there are still many problems to be dealt with in that area. Particular successes in the
field have been Terry Winograd's SHRDLU [Winograd 1971], Bundy et al's MECHO
(specifically Chris Mellish's contribution, in this area of interest) [Mellish, 1981], and
Bonnie Webber's "Formal Approach to Discourse Anaphora" [Webber, 1979]. Indeed, the
bulk of the George system described here rests heavily on the work of these last two
authors, whose work is summarised in Chapter 2.
Part of the reason why noun phrase reference is such a large problem is the large variety
of forms it can and frequently does take. [Webber, 1979] discusses in detail three
particular forms of NP anaphor: Pronominal reference, Definite Noun Phrase reference,
and (so-called) One-Anaphora. But these are just three kinds out of a range of ten which
Webber lists. In this document, I shall specialise further - looking only at Prominal and
Noun Phrase reference, though including indefinite reference in the latter, and
suggesting that the two may be dealt with in the same way.
Above and beyond the multiplicity of kinds of noun phrase reference, problems also arise
from the tendency in common natural language usage for speakers and writers to leave
information out of the initial specification of and subsequent references to an entity or a
set of entities taking part in a discourse. These omissions are often filled in later - though,
sometimes, they are not filled in at all. They may take place for a number of reasons, some
of which are deliberately stylistic - for example, to improve clarity, or to maintain tension.
Sometimes they are made because of plain laziness, but in most cases the speaker or
writer will use them to improve the efficiency of the communication, leaving some
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information to be inferred by the hearer or reader. This inference, it would appear, often
occurs as (or at least very soon after) a noun phrase is heard or read.
An example of the use of pronouns to increase bandwidth, where ambiguity is introduced
by that use, is the well-known "donkey sentence"1:
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it." 2
Translation of the donkey sentence in isolation is indeterminate in two ways. First, and
less interestingly for our current purpose, there is ambiguity between the generic reading,
where there is no particular set ofmen, and the referential reading, where such a set has
been introduced into the discourse by a previous noun phrase.
The other, more interesting, indeterminate aspect of the translation arises only in the
second of these interpretations. It is a kind of vagueness which only matters in certain
contexts, and it seems not to have been singled out for specific attention in the past.
Consider, for example, the discourse:
"There are ten men. 3a
Five of the men own a donkey each. 3b
Every man who owns a donkey beats it." 3c
We could represent this with the diagram in Figure 1.
Now consider example 4:
"There are ten men. 4a
Some of the men own a donkey each. 4b
Every man who owns a donkey beats it." 4c
Two noteworthy points arise in this second version. First, it is clearly impossible to draw a
diagram like figure 1, because the reference of the subject in 4b is underspecified - by
which I mean that some of the information which it could carry is absent. Specifically, the
subject noun phrase of 4b is underspecified in number.
1:1 will refer to the points of interest in this sentence - the indefinite singular reference and its
associated singular pronoun, "it" - as the "donkey existential" and "donkey pronoun"
respectively, to distinguish them from the more general example sentences presented here,
almost all ofwhich have something to do with donkeys.
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Figure 1: Ten men and five donkeys
Secondly - perhaps surprisingly - this makes no difference at all to the human ability to
reason about the relationships between the sets in the discourse, until a specific reference
is made, for example, to the number of animals, as in 5.
"How many donkeys are there?" 5
We can even make statements as complex as 6, where we refer to subsets of and set
differences between subsets of sets mentioned but not enumerated in 4.
"Half of the donkeys are brown; the other half are grey.
The men who own grey donkeys dislike some of the men who own brown ones." 6
While these examples are perhaps a little strained, they serve to show just how far we can
go, meaningfully, in a discourse without even trying to resolve this ambiguity, neither
from the speaker's nor from the hearer's point of view. Indeed, one approach to dealing
with the simple examples of this problem given here so far might be to compare it with so-
called lazy evaluation of mathematical expressions in some computer languages. To put
this basic idea into a context rather closer to our subject here: maybe a useful approach is
to mirror the original ambiguity of the English discourse, in whatever representation of
its meaning we use on a computer, from the point at which it occurs in the input as far as
possible into the discourse - or until the input is itself no longer ambiguous.
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Returning for the moment to a more general level, there is a further problem. The
sentences in examples 3 and 4 are special in that the relationship between the elements of
the sets is deliberately contrived to be one-to-one in, at least, what I think is the most
natural reading. In general, this will not be the case, as can be seen, for example, in 7a-c.
Now, it may well be necessary at some stage in a discourse to state explicit relationships
between elements and/or subsets of these underspecified sets of referents, as, for example,
in 7d-f.
"There are ten men. 7a
Some of the men own donkeys. 7b
Each man who owns a donkey beats it. 7c
Jim is one of the men. 7d
Jim beats his donkey for fun. 7e
The other men pity Jim's donkey." 7f
If we wish to be able to discuss Jim's donkey as an individual entity, we must have a
means to enumerate parts of the sets specified in the discourse, while leaving other parts
simply as underspecified (sub)sets. To do this, we need a formal means of separating out
the exact relationships between Jim and his donkey as (under)specified in the English
discourse. This concept is the central focus of the work presented here
3. The Timing of Reference Evaluation
In general, when we consider the analysis of reference in anything other than trivial
natural language, we are presented with a particular problem of inference: it is almost
never clear exactly how far one should go in making inferences about the items which one
is discussing and/or the situations in which they are placed. In Figure 1, I illustrated a
very simple situation where we can easily take an obvious course of action, and work out
everything as far as possible. However, it is certainly not always possible to do this - for
example, in cases where there are too many elements in a set to consider them all, or,
worse, where we do not know how many elements there are.
It is not immediately clear how one might go about determining what is the "correct"
amount of inference to apply to a referring expression; indeed, one might make a strong
argument for there being no such quantity, by reference to the easily observable variation
in application of this kind of inference between different individuals. There is, however, a
minimal, "safest" position, analogous with the ideas of "lazy evaluation" in computer
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programming languages: an expression is left unevaluated until its result is explicitly
needed. Thus, when we finally analyse a reference we always have as much information
as possible; if it is still ambiguous, then there is nothing further we can do, so we are
justified in allowing the ambiguity to proceed, in the hope that it will be resolved later in
the discourse. While I do not claim that is necessarily a psychologically plausible solution
(indeed, it is not so in general), it is useful from a computational point of view, and serves
our purposes here. In particular, it will prove useful to apply this idea to the
representation of sets ofentities in the translations ofnatural language utterances.
The application of a notion of lazy evaluation begs a question of how we are to proceed to
analyse discourse, which may be very heavily ambiguous, and at the same time postpone
evaluation of the structures which constitute our data. Also, there are clear advantages,
both psycholinguistically and practically, in performing at least some reference
evaluation as early as possible - see, for example, the work of [Mellish, 1981], summarised
in Chapter 2.
Lazy and early evaluation fit most comfortably into language analysis if we allow
ourselves one fundamental underlying assumption. Fortunately, this assumption is not
unreasonable. It is simply that the person (or program) generating the input to our
analyser intends to make sense. It gives us two advantages.
First, we do not have to make judgements about what is (in some sense) "correct" and
what is not. We simply attempt to understand or analyse; we may either succeed or fail.
This is in line with the human sentence processing mechanism which does not, on the
whole, make correctness judgements about its input, but attempts to derive some meaning
from it, even if the input is at odds with expectation - though, of course, we must
acknowledge that expectation can play an important (if sometimes misleading) part.
Second, and more importantly, our assumption means that we are free to suppose that
reference will at some stage in the course of the discourse become unambiguous, (if it is
necessary that it does so. Plenty of ambiguities can often be harmlessly left unresolved -
eg the collective us distributive ambiguity in ordinary plural noun phrases).
It will be seen later that this assumption affects design decisions in the theory. These
decisions are, however, not irreversible: if the "judgemental" view were required, it would
not be hard to adapt the theory or the implementation.
A corollary of the assumption is that we want to represent ambiguity {ie make all the
possible readings available) in our system; otherwise, we will not be able to resolve it
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appropriately when the time comes. Many ways of doing so already exist, for example:
simple backtracking or breadth-first shift/reduce parsers; chart parsers; word expert
parsers. Another example on a different level is Mellish's reference analyser in the
MECHO program. I will argue that none of these approaches is adequate for the task in
hand here, though [Mellish, 1981 ]'s work on "early evaluation and incremental analysis"
constitutes an unprecedentedly large step in the right direction.
In particular, when set references are involved, really vast numbers of readings may be
available from just one predication, because the relations between sets referred to by
ordinary plural noun phrases are not specified, except in as far as they exist. Take for
example sentence 8.
"Ten men own ten donkeys." 8
It is easy to list large numbers of ways in which the exact details of such an ownership
relation could be worked out. (It would be boring to do so here. The point will be raised
again in Chapter 7.) Given this, and the ability to refer to arbitrary subsets, individuals,
set differences, and so on, and the combinatorially explosive effect of subsequent
underspecified reference to the same sets, any method depending in any sense on
immediate enumeration of all the possible readings, no matter under what search
strategy, is doomed to eventual failure.
Rather, what is needed is a representation and supporting analysis system which allows
us to encode what information we have as and when we receive it - hence early analysis -
but also implicitly to encode and reason about ambiguity, so that explosions like that
described above are no longer an important issue. We will need to be able to update this
representation as we obtain more information from our input, possibly changing it quite a
lot, maybe replacing a set with subsets, or (like Mellish's incremental representation and
analysis system) ruling out possibilities for reference.
I will call such a representation system adaptable. The majority of this document will be
devoted to the presentation of one such system, focussing particularly on the analysis of
underspecified set reference. The goal, aside from presenting this particular set technique,
is to show that any representation which is truly useful for natural language analysis will
be adaptable, because, quite simply, it is never, in general, possible to say that all of the
reference in an analysis has been analysed correctly, until the end of a discourse has been
reached - and sometimes not even then.
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A corollary of this view of language understanding is that to take full advantage of the
adaptability of representations, we require the ability to represent partial sentences.
Thus, local ambiguity within sentences can be represented implicitly and efficiently.
4. A Manageable Domain
Clearly, from the size of the general reference problem discussed in Section 2,1 must make
some kind of artificial separation between which effects we are to study and which we are
not, if I am to address a manageable problem. Some researchers have chosen to limit their
discussion to a particular style of language {eg [Mellish, 1981], which analysed A-level
mechanics questions), while others have selected a very restricted world of which
descriptions can be formulated (eg the "blocks world" of [Windograd, 1972]'s SHRDLU).
While the basic need for a manageable domain is evident, it is not clear that limiting
either style or discourse domain or both maintains the full range of linguistic effects that
one might wish to discuss. Certainly, the choice of A-level mechanics questions for
MECHO affects the range of the analysis problems tackled by the system, to the extent
that the issue of underspecified sets, for example, does not even arise.
Therefore, I propose that a better approach is to select particular linguistic features which
affect reference analysis uniformly throughout linguistic usage. These may be dealt with
in isolation, ideally before attempting to tackle the harder issues involved in relating
reference analysis to context - eg focus, real world knowledge. The particular effects I
propose to discuss here are those created by number, sort, and definiteness. In particular, I
shall consider the effects of number and underspecification in number.
5. Definition of Terms
In this exposition, I have of necessity introduced a number of new terms. It seems that
there are not enough words in the English language to have a separate term for every
feature of each person's work, so some of these unfortunately overlap the terminology of
other researchers. Where this is the case I have tried to make it clear whose term I am
using at each ambiguous occurrence. So that the reader is forewarned, some of the most
problematic of these terms are detailed below. A fuller glossary is given in Appendix A.
Adaptability
The ability of a representation to be uncommitted as to its exact interpretation, but to
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change (in some well-defined meaningful way) as and when factors within the
analysis require it to do so. In the system presented here, changes will always be
towards less ambiguous representations.
Definiteness
The property of a noun phrase which requires that its referent be uniquely selectable
from a number of possibilities. NB this is not equated here with given-ness.
Dereferencing
The process of finding and refining sets of possible referents for referring expressions
(by analogy with the dereferencing process applied to variables in programming
languages).
Early Evaluation
Evaluation of referential information before the traditional points (eg end of sentence)
in sentence processing.
Given/New-ness
The property of information in discourse determining whether it is known (and so can
be used for selection of candidates for reference) or new (and so should be added to the
discourse representation). These two are not mutally exclusive, and only form an
approximation which I will not use; I suggest that the usual equation of this property
with definite/indefinite-ness is misleading.
Incremental Parsing
The incorporation of discourse information into a (partial) translation, word by word,
as soon as it appears (c/"Mellish's incremental evaluation - the notion of accumulating
information in a representation).
Incremental Reference Evaluation
The piecemeal evaluation of reference, in a system where evaluation is performed
early. New information may be continually added.
Introductoriness
The property of a referring expression which determines whether it causes a new
entity or set of entities to be added to the world model of a discourse analysis. NB
Again, this is not equated with given/new or definiteness here.
6. Summary
The material in this chapter can be summarised in three main claims.
-9- PhD Thesis
The Problem ofReference to Underspecfied Sets
1. We need to be able to analyse, reason about, and represent reference to sets
which are subsets of other sets existing in a discourse, but not fully specified
therein, in particular in terms of number.
2. We cannot, until the end of an input discourse, fix substitutions for names of
discourse world entities for the referring expressions in our input, because it
is not possible to be sure that a candidate entity is the correct choice until it is
known that no more information is forthcoming. Thus, representations must
be adaptable.
3. As a corollary of 2, we need to produce partial representations in order that we
may represent intermediate stages along the path to the eventual analysis.
Most of the rest of this document is devoted to the justification of these claims By the end
of Chapter 7, I will have demonstrated how the problem discourse in example 1 can be
analysed in a computational system using an adaptable representation. I will place the
presentation in the context of word-by-word incremental evaluation, with as little non-
determinism as possible, because this enforces an extreme requirement of adaptability on
a representation, and therefore forms a stringent framework for research.
7. Afterword
This chapter has introduced the example problem discussed in this document, and a basic
idea for a context in which to solve it. The rest of the document is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 is a brief survey of related work in computational analysis of reference. Chapter
3 introduces the George system, which embodies the theory presented here; also, some
important basic hypotheses are presented. In Chapters 4 and 5, the George
Representation Language (GRL), an adaptable discourse representation system, and the
George Parser, a parser designed to produce partial representations and take advantage of
the adaptability of GRL are explained and illustrated.
Chapter 6 explains how George analyses reference of the kinds covered by [Mellish, 1981],
and introduces a new view of restrictive and non-restrictive noun modification. Chapter 7
extends this and shows how adaptability admits reasoning about reference to
underspecified sets. Chapter 8, discusses the George system and theory and compares it
with existing work. Finally, Chapter 9 outlines ideas for extension and improvement.
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This chapter introduces and justifies the starting point ofmy approach to noun phrase reference
analysis, in terms of existing work in the field. In particular, it discusses which referential
features of language are to be used, and presents the contributions of three closely related pieces
ofwork by Webber, Mellish and Haddock. The referential Principles of Steedman et al are also
presented, since they are implicit in the work presented here. Incremental parsing is
introduced.
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will provide a context for the problem presented in Chapter 1, in terms of
work by other researchers in the field of Natural Language Processing I will focus on the
work of [Mellish, 1981, etc], [Webber, 1979], [Haddock, 1989], and, to a lesser extent, on
[Crain & Steedman, 1985], [Steedman, 1985], [Altmann, 1986], [Steedman, 1987].
Three other important pieces of work, by [Sidner, 1979], [Alshawi, 1987] and
[Carter, 1988] are also concerned with resolution of anaphora. The first two mainly
discuss focus, and so are orthogonal to the work presented here. The third, while having
features common with the George system (in particular, what Carter calls "shallow
processing") is not directly relevant to adaptability or to underspecified set reference
(quantified reference is explicitly excluded from Carter's discussion).
For each of my chosen authors, I will discuss in this chapter the main issues introduced in
Chapter 1, namely: reference to subsets of underspecified sets and how to represent it; the
need always for adaptable representations of entities taking part in a discourse in general;
and the need to derive correct partial representations of entities (both sets and
individuals) from an input discourse. The presentation is given in the context of word-by¬
word incremental evaluation, with as little explicit non-determinism as possible. This
enforces an extreme requirement of adaptability on a representation, and therefore forms
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a stringent framework for examination of the problems and advantages of the
adaptability of that representation.
Before proceeding to issues of set reference and ofmy representation and parsing system, I
will restrict my domain of data by listing a number of linguistic issues I will not cover and
explaining why. I will also list and exemplify [Steedman etal, 1985, e<c]'s Principles of
Reference , which will form fundamental implicit tenets ofmy presentation.
All of the discussion in this chapter should be viewed as providing a context for the
presentation of the George Parsing and DeReferencing system, in the next five. Chapter 8
will then highlight differences and similarities between George and the other researchers'
work, and the improvements embodied in it.
2. Noun Phrase Reference
Noun phrase reference evaluation is a large problem, in two respects: first, because there
are so many different aspects to it, and second, because there are so many existing ways
partially to solve it. Both of these respects form choice points in the search for a focus of
research.
In respect of the first choice point, in order to constrain my domain to a manageable size, I
must make some decisions about what I will and will not address. The broad issues I might
cover here are as follows; the list is in an order which (in an informal sense) starts more in
the mind of the hearer and moves "outward", as it were, deeper into the explicit discourse.
1. Knowledge ofspeaker's intention
Knowledge of a speaker's intention in carrying on a discourse may affect a hearer's
ability to analyse referring expressions (among many other things). For example, if
the hearer believes (because of context, punctuation, or inflection) that the speaker is
issuing an instruction and the context does not preclude this (see below), s/he is likely
to assume that a sentence sounding like "Have the animals eaten?" is an order to send,
say, cattle to a restaurant, and nothing to do with concern over their possible hunger.
2. Knowledge ofspeaker
More commonly, and more obviously, knowledge of the speaker's background and
likely assumptions will affect dereferencing. For example, when the speaker refers to
"John", but the hearer knows two people called John, the hearer will assume that the
speaker is referring to the one they both know, if s/he believes such a unique
individual to exist.
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3. Inference!deduction from situation described in a discourse (eg [Winograd, 1971])
More commonly still, a hearer will make inferences, particularly regarding
referential consistency of a situation described or requested. For example, if the
speaker refers to "the donkey the man owns" but no man has been previously
mentioned, the hearer is likely to require clarification.
4. Inference!deduction from real world knowledge (eg [Winograd, 1971])
The hearer will not normally allow reference which would imply a situation which
s/he knows is physically impossible, impracticable, or just unlikely. For example, if
the speaker refers to "the donkey riding the man", the hearer is likely to require
clarification, unless the discourse is presented in a context where such a situation is
possible (for example, in reference to a cartoon film). Another example is deixis, where
one refers directly to entities in the real world surrounding the discourse participants;
deixis may also play a part in 3, above.
5. Focus (and recency) (eg [Grosz, 1977])
The term "focus" has a number of definitions in the (computational) linguist's
dictionary. I use it loosely here to cover various syntactic and pragmatic effects which
may influence the choice between a number of possible referents for a referring
expression, based on theme or thread of meaning. A good example is the idea of
recency: that, given two otherwise equally likely candidates for reference, the most
recently mentioned is often a better choice.
6. Definiteness: the given!new distinction (eg [Mellish, 1985], [Webber, 1979])
The distinction between given and new information is one which has been the subject
of numerous discussions in the past. In many cases, researchers have made do with an
approximation to the distinction: that definite references always contain information
already known, and that indefinite ones always introduce new information.
7. Sort (eg everything ever written about noun phrase reference)
Sort information is that concerning the properties of entities existing in the world of
the discourse. Sorts are often expressed as predications of entities; they may be viewed
as defining properties (eg "a red ball"), or as properties arising from the situation
described by a discourse (eg "a ball I kicked"), or as both. There is a very fuzzy dividing
line between what genuinely constitutes definition and what constitutes situation
information; I will address this issue briefly in Chapter 4. Sort information is a
fundamental force in determining candidates for reference.
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8. Number {eg [Webber, 1979])
The number information concerning a set of individuals may in some cases be as
strong as sort in determining reference. For example: "Ten Tory MPs spoke in
opposition; twenty Labour Members spoke in support; the ten won the vote.". Even
though the practical aspects of the situation might quite strongly suggest an opposing
reading, the reference carrying nothing but number information is still unambiguous.
As did Mellish and Haddock, I will restrict the area of my discussion to points 6,7 and 8
and certain aspects of 3. This is justifiable on the grounds that the problems covered here
will all be phrased in terms of reducing sets ofpotential referents for referring expressions
(Mellish's candidate sets). The issues covered in 1, 2 and 5 above are all characterisable as
processing operations on these candidate sets. For example, one might naively view the
initial candidate set of a reference as being all the entities in a discourse, some of which
will be ruled out as the parse proceeds incrementally. A more sophisticated stance would
be that the initial candidate set is those entities which are in focus (given some suitable
definition of the term). Therefore, useful work can be done by taking small discourses, in
such a way that the candidate set is restricted aa though by these other factors, thus
keeping the problem both realistic and manageable. These processing operations probably
need to be modelled in parallel with the semantic analysis and more simple reference
analysis of language; the topic of a discourse, for example, will affect the discourse focus.
One major advantage of this view is that it need not restrict research to a particular
domain ofdata.
Issue 4, above, can be included on a sentential level, by the use of selectional contraints in
more or less complicated ways: for example, [Wilks, 1975]'s preference semantics allows
such decisions to be made on grounds of probabilities of correctness, or likelihoods. I will
discuss in Chapter 9 how selectional constraints could be built into the theory.
In this section, I have narrowed down the area of my research into three related issues:
definiteness, sort, and number. There is wide agreement among researchers that these are
fundamental determining factors in noun phrase reference analysis. Therefore, it seems
unnecessary to justify this choice further.
3. Steedman, Crain & Altmann: Principles of Reference
In a number of different articles, Steedman, Crain and Altmann formulate various rules
or principles of referential behaviour, all of which are embodied either implicitly in the
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theory presented here, or prospectively in the further stages of which it might be a front
end. I will merely state and outline these principles here - they are sufficiently intuitive
not to require further discussion, and are anyway more than adequately explained in the
original sources.
The Principle of Referential Success [Crain & Steedman, 1986]
"If there is a reading which succeeds in referring to an entity already established
in the hearer's mental model of the domain of discourse, then it is preferred over
one that does not."
For example, in 9, "a donkey" refers most readily to one of the set of ten, and not to some
newly introduced donkey.
"There are ten men and ten donkeys. Each man owns a donkey." 9
The Principle of Referential Failure [Altmann, 1986]
"If a definite referring expression fails to restrict the set of candidate elements in
the hearer's mental model of the domain of discourse to a single member, then an
analysis which treats subsequent material as a modifier for that referring
expression (ie as providing information which may lead to further restriction) will
be favoured over one that does not."
For example, in 10, two noun phrases are post-modified by relative clauses. The first,
marked ® is modified non-restrictively; there is only one possible referent of the noun
phrase "the farmer"; thus, according to the rule above, the relative need not be treated
restrictively. However, because there are two candidates for reference by the phrase ©,
"the donkey", the precondition of the principle is fulfilled, and the rest of the noun phrase
is viewed as restricting that set of candidates. Therefore, according to the rule, this
relative clause must be viewed as restrictive.
"Two donkeys lived in a field owned by a farmer. One was very greedy.
The farmer® who was mean decided to sell the donkey® which was greedy,
because it cost too much to feed." 10
The Principle of Referential Support [Altmann & Steedman, 1988]
"An NP analysis which is referentially supported will be favoured over one that is
not."
Here, the notion of referential support encapsulates the preconditions of both of the earlier
rules; if an analysis is referentially supported, it contains all and only the information
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required to disambiguate completely any references which are not introductions of new
entities into the world model. Note that this rule does not preclude the addition of new
information from referring expressions; it merely requires that the information in those
expressions does not contradict that already known about the existing entities to which
they are found to refer.
The Principle of Parsimony [Altmann & Steedman, 1988]
"A reading which carries fewer unsatisfied presuppositions will be favoured over
one that carries more."
This principle is like a principle of lazy evaluation: its claim is that as less reasoning is
necessary in making a discourse world analysis consistent, so the human sentence
processing mechanism is more likely to achieve that analysis. Consider the (very)
strained anaphor in example 11a.
"Nine of the ten marbles were in the bag. It was under the couch." 11a
"Nine of the ten marbles were in the bag. The marble was under the couch." lib
In this example, there are two readings, one of which is achieved much more readily than
the other: in the "easy" reading "it" refers to the bag; in the "hard" one, "it" refers to the
tenth marble. The point is that, given the ambiguity, it is extremely counter-intuitive to
prefer the more obscure reading, because it presupposes the existence of an entity (the
tenth marble) not explicitly mentioned in the discourse, which must therefore be inferred;
thus, this reading is less parsimonious. In the easy reading, the entity already exists. In
lib, the obscure reading somehow becomes less so, because the more easily achieved
reading has been removed.
The Principle of Parsimony might well be used as part of a final output stage for choosing
between the various readings produced in the theory presented here. However, in the
working George system all readings are produced, and it is left to some other filtering
stage (or oracle) to select between them at some stage (NB not necessarily the end) in each
possible parse.
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4. Analysing Reference in a Discourse
4.1. Introduction
In this section, I will discuss work presented by three authors, [Webber 1979],
[Mellish, 1985], and [Haddock, 1989]. For each author, I will give a brief resume of his or
her work, with particular attention to adaptability of representation and to the ability to
represent and reason about sets. I will also introduce some motivation for incremental
parsing and analysis of natural language.
4.2. Webber: "A Formal Approach to Discourse Anaphora"
4.2.1. Introduction
"This thesis starts from the perspective that dealing with anaphoric language can
be decomposed into two complementary tasks: (1) identifying what a text
potentially makes available for anaphoric reference and (2) constraining the
candidate set of a given anaphoric expression down to one possible choice."
[Webber, 1979, Synopsis, page vi]
Thus, BonnieWebber defines the context of her PhD thesis. She goes on to suggest that
"it has only been the second task ... that has stimulated research in psychology
and artificial intelligence (AI) natural language understanding".
Indeed, it would seem very hard to contradict the initial claim. Essentially, Webber is
saying that, in order to refer to something, one needs something to which to refer. At first
sight, this paraphrase seems almost fatuous - but Webber is quite right to make the point:
in Chapter 8,1 will suggest that in the past some (or even many) researchers have viewed
reference as something internal to language.
The suggestion is that we need to make a clear, formal distinction between linguistic
references and the entities to which they refer. Given this starting point, Webber states
the main message of her PhD thesis in
"two strong claims:
1. None of the three types of anaphoric expression that I have studied - definite
anaphora, one-anaphora and verb phrase deletion - can be understood in
purely linguistic terms. That is, none of them can be explained without
stepping out of the conceptual model each participant is synthesising from the
discourse.
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2. On the other hand, if a discourse participant does not assign to each new
utterance a formal representation in which, inter alia,
a) quantifiers are indicated, along with their scopes;
b) main clauses are distinguished from relative clauses and subordinate
clauses;
c) clausal subjects are separated from clausal predicates;
then s/he will not be able to identify all of what is being made available for
anaphoric reference."
She goes on to show that
"there is an intimate connection between such a formal sentential analysis and
the synthesis of an appropriate conceptual model of the discourse."
This notion of reflecting surface structure in a representation (point 2, above) is central to
the work presented here. It is certain that the theory embodied in the George system
would not function without the proper distinction between referring expressions and
entities or without the extra-logical linguistic information encoded in the George
Representation Language (which is defined in Chapter 4). Furthermore, we cannot have
access to a separated structure of entities in the world model and reference to them in the
discourse, unless we step outside the world model to some other level from which we can
view the two - this is Webber's point 1, above.
4.2.2. Separated Representations of Reference in Discourse
Webber's central claim, then, is that we must represent the entities in the discourse world
distinctly from the referring expressions which refer to them. To this end, she introduces a
formalism admitting (quasi-)logical representations of the semantics of input sentences,
and entities, initially separate from the formal representation, but described by an
inuoking description specified in terms of the same language. This is all presented at an
abstract level, rather detached from issues of parsing and of mechanically producing the
necessary translations.
Webber does not give a formal semantics for her representation language. It seems that
the representation is based on first order predicate calculus, with the addition of
parametric sorts (or types, in Webber's terminology), lambda (A) abstraction, meta¬
variables and a definite operator, i {iota). Of particular interest here are the means of
representing types, sets and entities.
A type is a unary predicate, associated with a logical variable in the representation
language via the quantifier binding it. Free variables are not allowed, except in special
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cases, where they are used as short cuts and are not associated with any strong claims (eg
"I" is used to denote the speaker). Examples of typed semantic expressions are as follows.
"A man wants a t-shirt." Si: 3(m:Man).3(t:T-shirt).[Wants m, t]
"The man buys a blue t-shirt." S2:3(t:A(u:T-shirt)[Blue u]).[Buys im:Man(m), t]
After Webber's semantic processing, three entities will be associated with these sentences:
the man who wants a t-shirt and buys one; the prototypical t-shirt he wants to buy; and
the blue t-shirt he actually does buy. These entities are defined by associated identifying
descriptions, including specifications of which sentences "evoke" them, thus:
ei: ix: Man( x) & 3(t:T-shirt).[Wants x, t] & 3(t:A(u:T-shirt)[Blue u]).[Buys m, t]
& evoke( Si, ei) & evoke( S2, ei)
e2: 3(x:t-shirt).3(m:Man).[Wants m, t] & evoke( Si, e2)
63: ix: T-shirt( x) & 3(m:Man).[Buys m, t] & evoke( S2, e3)
Having deduced the existence of these entities, Webber specifies an iterative procedure by
which the entities may be inserted into the original expressions to represent the
translation of the sentences, to give a complete translation, in association with the
identifying descriptions, like this:
"A man wants a t-shirt." Si: 3(m:Man).3(t:T-shirt).[Wants m, t]
"The man buys a blue t-shirt." S2: 3(t:A(u:T-shirt)[Blue u]).[Buys ei, t]
Thus, in the final representation, Webber partly abandons her idea of a separated
representation, and with it, adaptability. I will argue in Chapter 8 that this is a serious
failing in the theory.
Webber uses this framework to give examples of treatments of three different kinds of
anaphor: definite noun phrases, "one" anaphors, and verb-phrase ellipsis. In her
treatment of definite noun phrases, she discusses set entities quite thoroughly. These set
entities are the subject of the next section.
4.2.3. Set Reference, Quantification and Parametric Types
Webber uses two distinct devices to cover reference to sets in her language: the notion of a
set entity, and that of conventional universal quantification over a type. Thus, sets can be
referred to as individual entities or collectives, and explicit distributive quantification can
be represented as such.
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To represent sets, Webber introduces a type constructor (which she views as simply a
function from types to types, rather than as a parametric type in itself) called set. Thus,
the type of sets of men is denoted by set(Man). As syntactic sugar, she also introduces
maxset, defined such that maxset(Type) contains just the element of set(Type) whose
extension is largest; maxset might alternatively be defined logically in terms of set.
Examples of set references and the entities they invoke are as follows. Note the ambiguity
between the collective and distributive readings of the first sentence, which gives rise to
two possible discourse translations. Recall that set and maxset are functions returning
types, so "maxset(Man)m" denotes the application of a predicate name to the variable m.
1: "Some men want a t-shirt." 3(m:set(Man)).3(t:T-shirt).[Want m, t]
"The men buy a t-shirt each." V(x£ im:maxset(Man)m).3(t:T-shirt).[Buy x, t]
2: "Some men want a t-shirt." 3(m:set(Man)).3(t:T-shirt).V(xCm).[Want x, t]
"The men buy a t-shirt each." V(x€im:maxset(Man)m).3(t:T-shirt).[Buy x, t]
From these, Webber's entity derivation rule produces three entities, as before; except that
this time there is a set of men and of non-prototypical t-shirts, and there are two possible
interpretations, because of the collective/distributive ambiguity above.
1: ei: ix: maxset(Man)x & 3(t:T-shirt).[Wants x, t]
& V(x€m).3(t:A(u:T-shirt)[Blue u]).[Buys m, t]
& evoke( Si, ei) & evoke( S2, ei)
e2: 3(x:t-shirt).3(m:set(Man)).[Wants m, t] & evoke( Si, e2)
63: ix: maxset(T-shirt)x & 3(m:maxset(Man)).V(u£m).3(v€x).[Buys u, v]
& evoke( S2, 63 )
2: ei: ix: maxset(Man)x & 3(t:T-shirt).V(u(ix).[Wants u, t]
& V(x£ m).3(t:A(u:T-shirt)[Blue u]).[Buys m, t]
& evoke( Si, ei) & evoke( S2, ei)
e2: 3(x:t-shirt).3(m:set(Man)).V(u€m).[Wants u, x] & evokef Si, e2 )
63: ix: maxset(T-shirt)x & 3(m:maxset(Man)).V(u€m).3(v€x).[Buys u, v]
& evokef S2, e3 )
When the entities are inserted as before, we are left with the following two alternative,
fixed representations, given the respective descriptions, above, of the entities:
1: "Some men want a t-shirt." 3(m:set(Man)).3(t:T-shirt).[Want m, t]
"The men buy a t-shirt each." V(x€ei).3(t:T-shirt).[Buy x, t]
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2: "Some men want a t-shirt." 3(m:set(Man)).3(t:T-shirt).V(x(:m).[Want x, m]
"The men buy a t-shirt each." V(x£ei).3(t£T-shirt).[Buy x, t]
4.2.4. Summary
In this section I have summarised the parts of Bonnie Webber's work which are relevant
to the work presented here. I suggest that her basic claims are correct and important and
therefore worthy of further investigation. However, there are some important issues
which Webber does not discuss, the relevant ones here being reference to subsets of
existing sets or particular individuals, and the status of the entities in the representation
language. The former is simply not covered in Webber's examples; the latter is is
undefined - in particular, it is arbitrary whether entities are individuals, sets, sets of sets,
or whatever. This is a problem, for example, if we wish to refer to two existing sets with
the same quantified referring expression: even if Webber defined the set union operation,
which we would need (and she does not), extra type checking would always be necessary to
determine the correctness of the types of the entities being combined.
In this document, I suggest that a dual-level representation is indeed needed, but that the
levels need to be even more explicitly separated than in Webber's proposal, if we want an
elegant and well-motivated adaptable representation of language; further, I suggest that
the information contained in the separation may not in general be discarded until it is
known that no further input is forthcoming, even though an intermediate unseparated {eg
FOPC) translation may be produced. I will propose such a separated representation,
covering the problems outlined above, and define an associated semantics in Chapter 4; in
Chapter 5, I will specify a mechanical process for translating a subset of English into this
representation; and in Chapter 7, I will define a process of reasoning about reference to
subsets of sets.
4.3. Mellish: "Copingwith Uncertainty: Noun Phrase
Interpretation and Early Semantic Analysis"
4.3.1. Introduction
Chris Mellish's PhD thesis made a major contribution to computational linguistics in its
suggestions that noun phrase reference is a process of satisfaction of constraints
introduced by the global discourse, not just by the local noun phrase, and that reference
analysis may be performed early and incrementally. I will discuss the advantages of early
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and incremental evaluation in Section 4.5; in this section, I will outline Mellish's work,
assuming the justification of his early/incremental approach - the successful operation of
his system is rather dependent on its incremental nature.
Mellish's program formed a part of a much larger framework, the MECHO system (see
[Bundy et al, 1979]). The system was designed to take as input standard A-level
mechanics questions, parse and translate them, solve the problems, and output solutions.
The project was successful, and benefitted from the existence of a clearly defined and
fairly tightly constrained domain of data, in which many words and phrases were used in
particular constrained ways.
Within MECHO, Mellish's new approach to noun phrase reference
"involves three key ideas:
1. The representation and use of levels of meaning between the description
provided by a noun phrase and the set of entities in a world model which the
phrase is talking about. This includes the representation of partially
evaluated references and various kinds of'typical elements'.
2. The viewing of definite reference evaluation as a global problem of satisfying
consistency constraints and presuppositions, rather than a local problem of
finding an object satisfying a description. This introduces the possibility of
using existing algorithms for constraint satisfaction, such as that used by
Waltz [Waltz, 1972],
3. The idea of expressing the determination of quantifier scope and set
cardinality by operations on dependency information, which represents the
structure of sets represented by typical elements." [Mellish, 1985, pl2]
Thus Mellish's work is aimed in very much the same direction as that ofWebber (which
was done at almost the same time), and starts from some of the same ideas: the need for a
multi-level representation, and the need to encode quantification structure in the
representation. Mellish does not, however, insist on the maintenance of linguistic
structure found in Webber's work; in MECHO, all constraints on noun phrase reference
are treated uniformly, by the same constraint satisfaction algorithm.
4.3.2. Candidate Sets and Constraint Satisfaction
One notion fundamental to Mellish's view of noun phrase analysis is that of the candidate
set, first introduced by [Charniak, 1972], Each referring expression is represented in the
system by an entity (indefinite, reference, or set entities are available, depending on the
referring expression). With each reference entity is associated a set of entities which are
already known (or assumed) to exist in the discourse world, to which the referring
expression (or as much of it as has been parsed, in Mellish's incremental framework) may
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refer. These entities are candidates for reference by the referring expression; the set is the
candidate set of the reference entity. In Mellish's system, the candidates exhibit some non-
strict superset1 of the properties required by their referring expression. As the process of
analysing a particular reference in the larger sentential context proceeds, the candidate
set associated with it becomes more constrained; so its size decreases, until, eventually,
there is some number of elements (often exactly one) which is appropriate to the form of
the reference {eg definite, plural, etc) - otherwise the process has failed, implying that the
reference is ambiguous, or that it has no referent.
The notion of the candidate set is sufficiently general to be of use in almost any context of
early and/or incremental reference analysis. It is the idea of the sets being repeatedly
more constrained by the information contained in the noun phrases and subsequent text
which allows Mellish (and Haddock) to treat noun phrase reference analysis as a
constraint network problem, and to attempt to solve the sets of constraints by well-
understood network consistency techniques (see [Waltz, 1972]). Haddock's writing
focusses more on this aspect than Mellish's - it will be more appropriate to discuss it
further in Section 4.4, with the rest of Haddock's work.
4.3.3. Set Entities and Linked Dependencies
Mellish's treatment of sets is at a less abstract, more practical level than Webber's. He
extends his existing notion of indefinite entities representing individuals to set entities
which represent sets. Unfortunately, at this stage, he is forced to introduce a theoretical
impurity into the system, because there is no translation of the discourse as such, but only
a representation of the discourse world described. As both Webber and Mellish point out,
there are broadly two different ways of referring to sets in English: either as composite
individual entities (predications of which may be either distributive or collective) or
explicitly as sets of individuals - the difference between, for example, "The men" and
"Each man". Mellish uses two different kinds of set entity to represent these two kinds of
reference, because the two forms require different kinds of subsequent reference, and so
much be distinguishable in a reference analysis system. Thus, one might infer that the
surface form of the discourse is to some extent made manifest in the world model described
by the discourse, which seems philosphically undesirable2.
1: This relationship is significant; I will discuss it further in Section 4.4.2.
2: Although Mellish explicitly views the entities as somewhere between the language and the
discourse world, he does not tell us at exactly what level they really do appear.
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Mellish's constrained domain led to a considerable simplification of set reference. All of
MECHO's sets were small, of definite size, and therefore explicitly enumerable - though
in fact the chosen representation is much more general than mere enumeration. Mellish's
main point in designing the set reference mechanism is that one often needs to treat sets
as though they were defined as the cross product of other sets, and/or to generate set
definitions from cross products. For example, in 12, there are six pulleys, not three.
"Two blocks, each containing three pulleys, are placed on a smooth table." 12
In fact, Mellish views sets as n-dimensional matrices, labelling each element by its
position in the matrix. This decomposition into dimensions is denoted by the device of
subscripting, where a reference is annotated with a value (which may be an
uninstantiated variable) for each dimension to yield a reference to some subset. Thus,
individuals can be picked out by supplying a numerical label for each dimension; and
subsets containing all the elements along one or more particular dimension(s) can be
selected simply by leaving the particular label associated with the relevant dimension(s)
uninstantiated. Mellish uses a neat positional encoding in the representation of these
dependencies to associate each label directly with the correct dimension. In order to
constrain the domain still further, he makes a simplifying assumption concerning set
relationships such as that expressed in 13; he assumes them to be one-to-one
correspondences, which he represents by unifying the subscripts of the related set entities,
to create linked dependencies.
"The particles are attached to the strings." 13
This was certainly a reasonable decision in context, but in the more general case leaves a
multiplicity of readings unexplained. The automatic generation of representations of
these readings is one goal of the work presented here.
Finally, it is not clear how (if) Mellish deals with problems like those presented in
Chapter 1, where the cardinality of a set is unknown - indeed, for purposes of
decomposition, through the subscripting described above, he requires that it be known.
4.3.4. Summary
In this section, I have introduced those parts of Mellish's work which are relevant to the
theory presented in this document. In particular, I have suggested that, like Webber,
Mellish exhibits a certain disregard for purity of representation, and I have pointed out an
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area deliberately excluded by Mellish which deserves further investigation - that of
reference to subsets of underspecified sets. In Chapter 4 and 6, I will introduce a fully
separated representation for natural language utterances; in Chapter 6, I will specify a
reference analysis system which allows external constraints arising from other (maybe
subsequent) noun phrases to affect each local noun phrase reference evaluation, which is
then generalisable to general discourse world inference within the existing program, as in
MECHO. In Chapter 7,1 will specify a reasoning system which aims to subsume Mellish's
useful ideas of subscripting and dependency linking and to generalise them to allow
generation of the readings available from references to underspecified sets and their
subsets.
4.4. Haddock: "Incremental Semantics and
Interactive Syntactic Processing"
4.4.1. Introduction
In [Haddock 1989], Nick Haddock's general aim is to investigate the idea of carrying
incremental parsing and the interaction of syntax and semantics (and reference) rather
further than [Mellish, 1981], in that his system composes the translations of noun phrases
incrementally, from words, rather than composing semantics incrementally from noun
phrases et al, as does Mellish's. Thus, Haddock's evaluation is both early and incremental,
but is often more so than Mellish's.
Primarily, there are two sections to the work; one of these deals in depth with issues of
complexity in network constraint satisfaction, most of which, though interesting, is not
relevant here. The other, which is directly relevant to my work, concerns issues like those
considered by [Winograd, 1972], where definite references are mutually dependent.
Haddock's proposal is that
"a definite NP should refer uniquely by the time it is syntactically closed".
For example, in a situation where there are two hats and two rabbits, and one of the
rabbits is in one of the hats, the noun phrase in 14 is unambiguous, even though the two
noun phrases of which it is composed are ambiguous in isolation.
"The rabbit in the hat" 14
This might be thought to present a problem to an incremental analysis, since the first
embedded NP is ambiguous until the meaning of the word "hat" is incorporated into the
semantics. However, Haddock uses the fact to distinguish between the restrictive and
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non-restrictive readings of the prepositional phrase. In the non-restrictive reading, the
prepositional phrase is viewed as associated with the head noun phrase; in the restrictive,
it is associated with the noun. In this situation, where there are two rabbits, the head
noun phrase in isolation does not have a unique referent - therefore, under Haddock's
proposed rule, the non-restrictive reading is deemed to have failed, and the restrictive
(which passes the test) is presented as the correct analysis.
Mellish's approach to this issue is rather more liberal - no enforcement of such a rule is
attempted. Now, Haddock suggests that his rule encapsulates the force of
[Altmann, 1986]'s Principle of Referential Failure. In fact, this is not so: Altmann's rule
states that when a definite referring expression does not have a unique referrent, an
analysis of subsequent text which has the effect of modifying the referring expression will
be preferred over one that does not. Haddock's rule requires that the immediately
subsequent text be regarded as modifying, which is a much more (too?) strict requirement.
4.4.2. Noun Phrase Reference Analysis as Constraint Satisfaction
Both Haddock and Mellish use the idea of constraint network satisfaction as a means of
expressing and refining the relationship between a referring expression and the members
of its associated candidate set. Haddock's work is partly directed at a deeper
understanding of the issues of complexity involved in this, which I will not discuss here
(though it is worth mentioning that there are operations in my system which constitute
adaptations of Haddock's constraint network system - the exact relationship will be
pointed out in Chapter 6).
Constraint satisfaction, or some equivalent of it, is likely to be fundamental to any
incremental attempt to analyse reference. There is an important point, though, which
neither Mellish nor Haddock explicitly addresses: the issue of what constraints to
represent, and how to use them. [Charniak, 1972] introduces the distinction between
overspecified, underspecified (meaning "noun phrases containing new information" and
"noun phrases with a non-empty, non-singleton candidate set" respectively) and ordinary
noun phrases in the context of definites. Haddock's formalism explicitly excludes these:
his referring noun phrases always contain only given information, and must have
singleton candidate sets by the time they are syntactically closed. Mellish's domain of
data deliberately excludes Charniak's "overspecified" noun phrases, and the
"underspecified" ones, which anyway hardly ever arise, again because of the style of
language covered, are allowed to proceed under the implicit assumption that ambiguity
will be resolved before the end of the input discourse.
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Another distinction raised by Charniak is that of sort comparison by necessity or
possibility. His point is that entities existing in a discourse world are available for
reference by a noun phrase not only if they are known to have the properties required by
the noun phrase, but also if they are net known not to have them. Thus, if we have exactly
one ball in our discourse world, and we parse the phrase "The red ball", it is incorrect to
rule out the existing ball as a candidate because we do not know it is red. Indeed, we might
want to add the new property to our representation of the ball (maybe with an indication
of its special source, to allow revocation later). Charniak calls this style of candidate
selection the "double negation technique"; in terms of candidate sets, it means taking the
set of candidates which do not contradict the properties in the noun phrase, rather than
just those that explicitly exhibit them. Neither Mellish's nor Haddock's theory takes this
view, and so both are unable to deal with the simple "ball" example above. In fact, this is
the closed/open world distinction. Mellish and Haddock both use a closed world
assumption - that is to say, nothing is true unless it is provably so. Charniak's open world
assumption is the converse of this - anything may be true unless it is known to be false.
This distinction will be important later in the discussion ofGeorge.
4.4.3. Summary
In this section, I have summarised those aspects of Haddock's thesis directly pertinent to
the work presented in this document. In Chapter 8, I will raise a problem with his theory
of reference, in the notion of the closure constraint; since he does not cover plurals, the
problem of set reference does not arise.
In Chapter 6, I will propose a theory of reference which subsumes Haddock's (NB while
making his complexity arguments none the less valuable). Interestingly, this
subsumption arises by relaxing Haddock's definition, rather than tightening it, and using
the implication of [Crain & Steedman, 1985]'s Principle of Referential Success, that a
speaker is generally intending to be comprehensible, which seems not unreasonable. This
assumption will lead us, in general, to assume an open world instead of a closed one when
analysing reference.
4.5. Early and Incremental Evaluation ofReference
4.5.1. Introduction
The main issue under consideration in [Mellish, 1981] is that of early, incremental
evaluation ofnoun phrase reference - that is to say, the attempt to analyse the reference of
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noun phrases as or soon after each phrase arrives at the input of a parser, and not at some
later stage, when the entire sentence has been parsed. In this respect, Mellish's work is
seminal - prior attempts to deal with the reference problem had ignored or postponed this
"procedural" aspect of language understanding in favour of more "declarative" views
based on complete sentences (though [Bobrow & Webber, 1980]'s contemporary work on
incremental description refinement used the incremental approach on sense-semantic
refinement; and Winograd's SHRDLU used local information, performing analysis at the
end of each noun phrase).
In Mellish's terms, early evaluation means that attempts are made to analyse reference as
or soon after any disambiguating information is received; incremental evaluation is the
ability repeatedly to incorporate new constraint information into a representation so that
evaluation is in some sense a continuous process. Some form of incremental analysis is a
precondition of early evaluation, since in general it will always be necessary to add
constraints to an existing representation - eg in processing a definite noun phrase
containing an adjective (the initial constraint) and a head noun (the incremental
constraint).
[Haddock, 1989] extends the idea to a finer granularity - Mellish did not insist on
incremental analysis of the words within a noun phrase, but only of noun phrases with
respect to the overall structure of the discourse. Haddock suggests that a word-by-word
incremental analysis can be useful in disambiguating some perennially problematic
ambiguous constructions.
Haddock's usage of the term incremental, then, conflates both of Mellish's terms, since his
evaluation is maximally early (within the bounds of his parsing strategy), and is
incremental word-by-word, at least within noun phrases. Again, Haddock's view of
incremental evaluation is of continual addition to sets of constraints.
Why, then, is there such interest in early and incremental evaluation, and why is the
work presented here placed in that context?
4.5.2. Some Evidence for Early/Incremental Evaluation
The argument for early evaluation arises mostly from psycholinguistic sources, though
there are some practical computational considerations. To start with, the intuition in
many (most?) people that noun phrase evaluation is performed, at least to some extent,
word by word is so strong as to be unquestionable.
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More formally, the various experimental results reported in [Marslen-Wilson, 1975],
[Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980], [Marslen-Wilson, 1987] and [Shillcock, 1982], strongly
suggest an early/incremental aspect to language understanding. [Altmann, 1987]'s
results imply an earliness in human language processing, at a sentential level, on account
of the existence of so-called garden path sentences. Garden pathing is an effect produced
by syntactic ambiguity in a sentence, where one reading is (in some sense) much less
likely than another. If the ambiguity is resolved late on in the parse, and the unlikely
choice is found to be correct, the reader's attempt at parsing is detrimentally affected, and
can sometimes fail altogether. An example of garden pathing is given in sentence 15,
where the effect is due to lexical ambiguity in the word "raced", between active verb (the
favoured reading) and passive participle. This reduced ability to find alternative solutions
points to some commitment by the human sentence processing mechanism to a particular
reading before the disambiguating word(s) is(are) read; thus, analysis proceeds early and
incrementally (but not adaptably), and the desire to find the first possible analysis leads to
the parsing failure.
"The horse raced past the barn fell." 15
Another issue related to early evaluation is raised in [Ritchie, 1976], Like Mellish, Ritchie
suggests that global factors, external to any individual definite noun phrase, affect
reference evaluation and that analysis must proceed beyond the end of the phrase. One of
his examples is reproduced in 16.
"The President of the United States signed the test-ban treaty in 1962." 16
Ritchie's point is that we cannot ascertain the individual referred to by the subject noun
phrase until we have parsed the entire sentence, and know the date associated with the
context; thus, a global constraint is being applied. In similar vein, [Mellish, 1985, p5]
suggests that
"The notion of a referent is something shaped by the context of a noun phrase's
use, rather than a simple function of the noun phrase itself.".
Ritchie's example, in 16, might be taken as a piece of evidence for that claim.
[Haddock, 1989], though, contradicts this view, on the grounds that the presidential
reference in 16 is in some sense intensional, and does not refer to a particular individual,
but to a prototype - whoever fills the US presidential function at the appropriate time. It
is harder to argue this position, though, if the noun phrase were, say, "John's newest
child", where the reference is much less obviously prototypical. Haddock makes this point
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to help justify his main theory (see Section 4.4). I will argue in Chapter 8, however, that
even if Haddock's dismissive response to Ritchie's example (and to a similar one raised by
Mellish) is correct, the conclusion based on it is drawn from incomplete data, and is
seriously flawed.
One practical advantage of early reference processing is that it can actively aid
disambiguation, in cases, for example, where an entity in the discourse is a candidate for
reference by a pronoun in the sentence which introduced it. Consider examples 17a and b.
In case a, "he" must refer to the entity introduced by "A man", or to an entity already
introduced by prior discourse. In case b, "He" can never refer to the man entity introduced
in the subordinate clause, but must always refer to some existing entity. There is an open
question as to the conditions under which such an initial pronoun may be introductory - a
reasonable first approximation might be that it is only introductory if there are no entities
to which it might refer (eg if this is the first sentence of a new discourse in a new context,
or if all the known entities are female). The point is that, with one well-defined exception,
which I explain below, an introductory phrase must precede a pronoun which refers to it -
which indeed seems obvious from the terminology. However, unless our analysis is in
some way word-by-word (and in this I include, for example, time-stamping the words as
they are received, and then processing noun phrases in that order at the end of the
sentence), the man introduced by the translation of 17b will need to be ruled out as a
candidate for reference of the pronoun by an explicit rule, which seems unnecessary.
The exception to this referential rule is where the pronoun occurs in a prefixed
subordinate clause. [Haddock, 1989, pp 2-3] merely dismisses this as sufficiently rare to be
dealt with effectively as a special case. I suggest that a better view is to ensure that one's
representation makes the distinction between this and other cases clear, by including
subordinate structure in it, as does Webber's; then, detecting a special case is more clearly
a viable proposition. The representation I will propose here does exhibit this distinction.
However, for the purposes of this document, I shall follow Haddock's line, and discuss this
aspect of the issue no further detail.
4.5.3. More Directly Relevant Advantages
These, then, are some justifications for investigating further the viability of incremental
parsing in general, and early noun phrase reference analysis in particular. There are,
A man feeds a mare which he owns." 17a
"He feeds a mare which a man owns." 17b
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however, two properties of a reference analysis system whose parsing and evaluation are
strictly incremental, and so maximally early, which are ideal for my purposes here.
The first is that the efficiency of an such implementation can easily be greatly enhanced
by sensible use of parallelism: in particular, repeated evaluation of intermediate results
can be reduced dramatically, if not removed altogether. This is certainly possible in non-
incremental and/or backtracking systems, but it is much harder. Since one of the
arguments against incremental semantic analysis is the overhead involved in cases where
re-evaluation is necessary (eg in a backtracking parser), this is a significant point. In
Chapter 5, I will present the first steps towards a parser which will take maximum
advantage of this parallelism, through use of an ambiguous adaptable representation
The second property, more important here, is that a strictly incremental system provides
the most extremely (within the bounds of reason) stringent framework possible for the
development of a theory of adaptable representation of discourse reference, as was
introduced in Chapter 1.
Finally on this issue, [Crain & Steedman, 1985] suggest that some kind of preference
analysis between readings is required, and that the corollary of this is the requirement for
a parser which produces possible readings word by word, in parallel.
5. Summary
In this section, I have discussed the relevant work of those researchers whose theories
form the foundation of the work presented here (viz Webber, Mellish, and Steedman et at),
and also a theory developed concurrently in a similar context - that of Haddock.
I have broadly suggested that the ideas of Webber and Mellish are complementary, and
that both may be placed in a context of strictly incremental parsing. I have also suggested
that Haddock's contribution lies mostly in his analysis of parsing and network
complexity, because a fundamental part of his theory of reference (closure constraints on
singular definite noun phrases) is flawed; I will substantiate this in Chapter 8.
In surveying this selection of existing work, I have highlighted several common points of
interest, and suggested that the theories might be improved in some way. In particular, I
have emphasised the issue of representation, and of separation between discourses and
worlds described by them, which, even if it does not lead to a better theory, is necessary for
philosophical purity. I have suggested the need for adaptability in representation, on the
grounds that only when a discourse is known to be finished can one irrevocably
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amalgamate the two levels of the separated representation; in George, amalgamation will
never take place, on grounds of theoretical purity.
I have pointed out (as have others, no doubt) that one must take great care in choosing a
restricted domain of data, when attempting to develop a general theory: Mellish's choice,
for example, leads to one non-general (but true) conclusion, but is justified in context;
Haddock's restriction to single sentences, with noun phrases containing only "given"
information, is not (I will argue in Chapter 8), because it leads to a conclusion which is
actually false.
6. Afterword
This completes my discussion of related work. The next five chapters introduce the George
system and its associated theory of reference. Chapter 3 is a general overview, which
presents some fundamental principles and gives a feel for the operation of the working
system. Chapter 4 introduces the George Representation Language and its semantics.
Chapter 5 presents the George Parser. Chapter 6 explains how the George DeReferencer
analyses noun phrase reference, while Chapter 7 shows how to generate readings of
sentences containing incompletely specified set references. Chapter 8 will discuss the
relationships between the theory embodied in George and the earlier work of the other
researchers presented in the foregoing sections.
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Chapter 3
The George Parsing and
DeReferencing System
Abstract
An overview of the George system is presented, forming an introduction to the subsequent four
chapters. The main facets of the George system are introduced, along with some of the
motivation for the decisions taken and assumptions made in their design.
1. Introduction
The George Parsing and DeReferencing System is an attempt to synthesise some
generally prevalent and some rather more idiosyncratic ideas into a uniform system for
translating a subset of English into a more computer-friendly form. It does so in such a
way as to present a solution to the problem of set reference detailed in Chapter 1.
The particular subset of English which George covers has been deliberately chosen to be
independent of stylistic context. By this, I mean that it is not limited to a particular usage
ofEnglish, as was, for example, MECHO [Bundy et al, 1979] (see Chapter 2).
The especial focus of the work presented here is one particular aspect of noun phrase
reference evaluation. For this reason, the design of all aspects of the George System
relating to other linguistic and computational issues has been based on well-tried existing
approaches. For example, the George Representation Language borrows a number of
useful ideas from First Order Predicate Calculus; the George Parser uses a variant on a
standard grammar formalism.
It is important to understand that it is the combination of the various aspects of the
George System, and not any individual feature in isolation, which enables it to fulfil its
function. This fact must be borne in mind while studying this and the subsequent four
chapters, which cover the three main sections of George in detail.
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2. Fundamental Hypotheses
The George System is based on some fundamental theoretical hypotheses which are in
themselves worthy ofmore thorough linguistic and/or philosophical research. George does
not attempt to justify these hypotheses in abstract, but it does show that they can be
useful in performing the task for which George was designed. The hypotheses are not the
central focus of the work presented here, but are sufficiently important to merit
theoretical explanation before George is discussed in detail.
2.1. Referring Expressions and Existentials
One such hypothesis concerns the differing status of existentials in natural language and
in logic: which can be encapsulated in the question of whether one can refer to an entity
which does not exist in the "real world", and how one is to represent such a reference if it
can legitimately be made. It is sometimes claimed that the means by which we refer to
unicorns is in some essential sense different from the way we refer to, say, horses, simply
because horses actually exist in our environment and unicorns do not.
I claim that it is permissible, and, in fact, useful, to suppose that any entities may be
referred to in a discourse in a uniform way, irrespective of whether they exist in the real
world or not, as long as all participants in that discourse - that is, both speaker(s) and
hearer(s) - already have, or are provided with, some personal definition of what that
entity is. Further, this is so even if these personal definitions are not consistent between
the participants. For example, as long as all participants are aware that unicorns have
horns, they can talk about someone being run through by one, and neither the real
existence or otherwise of unicorns nor non-relevant differences in their definition makes
any difference at all to the information content of the discourse in abstract. We run into
trouble only when (if) we try to map the entities in such a discourse explicitly into the real
world (and even then, only if we require proof by direct evidence) as it is perceived (at or
prior to discourse time) by the participants, or into a discourse world in which the entities
in questions are denied existence. This is so because this issue of the existential status of
discourse participants does not present a problem until it makes, for example, a claim
disprovable or an imperative impossible to perform with respect to the discourse world, or
with respect to the real world which the dicsourse world claims to model.
To take this argument one stage further: it is perfectly possible for a number of people to
carry on a discourse referring (with identical referring expressions) to objects which are
different for each of them - consider, for example, a story about John, when the speaker
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means John Smith, and the hearer is thinking of John Brown. There is nothing wrong
with the formation of the discourse per se: it is the speaker's attempt to convey certain
information which has failed.
Similarly and finally, it does not make any difference, nor, arguably, does it matter in a
more general sense, if the speaker, and not the hearer, believes that unicorns have trunks,
tusks, large ears, and no horns. This is so, again, only as long as the speaker does not
explicitly refer to these properties and thus contradict the information the hearer is using
to analyse the referring expressions. Nor may the speaker attempt to extend the reference
into the real world, because the hearer will then be presented with a corresponding
inconsistency from a different (perhaps visual) source, and the discourse will again be
shown to have failed.
From this argument, it would seem clear that a discourse, however represented, has a
status in some sense abstracted from the world with respect to which it is to be interpreted
(which, of course, may or may not coincide with the real world). If this is so, we must
suppose the existence of a mapping between whatever represents the entities taking part
in the discourse and their correspondents in this discourse world. Informally, we might
say that this is the mapping between what a speaker or hearer understands by a referring
expression and referent to which it "really" refers in the discourse world. It follows that
this mapping must be dependent upon (and, sometimes, known only to) the agent creating
and using it, so that a number of people may discuss different entities while appearing to
discuss the same one, as in the "two Johns" example above. The mapping must also allow
the existence of "discourse world entities" which do not correspond with any "real world
entity", as for the unicorn, above. Similarly, to allow for the potential difference in
interpretation of referring expressions themselves by different speakers and hearers even
when given identical discourse worlds, we must acknowledge a similar mapping between
referring expressions and the "understood" entities in the discourse world with which
they are associated by the discourse participants.
George's reference analysis system is built on this assumption. It supposes a three-layer
representation of a discourse, which is then related by a further layer to the real world.
The layers (ordered by increasing separation from the linguistic material itself) are: the
translation at the linguistic level, including, for example, the sort and definiteness
information in a noun phrase; the hearer's discourse world level, representing the entities
themselves as understood by him/her to be defined by the discourse; the discourse world;
and the real world level. There is a fully defined mapping between the first two (by
definition - referring expressions give rise to the understood entities) and possibly partial
mappings between the others.
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When we are considering the analysis of noun phrases in a discourse, we can discuss these
three mappings separately, or, indeed, bypass two of them altogether. This is the course I
shall take with this discussion ofGeorge: the mappings from understood world entities to
discourse world entities, and thence to real world entities will not be considered, because,
as suggested above, it does not affect the behaviour of the analysis of the discourse at the
level in which I am interested here.
I will explain in Chapter 8 that split level representation and the necessarily associated
inter-level mapping are also necessary for adaptability. The levels of representation
proposed here are summarised and placed alongside their George analogues in Figure 2c.
2.2. The Representation ofDiscourse Surface Form
It will become clear later that the hypothesis in 2.1 has a bearing on several aspects of the
design of George's style of representation. In particular, not surprisingly, it affects the
way I represent referring expressions and their referents.
To support the mapping outlined above as part of our reference mechanism, we must at all
times hold the information from referring expressions in a form in which it is identifiable
as such as well as separate deduced or a priori knowledge about referents. This is also a
requirement ofadaptability - we must know where information has come from if we are to
manipulate it in full generality. One way of viewing this constraint is to say that we will
represent referring expressions at a level rather closer to its surface form than that of the
discourse world or that of the conventional view of semantics. In particular, the obvious
thing to do is to represent the referring expressions. This is preferable to the only
alternative course of calculating some information of intermediate status, which entails
unnecessary extra work (both for the system and its implementer), and which would make
the theory more complicated than necessary.
Having taken this first step towards a representation of referring expressions which is
closer to the surface form utterance than the "deeper" representations, closer to
semantics, to which we have become accustomed in much of the literature, we will begin
to see that there are often advantages in applying the same approach to other aspects of
discourse. For example, [Webber, 1979] has shown that it is often useful and sometimes
vital to maintain some representation of the surface structure of relative clauses when
attempting to deal with noun phrase reference.
I must emphasise that, while it might well be useful to specify mappings between "surface
form" expressions and corresponding representations nearer the discourse world level, it
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is nevertheless not the case that this surface form may be converted into a pure semantic
representation (as opposed to one containing surface form information) before the absolute
end of the discourse. This is because it is not possible to say that reference has been
evaluated correctly until no more information is forthcoming (or even then, in some
cases!). Therefore, until this point, the representation must be adaptable in some sense;
therefore, we need all the information we can get in order to recalculate correctly the
references which may need to be adapted.
It will become clear in this and the succeeding chapters that this "surface form"
hypothesis affects the design of George in a number of ways. The most obvious effects
appear in the design of the representation language; this, in turn, though, has
implications throughout the rest of the system, both in terms of theory and
implementation.
2.3. The Representation ofAmbiguous Sentences
The last of my three hypotheses follows in part from those introduced above. It concerns
both computational efficiency and ideological cleanliness. It also gives George the
property ofadaptability in a strong sense.
The assumption is that, wherever possible, it is better to represent ambiguity by means of
a single genuinely ambiguous representation than by more than one unambiguous one.
The reasoning behind, and the implications of, this depend on the particular kind of
ambiguity in question.
First, if ambiguity resides in the question ofwhich of a number of entities is the referent of
a particular referring expression, then it is pointless to maintain two full translations of
the discourse to represent it, in view of the foregoing comments about surface forms and
referring expression/referent mappings. Instead, the ambiguity could easily be
represented by allowing the reference mapping to be one-to-many instead of one-to-one.
This is the candidate set approach of [Charniak, 1972] and [Mellish, 1981], Conveniently,
this also allows us, if a supposed referent suddenly proves to be unsuitable to a referring
expression, simply to remove it from the mapping. If all the potential referents for a
referring expression disappear in this way, we can simply insert a new one, on the
assumption that the reference is therefore introductory.
Less obviously, if ambiguity resides in the syntactic category of a word, in the vast
majority of which cases it will be resolved one or two words later, it is pointless to create
new versions of the translations of the discourse only to throw them away again almost
immediately. For example, consider the various usages of the word "is" - as an auxiliary
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verb, as an auxiliary to an auxiliary verb {etc), as a copula, or as an equative. This could
give rise to a number of possible translations for any one sentence, the exact behaviour
depending, of course, on the parsing strategy being used. It is therefore much more
elegant to use an intermediate representation which can subsequently interact with the
translations of succeeding words to choose the correct meaning without all the potential
computational effort of creating new translations; in this way, we can gain at a
computational level, in being able to parse our input more efficiently. This, again, is an
example of a practical advantage of adaptability.
3. A General Overview of the George System
3.1. Introduction
Having discussed these fundamental ideas, it it now appropriate to introduce the George
Parsing and DeReferencing System, which is the embodiment of the theoretical approach
under discussion here. The system described is a direct implementation (or, sometimes,
simulation, because of practical limitations) of the theory presented in this and the
succeeding chapters.
At the highest level (ie from the point of view of the user) the George System behaves as a
"black box", taking typed input in a small subset of English, and delivering output which I
claim is a representation of the surface form (and maybe some inferred information) and
reference of that input in a form more easily manipulable by a computer.
The input coverage of the current implementation is small, because neither the
grammatical nor the lexical variation available to the system need be very great to
recreate the particular problems of reference with which we are attempting to deal here.
Therefore, it is useful to limit the size of the lexicon, because this increases the running
speed of the system, making it more efficient for experiment. Limiting the grammatical
coverage available (within reason), helps ensure that issues do not become clouded,
because they can be considered, as it were, in isolation.
The output of the George System is expressed in the George Representation Language, a
logic-like representation based loosely on the conventional Predicate Calculus. This
representation expresses translations of the input linguistic utterences in a form very
much closer to their original surface form than many representations used in comparable
work, which usually claim to represent a "deeper" form - the semantics of the discourse.
The theoretical reasons for this have already been introduced.
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In the event that a discourse input to George is unresolvably ambiguous and the
ambiguity cannot be represented by a single adaptable expression, more than one
translation is produced (in parallel) at the output.
Importantly, the George Representation Language may be translated into the more
conventional formalism of First Order Predicate Calculus. Not only does this make the
translations George produces less inscrutable to the user, but it also supplies a semantics
for the Representation Language per se. It is important to understand that this
translation involves loss of some surface form information.
3.2. Some Terms
It is now appropriate to introduce some of the terms which I will to use to discuss reference
throughout the rest of this document. It is regrettable that some of the George
terminology is at odds, sometimes in confusing ways, with more common linguistic usage.
This is because there are no other suitable words for the concepts we need to express here.
Appendix A is a Glossary of these and other terms.
Reference
The level of representation of referring expressions nearest the input utterance is the
reference. In George, the reference representing any particular noun phrase is a
translation of the information contained in that noun phrase and sometimes some
information inferred from it by the system. It does not represent the entity to which
reference is being made - ie it is not the same as the reference of a noun phrase in the
common linguistic sense, in that it does not represent a particular entity or set of
entities. It is in fact, like anything represented in the George Representation
Language, a (partial) representation of the utterance, closely related with its surface
form- which, as [Webber, 1979J shows, is useful in the analysis of noun phrase
reference. Thus, it is only indirectly associated with the set of entities to which
reference is being made. It may be helpful to view the information carried by a George
reference as a set of constraints which is (by definition) a subset of the total set of
constraints defining the item in the discourse to which reference is being made.
Entity Token
The next level of representation of referring expressions, in the mind, as it were, of the
hearer, and one step away from the surface form of the discourse, is that of the entity
token. The entity token is the point at which the (constraint) information gleaned from
the various references within a discourse to a particular entity collects. As such it may
be viewed as something like the sense of the entity or entities to which reference is
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being made. We may treat these entity tokens as specifying a set of entities which are
candidates for reference by the references associated with them by binding (qv below).
The entity tokens involved in a discourse are stored by the George system in the
database labelled "Entity Tokens" in figure 2a. They are thus conceptually separate
from the discourse, which position was defended in Section 2. The connection between
references and entity tokens is made by the bindings shown in figure 2a. These are
inferred by the DeReferencer, and are best viewed simply as a mapping between the
set of references in the current discourse and the set ofcorresponding entity tokens.
Discourse Entity
The final level of representation of discourse is that of the discourse world, which
contains discourse entities. This is the level at which we represent the actual things in
the discourse world. It will not be necessary to discuss discourse entities in more detail
here, since references, bindings and entity tokens will be enough for our purposes.
Binding
The three levels of representation introduced above are no use in isolation. In order
that we may express the relationships between them, I will introduce ths ideas of
binding and specification. The latter is not important here, because it forms the
linkage between entity tokens and (sets of) discourse entities, which we are not
discussing, and is included only for completness. Bindings, however, are relevant. A
binding is a relation between a reference and a set of entity tokens. It represents, in
informal terms, the relationship between a referring expression and a token
specifying its referent. Specification represents the relation between that token and
the referent itself.
Bounding Constraint
A Bounding Constraint is an arithmetic equation between the upper bounds of set
sizes. The Bounding Constraints are stored alongside the bindings; they are
fundamental to the adaptability of the system.
3.3. The basic George System
Within this high-level unit, there is a number (greater than zero, but always small) of
basic George systems, each of which receives its own copy of the English input as analysis
proceeds. Each system notionally contains its own complete representation of the
discourse so far, its own Parser, and its own DeReferencer.
Each one of the basic systems represents one or more possible translation(s) of a sentence.
In general, spawning of new basic systems occurs when the addition of a new word to the
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current sentence yields two or more (partial) translations with syntactic categories so
different as to be unrepresentable by single ambiguous adaptable representations. For
example, the combination of the translation of a verb may be either in- or mono-transitive
with that of a subject noun phrase, as in "A man eats..." - conventionally, this yields
(partial) translations with category s and s/np respectively, which are not, in George,
representable by a single ambiguous adaptable translation (though there is no reason in
principle why they should not be so).
This basic George system, then, consists, theoretically, of two computational processes
(Parser and DeReferencer) operating in parallel over a shared data set (Discourse
Memory, Entity List, and Bindings) and communicating data between themselves and
that data set. The concept of success and failure familiar to Prolog programmers also
applies: it is necessary for both the Parser and the DeReferencer to succeed (according to
criteria specified later) for a particular translation to be proposed as correct.
Now, in anything other than a trivially simple discourse, this replication in parallel of the
translations of a sentence which cannot be bundled with one or more others might appear
to present a potential danger - of a combinatorial explosion of structures and processes.
However, because of George's fundamental assumption that ambiguity appearing in the
input data should be adaptably maintained as far as possible into the discourse, there is
little danger of a damagingly large amount of non-determinism arising. This assumption
effectively defers the explosion problem until either we are queried in a way which insists
on the resolution of ambiguity (in which case, if we do not have an unambiguous
translation, we are entitled to ask for more information) or the ambiguity disappears as a
result of further input.
The structure of the basic George system is represented in figure 2a (2b is a key to the
symbols used). A snapshot of the whole system translating an ambiguous discourse could
be represented as a number of such diagrams, stacked up, as it were, all connected to the
same data input. Figure 2c shows the relation between the levels of representation
proposed in Section 2 and the components of George.
The top left and right boxes in figure 2a represent the George Parser and DeReferencer,
respectively. As may be seen from the diagram, the Parser receives data input from
outside the system, and sends output to the discourse memory and to the DeReferencer.
The data flow from the Parser to the Discourse Memory is in the form of sentences in the
George Representation Language (GRL). That from the Parser to the DeReferencer is in
the form of sets of fragments of GRL, extracted from the full GRL sentences by the Parser.
These represent the surface form of referring expressions; they are effectively ordered by
time of arrival at the input, by virtue of the parallelism between the Parser and the
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DeReferencer. Each time it receives a new fragment, the DeReferencer checks whether
the referring expression is new or an updated version of an existing one. If the latter, the
old representation is replaced with the new. The DeReferencer places new tokens
representing total knowledge about the referents in the discourse in the Entity Tokens
database, or updates information about those already there. It also places ordered pairs of
representations of referring expressions and sets of representations of referents in the
Bindings database.
The Discourse Memory database contains the surface form translations, expressed in the
George Representation Language, of each sentence in the discourse so far, in order.
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Figure 2c: Levels ofDiscourse Representation and their George analogues
(Recall that there is a separate Discourse Memory in each of the basic systems
representing a reading of the discourse, where those readings cannot be expressed by
ambiguous notation.) It combines with the information contained in the Bindings and
Entity Tokens databases to yield a translation of the sense of the discourse. Note that
sentences (or rather, syntactic entities which are deemed to be self-contained, such as
noun phrases) only appear in the Discourse Memory when they have been successfully
parsed in entirety. In Chapters 4, 6 and 7, I will show how sentences in the Discourse
Memory may be manipulated to allow reasoning about quantified sets.
The translation, then, ofGeorge's input is contained in these three databases. It is possible
to convert this tri-partite representation at any time to a more conventional form (FOPC -
see Chapter 4); but it is really only useful to do so when the discourse can be said to have
reached a "steady state". This is because of the issue of uncertainty mentioned before - we
cannot throw away any discourse information until we know we have a correct analysis,
and we cannot know that until the discourse is finished.
It may seem a little strange at first sight that the Parser takes no data input from the rest
of the system, since this might be expected to preclude failure of a translation on the basis
of spurious or incomplete reference. In fact this is not the case, because of the requirement
that both the Parser and the DeReferencer must succeed in a particular translation for
their output to pass into the data structures over which they work.
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The DeReferencer takes its input from the Parser and compares it with knowledge already
recorded in the lists of bindings and entity tokens (defined in full in Chapter 4). On the
basis of the result of this comparison, it decides whether the input is referentially
coherent, and makes additions to George's data structures representing the translation.
The DeReferencer knows nothing at all of the semantics of the sentences parsed by the
system, other than the information contained in the noun phrases (including relative and
prepositional post-modifiers - the only predicates passed to the DeReferencer appear in
these) and a very limited idea of the surface structure (viz subordinate structure). All it
can do with this information is a simple pattern match to ascertain the reference of context
extended references (also defined in Chapter 4) which arise from post-modified noun
phrases.
The DeReferencer has extensive knowledge of sorts (qv, Chapters 4 and 6), which
represent collections of properties which entities in the discourse world may be said to
exhibit (eg ball, red). It is able to make simple inferences about them and the relations
between them. There are 'slots' in the existing implementation to allow the insertion of
procedures to deal with (for example) inference from the preceding discourse (to allow this
kind of 'practical' reasoning: "X has been put on a table" => "X is on the table"). As I
explained before, this is not quite theoretically pure, because the representation language
represents something like the surface form of the discourse, and not its semantics; strictly,
this kind of inference should be made over some translation of the surface form into some
suitable reasoning system. Anyway, this kind of reasoning is outside the scope ofGeorge's
theory of reference, and therefore outside the scope of the work presented here.
The DeReferencer links any references found in the input discourse with a set of proposed
possible referents (ie entity tokens), and in the event that the system fails to find a
referent for a given reference, it creates one which is suitable (the criteria determining
this suitability will be discussed in Chapter 6). This means that the dereferencing process
is more likely to be unsuccessful because there are too many rather than too few possible
referents for a reference.
Finally, there are a number of very simple rules which the DeReferencer applies to
narrow down its candidate sets of entity tokens on a purely mechanical basis. For
example, different referring expressions appearing within the same clause cannot be
associated with the same referent; this can be expressed in simple syntactic terms in GRL.
On these bases, then, the DeReferencer makes judgements about what referring
expressions may refer to what objects in the discourse world. Referential ambiguity is
maintained, in accordance with George's fundamental hypothesis about maintainance of
ambiguity in general - George at all times supposes that the 'speaker' (the user) is trying
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to make sense to the 'hearer' (George) and that, in the event that a sentence is lexically or
referentially ambiguous, the speaker realises as much and will attempt to resolve the
ambiguity subsequently.
3.4. Representing Ambiguity
As was stated before, George deals with what is conventionally called lexical ambiguity in
two different ways, and with referential ambiguity in a third.
Lexical ambiguity (by which I mean the existence in the lexicon of more than one
translation of a word) is dealt with by the creation of new George processes - one for each
possible interpretation - when it is impossible (or for some reason undesirable) to use a
single ambiguous representation.
However, the George Parser also allows some of what might conventionally be viewed as
lexical ambiguity to be maintained into the translation of the discourse. This is achieved
by means of including deliberately ambiguous representations in the lexicon, coupled
with a set of transformations applicable to syntax and semantics of translations of initial
substrings of sentences. The transformations are guided by the syntax and sometimes the
semantics of the partial sentence being transformed. They may be viewed as coercions -
not unlike those defined in the Algol68 programming language; more on this in Chapter 5.
The coercions allow ambiguous representations to be rewritten more specifically when (if)
it becomes possible to do so.
Within any given translation, referential ambiguity (by which I mean ambiguity arising
from inability of the hearer of a discourse to find a mapping for the referring expressions
in it, in such a way that no referring expression is mapped to a wrong number of referents)
is dealt with by allowing the existence of bindings between references and referents (using
the terms informally) in any given translation which are one-to-many, as well as the more
predictable many-to-one. This is equivalent to Charniak's and Mellish's candidate sets. It
is not meaningful for a reference in one basic George system to be bound to a referent in
another.
4. Summary
In this chapter, I have outlined three basic hypotheses relevant to the George system, and
given a briefoverview of the George system. The main points covered were as follows.
1. It is unnecessary, at least at a practical level, to represent "real" existence of entities
in a discourse, as long as the participants are able not to disagree upon the properties
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of those entities. This means that it is never necessary to refer to the real world; a
model will always do.
2. There should be a separation between representation of discourse, discourse world and
real world.
3. An interesting possibility, which may become a necessity in set reference analysis, is
to make computational language systems able to reason about ambiguous
representations. In general, this leads to a requirement of adaptability.
4. The George system is a strictly incremental parser and reference analyser, which
attempts to represent ambiguity implicitly where possible, and deals with different
readings in parallel otherwise.
5. Each basic George system theoretically consists of the following sections: Parser,
DeReferencer, Discourse Memory, Entity List and Bindings. The last three constitute
the representation of the discourse so far, which may be translated into First Order
Predicate Calculus by a straightforward syntactic algorithm. In each basic George
system, both Parser and DeReferencer must succeed, otherwise the process dies.
6. The George Representation Language (GRL) is used to represent the surface form of
the input discourse adaptably.
7. Parsing is performed word by word; a self-contained (partial) representation of the
input is always produced.
8. Mechanisms exist for the representation of sets, their subsets, and the relations of
membership and cardinality between the two. Adaptability is fundamental to these.
5. Afterword
It is now necessary to flesh out the introduction which has been given in this chapter. The
next four chapters contain details and formal specification of the three main parts of the
system introduced in this chapter. These parts, and the theory they realise, will be
summarised and related to comparable work in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 4
The George Representation Language
Abstract
The George Representation Language is built on a basis structurally similar to the First Order
Predicate Calculus. Its function within the George System is to provide a means of expression
for the discourse being analysed, in order that the semantics of the discourse may be stored and
related with the information about reference which George computes.
The Language differs from First Order Predicate Calculus in that it has explicit operators for
certain linguistic concepts (such as definiteness); its usage differs from that of First Order
Predicate Calculus in comparable Natural Language Understanding systems in that it is used
to represent something close to the surface structure of the discourse, rather than its
(subsequently calculated) semantics and, in particular, the reference therein.
The George Representation Language is presented, first informally as an introduction with
motivation, then with full formality.
First, the basic concepts involved in the language are laid out in the context of representing
reference. This leads into a series of examples showing how the language can be used to describe
utterances in a form closer to the linguistic surface form than is conventional.
The main part of the chapter deals with the formal definition of the language.
The language's truth-conditional semantics is shown, through a conversion algorithm to FOPC.
(The manipulation of references- in particular of indexed references - and the rules and
operations associated with it, are covered in Chapters 6 and 7 I
1. Introduction
The George Representation Language (GRL), the representation medium used by the
George Parsing and Dereferencing System, is a quasi-logical first-order symbolic
representation. It has been designed to be as much like First Order Predicate Calculus
(FOPC) as possible, diverging only where a specific notation is deemed useful to the
central aim of this research. Therefore, the parts of GRL outside FOPC are associated with
expressing the form of referring expressions in English language.
This chapter presents first an informal introduction to the syntax of GRL and the
intuitions behind it. This concludes with some examples of English sentences and their
translations. The rest of the chapter gives the formal definition of the language, including
a translation procedure for converting a complete George translation into an FOPC
semantic representation.
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2. Representing Surface Form
It is important to understand that GRL's function in George differs quite markedly from
that of FOPC (or other logics) in many systems concerned with the same problems, in that
it does not claim to represent the pure semantics of the input discourse, but something
much closer to its surface structure (deliberately implicitly including some forms of
ambiguity). For example, GRL permits explicit representations for different voices of
verb, which might more conventionally be covered by inversion of arguments; and it
includes explicit operators for such concepts as definiteness.
The reasoning behind this approach is fundamental to the philosophy of the George
system; it is derived from the "surface form" hypothesis proposed in Chapter 3. In general,
GRL is capable of representing explicitly all of the syntactic, semantic, and/or pragmatic
features required to do the kinds of operations performed by the George DeReferencer (see
Chapter 6). These features are: definiteness; number; discourse-world sort; and some cases
of subordination.
It is desirable to maintain such an explicit representation of the (near-)surface form of the
discourse, rather than of its calculated (and possibly wrong) semantics, in order that
re-evaluation of the system's decisions on reference may take place if necessary, with the
minimum of recalculation. In other words, we wish never to be forced to discard
information by opting for a particular semantic interpretation of a surface construct,
because if we do so, we sacrifice adaptability. For example, consider this variation on a
pair of sentences used in [Webber, 1979]:
If we were to opt for the reading of 18 where "the great Dane" in 18b refers to the same
individual as that in 18a, and represent it semantically in Webber's style, as shown in 19,
we would be forced either to fail or to backtrack on presentation of a subsequent sentence
like 18c.
"Bonzo, the great Dane, ate the whole VW.
The great Dane is a large dog.




S i: 3(Bonzo: greatDane). ate(VW,Bonzo)
S2:3(Bonzo:greatDane).Large(Bonzo) & Dog(Bonzo)
Bonzo: i(x:greatDane).ate(VW,x) & evoke(Si,x) & evoke(Si,x) 19
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This need not be a serious problem if the third sentence appears soon. But we have no way
of knowing when or if it will do so. Therefore, to be foolproof, we need to be able to
backtrack over the entirety of an arbitrarily large discourse translation procedure - and it
is not hard to imagine a situation where the truth about Bonzo appears as a "punch-line"
to quite a long (shaggy-dog?) story.
Further, as stated in the "ambiguity" hypothesis of Chapter 3, we are working under the
assumption that it is useful deliberately to maintain any ambiguity which appears in a
(partial) sentence without making any decisions about the correct translation. The
practical reasons for this in terms of resolving syntactic ambiguity will become clear in
Chapter 5; and [Mellish, 1981] has shown that it is useful to extend the principle to
referential ambiguity also. For now, though, the relevant point is that a very good way to
do this is simply to represent the ambiguous input directly. The part of GRL devoted to the
annotation of referring expressions has been designed in such a way that all the aspects of
plural and quantified reference may be explicitly and separately denoted, giving us a firm
grip on the different aspects of any reasoning we may need to follow about the referent
sets of referring expressions.
3. Representing Sentence Surface Structure
A surface representation of this kind also gives us a useful handle on the hierarchical
structure of sentences. This is comparable with the idea presented in [Webber, 1979]
where subordinate clauses are built up into compound types, as shown in 20a and
explained more fully in Chapter 8:
"A man I saw": 3( x : A(y:Man)[Saw y, I]).x 20a
"A fat man": 3( x : A(y:Man)[Fat y]).x 20b
However, a single level of abstraction in the representation (as opposed to the extra one
introduced by the A-expression in 20) would be preferable, because of the complexity of
these higher order terms. Further, the same notation does not allow a distinction to be
made between adjectives and adnominals: compare 20a and b. I will discuss this further in
Chapter 8.
Chapter 6 will show that we must have this information regarding sentence structure if
we are to perform some of the more complicated reference analysis operations which
George is designed to cover.
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4.FOPC vs GRL
Except as detailed in the foregoing sections, the basic representational concepts
underlying GRL are closely related to those of FOPC. The remaining important
differences and similarities between the existing version of GRL and FOPC are as follows.
Possible extensions to this limited version of GRL will be discussed in Chapter 9.
GRL does not include the existential quantifier, 3, because existentials are dealt with
outside GRL, by means of the binding mechanism (detailed in Chapters 6 and 7). GRL
does include the universal quantifier, V, but allows it to quantify only over the set of non-
negative integers (or natural numbers), N. The X and <8> {weak and strong index
application) operators allow this quantification to be passed to other elements of
expressions in GRL. This will be explained in Chapters 6 and 7.
GRL includes a number of operators specially for expressing the information found in
noun phrases. The index application operators mentioned above are two of these, used to
indicate the number or quantification of a plural reference. The others are ! (definite),
'
(sort application), and ► (context extension - the addition of the information in a
subordinate clause to the associated reference in its superordinate clause).
A further binary operator, coref, enables us explicitly to state that two references have the
same referent, as in, for example, equatives (eg "The big man is the doctor.").
GRL includes two abstraction operators, the common A (lambda) and # (hash), the latter
being specific to the construction of translations of NPs. Both are defined purely in terms
of textual substitution. It will become clear that these operators are in some sense "second
class" in that they do not have a semantics in the language proper - they only appear in
the output of intermediate steps towards producing expressions with a full semantics, and
cannot appear in the finished form of the translations.
The scoping of the universal quantifier in GRL is rather different from that in FOPC, in
that the scope of a universal is simply the entirety of the expression in which it appears;
quantification is thought of as part of a reference, not part of an expression. It is useful to
perform an operation called quantifier expansion, to bring quantifiers to the front of
expressions. This makes no semantic difference, because of the very loose scoping of the
quantifier, but the result is quite a lot clearer to the human reader, and considerably
easier to manipulate using first-order term unification, which George uses extensively. A
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corresponding operation is applicable to expressions containing the context extension
operator, ►, for the same reasons.
5. Basic Concepts
5.1. Representation of Referring Expressions
In GRL, references to items in the discourse being represented are connected by predicates
which express relations between the items.
Most of the interest of this part of this work lies in the references. The purpose of a George
reference is to represent the information in the surface form of a noun phrase - and
neither the referent of that NP nor its intension. It will be seen that this is particularly
useful when dealing with references which are initially ambiguous. There are various
kinds of reference, the kind of a given reference depending on the various operators which
are applied to it.
One important feature of George references, with respect to adaptability, is that they
contain information regarding the "discourse-world sort" of the entity to which the
reference refers. Suffice it to say for now that these sorts are collections of properties,
represented in GRL by the English word (or one of its synonyms) representing those
properties. Thus, "a red ball" has sorts "red" and "ball". Sorts are arranged in a partial
lattice (see Section 5.5, "The Sort Hierarchy"), which will allow us easily to analyse
reference by synonym and/or partial specification.
The basic representation of referring expressions is the simple reference, like this:
(in general, "refN" where N 6 N). This denotes a indefinite referring expression conveying
no sort information, if such a thing exists.
The simplest useful kind of reference is the simple sorted indefinite reference. This
essentially represents singular (or generic) indefinite noun phrases. For example, the
phrase "A man" translates as:
The "man" part is a sort, and is applied by the " (sort application) operator, like a selection
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The next simplest reference is the simple sorted definite reference. It is similar to the
simple sorted reference, but for the application of the post-fixed definite operator, !. Thus,
"The man" translates as:
Note that, however many sorts we apply to a reference (see below), the definite operator is
always postfixed to the whole - that is, the sort application operator can never apply to a
definite operator. This makes intuitive sense - the analogue in English would be a
determiner appearing in between an adjective and its noun.
The next kinds of reference are those which are indexed. An example of a weak indexed
sorted definite reference is the translation of "The men" shown in 24. The intuition is that
the quantification is represented by "Vindl", the domain of the quantifier being (some
subset of) N; the application of that quantification to the reference is represented by the
application of "indl" to the references by the X (weak index) operator.
Weak indexed indefinite sorted references differ from this only in that they lack the
definite operator, as one might expect.
Strong indexed references are identical except that they contain the strong index
operator,®, instead of the weak one. We will see later that it is possible for a reference to
contain both weak and strong operators - therefore, it is sometimes useful to think of a
reference as being weakly or strongly indexed with respect to a particular index.
Indexed references denote noun phrases which refer to sets; it is the indexing mechanism
and the operations one can apply to it which will provide the answer to the central
question of this research. For the moment, it is enough to say that we will view references
to sets as sets of references, by allowing the index (denoted by the index symbol
immediately to the right of the quantifier) to range up from 0 over N, and requiring that
each reference/index pair under X and <8> denotes a different reference. In some cases (viz.
sets with explicit cardinalities - eg "Two men"), we will apply an upper bound to the index
variable. Indexing is comparable with the subscription found in [Mellish, 1981],
refl'man! 23
Vindl.refl "man! X indl 24
-52- PhD Thesis
The George Representation Language
Lastly, context extended references are like the translation1 of "The man who owns the
donkey":
The intention here is to represent the information found in the subordinate clause as a
complete expression in GRL while maintaining its status as explicitly subordinate. This
means that we are free to use the information in the subordinate clause either to select
subsets of earlier references, or as "new" information. This, along with some simple
assumptions about what can refer to what (covered in Chapters 6 and 7), will give us a
means to deal with the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive relatives.
5.2. Surface Structure
As stated above, one of the advantages of GRL with respect to adaptability is that it
explicitly represents some of the surface structure of the sentences in a discourse -
specifically that to do with subordination in noun phrases, by means of the context
extension operator. This is comparable with [Webber, 1979]'s use of compound types - and
justifiable by the same reasoning. For example, in example 25 above, the relative clause is
identified as subordinate by its position to the left of the context extension operator.
Representing some surface structure in this way will prove to be useful when we consider
dereferencing noun phrases containing relative and prepositional post-modifiers.
5.3. Predicates
Predicates in GRL are comparable with those in FOPC. The predicate modifiers used in
George are intended as a hook on which to hang further work in tense, aspect, the effect of
voice and mood on reference. Uncontroversially, they cover: tense, aspect, modality, voice,
and mood, in that order. Thus, for example, "will eat" translates as the predicate
1: The predicate symbol "owns" is an abbreviation - the predicate in GRL contains information regarding
tense, mood, etc, which is not relevant here.
[owns,ref2"donkey!,refl "man!! ► refl'man! 25
eat( present, perfect, future, active, indicative ); 26
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while "may have been eating" translates as
eat(past, progressive, modal,active, indicative); 27
and "were being eaten" (as in "if it were being eaten") as
eat( past,progressive, conditional, passive, subjunctive). 28
The values available to the modifiers are:
tense (past, present}
aspect {progressive,perfect}
modality (present, future, conditional, modal}
voice {active, passive}
mood {indicative, subjunctive, imperative, interrogative}
From here on in this document, for the purposes of explaining this work, predicates will be
represented in a simpler form, just borrowing the appropriate form from the English
input. Since most of the examples considered in this work are in the present tense,
predicate names will usually be of the form of the third person singular of the verb, eg.:
eats. 29
5.4. Abstraction Operators
Of the two abstraction operators available in GRL, only # is unconventional.
Lambda, A, may be used to form X-abstractions like this:
Xx.f(x) 30
where f(x) is an expression containing x. Such expressions may be X-applied to other
expressions by the simple textual substitution of the expression to which it is being
applied for x in f(x). Because these expressions are used only for the association of fillers
with slots during semantic composition, the abstracted variable always appears in the
body of the expression, as in Church's original A-calculus ([Church, 1940],
[Church, 1941]), now called AI- or sometimes AK-calculus.
Invariably, in the George Parsing and Dereferencing System, this X-reduction is followed
by an evaluation step. This evaluation (fully described in Section 7.1.4), however, is best
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thought of as triggered by, rather than part of, the A-reduction procedure. #-reduction
entails no such evaluation.
Also, A-abstracted expressions may be X-composed in the following way
Ax.f(x) + Ay.f(y) -comP°sition-» Ay./'(/"(y)) 31
where + means "is combined with" and -operation—> means "under operation to give".
(Note that this operation is defined here for the purposes of explanation only. It does not
arise in the George system.)
#-abstracted expressions are rather more complicated. First, a #-abstraction may be
#-applied only to an element of the George sort hierarchy. Effectively, this means that it
may only apply to translations of nouns and adjectives. Thus, a #-abstraction represents
an isolated determiner or a headless noun phrase.
For example, the #-abstraction associated with the indefinite article, "A" is
refl#refl 32
Note that this is not quite the same syntax as for the A-abstraction: the bound variable (or,
more correctly, bound reference symbol) precedes the abstraction operator. Analogously
with A-abstractions, the right hand side of the expression is referred to as the body. This
example is particularly simple: in general, the right hand side will be a more complex
reference containing the bound reference symbol.
#-reduction is similar to A-reduction in that it operates through #-application to its
argument, except for a special #-composition of adjectives.
For example, if we apply the translation of "A" to the translation of "man", we get the
following behaviour (see Chapter 5 for an explanation of the actual application
mechanism):
refl#refl + man -application-* refl'man 33
On the other hand, with an adjective, for example, "male" (which has syntactic category
n/n) we get
refl#refl + male -composition—* refl#refl"male. 34
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Finally, the composition of a A-abstraction with a #-abstraction (or vice versa) is not
allowed. The insertion of partial noun phrases into verb argument positions, which one
might have expected composition to do, is performed by the protraction operation, defined
in Chapter 5.
5.5. Sort Hierarchy
GRL supports a lattice of sorts, corresponding with the set of English nouns and
adjectives. A sort is written in GRL as the appropriate noun or adjective. For the purposes
of this work, the issues of representation of relative and intensional adjectives, though
important in themselves, have been set aside.
Sorts are also represented by sets of property/value pairs, which correspond with the sort
symbols but do not figure in GRL proper - the sets are used by the Parser and the
DeReferencer for reasoning about semantic well-formation and reference respectively.
This representation is more expressive than those used in some comparable systems, in
that the connectives between the members of the pairs, rather than being the usual
implicit "has value" are explicit and may be negated, thus admitting failure of consistency
in a way equivalent to the notion of typed disunification (in the same way that consistency
may be viewed as equivalent to typed unification). In particular, the value position may
contain an uninstantiated variable, allowing the unform representation of specifically
undefined values. This is also possible in, eg, KL-ONE of [Brachman & Smolze, 1985]
The basic connectives between properties and their values are is and isnt, these are binary
operators, infixed between their operands, the property being on the left. For syntactic
sugar, and to avoid the need for explicit representation of truth values, the unary forms of
is and isnt, and their alternative forms, has, and hasnt, can be prefixed. Thus, in order to
represent "a black bird", we need (among other properties and values) "colour is black"
and "has wings" (ie "wings is true"). Similarly, to represent "a harmless animal" we might
use "isnt dangerous " (ie "dangerous isnt true" or "dangerous is false").
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{ shape is ellipsoidal}
and compose them by set union:
{colour is red, shape is ellipsoidal}
Uninstantiated values in these sort definitions are written as (from the anonymous
variable, in Prolog). For (a rather strained) example, we could use to represent the sort
"colourless" as meaning "colour isn't anything", like this:
{colour isnt }
These sets of property value pairs are called defining sets. They specify three relations
between sorts: subsumption, consistency, and contradiction, as follows (full definitions are
given in Section 7.2.3).
X subsumes Y (where X and Y are sorts - eg human, man) if and only if every pair in the
defining set ofX appears in the defining set ofY. This is equivalent to "is a supersort of' or
"is a generalisation of' - though, thinking extensionally, the word "subsumes" is more
usefully descriptive.
X is consistent with Y if and only if no pair in the defining set of X specifies a value
conflicting with a pair in the defining set of Y.
X contradicts Y if and only ifX is not consistent with Y.
5.6. Sort Application
The association of sort information with references in GRL is perhaps one of the more
esoteric aspects of the language.
When a sort symbol is applied to a reference, as in examples 33 and 34 above, the sort
application operator, ", is used to denote the connection between the two. It is important to
understand that the resulting combination of symbols is then itself viewed as a reference;
the reference is constrained by the application (c/TMellish, 1985]). Therefore, if we apply
another sort symbol to that reference (as will often happen in all but the most trivial NPs),
we get another reference which is more strictly sorted. Application of a sort symbol to a
reference corresponds with a (possibly null) reduction in its candidate set of referents.
For example, consider the composition of "A" with (the adjective) "red":
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refl#refl + red -composition—* refl#refl "red 35
The body of the resulting #-abstraction is a reference, just like the body of the initial one,
except that it only refers to things which may (NB may - not must - because of George's
open world assumption) have the property of redness.
Now, we go on to apply the result of 35 to (the noun) "ball". We get this:
refl#refl~red + ball -application—* refl"red"ball 36
Ultimately, it makes no difference which way round we write the two sorts. Note that this
is contrary to Webber's argument about structural requirements of a representation - I
will discuss this in Chapter 9. A new sort application appears within the scope of any
other operator (viz X,! or ►) already in the reference. Thus we can translate "The red
ball" as follows.
refl#refl! + red + ball -composition—* refl#refl"red! + ball
-application-* refl "red'ball! 37
5.7. Indexing and the Expression ofReference to Sets
A large part of GRL is devoted to the representation of "set references" - that is, reference
to a number of entities in the discourse via a single noun phrase. GRL does not attempt to
deal with such linguistic devices as collective nouns: the view is that, for example, a
flange of baboons is a singular entity, and should be referred to as such, and that dealing
with collective nouns is a further level of linguistic abstraction, as it were, which would
only obscure the central theme of this research.
We need a general notation for applying a predicate to each member of a set, which will
allow us explicitly to sub-divide the sets and make further predications on the resulting
subsets. Consider, for example, another partial discourse adapted from [Webber, 1979]:
"Jim bought two t-shirts. 38a
The blue one was faulty." 38b
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Here, since the set of entities is small, there is no real reason why we should not represent
it something like this (ignoring tense and reading © as "exclusive or"):
bought( t-shirtl, Jim) A bought( t-shirt2, Jim ) A
((blue( t-shirtl) A faulty( t-shirtl)) © (blue( t-shirt2 ) A faulty! t-shirt2 ))) 39
However, ifwe want to represent
"Jim bought two thousand t-shirts. 40a
The blue ones were faulty." 40b
we get an explosion of conjuncts if we try to use the rather simplistic approach of 39. If the
cardinality of the set is not defined at all, as in
"Jim bought some t-shirts. 41a
The blue ones were faulty." 41b
that approach is even less helpful, since we cannot even write down an exhaustive list of
possibilities.
I therefore suggest that we need to introduce an explicit separation between the number
information contained in the discourse and the semantic representation of the entity(ies)
being represented.
We can make such a separation by showing each reference to each set of entities (ie each
noun phrase) in the explicit representation of its surface form, while representing the
sense of each as a prototypical entity having no number. The prototypical entity is then
linked to the reference by a binding, which is calculated and updated if necessary by the
George DeReferencer (qv, Chapter 6). Relations between set cardinalities are represented
by Bounding Constraints (see Chapter 7).
The translations into GRL, then, of the above partial discourses are as follows1.
38: Vindl<2.[bought, ref2"t-shirtXindl, refl"Jim! ] 42a
Vind2.eoref( ref4~faulty, ref3"blue!Xind2 ). 42b
1: NB: I do not claim that this is a "correct" way of representing proper names. It is merely a way which
works well enough for the purposes ofexperiment.
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40: Vindl <2000.[bought, ref2"t-shirtXindl, refl'Jim! ]
Vind2.coref( ref4 "faulty, ref3"blue!x ind2).
43a
43b




the last ofwhich, for example, might be translated back into English as
"The entity called Jim bought an unspecified number ofentities of sort t-shirt. 45a
(Note that GRL is incapable of denoting the association between the entities of the first
sentence and those of the second; this side of things is handled, in the context of the
Discourse State, by the DeReferencer.)
The above examples show clearly how GRL mirrors the surface structure of the utterance.
In particular, note that the translations of the second of each pair of sentences are all the
same, as are the originals in English; contrast this with example 39 and its extensions to
the harder problems in 40 and 41. I suggest, therefore, that this is perhaps a more correct
translation of the pure sense of the sentence than, for example, the FOPC-style
translation suggested in 39, because it does not include results of inference about
references in the utterance.
5.8. Bindings and the Representation of Entities
The fine detail of the entities and bindings will be covered with the DeReferencer in
Chapters 6 and 7. However, for clarity here, an example is appropriate.
First, two informal definitions. Outside GRL, George uses symbols called entity tokens,
constructed from entity token symbols and sorts, to represent sets of entities in the
discourse. Entity token symbols are of the form eN where N ( N; sort symbols may be
applied to entity token symbols using the same notation as for references. For example, an
entity token representing the sense of "A donkey" would look like this:
It is important to understand that the entity token does not directly represent the
discourse entity itself, but some abstraction of its sense; the further level of specification
indirects to the discourse world proper. Thus, the token represents an approximation of
An unspecified number of the blue entities were faulty entities." 45b
el "donkey
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the entity referred to in the discourse in the mind of the hearer. Recall also that an entity
token may specify a discourse entity which has no corresponding entity in the real world
(so we can discuss unicorns and such with impunity). It also means that an entity token
can be viewed as denoting a generic or prototypical entity (cf prototypes in [Webber,
1979]). This ambiguity closely parallels that in English (which is desirable, according to
George's design philosophy).
Entity tokens are explicitly associated with the references giving rise to and referring to
them by structures called bindings. Bindings are ordered pairs, the first element being a
set of co-referential references, as written in GRL, and the second being a non-empty set of
entity tokens. Both sets in the pair are often singleton.
Consider again example 41. When we have translated 41a to give 44a, we may draw a
diagram like figure 3a to represent the bindings and entity tokens. The arrows in figure 3
represent bindings between references and sets of entity tokens, and may be read as
"refers to". The sentences and translations are reproduced here:
( "Jim bought some t-shirts. 41a
The blue ones were faulty." 41b)
( Vindl.[bought, ref2"t-shirtXindl, refl"Jim! ] 44a
\/ind2.coref( ref4"faulty, ref3~blue! X ind2). 44b)
refl "Jim! el "Jim
ref2"t-shirtXindl i indl<N e2" t-shirt
Figure 3a: Entities and Bindings for Example 41144a
Since the V quantifier is viewed as part of any reference with which its bound index is
applied (by X or ®- see Section 7.2), the information it carries must appear in the
binding. In the figures 3, where the reference part of the bindings is shown in the boxes at
the blunt end of the arrows, quantification is represented by the application of the X
operator and an index. The information conveyed by the upper bound of the binding is
then shown in the box attached directly to the arrow. The set of entity tokens at the other
end of the binding is at the sharp end of the arrow.
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refl'Jim! el'Jim




Figure 3b: Entities andBindings for Example 41/44b
In the case of example 41/44, the upper bounds on the quantifications are unspecified.
Therefore, in the diagrams, the upper bound is written is denoted by a variable, N or M,
whose value is in N. Such unknowns may be denoted explicitly in GRL by -L.
The attachment of the variables to the arrows may be thought of as shorthand for N or M
bindings from N or M distinct but characteristically identical references to N or M distinct
copies of the entity token (these notions will be formalised as entity token partition in
Chapter 6, and index expansion and index partition in Chapter 7, where I will return to
this example). In a case such as this where N and M are unspecified, it is (still) impossible
to draw the complete expansion.
6. Some Examples of Expressions in GRL
This completes our informal introduction to GRL. Below are some examples of English
sentences and their translations in GRL. It is important to remember that GRL is
intended to represent the surface form of the utterance, and so does not, for example, allow
substitutions of referents for references once reference has been determined. Remember
that the syntactic differences between FOPC and GRL lie almost entirely with references
(instead of logical variables in FOPC); this is deliberate design strategy, since the
language is intended as a vehicle for research into reference. A Backus-Naur Form
specification of the syntax of GRL is given in Appendix D.
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"A man owns a donkey" [owns,ref2 "donkey,refl"man]
"The man beats the donkey" [beats,ref2 "donkey!,refl "man!]
"The donkey hates the man who beats him"
[beats,ref3"male!,ref2"man![ ► [hates,ref2"man!,refl "donkey!]
"Jim is a man" coref( refl "Jim!, ref2"man)
"Fred is a man" coref( refl "Fred!, ref2"man)
"The men own a donkey" Vindl.[owns,ref2"donkey,ref3"man!X indl]
"Pedro is the donkey" coref( refl "Pedro, ref2"donkey!)
"Every man owns a donkey" Vindl.[owns,ref2~donkey®indl,ref3"man!<8>indl]
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it"
Vind 1. [owns, ref2"donkey® ind 1 ,ref3 ~man <8> ind 1 ]
► [beats,ref2" it! ® ind 1 ,ref3"man <8> ind 1 ]
"Two men own a donkey" Vindl <2.[owns,ref2"donkey,ref3"manX indl]
"One man feeds him" Vindl <1.[feeds,ref3"male!,refl"man!Xindl]
7. The Definition of GRL
7.1. The Syntax of the George Representation Language
7.1.1. Basic Categories and Functions
The elements ofGRL are divisible into a number of basic categories according to function.
Var variable symbols (countably infinite) {varO,varl,.
Ref reference symbols (countably infinite) {refO, refl.
Ind index symbols (countably infinite) {indO, indl..
Sort sort symbols (finite) {chair, man.
Pred predicate symbols {beat, own, hate,.
Mod predicate modifier symbols (small) {tense, mood
ModVal modifier value symbols (small) * {past,present,subjunctive,indicative
Dom a mapping from Mod to 2M°dVal
Arity a mapping from Pred X IImeM0dDom(m) to N
(Var, Ref and Ind are in explicit bijection with N.)
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7.1.2. Syncategorematic Operators and Quantifier
Referential Control Operators
binary sort application (most binding)
! unary (postfix) definite
X binary weak index application
<2> binary strong index application
coref binary coreference association
► binary context extension (least binding)
Quantifier - Forall (V)
V associates a unique element of Ind (an index, which is bound by the quantifier) with a
(well formed) reference and an optional element of N. The entire GRL expression is the
scope of the quantifier, and the element of Ind in question may appear only within this
scope. Because of the quantifier expansion operation, which is explained below, the scope
of a particular V is the entirety of the expression in which it appears.
The natural number is an upper bound on the range of the index, which may in certain
circumstances be thought of as a variable ranging over N". This is part of the solution to
our central question of subset reference.
A quantified expression (fully expanded) is written:
VindN < M.Expr
where N ( N, M ( N U {X} (indN being an element of Ind), and Expr is a well formed GRL
expression. In the (common) case where indN has no explicit upper bound, the "< X",
which would explicitly represent the fact, may be omitted.
Abstraction Operators
Lambda (X)
Given a variable symbol and an expression in GRL, denotes a A-abstraction (see below).
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Hash (#)
Given a reference symbol and an expression in GRL, denotes a #-abstraction (see below).
#-abstraction is like A-abstraction, except that the abstracted entity is a sort, and not a
value.
7.1.3. Syntactic Well-Formation in GRL
A sentence created from the above elements of the language is syntactically well-formed if
and only if it may be synthesised from the categories described above in any of the
following ways.
A Simple Reference is any element of Ref. For example: refl
A Sorted Reference is any simple or sorted reference combined by the sort association
operator, ~, with an element ofSort. For example: refl'man
ref2~dog"brown
A Definite Reference is any simple or sorted reference to which is applied the definite
operator,!. For example: refl "man!
An Indexed Reference is any simple, sorted or definite reference associated by one of the
index operators, X and <8>, with a member of Ind, and preceded by a quantifier, bounded or
otherwise, binding that member of Ind. For example: Vindl.refl "man! X indl
Vind2 < 4. ref2 "donkey! <8> ind2
A Predicate is any element of Pred associated with a tuple of predicate modifier values
chosen from (IlfgMod Dom(f)). For example: run(present,perfect,present,active,indicative)
This will often be abbreviated here to the English verb form which carries the same
meaning - in this example, "runs".
A Closed Predicate is any Predicate and a number (Arity(P) where P € Pred and the
Predicate is formed from P) of well-formed references separated by commas and enclosed
in square brackets. For example: [run(present,active,continuous,indicative),refl "man!]
[eat(past,passive,perfect,subjunctive),Vindl .refl "carrot X indl]
A Context Extended Reference is a well-formed closed predicate combined with a reference
by the context extension operator, ►. The closed predicate to the left is the context
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extension. The reference always appears inside the closed predicate. For example:
[own(present,active,continuous,indicative),ref2"donkey,refl "man] ► refl "man
A Context Extended Expression is a combination of two well-formed closed predicates by
the context extension operator, ►. For example:
[own(present,active,continuous,indicative),ref2"donkey,refl "man] ►
[beat(refl "manpresent,active,continuous,indicative),ref3 "it!,refl "man]
These expressions are produced by quantifier expansion of a closed predicate with a
context extended references as one of its arguments. The context extension must always
have a reference symbol in common with the body (the closed predicate to the right of the
operator), because of the nature of the linguistic behaviour - subordination - which
context extension represents.
A Hash (#) abstraction is a reference prefixed by the # operator and an element of Ref,
which is called a bound reference symbol. For example: refl#refl "green!
A X-abstraction is an expression prefixed by the lambda abstraction operator and a bound
variable (element of Var) which would be well-formed if all occurrences of the bound
variable were replaced with a well-formed expression. For example: Avarl.varl
A Coreference is the combination of two well-formed references by the coref operator. For
example, coref( ref2"bear, refl "animal!)
7.1.4. Operations
Reduction
Given an abstracted expression and an expression of the appropriate kind (see below),
reduction enables the creation of a new expression. After reduction, resulting expressions
are evaluated (see below).
Lambda (X) Reduction
A A-abstraction may be applied to any other expression. The result of the application is
obtained by replacing all occurrences of the bound variable in the body of the A-
abstraction with the expression to which it is being applied. The lambda operator and its
bound variable do not appear in the result. For example:
Avarl.[pred,varl] + refl -application-* [pred,refl]
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A A-abstraction may be composed with any other abstracted expression. The result of the
composition is obtained by replacing all occurrences of the bound variable in the body of
the A-abstraction with the body of the expression with which it is being composed. The
abstraction operator(s) of the latter expression are then prefixed to the result; the lambda
operator and bound variable from the applied expression do not appear in the result.
Recall that composition is only defined here for the purposes of discussion - it does not
appear in the George system. For example:
Avarl.[predl,varll + Avar2.[pred2,var2] -composition-* Avar2.[predl,[pred2,var2]]
Hash (#) Reduction
A #-abstraction may be applied to any member, S, of Sort. The result of the application is
obtained by replacing all occurrences of the bound reference, R, in the body of the #-
abstraction with a sub-expression of the form R"S. The # (hash) operator and its bound
reference do not appear in the result. For example:
refl#refl + man -application—* refl'man
A #-abstraction may be composed with any member of Sort. The result of the composition
is obtained by applying the #-abstraction, and then prefixing the hash operator and its
bound reference to the result. For example:
refl#refl + red -composition—* refl#refl "red.
Quantifier Expansion
It is possible to make statements of the form:
[pred,Vindl.refl X indl ]
in GRL. The statement is synonymous with:
Vindl.[pred,refl X indl]
Because GRL has no existential quantifier, 3, and because the quantifier is viewed as
modifying the whole sentence, we can make this purely textual transformation with
impunity, even over multiple quantifiers.
Quantifier expansion is the operation which enables the scope of an arbitrary number of
quantifiers to be expanded to cover the whole of the expression (except for abstraction
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operators and their bound variable or reference) in which they occur, to form an exactly
equivalent expression.
Quantifier expansion may also apply to expressions including the reference extension
operator, ►. The operator and its preceding expression may be moved so that they have the
same scope as the innermost quantifier or abstraction operator in whose scope they
appear.
Normally, quantifier expansion is applied by the parser immediately after each
evaluation, to transform the resulting expression into one more easily readable and more
easily manipulable under first order term unification.
Evaluation
Evaluation is the operation which enables the completion of reductions made possible by
other reductions. For example, in the application shown below, a A-abstraction is moved
"inside" another; the result must then be evaluated to enable the "inside" expression to
apply to its (new) argument. Note that this example shows an application and not a
composition, as one might at first think. The decision on whether to apply or compose is
taken by the syntactic mechanism of the parser, described in Chapter 5.
A( varl, [varl,refl]) + A( var2, [pred,var2]) —* [A( var2, [pred,var2] ),refl] —> [pred,refl]
Evaluation is recursive; the (unsurprising) results of applying it are as follows:
Op Exp —evaluation—> Op NewExp
Exp Op -evaluation—» NewExp Op
where Op is a unary operator and Exp and NewExp are well formed
expressions in GRL. NewExp is formed by evaluating Exp.
Expl Op Exp2 —evaluation—> NewExpl Op NewExp2
where Op is a binary operator and Expl and NewExpl are well formed
expressions in GRL. NewExpl is formed by evaluating Expl.
[AbsExp.Arg] -evaluation—NewExp
where AbsExp is an abstracted expression, and Arg and NewExp are
well-formed expressions in the language, and NewExp is formed by
applying AbsExp to Arg.
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VIndex.Exp -evaluation—►VIndex.NewExp
where Index € Ind, Exp and NewExp are well formed expressions in
GRL, and NewExp is formed by evaluating Exp.
Evaluation for all other expressions is the identity function.
7.2. Semantics and the Discourse World
7.2.1 Introduction
In George, the representation of the discourse is split into two parts. First, there is the
Discourse World, which defines the properties of objects (via their sorts) and in which
Discourse Entities exist (though they are accounted for neither here nor in the
implementation). The meaning of predicates defining actions and states is defined here.
Second, there is the Discourse State, in which predications about the discourse world is
made. The Discourse State therefore is defined in terms of and within the Discourse
World, and is meaningless outside it. The Discourse State includes the set of Entity
Tokens which specify the Discourse Entities. The set is partially ordered in
correspondence with the D relation. The Discourse State includes translations of the input
discourse, bindings from the references in it to the entity tokens in the Discourse World,
and Bounding Constraints which, syntactically, are arithmetic equations.
7.2.2. The Discourse World
A Discourse World consists of
- a finite set, Prop, ofproperty symbols
- a countably infinite set, PropVal, of property value symbols
- a small set, PropConn, of property/value connectives




{(colour, is, red),... }
- a function1, SortDef, between Sort (ie the sort symbols in GRL) andWDef
- a set, DEnt, of discourse entities
1: If this function is a bijection, certain efficiency measures can be taken in the consistency
checking algorithms; this option is built in to the existing system.
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Given a Discourse World, a.Discourse State consists of
- an ordered set, Sense, of syntactically well-formed GRL expressions
- a function, Bind, from 2SRef to 2Ent
where SRef is the set of references which appear in expressions in Sense
- a relation, HasSort, between Ent and Sort
- a function, IndexRange, from Ind to N U {X }
- a set, Bound C IExpr X Ind
where IExpr = Ind U (IExpr X {+, -} X Ind)
- a set, Ent, ofEntity Token Symbols
- a partial order, , on Ent
Utterances are regarded as mapping from discourse states to discourse states; a discourse
is seen as starting with some initial discourse state (possibly empty) and updating that
state with new elements of Sense and possibly new information defining HasSort,
IndexRange and/or bind. If Sense contains no contradictory groups of expressions, directly
or by inference, it is consistent; the Sense of a discourse state may correctly be
inconsistent. IndexRange specifies upper bounds on indices; the set Bound specifies
arithmetic relations between members of Ind.
7.2,3. Relations on Sorts
Vsi.Vs2- si € Sort A S2€Sort => ( si subsumes S2 <=> SortDef( S2) 2 SortDef( Si))
Vs1.Vs2.s1C Sort A S2CSort ==» (si strictly subsumes S2 SortDef( S2) 3 SortDef( si))
Vsi. VS2.S1 C Sort A S2C Sort =>
( si is consistent with S2 &
Vp.Vv.Vq.Vu.((p,is,v)CSortDef(si) A (q,is,u)CSortDef(s2) A (p = q) => (u = v))
A Vp.Vv.Vq.Vu.((p,is,v)C SortDef(si) A (q,isnt,u)€SortDef(s2) A (p = q) =» (u=£ v))
A Vp.Vv.Vq.Vu.((p,isnt,v)CSortDef(si) A (q,is,u)CSortDef(s2) A (p = q) => (u^ v))
Vsi.Vs2.Si^Sort A S2^Sort ( si contradicts S2 & ( si is consistent with S2))
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8: Translation Algorithm:
GRL to First Order Predicate Calculus
8.1. The Target Language and the Translation Procedure
In order to make George worthwhile in a wider context, I must supply a semantics for its
output in terms of a standard (or at least well-understood) formalism. The formalism
chosen here is First Order Predicate Calculus. The choice of such a language highlights
certain issues already discussed in this document. In particular, GRL has operators which
allow the explicit statement of information about reference and other extra-logical issues
{eg definiteness and subordination) and there are Bindings linking the representation to a
model of the discourse world. The translation algorithm, therefore, discards this
information, and represents only the truth-conditional aspects of the input discourse in its
output. It is fundamental to the operation of the George system that such a loss of
information should not be irrevocable, or that it should occur only when the discourse has
definitely finished, because otherwise the adaptability of the representation (and
therefore George's ability to resolve any existing ambiguity) would be compromised. Thus,
the FOPC output, which can be generated from any set of complete GRL expressions,
entity tokens and bindings, should be used for reasoning about the truth-conditional
aspects of the discourse in parallel with George's operation and without sacrificing the
extra-logical information encoded in the system. It is also possible to imagine a system
where GRL predicates have analogues at the Entity Token level, in which case discourse
world inference might proceed at that level - this might lead to an analysis of sentential
anaphora; events could be represented by entities, as in situation semantics
([Barwise & Perry, 1983]).
The target language for this transformation is FOPC with the inclusion as predicates of
set operations €, D, II (modulus), and = (equality). A naming isomorphism, \ is used,
which, given a natural number or a logical object in GRL or FOPC, produces an
isomorphic string naming that object; the function is reversible. I also use the usual
function, gensym, which generates unique object-level logical symbols (here, exclusively
FOPC variables).
The translation procedure is specified here in three main parts. First, I translate the
discourse world (whose translation will be the same for any discourse state within that
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world). Second, the entities and sets referred to in the discourse must be introduced.
Finally, the expression defining the discourse state must be introduced.
The neatest way to defined this transformation is in terms of meta-logical functions,
whose behaviour is determined by logical expressions involving the sets defining the
discourse world and state, and whose output is a string naming the ultimate output,
rather than the output itself. Because of the reversible nature of the naming isomorphism,
\ this string can then be "de-named" to produce the FOPC translation; this is the
technique used extensively in meta-level reasoning in the logic programming community
(see eg [Lloyd, 1987], [Kowalski, 1979]). The string-based nature of the definition requires
the use of a concatenation operator, +. The definitions will also use the functions Pick and
First. Pick chooses an arbitrary member of a set; First chooses the first item of an ordered
set or one of the first items of a partially ordered set. We also need one new logical object
and two meta-level functions not already in the definition ofGRL. These are:
Predicates: a set of FOPC objects in bijection with PredX IlragModDom(m)
PredOf: a function over GRL closed predicates which returns the member of
Predicates corresponding with the modified predicate symbol in the
argument expression.
RefOf: a function over GRL closed predicates which returns a set containing the
references (including quantifiers) in the argument expression, ordered in
the same sequence as in the expression.
Because the translation specified here is a recursive functional algorithm, rather than a
relation, it is quite hard to read. Therefore, an informal specification and an example of
the output of each main function is given. The translation algorithm has been
implemented, and output examples are given below and in Appendix B.
8.2. Examples of George Output
Figures 4a and b show the actual George output for two different discourses, given in
examples 46a and b. The FOPC translation is shown in the figures between two broken
lines. The output of the program has been massaged slightly to make it more readable:
symbols like "forall" and "=>" have been replaced with their more conventional
equivalents, and the layout has been changed (by the addition of indentation) to reflect
quantifier scope.
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** George parser **
State 1:
** s:\/indl.Vind2<2. [own(pres,pres,perf,act, indie) ,






refl is bound to el'man
ref2 is bound to e2~donkey
ref4 is bound to e4"woman
ref5 is bound to e5~carrot
ref7 is bound to e4"woman
and el~man
ref9 is bound to e2~donkey
reflO is bound to e5~carrot
Vx.(carrot(x) => colour(x, orange)) A
Vx.(carrotlx) => nature(x,vegetable)) A
Vx. (donkey(x) => nature(x, animal)) A
Vx.(man(x) => gender(x,masculine)) A Vx.(man(x) => type(x,human)) A
Vx.(man(x) =» nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(woman(x) => gender(x, feminine)) A
Vx.(woman(x) => type(x, human)) A Vx.(woman(x) nature(x, animal)) A
3vl.(carrot(vl) A 3v2.(woman(v2) A
3V1.(|V1| = 2 A (Vv3.v3€Vl =* donkey(v3)) A
3V2 . ((Vv4 . v4 € V2 => man(v4)) A
(Vv5.(v5€Vl =» Vv6.(v6€V2 =4. own(v 5, v6)))) A (own(vl,v2)) A
(Vv7.(v7€Vl => give(v7 , vl, v2)) A
Vv7.(v76Vl => Vv8.(v86V2 =£ g i ve(v7 , vl, v8))))
))))
>> ~D !! End of input Stream !!
** Terminating parse **
Figure 4a: George output with FOPC translation for example 46a
The examples demonstrate various points about the translation. 46a shows quantification
applying sort predicates to members of sets of known and unknown cardinality; it shows
singular reference; and it shows conjunction arising from reference to members of a set
composed of an individual and another set split into individuals by quantification.
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refl is bound to el'man
ref2 is bound to e2~donkey
ref4 is bound to e4~woman
ref5 is bound to e5~carrot
ref7 is bound to e4~woman
or to el~man
re£9 is bound to e2~donkey
reflO is bound to e5~carrot
Vx . (car rot(x) => colour(x , orange)) A
Vx.(carrot(x) => nature(x,vegetable)) A
Vx. (donkey(x) =£ nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(man(x) =$> gender(x,masculine)) A Vx.(man(x) => type(x,human)) A
Vx.(man(x) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(woman(x) => gender(x, feminine)) A
Vx.(woman(x) => type(x, human)) A Vx.(woman(x) => nature(x, animal)) A
3vl. (carrot(vl) A 3v2 . (woman(v2) A
3v3 . (donkey(v3) A 3v4 . (man(v4) A
(own(v3,v4)) A (own(vl,v2)) A
(gi ve(v3 , vl, v2) V give(v3,vl, v4))
))))
>> ~D ! ! End of input Stream !!
** Terminating parse **
Figure 4b: George output with FOPC translation for example 46b
"Some men own two donkeys. A woman owns a carrot.
The people give the carrot to the donkeys." 46a
46b is deliberately ambiguous. It shows the disjunction introduced by unresolved singular
references.
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"A man owns a donkey. A woman owns a carrot.
The person gives the carrot to the donkey." 46b
8.3. World Formation
To translate the Discourse World, we translate those (parts) of its defining sets containing
information used in the final representation: Prop, PropVal, Sort and WDef. We will also
need to use the function SortDef. The translation function TWorld calls the other
translation functions, and is called initially with the expression
TWorld( Sort, Ent, Sense )
the last two arguments being passed to deeper function calls, which are defined below.
Specification:
For each sort symbol, s, in the discourse world (ie in the domain of SortDef),
there is a predicate, P, in FOPC, with the same name such that,
if P is true of a FOPC object, x, then
for each (Property,is,Value) triple in SortDeff s ),
the FOPC relation Property holds of the pair (x,Value), and
for each (Property,isnt,Value) triple in SortDeff s ),
the FOPC relation Property does not hold of the pair (x,Value).
Definition:
If S = 0 then TWorld( S, SE, Se ) = TDomain( SE, Se, 0 ).
Otherwise, let s be Pick( S). Then
TWorld( S, SE, Se ) =
TWorld'( s, {(p,c,v): (p,c,v)€SortDef( s)}) + TWorldf S \ {s}, SE, Se )
If SD = 0 then TWorld'( s, SD ) =
Otherwise, let (p,c,v) be Pick( SD ). Then
If 'c = "is" then
TWorld'( s, SD) = "Vx.(" + ^s + "(x)" + "=>" + *p + "( x, " + W + ")) A"
+ TWorld'f s, SD \ {(p,c,v)}).
If vc = "isnt" then
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TWorld'( s, SD) = "Vx.(" + *s + "(x)" + "=>-."+ 'p + "(x," + > + ")) A"
+ TWorld'( s, SD \{(p,c,v)}).
Example:
A world in which carrots are distinguished from other entities by being orange and edible.
Let Sort = {carrot} and SortDef( carrot) = {(colour,is,orange), (edible,is,true)}. Then,
TWorld( Sort, Ent, Sense ) =
"Vx.( carrot( x) colour( x, orange )) A Vx.( carrot( x) =* edible( x, true)) A"
+ TDomain ( Ent, Sense, 0 )
8.4. Domain Formation
Domain formation is the translation of entity tokens existing in the discourse to variables
in FOPC. It is defined in terms of the discourse state, using the sets Ent, Ind and Bind, the
function IndexRange, the relation HasSort, and the partial ordering, The definition is
in the form of a meta-logical function defined inductively over the partially ordered set,
Ent. The meta-logical functions TSort, TPartition and TSense are defined below. The
argument C is an accumulator, allowing us to keep track of which GRL entity token is
associated with which FOPC variable. The FOPC representation of the existing GRL
discourse state is obtained by the evaluation of TDomain( Ent, Sense, 0 ), and is then
placed in context of discourse world information by TWorld, above.
Specification:
For each entity token, e, in Ent,
there exists an existentially quantified FOPC variable, V, such that
if e is only bound to singular references,
V is a variable over individuals; for each element, s, ofHasSort( e ), s( V ) holds,
if e is bound to plural references,
V is a variable over sets;
for each element v ofV, for each element s of HasSortl e ), s( v ) holds;
if r is in R where eC Bind(R) and r is indexed by I and IndexRange( I) =£ _L, then
IVI = IndexRangef I) holds
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Definition:
If SE = 0, TDomainI SE, S, C ) = TSense( S, C ).
Otherwise, let e be First( SE ). Then
If 3(R,E).(R,E)€BindAe£EAVr.(r(:R=s>rissimple) or
3(R,E).(R,E)£Bind A e€E A 3r.3i.( rXi£R A IndexRange(i) = 1) then
Let v = gensym;
TDomainI SE, S, C ) =
"3" + v + + TSortI { s : HasSortI e, s) }, v)
+ TPartitionI e, v, C ) + TDomainI SE \ {e }, S, C U {< e, v)}) + ")".
If 3{R,E).(R,E)^Bind A e€E A 3r.3i.( rXi€R. A IndexRangel i) = i.) then
Let V = gensym; let v = gensym;
TDomainI SE, S, C ) =
"3" + V + ".((V" + V + + v + "C' + V + " =>
+ TSortI {s : HasSortI e, s)}, v) + ")"
+ TPartitionI e, V, C ) + TDomainI SE \ {e }, S, C U {< e, V >}) + ")
If 3<R,E).<R,E)€ Bind A e€E A 3r.3i.3N.( rXi€RAN€NA IndexRange(i) = N ) then
Let V = gensym; let v = gensym;
TDomainI SE, S, C ) =
"3" + V + ".(I" + V + "I = " + ~N + "A (V" + v + + v + "<E" + V + " =>"
+ TSortI {s : HasSortI e, s)}, v) + ")"
+ TPartitionI e, V, C ) + TDomainI SE \ { e}, S, C U {(e, V )})+") ".
Example:
A discourse consisting of "A man owns two donkeys. The man beats one donkey.". (Note
that the calls to TSort and TPartition (see below) are also evaluated here for clarity.)
Let SEnt = {el, e2, e3, e4}, HasSortI el) = { man}, HasSortI e2 ) = {donkey},
HasSortI e3 ) = {donkey }, HasSortI e4) = {donkey}, e2 > e3, e2 e4, and
Bind = {({refl'man}, { el }), ({Vindl <2. ref2~donkey X indl}, {e2}),
({ref3"man!}, { el}), ({ Vind2< l.ref4"donkey!Xind2}, { e3})}. Then
TDomainl SEnt, Sense, 0 ) =
"3x.( man( x) A 3Y.I Vy.( y€Y => donkey! y)) A lYl = 2 A
3a.( donkey! a ) A 3b.(donkey! b)Aa£Y AblY A"
+ TSensel Sense, {(el, "x"), ( e2, "Y"), (e3, "a" ), (e4, "b")}) + ")"
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8.5. Sort Formation
TSort produces a string naming sorting relations on logical variables. The operation of
TSort can be seen in the TDomain example above, in (for example) the application of the
predicate "donkey" to the variable "a".
Specification:
For each sort symbol, s, in S, construct an expression consisting of the FOPC predicate
named by s applied to the variable v. Conjoin all the expressions.
Definition:
If S = { s } then TSort( S, v) = * s + "(" + v +
Otherwise, let s = Pick( S ), then
TSort( S, v ) = TSort( {s}, v) + " A " + TSort( S \ { s }, v)
8.6. Partition Formation
TPartition yields a string naming relations between logical variables (specifically: D
relations between the sets they denote). The relations are derived from the ordering 5> on
Ent. Its example is included in the TDomain example, above. TPartition is called as
TPartition( e, v, C ) where e is an entity token, v is the name of the FOPC variable which
is the translation of e, and C is the set of existing (entity token, variable name) pairs from
the discourse so far.
Specification:
If e is not after anything in 8>, there is no partition information.
Otherwise, let Y be the name of the variable associated with the entity token
immediately before e under >. Then
If e is only bound to singular references, v £ Y holds.
Otherwise, YDv holds.
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Definition:
If 3e\(e'£ EntAe'^e) then TPartition( e, v, C ) =
Otherwise, let E = {t: t€Ent \ {e}At $> e}.
Let e' = Pick( E ) s.t. -< 3e".( e"€E \ {e'} A e' £> e" ) A (e\ v' )€C; then
If all references bound to e are singular
TPartition( e, v, C ) = "A" + v + "€" + v'
Otherwise
TPartition( e, v, C ) = "A" + v' + "D" + v.
8.7. Discourse Formation
The function TSense defines translation of the sequence of sentences in the discourse. It is
defined inductively over the set of GRL sentences in the discourse state, and produces a
string naming the conjunctions of their translations into FOPC. TSense is called by
TDomain as TSense( Sense, C ), where C is the set of (entity token,variable name) pairs
created by TDomain.
Specification:
TSense yields the name of a conjunction of translations of expressions, given by calls to
TExpr, in Sense.
Definition:
If S = {s } and s is not context extended then
TSense( S, C ) = ")" + TExpr( ^PredOf( s), RefOf( s ),C,"(") + ")".
If S = {coref( ri, r2)} then
TSense( S, C ) = ""
If S = {coref( rl, r2) ► s'} then
TSense( S, C ) = TSense( {s*}, C ).
IfS = {s" ► s'}then
TSense( S, C ) = TSense( {s" }, C) + " A " + TSense( { s'}, C ).
Otherwise, let s = First! S). Then
TSense( S, C ) = TSense( { s }, C ) + " A " + TSense( S \ {s }, C ).
-79- PhD Thesis
The George Representation Language
Example:
The example of TSense (and of TExpr and TRef) is given as part of the larger example in
Section 8.2. TSense constructs the conjunction of predicates which constitutes the main
body of the expression.
8.8. Expression Formation
Specification:
The translation of each expression in Sense is a (possibly degenerate) disjunction, Dj, of
FOPC expressions, D;j. There is one disjunct (i) for each combination of individual entity
tokens (j) appearing in each binding containing no indexed references.
Definition:
If R = 0 then TExpr( P, R, C, Q, A, F, T) = Q + P + A + ")" + F.
Otherwise, let r = First( R ). Then choose (R',E) such that (R',E)€Bind A r€ R'.
IfVr'.( r'€R' =» r' is simple ) then
TExpr( P, R, C, Q, A, F, T) =
TRef(P,R\{r},C,"v",{v: 3e.e£E A<e,v)€C},Q, A + T,F,",").
If 3r'.( r'€ R' => r' is indexed ) then
TExpr( P, R, C, Q, A, F, T ) =
TRef( P, R \ {r}, C, "A", {v : 3e.e€E A (e,v)£C }, Q, A 4- T, F,).
8.9. Reference Formation
Specification:
Each Dy is a conjunction of FOPC expressions, C^. There is one conjunct for each
combination of individual entity tokens appearing in each binding containing indexed
references.
Each C;jk is formed as follows:
Each quantifier VI is replaced in each C^t by one or more Vx where X is the name of
the FOPC variable associated by TDomain with the entity token bound to each
reference associated with I and x€X holds.
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The predicate symbol and modifers, P in is replaced by the corresponding
member ofPredicates.
Each reference in each C;jk is replaced by the variable associated by TDomain with
the entity to which it is bound.
Definition:
IfO = "v" then
IfV = {v} then TRef( P, R, C, O, V, Q, A, F, T) = TExpr( P, R, C, Q, A + v, F, T).
Otherwise, let v = Pick( V ); then
TRef( P, R, C, O, V, Q, A, F, T ) =
TRef( P, R, C, O, {v}, Q, A, F, T) + "V" + TRef( P, R, C, O, V \ {v}, Q, A, F, T).
IfO = "A" then
IfV = { v} then
Let u = gensym;
TRef( P, R, C, V, O, Q, A, F, T) =
TExpr( P, R, C, Q + "V" + u + ".(" + u + "€"+ v + A + u,")" + F,T).
Otherwise, let v = Pick( V); then
Let u = gensym;
TRef( P, R, C, V, 0, Q, A, F, T ) =
TRef( P, R, C, {v}, O, Q , A, F, T ) + "A" + TRef( P, R, C, 0, V\{ v}, Q, A, F, T ).
Example:
The translations in figures 4a and b, above, show the full output of the translation
function - ie the output of TWorld( WSort, Ent, Sense ) for a particular possible
translation of the input; as stated before, the translation function works separately on
each of the parallel possible translations elaborated in the George system. The conjunction
of universally quantified implications comes from TWorld itself; no claims are made
regarding correctness, completeness, or even good sense, of the sort specifications - they
are merely defined sufficiently for experimental purposes. The nested existentials are
produced by TDomain, the sort predicates added immediately after the quantifier being
added by TSort. The expressions conjoined to form the main body in each example are
produced by TSense, their internal conjunctions and disjunctions being inserted by TExpr
and TRef.
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9. Summary
In this chapter, I have covered those parts of the George Representation Language which
are relevant to the work presented here. I have introduced the following topics; discussion
of the detail of those marked ★ has been deferred to later chapters.
1. Representing references, as primary objects in the language.
2. Representation of information about sort, definiteness, and cardinality.
★ 3. Quantification over sets by two kinds of indexing, weak and strong.
4. #-abstractions, which abstract sorts, as A-abstractions abstract values.
5. Representing surface structure as far as subordinate clauses by context extension.
6. Representing entities in the discourse world by entity tokens denoting their
nature, but not their specific form.
★ 7. Representing relationships between references and entity tokens with bindings.
★ 8. Representing cardinality relationships between sets by bounding constraints.
I have laid out a formal specification of the language, and given it a semantics by
specifying an algorithm for translating the truth-conditional part of its content, given a
context specified by George's output in terms of bindings and entity tokens, into First
Order Predicate Calculus.
10. Afterword
We now have a formal language in which to work. Before we can begin to perform analysis
of reference, we need a procedure for translating the input discourse into that language.







The ideasmotivating the design of the George Parser are restated in summary.
Basic categorial parsing is explained in detail, and it is argued that, by itself, categorial
grammar is well-suited to, but not perfect for, deterministic incremental parsing. A means of
overcoming this imperfection is introduced.
The structure ofGeorge's lexicon is defined.
The idea of adaptable representation is discussed, with a mechanism to extend the coverage of
the simple categorial parser to a realistic level, with details of the ambiguous semantic forms
introduced in earlier chapters.
1. Introduction
This chapter is a complete statement of the theory and implementation of the section of
the George Parsing and DeReferencing System devoted to parsing natural language. The
reader should be aware that, in making such a statement, certain assumptions have been
made which are introduced and justified elsewhere in this document.
The most prevalent of the assumptions in question are as follows:
Introduced in Chapter 2: Incremental reference evaluation can be useful;
Incremental parsing is therefore appropriate;
Introduced in Chapter 3: The "surface form" hypothesis - it is advantageous to
use a representation rather closer to the surface form
of an utterance than has been hitherto practised;
The "ambiguity" hypothesis - it is possible and
computationally useful explicitly to maintain
ambiguity in unfinished translations.
No further justification of these is necessary, and therefore none will be attempted.
It is not immediately obvious that the content of this chapter is fundamental to the
research presented here. Nevertheless, this is so. Without (some equivalent of) the new
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ideas introduced here, adaptable, ambiguous representation, which is fundamental to my
solution of the central set reference problem would be impossible.
2. A Suitable Formalism for Incremental Parsing
2.1. Introduction
In selecting the best formalism for incremental parsing, we must first consider what
particular problems the incremental approach introduces. There are two main issues.
First, and fundamentally, we need to be able to create a self-contained representation of
any left-complete partial sentence, in order that we may evaluate our semantics and
reference word by word. It will also be convenient if there is a close correspondence
between the syntactic and semantic representation of partial sentences, in that it is then
easy to allow the same process to handle both syntactic and semantic composition. Then,
the syntactic parsing operation can guide the semantic composition directly, which is an
elegant state of affairs. (The correspondence will also prove useful later, when I define
protraction.)
Second, we wish to reduce non-determinism as far as is possible. This is because, with the
early processing involved in dealing with semantics and reference word by word, the
computational cost of following dead end paths can be orders of magnitude larger than
that of syntactic parsing alone. Non-determinism is, therefore, a much more significant
issue in the incremental context than in other approaches, where it can sometimes be
viewed as little more than an implementation detail. I will propose a new way of avoiding
some non-determinism, by taking advantage of the adaptability of the George system.
One existing formalism which partly fulfills the first of these requirements is that of
Categorial Grammar (CG). I use the term loosely here to include the recent developments
in (eg) Combinatory Grammar in [Steedman, 1987] and Unification Categorial Grammar
(UCG) in [Zeevat etal, 1986], Later in this chapter I will explain a new development of
CG, enhanced in ways comparable with these developments, which will allow adaptability
to fulfil the second requirement, above.
2.2. Issues in Incremental Parsing
The choice of incremental parsing brings with it a number of practical issues, which I will
cover in this chapter. The collection is, from a conventional linguistic point of view,
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apparently arbitrary, because all the points of interest arise from clashes between the
incremental parsing view and more traditional view of syntactic and semantic translation
and composition of natural language, and thus are not motivated by, say, a desire to study
a particular class of linguistic phenomenon. This begs a question of why the two views (ie
conventional and early/incremental/adaptable) should be so much at odds in apparently
arbitrary ways, and why the justifiable (I argued in Chapter 2) incremental view should
disagree with traditionally received wisdom on the nature of human language
understanding. Fortunately, for the purposes of this thesis, which is primarily of a
practical nature, this can safely remain an open question.
The issues that I will cover, then, are all to do with fitting the conventional view of
grammar (albeit expressed in a fairly up-to-date formalism) into an incremental style. For
example, one issue is the problem of combining a (traditional) transitive verb phrase,
which notionally already includes an object, with its subject, when the subject arrives at
the input first. Another difficulty, apparently the converse, is the application ofmodifiers
appearing after a phrase to that phrase when its (translated) structure has disappeared
inside the translation of the sentence so far.
I will present two new mechanisms to solve these problems in what I suggest is a better
way than before, on the grounds that it can lead to much more deterministic parsing than
existing approaches to the same problems. In this chapter, I will show how these problem
points are covered by the George system, and introduce two other issues, specifically head
noun deletion and relative pronoun deletion which can be neatly dealt with under the new
approach. The point of all this is that, although the collection of linguistic phenomena
here may seem arbitrary, this is in fact not so - the problems arise as the result ofmutual
erosion between the edges of two apparently conflicting formalisms, and are therefore by
nature rather irregular.
2.3. Categorial Grammars
The idea of categorial grammar began with [Adjukiewicz, 1935]. It has appeared in
various forms in the literature (eg [Lambek, 1957]) and was recently revitalised in work
(referenced above) by Steedman, Zeevat, Klein and Calder, and others at the Centre for
Cognitive Science (formerly the School of Epistemics) in the University of Edinburgh, as
well as by researchers in other institutions (eg [Dowty, 1985], [Moortgat, 1988]).
There are three reasons why CG is suitable for incremental parsing systems. Firstly, the
modern developments of CG (mentioned above) are in principle capable of producing a
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single valid translation for any meaningful sequence of words (though for our purposes,
translation of any initial sub-sentence will be sufficient). This is the first requirement
specified in Section 2.1 for George.
Further, the modern usage ofCG is partly motivated by the fact that it is easy to construct
a compositional semantics whose functional structure corresponds closely (or even
exactly) with the functional structure of the grammar. This also is useful for strictly
incremental parsing.
The third reason is that CG facilitates the maintenance of implicit ambiguity in the
representation of translations. This point will be covered in Section 7; the argument will
require information not yet presented.
In general, then, Categorial Grammar is an ideal formalism for an incremental system
like George. It will be necessary, though, to adapt the ideas of basic CG (as in
[Lambek, 1957]) to iron out a few significant problems (the same problems which are
covered in the extensions from CG to CCG and UCG). These will be explained later in this
chapter.
2.4. Categorial Notation and Type Raising
2.4.1. Two Notations for Categorial Grammars
In the literature on Categorial Grammars we can find two slightly (but significantly)
different notations.
In [Lambek, 1958], as with all categorial notations, atomic syntactic categories are chosen
from some small set {eg {s np n} denoting { sentence noun-phrase noun} respectively), and
functions over categories are defined in terms of the categories of the argument and result.
In particular, a function which applies backwards to its argument is written with the
argument category first, and the result category second, separated by a backward oblique.
For example, an intransitive verb (which applies backwards to an np to give an s) has
functional category np\s. Forward application is written the other way round, with a
forward oblique; so the category of a determiner (which applies forwards to a noun to give
a noun phrase) is written np/n.
A simple set of basic combination rules for a grammar allowing forward and backward
application (hence these are application rules) would look like 47a and b respectively
(where X and Y range over basic and functional categories):
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X/Y + Y -* X 47a
Y + Y\X -* X 47b
The advantage of this notation is that it maintains two separate argument lists for its
functions, one for each direction of combination: the orders of the categories on either side
of the main result category are exactly the orders in which they combine, forwards or
backwards, with their arguments. 48 is an example of the combination of subject noun
phrase with a mono-transitive verb.
np + np\s/np -application-* s/np 48
According to Lambek's rules, above, we could equally well perform the combination of the
verb with a post-fixed object noun phrase, thus:
np\s/np + np -application—* np\s 49
The syntax of the notation reflects an ability to apply the function to its arguments in
either order, the respective orderings of the arguments forwards and backwards being
independent.
In later work on Categorial Grammar {eg [Steedman, 1985]), a slightly different notation
has become common - which gives rise to a different set of combination rules for our
example grammar. The rules are given in 50; compare with those in 47, which define
exactly the same behaviour for Lambek's notation. Upper case letters in all the rule
statements denote variables (ranging over categories, both basic and functional).
X/Y + Y X
Y + X\Y * X 50
The notational difference is simply that a function applying backwards to a member of
category Y to give a member of category X is written X\Y instead of Y\X. This has further
reaching consequences that one might at first realise.
(For completeness at this stage, I must also introduce Steedman's forward composition
operation, which is defined as in 51. It will become clear later that we do not need this in
George, but it will be useful for the moment for the purposes ofgeneral discussion ofCG.
X/Y + Y/Z X/Z 51)
Now, consider again the example in 48. The verb category, in Steedman's notation, is
written s\np/np. Some authors go further, and write (s\np)/np, to ensure and emphasise
that the syntax of the linguistic entity (in this case a mono-transitive verb) corresponds
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structurally with its semantics - it is often useful to think of the semantics of a mono-
transitive verb as a function applying to an object noun phrase, and yielding an
intransitive verb. The result of this notational difference is that the two lists of arguments
(forward and backward) which were neatly separated in Lambek's notation are now
interleaved, with the result that, when we attempt to perform the operation
*
np + (s\np)/np -application-* s/np 52
we are prevented from so doing by the requirement implicit in the notation first to
combine forwards with an np.
This presents us with a rather more fundamental problem than how simply to "unwrap"
the brackets, as it were, in a syntactic category in the Steedman notation. Recall from
Chapter 3 that the problem has arisen in the first place from a desire to make the
structure of the syntax of our grammar correspond with that of the semantics associated
with it. This desire is worthwhile and justifiable in a context where we wish to perform
composition of semantics, as well as syntax, word by word; and this, for the purposes of
George, we must do - otherwise, we will be unable to perform word by word reference
evaluation, because that evaluation depends on the semantics of noun phrases.
We are left with several solutions to our problem. Either we must find a means of
expressing semantic functions which will allow their representation in a way functionally
isomorphic with the Lambek notation of the corresponding syntax (but Lambek does not
discuss semantic representation, except in viewing syntax as a very coarse grained
semantics), or we must adapt parsing of the Steedman notation in such a way that we can
still make combinations like that in 52 incrementally. (A further possibility is the
approach of situation semantics (see eg [Barwise & Perry, 1983]), where global syntactic
roles are used instead of abstraction).
George takes the option of adapting the Steedman notation. The point is that there exists
already a standard functional notation system (the A-notation and its associated reduction
and composition rules), and that the use among current researchers of the Steedman
notation for CG is widespread. There seems little point in designing a new, non-standard
semantic notation to support the use of the archaic syntactic one used by Lambek.
So, having made this decision, how do we approach this direction and ordering problem




Let us first consider Steedman's own solution (eg [Steedman, 1985]). Steedman suggests
that one way ofmaking the failed combination in expression 52 work would be, instead of
attempting to change the function, to change the argument. We cannot justifiably change
the way the argument combines with the function as it stands; this would amount to
parsing the words in reverse order. We can, however, modify the noun phrase in such a
way that it becomes a function which can compose with the verb as we require it to, and in
the correct (forwards) order. This operation, which is applicable only to certain categories
(eg head noun, nominal), is called type raising. The left-most term in 53 is a type-raised
noun phrase.
s/(s\np) + (s\np)/np -composition-* s/np 53
We can now compose the rest of the sentence in the conventional way for CG
However, application of the type raising operation begs a very important question: what
about the semantics - consideration of which, after all, led to the emergence of this
problem in the first place? In answer, we can propose a semantic change correspondent
with the syntactic one.
Suppose that \x.A/y.<f>(x,y) is the semantic expression representing the mono-transitive
verb (category s\np/np) above, and x is the translation of the head noun phrase. Then by
simple substitution, Ax.<l>(x,x) is the translation of the resulting item of category s/np. The
transformation we need to apply to x to get this behaviour is
t -type-raising-* AF.F(x) 54
which is clearly a general transformation, because it does not depend on x. Now, we can
compose the semantic functions, as in 55, to give a correct translation. (The composition
operation used here is the usual one for composition of A expressions. The square brackets
are used merely to aid readability.)
AF.F(x) + Ax.Ay.<b(x,y) -composition-* Ax.([AF.F(x)].[Ay.4>(x,y)])
-reduction-* Ax.([Ay.<t>(x,y)](x))
-reduction-* Ax.4>(x,x) 55
The essential principle being embodied here is more than a simple textual manipulation
of the A-notation. What we are representing is a change of functional order in the
translation of the noun phrase, from a mapping from 0 (empty set) to {constants} (ie a
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constant function) to a mapping from {functions of arity two} to {functions of arity one} -
hence the term "type raising".
In isolation, type raising certainly seems to be an effective solution to our current
problem. However, in some ways it seems more than a little ad hoc.
First it is not a general solution: to use it correctly, we must make a rule that only head
noun phrases, and some other categories {eg nominals) may be type-raised. The
justification for this depends solely (and therefore, surely, inadequately) on the fact that
these categories are the only things which need to be type-raised to facilitate incremental
parsing. Further, type-raising does not fit in to a more general solution to other issues,
such as the perennial problem (which is addressed in [Pareschi & Steedman, 1988] and
[Pareschi, 1988]) of backwards application of modifiers later in a sentence, when the
structure of the exsiting composition has been buried in the higher-level category (usually
s/X for some category X).
Secondly, there is no formal rationale at all for the complicated functional form of the
type-raised entity: in a context where the normal representation of (the translation of) a
noun phrase is a constant, such complexity, unjustified, in an expression is surely out of
place. Worse, there is no general statement of meaning for the semantic expression
corresponding with a type raised object (aside from saying that it is the same as that of the
object before it was type raised). It will become clear in Chapter 6 that this is undesirable,
from the points of view of both elegance and computational efficiency, when we attempt to
evaluate the reference of partial sentences.
Another function of type-raising in some theories is to allow production of different
quantifier scopes. Here, the notion of changing the order of a function fits much more
comfortably, because quantifier scoping exactly corresponds with the order of combination
of lexical items. However, for the adaptable representation I propose here, it is highly
undesirable that quantifier scope should be denoted by bracketting in expressions, since it
is hard to imagine a representation which intuitively represents two differently scoped
versions of the same quantified predications at once, unless it is without any scope at all.
What is more, [VanLehn, 1978] (cited by [Sidner, 1983])
"reviews the major theories of scoping phenomena and concludes that
disambiguation of quantifier scope does not seem to take place during parsing or
semantic interpretation of a sentence and that the determination of quantifier
scope is the result of other linguistic processing."
George's approach is exactly in line with this suggestion.
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3. The George Parser
3.1. Introduction
Having raised these questions, I will now begin to supply some answers. This section
explains the operation of the George parser, with particular emphasis on the issues of
incrementality, adaptability and the operation which George uses instead of type-raising.
Before dealing with the declarative statements of the rules and principles used in the
George system, it will be useful to discuss an overview of the process model which George
follows. The procedural model is presented below as such, the purely declarative rules and
principles used within the procedures being stated subsequently.
3.2. George's Process Model
Figure 5 represents the top level of George's parsing process model. The terms used in the
figure were defined in Chapter 4. The single-line boxes denote data structures; the double








Current Translation / /
Current Utterance / /
Local (New) Bindings /
Discourse Memory /
Entities Discourse
Global (Old) Bindings State
Figure 5: George's Process model
process. Each time a new word arrives at the input, the lexicon is consulted, and all
possible translations of the word are found (by deduction if necessary - see Section 3.6). An
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attempt is made to combine each of these translations with the "current utterance" part of
each possible translation existing at the time. If a particular combination fails (under
rules specified below) the parser proceeds no further along that branch of the search tree.
If a combination succeeds, then the result (again, defined below) is passed to the
DeReferencer (see Chapter 6), in the form of a set of George references, extracted directly
from the current translation by a simple textual operation. Each time such a set is
received by the DeReferencer, any information in it about references which already exist
replaces that already known. This is a requirement of adaptability - if we wish our GRL
expressions to be adaptable, the copies of them elsewhere in the system must also be
adaptable, otherwise inconsistency could arise.
Recall from Chapter 3 that the current (partial) utterance is not included in the discourse
state until it can be viewed as a "complete utterance". This is detected, once an end-of-
sentence flag has been received, by matching the syntactic category against certain
distinguished syntactic labels (sentence, noun phrase, and prepositional phrase currently,
though the content of the full set is an open question). For the purposes of discussion here,
I will cover only full sentences, since detailed work on the other cases has not been carried
out.
In the event that one of the distinguished categories has been obtained in a particular
translation, the erstwhile current utterance and its bindings are appended to the
discourse memory and the global bindings, respectively, and the current utterance and
local bindings are reset to empty. It is safe to update the Entity Tokens database
incrementally throughout the process because the DeReferencer ensures that the list is
consistent (ie it does not contain any entities to which no reference has been made), so it
does not matter if entities are created prematurely as candidates for reference. Therefore,
by this stage, the entities list will have been updated with all the relevant information.
(All this will be covered in Chapter 6.) So now we are ready to accept the first word of the
next utterance and to start the process again.
If we have not reached a distinguished category, we replace any out-of-date local bindings
with the new ones produced by the DeReferencer and add the current utterance to the
current translation (the entities already having been updated incrementally by the
DeReferencer, as above), and wait to start the process again for the next word of the
sentence.
At this top level, the model is very simple and uniform. As we move deeper into the detail,
below, George becomes more complicated. Uniformity, though, has been a major design
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constraint - it will become clear below that it has been maintained into the full depth of
the George system.
3.3. Combining Partial Utterances in George
Some basic operations for combining partial utterances in GRL (eg A-reduction) were
defined in Chapter 4. At this higher level of the process model we need a means of deciding
which one(s) of these primitives to apply, and how to apply it(them).
This information is specified by a (small) number of combination rules; in fact, those
already specified in 50 form a special subset, the basic combination rules. The combination
rules are of the following general form.
Xi:2i + X2:S2 * X3:E3 <= conditions 56
where X; and Sj are variables ranging over categories and expressions in GRL
respectively and : associates pairs of these together, conditions are an arbitrary logical
formula, which will usually be empty (in such cases, the <= operator will be omitted).
While I have not specified any restrictions on the form of conditions it seems likely that in
general either they will be a fairly simple predication of properties of (parts of) the
combinands and/or the result, as in the termination rule, explained below, or they will be
recursive calls of the combination rules like those which admit protraction and coercion
here (again, explained below). Thus, the notion of implication here is procedural, as, for
example, in Prolog.
Given two items which we wish to combine, say
XiiSt + X2:S2 57
we attempt to unify (using first-order term unification) with the left hand side (that is, the
part to the left of the first -») of all the available rules. In general, the semantic parts of
the rules will be unconnected at this stage; but they and (more usually) the two syntactic
categories may contain references to common variables. This allows us neatly to check the
syntactic compatibility of the combinands, and thence their compatibility under
whichever operation the rule specifies, by simple unification. Next, we attempt to prove
the conditions, if there are any. If these succeed, unification gives us a result. For
example, ifwe wish to combine the following function and argument
np/n : refl#refl + n : man 58
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we could match it with the following left-hand-side (using upper case characters to
represent variables).
X/Y:Ex + Y:S2 59
X unifies with the np, and Y with both the n's. Si and S2 are unrestricted in unifying with
the respective semantic expressions, because they are named distinctly. Now, if the
category of the second combinand had been, say, np, this unification would have failed,
and therefore the rule would not have matched, which is the behaviour we want. It can be
seen throughout this discussion that this approach allows us to specify our rules in a way
exactly equivalent to the de facto standard (Steedman) notation for categorial rules.
Once we have performed the unification to show the syntactic correctness of the
combination, we can check the well-typedness of the semantic expressions; for example,
we can check that a #-expression is indeed being applied to a discourse world sort (as
required by the definitions in Chapter 4). Once the well-typedness has been shown, we can
go ahead and do the combination, which will normally involve a reduction step and an
evaluation step (again as defined in Chapter 4), and obtain our result.
3.4. Basic Combination Rules
The basic mechanism of the George Parser is built on a simple shift-reduce parser,
borrowed from [Haddock, 1989], though now it is altered almost beyond recognition. The
parser is a general incremental parser for categorial grammars, because the user is able to
specify not only the lexicon, but also the combination rules, independently from the
parsing mechanism. It is in truth not clear that one would necessarily wish to be able to
alter the combination rules between different grammar implementations; ideally, we
would like to think that the set of rules, once expressed, is universal and immutable.
However, experience (throughout, for example, Steedman's work on CG) has shown that
the correct set of rules, if such a one exists, has not yet been found; each variant on basic
CG, designed to solve a particular problem, seems to require a different set.
Therefore, in George, the grammar writer has the option of changing the combination
rules. The stated intention is that those already supplied (and detailed below) should be a
necessary and, possibly, sufficient set for parsing English in the George paradigm, though
no claims are made here for sufficiency.
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George's combination rules are expressed as schemata specifying the form of the
application and composition operations. Possibly because of the small coverage of English
required for the study of the particular linguistic phenomena with which we are
concerned here, George currently requires only two basic combination rules - the same
two application rules used in the foregoing example. The logical specification of the basic
rules is shown in full in 60.
X/Y:<f>+ Y:a -» X:<5(a)
Y:a+ X\Y:<1> X:d>(a) 60
Roman characters denote syntactic categories (basic or functional); Greek characters
denote expressions in GRL, upper case being functions, and lower case atomic expressions
(which may be functions treated as such). Both kinds of character represent variables in
the rules, which are associated with the real functions and arguments by first-order term
unification, which enables the initial syntactic compatibility check between function and
arguments mentioned above (c/UCG in [Zeevat et al, 1985]).
It is worth emphasising again the nature of George rule definitions. Any of George's rules
as stated in this chapter may be made conditional upon an arbitrary logical formula, in
order, for example, to express preconditions on the rules. In particular, it will be seen later
that this is useful in specifying complicated rules recursively in terms of the more basic
ones. Such rules are written thus:
Rule <= Formula 61
Formula will often contain variables instantiated in Rule. It is important to understand,
though, that the conditional operator, «=, is used here procedurally, and not in the
classical logical sense. In other words, the statement above indicates that attempted
application of Rule may only succeed if Formula is true, given the variable instantiations
caused by matching with Rule, in the backward chaining sense (of, for example, Prolog). It
does not indicate that, if Formula is true, we may assume the applicability of Rule.
Formula is evaluated as part of the attempt to determine whether Rule is applicable; the
result it produces in binding its variables constitutes the construction which justifies the
application of the rule. In the George grammar as it stands, only one basic rule has such a
conditional, and the others use the conditional just to introduce recursion; but
implementers of other grammars would be able to include arbitrary conditionals in any
rule, if they so desired.
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In accordance with the specifications given in Chapter 4, application and composition (the
latter for explanation only) are only defined for particular combinations of entities in
GRL. #-abstractions apply to sorts and nothing else; A-abstractions compose with
A-abstractions or with #-abstractions (but not vice versa). Because of this strict typing of
GRL, when we are attempting to select a rule, the success of that selection depends not
only on the rule selection by unification described above, but also on the successful
reduction of any function applications or compositions incurred, which involves checking
the compatibility of the George types.
Since we are parsing strictly incrementally, the right hand argument to one of the
combination rules will always be the translation of a single word, while the left hand will
always be a left-complete partial sentence. Because of this, it is convenient and elegant to
include the identity combination rule 62, where 0:0 denotes an empty translation. The
use of this rule is demonstrated in Section 3.7.
0 : 0 + X:T> -> X:<D 62
This rule allows us to parse uniformly from the first word with no special case built into
the parser for the initial word, thus maintaining the parser's generality. Similarly, we can
introduce a rule for termination, using 0:0 to represent the terminating symbol. This
rule, shown in 63, uses a conditional formula to ensure that the syntactic category of the
complete utterance is one of the distinguished categories.
X:T> +0:0—* X:<T += distinguished(X) 63
George needs this rule because (if the George Parser is to be fully general) it may be
necessary to apply certain operations - coercions, details of which will be given later - to a
partial sentence; this applies to the result of the very last combination in a sentence, too.
Now, this rule, in conjunction with that applying coercions, enables an adaptable,
unfinished sentence to be coerced to a complete one if this is possible, again without
building such a facility into the parser; and we do not want to break the existing division
between parser and grammar rules by building the rules into the parsing system itself.
The condition that the result be one of the distinguished "complete" categories mentioned
before is conveniently applied here as a condition on the rule; again, the grammar
implementer is free to change this condition without reference to the parsing mechanism.




Having defined our basic rules, we next need a parsing engine with which to drive them.
George has two primitive operations for this purpose, shift and reduce. Recall from the
description of George's process model in Section 3.2 that these two are called by the main
program in strict alternation: it is only possible to shift the set of translations of one new
word at a time, because the stack of [Haddock, 1989]'s parser has been replaced with a
single fixed storage location.
shift is defined, given a word W, to move a set T in to the "current words" slot of the parser
in a the way shown in 64 (The : = relation connects words with their lexical entries -
details in Section 3.6.).
T = {t: (W: = t) exists in the lexicon } 64
The reduce operation is rather more complicated, and requires a little more explanation.
Given a discourse world, as defined in Chapter 4, a current translation is a quintuple,
( s, L, D, E, B ), where s is the translation in GRL achieved so far of the current sentence, L
is a set of bindings between references in s and entities in E, D is a set of complete
translations of preceding sentences, E is a set of entity tokens arising from the discourse,
and B is a set of bindings between references in D and entities in E. ( D, E, B ) forms the
discourse state. Then we can say:
A set of discourse states, N, may be produced by reducing
a set of discourse states, O, with a non-empty set of translations T
O N = {< s', L',D, E', B'):
3t€T,<s,L, D,E,B>€ O.
( s + t -> s' A reference( ( s', L', D, E', B'), L, E, B ))} 65
reference is a relation between one current translation, and the three elements of another
(( L, E, B )) which define reference. For the moment, it is enough to say that reference is
true if the reference of the new structure is in some sense consistent in itself, and
consistent with the reference already existing in the preceding discourse. This loose
notion of reference will be formalised in Chapters 6 and 7.
If the set N in the definition above is empty - ie if all possible syntactic combinations have




The final component of this snapshot of the basic parser is the lexicon. George's lexicon is
almost trivially simple. It specifies an association between words and syntax/semantics
pairs of the form word : = syntactic category.semantic expression, some examples of which
are shown in 66. The notation is as defined in Chapter 4. (though the program does not use
exactly this notation - its version is rather less readable). The references, variables, and
indices (refNi, varN;, and indN;, respectively) are made unique by choosing a unique
integer value for each time the lexicon is consulted.
It has also been possible to generalise entries for (eg) nouns which form plurals by the
addition of "s" to the singular, by the inclusion of lexical redundancy (or deductive) rules
which relate the translation of a set of words from others which are directly defined, as
shown in 67. The detail of the forms plural with s predicate is irrelevant here; the
entailment operator <= is the same as that appearing in the combination rules.
Word : = n( plur ):Sort <= forms plural with s( Word )
When we try to look up a word ending in "s", this rule checks to see if it is a plural of a
word which forms its plural with "s". If so, the lexical entry is derived from the lexical
entry for the singular form (which happens to be an easy transformation in George, and so
this rule is worthwhile).
As is the case universally in George, pattern matching in the lexicon is done by first-order
term unification; matching an instance (in the case of the lexicon, an English word)
against a set of patterns yields an exhaustive set of possible matches (in the case of the
lexicon, translations). There is no implicit or explicit ordering on the items contained in
the lexicon (nor, indeed, on the combination rules). An implication of this is that
preferences may not be attached to some translations over others by ordering; if such
preferences are to be expressed, the George Representation Language must be extended to
the := np( plur, )/n( plur): refNi#VindN2.refNi!X indIST2
the := np( sing, )/n( sing): refNi#refNi!
man := n( sing): man
eats : = s\np( sing, nom ): AvarNj.[eats,varNi] 66
A Singular + "s"-concatenation-* Word
A Singular : = n( sing ):Sort 67
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include their expression, which is certainly better (from a grammar designer's point of
view) than preferences implied by ordering, because the mechanism is explicit.
Notice also that a further addition has been made in 66 to the elementary categorial
syntax described earlier in the form of simple feature structures appended to the category
names np and n. These features allow us to perform agreement checks just using first-
order term unification (which we need anyway for our basic syntactic agreement
checking). For example, n has one feature, which may be singular or plural - other kinds
of noun are not covered in George, np has two features, one for number as with n, and one
for case, which may take the values nominative or accusative, for agreement with verb
argument positions. The Prolog notation, , for the unnamed variable or "Don't Care" is
often used in these feature specifications.
3.7. A Simple Example ofGeorge Parsing
As an example of how this foundation level of the parser works, then, let us consider how
the sentence "The man eats." would be parsed with the simple rule set and lexicon given
in 50 and 65, respectively. Suppose, for simplicity, that this is the first sentence of the
discourse; for the same reason, I will not mention reference here. Recall that, at this stage
in our discussion, I am using only the most basic of George's combination rules.
Remember that, in the following explanation, wherever a combination rule is applied, the
associated evaluation, as defined in Chapter 4 is also performed. Thus, an expression <P(a)
will be replaced by 1ff, where V is the result of carrying out evaluation upon <I>(a), as
defined in Chapter 4..
To start, we have the initial set of one empty discourse state:
The empty set structure in the current sentence (leftmost) position expresses the fact that
there is no preceding word in this sentence. The other sets (new bindings, discourse
memory, entities, and old bindings) are empty, of course, because this is the beginning of
the discourse.
We attempt to shift the word "The". The result is the set of lexical entries
{np( plur, )/n( plur ): refl#Vindl.refl!X indl,
{(0,0,0,0,0)} 68
np( sing, )/n( sing): refl#refl!} 69
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which we combine with the initial (empty) state, using the identity combination in 61.
So, when we first perform the reduce operation using the identity combination, we obtain
a set of two discourse structures, like this (leaving discussion of the content of L; and E for
Chapter 6):
{( np( plur, )/n( plur): refl#Vindl.refl! Xindl, Li, 0, E, 0 ),
(np( sing, )/n( sing): refl#refl!, L2, 0, E, 0 )} 70
Next, we must shift again, because of the strict alternation by the parser between shift
and reduce, by which George enforces incrementality. Since there is only one translation
of "man" available, the set of new lexical entries is simply
{n(sing): man} 71
When we attempt to reduce this with the current translation, only the forward application
rule - the first rule in 60- has a left hand side whose respective components are
potentially unifiable at the functor level with both the function, from 70, and the
argument, from 71. However, because of the requirement also to unify the number feature
associated with the argument categories, only one of these possibilities will be realised, to
give a singleton set of discourse states:
{(np( sing, ): refl#refl"man!, L2, 0, E, 0 )} 72
Now we can shift the translation of "eats" and reduce again to give:
{( s:[eats,refl "man!], L2, 0, E, 0 )} 73
Finally, the appearance of a full-stop at the input indicates the end of a sentence
(representing an ending inflection in speech, if appropriate). This causes introduction of
the end of utterance translation, 0:0. The only rule with which this is unifiable is the
"end of sentence" rule shown in 62. In accordance with that rule, the category of the left
hand combinand is examined, to see if it is one of the categories distinguished as
constituting a complete utterance. Since it is (recall that the distinguished categories are
{snppp}), the combination succeeds, and the sentence is complete. This causes the
transfer of the current sentence to the discourse memory (and the corresponding operation
on references and entity tokens), yielding the singleton set of discourse structures shown
in 74. (Recall that the ordering of the discourse memory - as defined in Chapter 4, the
third element of each tuple - is significant.)
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{( 0, 0, { s : [eats,refl "man!]}, E, L2)} 74
4. The "Type Raising" Problem and Protraction
4.1. The Protraction Operation
While the above example shows how the most basic elements of the George parser fit
together, it bypasses the difficulty of directional combination in incremental parsing,
because the verb involved is intransitive, and so has only one argument.
To remove with that difficulty, I have introduced a new operation, called protraction, into
the parser. Because of the generality of the shift and reduce specifications, I can do so
elegantly by adding a recursive element to the existing combination rules - the two new
rules shown in 75. u and r are variables ranging respectively over the sets of symbols Var
and Ref, introduced in Chapter 4. Recall that the 4= symbol denotes procedural
dependency; that is to say, the left-hand side of an expression containing 4= is dependent
on the back-chained execution of the right hand side, as in Prolog. Thus, these rules
express not an ability to prepend arbitrary abstractions to syntactic categories (as one
might suppose, reading from right to left), but a dependency of the result of the left-hand
rule application on that of the right-hand one.
T : d> + V/U : Au.T' Y/U : Xv.E 4= T : + V : ¥ Y : S
T: <t> + V/U: r#T> -» Y/U: r#£ 4= T:^> + V:V->Y:S 75
These rules, defining X- and #-protraction, respectively, may be expressed by one
statement in English:
Any item V/U:2, where 2 is an abstracted expression, may be combined with
another item T:d> if T:4> + V:2' —> Y:2", where 2' is produced by temporarily
removing the outermost abstraction operator and its associated bound symbol
from 2 and treating any occurrences of that bound symbol as constant while
performing the combination. The final result of the combination is formed by
replacing the abstraction symbol in front of the intermediate result, 2".
In procedural terms, the program implements this as three distinct phases - stripping of
the abstraction operator, the intermediate combination, and the replacement of the
abstract operator - implicit in the recursive execution of the defining rules above. It is
fundamental to the operation of the George system that these three phases happen within
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the analysis of one word. Thus, no information is stored outside the translation between
words; so we always have a self-contained partial translation.
This operation is called protraction because it is almost the reverse of abstraction, except
that we do not have a value with which to replace the bound symbol - if we did, we would
be doing reduction. Instead, we are assuming that there will at some stage be a
substitution for the bound symbol; and we are projecting ahead to that time, using the
protracted variable or reference as a token for the value which it will eventually take.
(This might be viewed as the extreme of adaptability - the protracted symbol is being used
to stand for any GRL entity which might later be subsituted for it.'
Under this definition, one consequence of the protraction operation might be that if the
protracted symbol appeared in the expression being combined into the protracted
expression, we could get incorrect translations when that protracted variable was
eventually combined with its own argument (because of something akin to variable
capture). However, this can never happen, because the symbols being protracted are
always unique constants (guaranteed so because they are generated individually by the
lexical lookup giving rise to them); they are therefore certain to be mutually unrelated,
and so it is safe to manipulate them independently without fear of creating contradictions.
I have included here only the rules which allow protraction to apply to the second
combinand in a combination. It seems likely that a similar operation might be required for
the first combinand, if we wish, for example, to allow combination of categories usually
composed under Steedman's Backward Crossed Composition rule, which I will discuss
further in Section 4.3. For the existing limited linguistic coverage of George, this form of
composition is not necessary.
4.2. An Example of the Use ofProtraction
To show how protraction works, I will extend the previous parsing example to one which
requires protraction. Consider the sentence "The man eats the ham.". First, we need two
new lexical entries:
ham : = n( sing): ham
eats := s\np( sing, nom )/np( , acc ): AvarNi.AvarN2.[eats,varNi,varN2l 76
With the A-protraction rule specified in 75, we can proceed as follows. The assembly of the
first noun phrase is as before (in 69 to 72). Ignoring for this example the ambiguity which
now arises between the in- and mono-transitive readings of "eats" (which is anyway
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represented at a higher level by replication of George processes), we now shift the word
"eats". This leaves us trying to find a rule to allow the combination in 77.
npfsing, ):refl~man! 4- s\np(sing, nom)/np( , acc):Avarl.Avar2.[eats,varl,var2] 77
Now, the basic combination rules given in 60 will not unify with this combination, but
when the A-protraction rule in 75 is applied, it unifies successfully, with this unifier:
{T = npfsing, ), V= s\np(sing, nom), U = np( , acc),
4> = refl "man!, 1P = Avar2.[eats,varl,var2], o= varl } 78
and initiates a recursive call of the combination operation on the combination in 79.
Recall that, when in the recursively called environment, we view varl as a constant or at
least an externally bound variable; the context of evaluation is otherwise unchanged.
np( sing, ): refl "man! + s\np( sing, nom ): Avar2.[eats,varl,var2] 79
We can make this application with the basic combination rules.
s : [eats,varl,refl "man!] 80
We have now completed the recursive call, so on returning we effectively replace the
abstraction operator which was temporarily removed to give 81:
s/np( , acc): Avarl.[eats,varl,refl'man!] 81
To perform the next combination, with an item of category np/n, we will need to use the
#-protraction rule; the form is identical to the above. Thenceforward, we can proceed
using just the basic rules, in the same way as before.
4.3. Some Comments about Protraction
Having made this definition of protraction, there are some important points to note.
4.3.1. The Structure of Syntax and Semantics
Protraction is entirely dependent on the isomorphism between syntactic and semantic
functions assumed by George. This, however, is not a disadvantage; the correspondence is
a good thing, if only because it makes lexical entries easier to understand and design.
Also, there seems to be a general intuition amongst linguists that such an isomorphism is
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in some sense "correct". It is also dependent on the first-order nature of GRL evaluation
and on the use of A-(or {5-)reduction as merely a notation of textual substitution, because
these mean that semantic function application maintains the structure of components in
the result of their combination.
4.3.2. Stacks and Non-Determinism
Protraction may be considered as enabling exactly the same effects as a stack in a
conventional shift/reduce parser, and as the stack simulation hidden in the semantic
transformation of type-raising. Indeed, the recursive nature of the definition implies the
presence of a stack behind the protraction operation. However, the actual use of the stack
in protraction is fundamentally different, in that un-combinable items are not stored for
re-trial after reading more words from the input. Instead, we are, as it were, immediately
pulling the status ofour translation forwards (hence pro-traction) to a situation, if such a
one exists, where those words will have been read and the current combination will be
possible. Therefore, we are always able to find a fully evaluated expression (if one exists)
representing the syntax and semantics of a given partial utterance. Protraction allows us
to do this without compromising our position of strictly incremental parsing, because we
never leave items stacked for longer than it takes to combine any single word. What is
more, because protraction is demand-driven (ie it only arises in response to the attempt to
combine two given categories) is can never introduce unmotivated non-determinism, as
(eg) type-raising does frequently.
The upshot of this is that all the information about a translation can always be encoded in
that translation itself, rather than being partly off-loaded into stack storage. Therefore, at
any time during the parse of a sentence, we are able to treat the current analysis as a
complete translation of the part of the utterance so far covered. This is a fundamental
requirement for a system which parses strictly incrementally.
4.3.3. Protraction and Composition
With the exception of one special case, which will be detailed in Section 6, and which is,
anyway, resultant from a particular idiosyncrasy of the representation being used here,
the protraction rules subsume the action of the more traditional composition operation
and render it obsolete. We therefore no longer need to consider it as part of our grammar
specification, improving the simplicity and uniformity ofour rule system. The proof of this
for the syntax of the usual Forward Composition and Generalised Forward Composition
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rules follows - proof of syntactic equivalence implies semantic equivalence because the
































The other common composition rule, Backward Crossed Composition, has not arisen in the
George grammar, presumably because of its limited coverage. It is not subsumed by the
existing protraction operation, which is only defined for combinations where the second
combinand is a forward function. Given the Backward Crossed Composition rule,
Y/Z + X\Y —> X/Z, it is not hard to imagine an equivalent protraction on the first
argument, with Z as the protracted symbol. If such a rule is necessary in a wider coverage
version of George, the proof of coverage would be as follows, given a suitable operation
protraction'. The addition of such an operation need not cause problems of overgeneration,
because, like all of the unconventional transformations in George parsing, it is tightly
constrained by the symbols in the data - if the operation is necessary in this grammar,















4.3.4. An Alternative Statement of Protraction
Also, one might assume that application of the protraction rules (see 75) are equivalent to
the rule in 82, which uses a A-substitution to swap the arguments to the function around,
producing the same behaviour as protraction. Symbols are as before; square brackets are
used merely to aid readability.
X: a + (Z\X)/Y: <P Z/Y: (Ax.Ay.[[<t>(y)](x)])(a) 82
This single rule, though, is not general enough for our purposes in George, because it
requires a rule for each arity of predicate appearing in position 4> of the above example. To
deal with di-transitive verbs we would therefore need a corresponding rules with three
new A's on the right hand side; for tri-transitives, one with four, and so on. We can
represent this with a schema, thus, where Y represents n forward combinations:
X : a + (Z\X)/Y : 4> Z/Y : (Ax1....Axn.[<D(x2,...xn,xi)])(a) 83
I suggest therefore that, though the above schema captures the transformation we need,
on grounds of elegance alone, the single, universal pair of rules defining protraction are
preferable to the choice between a language-dependent number of rules like 82 and the
need to introduce meta-rules like 83 into the George Parser.
Perhaps more importantly, the protraction operation captures nicely the intuition behind
what we are doing here - the idea already mentioned of holding part of the protracted
expression constant while looking ahead to a time when that part will be fully elaborated.
This intuition is not captured at all by the rule(s) suggested in 83.
4.3.5. The Procedure of Protraction
Finally, it is worth re-emphasising that, in procedural (implementational) terms,
protraction is a process in three parts: the temporary removal and storage of an
abstraction operator and its bound symbol; a recursive call of combination rules (possibly
including protraction again); and the attachment of the stored abstraction operator and
bound symbol in front of the result of the recursive call to give the final result. It is
important to understand that this process happens during combination of a single word
into an existing partial sentence; the recursive call never involves reading input data.
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5. More complicated parsing - Coercions
5.1. Introduction
The foregoing description covers the two lowest levels of parsing with the George Parser.
While this is largely adequate for parsing the kind of sentences we need to use to
exemplify underspecified reference, some thought has been given to approaches to dealing
with harder linguistic problems. Conveniently, it turns out that the same mechanism can
be used for doing this as for resolving lexical ambiguity which has been implicitly
maintained in adaptable translations. This mechanism bears a strong similarity with the
notion of coercion in strongly typed programming languages (see, for example, [Brailsford
& Walker, 1979]); therefore, I will refer to it by the same term.
A coercion is a transformation performed upon the self-contained translation of an initial
sub-sentence in order to enable it to combine with a lexical translation in a way different
from that specified by the basic grammar rules and its existing category. In the context of
phrase structure grammar, coercions might be viewed as unary grammar rules. The
particular transformation performed by any coercion is defined by the syntax, and
sometimes by the semantics, of the translation to be coerced; it may or may not also result
in changes in the syntactic and/or semantic parts of the translation.
Note that under this definition, type-raising is not a coercion, because it is defined on
lexical entries by a lexical redundancy rule. It is therefore not demand-driven, and can
(and does) introduce unnecessary non-determinism.
In order to add coercions to the George Parser, we need another general principle, which
we can express by means of a new recursive parsing rule. These rules seem to be
proliferating - this, though, is the last; and anyway, such proliferation is preferable to a
less uniform system where such ideas as coercion or protraction are "hard-wired" into the
parser. Specification of such concepts as part of a grammar is preferable, because of the
considerably greater flexibility this offers the grammar writer. The new rule specifies
that two partial translations may combine to give a (self-contained) result if there exists a
coercion (~*) which adapts the first combinand to a partial translation which combines
with the second combinand to give that result. The formal statement of the rule is thus:
X : ^ + Y : ip -> Z 4= A X': + Y : ip -> Z : £ 83
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The symbol denotes the "coerces to" relation, defined by the grammar-writer, and
discussed in Section 5.2. Note that, although the rule's recursive nature allows more than
one coercion to be applied, coercions are only applicable to the partial sentence (ie the left
hand side) in a combination. This is because application of coercions to (protractions of)
lexical entries is equivalent to the existence of deductive lexical entries or lexical
redundancy rules, which we already have. The point of a coercion is to allow adaptability
within a partial translation, not between lexical entries.
5.2. Examples ofCoercion
A simple example of coercions is that which deals with one form of elliptical noun phrase,
the kind where the head noun is omitted in a phrase selecting one of two referents (by
colour in this case), as in 84a (where the gap is indicated by 0). Note that this form of
ellipsis is not universally applicable, as in the ill-formed 84b. As an ad hoc approximation
for the purposes of example, I will suppose that only colours allow this form - though this
is clearly not general.
"John owned blue and red t-shirts. The blue 0 suited him." 84a
* "John owned striped and spotted t-shirts. The striped 0 suited him." 84b
In the second sentence of 84a, we can transform the n/n category we have at the end of the
first noun phrase to an n category, using the coercion defined in 85. This coercion is
unusually simple, because of the (non-ideal) non-uniform representation of adjectives in
George, which will be covered later. The coercion states that any left-complete phrase
lacking a head noun, which would, were it present, become part of a reference whose
defining properties are currently only colour (the calls to the sort of and subsumes
predicates), may be viewed as the completed phrase. As before, upper case letters denote
variables and is the "don't care" unnamed variable. Lower case Roman letters denote
constants; greek letters denote semantic expressions. The sort of relation relates a
reference and an expression to the sort of the reference as defined by that expression. (For
example, sort of{ refl, [eats.refl "man!], man ).)
C/n( ): r#a C : a 4= sort of\ r, a, a) A colour subsumes a 85
Remember that the formula on the right hand side of the <= may in principle be arbitrarily




The parse of the second sentence of 84a, then, runs as follows (the syntactic category
features are omitted for clarity). Recall that the inclusion of a composition step is specific
to adjectives and that this is a spurious exception of which details are given in Section 6.
np/n : refl#refl! + n/n: blue
—composition—► np/n: refl#refl "blue! 86a
np/n : refl #refl"blue! + s\np/np : Avarl.Avar2.[suited,varl,var2]
—"call" protraction—> np/n : refl#refl "blue! + s\np : Avar2.[suited,varl,var2] 86b
In satisying the right hand side conditions of the protraction rule, 75, we make (recursive)
use of the combination rules, in an environment in which varl is a constant. The attempt
to match this new combination with the left hand side of a combination rule will fail in all
cases except with the rule which introduces coercion of the left hand combinand.
Syntactically and semantically, this unifies with the coercion given in 85.
np/n : refl#refl "blue! + s\np : Avar2.[suited,varl,var2]
-coercion—* np : refl"blue! + s\np : Avar2.[suited,varl,var2]
—application—» s : [suited,varl,refl "blue!] 86c
Now that we have completed this combination to yield a single translation, we are free to
return from the recursive call in the protraction rule, which will result in the
reinstatement of the A in front of the protracted expression, after which rightward
application may proceed normally.
s/np : Avarl.[suited,varl,refl "blue!] + np : ref2"male!
-application—* s : [suited,ref2~male!,refl "blue!] 86d
This is the required translation, according to the definitions in Chapter 4.
As a further, more complicated example, we can use coercions to deal with relative clauses
which are not explicitly marked with a relative pronoun, as in example 87.
"The man I saw 0 kicked the donkey." 87
Now, this particular form can only appear when the trace is not the subject of the relative
clause - otherwise, the relative pronoun is obligatory. This is exactly the kind of thing
coercions are good at expressing - the unification constraints on their introduction may be
specified as tightly or as loosely as is necessary (ie by means of an arbitrary logical
expression), even, should we wish to, down to specifying a coercion applicable only to a
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particular partial sentence. Going this far, though, would devalue the George parser and
the particular grammar in question as a general solution to the parsing problem.
So what we need to express in this case is that a noun phrase ("The man") with a semantic
translation 2, say, may be coerced into a categorial syntactic function taking object-less
transitive verb phrases ("I saw 0") and yielding post-modified noun phrases, and that 2 is
to be transformed in a corresponding way, if and only if the syntactic transformation is
possible.
It so happens that this raises another problem as well - one which is fundamental to
incremental parsing. I mentioned in Chapter 3 that post-modification is a linguistic
phenomenon which is at odds with the incremental approach. Ideally, if we want to
maintain isomorphism between syntactic and semantic structures, we would like to view
noun phrase post-modification as the backward application of a categorial function
mapping noun phrases to noun phrases. For a post-modified noun phrase at the front of a
sentence, this is trivially adequate. However, when we are parsing the noun phrases later
in the sentence we have as our translation so far, not, in general, something of category
np, but something of category s or s/X where X is some other arbitrary category. For
example, suppose we have the following naive lexical entry for a relative pronoun, where
T> is a semantic function:
who : = ((np/(s\np/np))/np)\np: <I> 88
(The lexical entry represents a function applying backwards to a noun phrase to yield a
function applying forwards to a noun phrase and then a transitive verb.) Suppose that we
are translating the sentence
"The donkey kicks the man who beats him." 89
and that we have reached the stage where we have read, translated and composed the
partial sentence "The donkey kicks the man", and have read the "who". Since we have
characterised the relative as a function applying backwards to noun phrases, we now need
to perform the combination (where a is a semantic expression representing the translation
so far):
s : a + ((np/(s\np/np))/np)\np : T> -application—> ((s/(s\np/np))/np): V 90
which is impossible under our definition of application, because s does not unify with
((np/(s\np/np))/np)\np. Further, V is some expression which we cannot specify - it is
impossible directly to pick out the part of the semantic translation which relates to the
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noun phrase, because there is no syntactic correspondence with which to unpack the
translation. [Pareschi, 1988] suggests a solution to this, using a chart to allow unpicking
of the path of compositions leading to the current translation. This solution is
unsatisfying here, because it contradicts the initial premise of incremental parsing. Since
this postmodification problem is not fundamental to George's area of interest it is enough
here to circumvent it; the particular circumvention used here, though, is a good example
of the power of adaptable representations, and of the use of coercions to manipulate them.
The argument behind my solution runs as follows.
One obvious way of treating this special post-modifying case might be to express it as an
exception to the basic grammar with the following coercion, from np to post-modified np
(characterised as function from post-modifiers - nmods - to noun phrases):
np: a np/nmod: AvarN.[varN,a] ►a 91
According to our combination rules, this would be applicable to complete noun phrases
just before they combined with the immediately subsequent word if that word had result
category nmod. However, this is inadequate, for the same reason as the backwards
application approach outlined above: in the case of a noun phrase not at the start of a
sentence, the np will have been subsumed into a "higher" category (probably s) by the
time it is complete; therefore, the coercion will not unify.
We can, however, adapt this idea, to produce a slightly less elegant form, which seems to
do the job. Consider the coercion in 92:
X/n: p#a X/nmod/n: p#AvarN.[varN,p] ► a 92
This coercion will now apply as soon as we attempt to combine any determiner or
quantifier (np/n) with the rest of its noun phrase. However, while this is certainly a viable
solution, there is a danger that it might introduce a kind of spurious non-determinism,
because of the variable on the left hand side of the specification. This is unsatisfying,
because the whole point ofcoercions is to enable adaptability - which is supposed to reduce
non-determinism.
So let us consider another solution. An approach using the lexical redundancy rule partly
equivalent to the coercion in 92 includes np/n entries as data in the lexicon, and deduces
from them (via that lexical rule) a second lexical entry (of category np/nmod/n) for each
word of the simpler category. This again solves the problem, but, as a side effect, increases
non-determinism in the parse just as much as type raising, which is undesirable.
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Now, suppose instead that we were strictly to follow our declared intention in the design of
the George system to make translations adaptable and represent ambiguity implicitly.
Then, we could use a representation of noun phrases which is syntactically and
semantically ambiguous between post-modified and plain noun phrases. We could use a
coercion in a way much closer to coercions' supposed purpose: to resolve or at least reduce
the ambiguity once we know the correct way to do so.
The effect we want to achieve is this. From one ambiguous translation of category X/n for
some X (ie a translation which has just incorporated a determiner), we must produce
either of the translations shown in 93, using one precisely defined coercion.
Now, it so happens that the functional expression in GRL for a phrase which is post-
modifiable contains all the information contained in its non-post-modifiable equivalent
(compare the two translations above). Therefore, if we can supply a coercion which will
remove the extra information on demand, we have exactly such an ambiguous notation,
ready made, in the form of the post-modifable version above. To introduce such a form into
the system is easy: each determiner or quantifier is replaced in the lexicon (NB - lexical
non-determinism is not increased) by its post-modifiable form.
Because of the quantifier expansion operation defined in Chapter 4, which ensures that
context extensions are always at the fronts of GRL expressions, we can define a very
simple coercion to do the simplification we need (something looking for an nmod into
something not). The coercion applies after combination of the head noun into the phrase,
so the final /n ofexample 93 has already been combined away, a is a variable over variable
symbols and X a variable over categories. Q is an arbitrarily complex series of nested
quantifiers.
This coercion, unlike the earlier suggestion, cannot repeatedly add categories to the
current translation: either it removes the nmod or it does not. Therefore, non-determinism
is only introduced if there is explicit justification for it (eg if the next word can both
introduce an nmod and combine directly with the category X above).
In proposing this mechanism, we seem to have dealt with a serious general problem of
incremental parsing, and reduced non-determinism in George at the same time - the
X/n: refNi#p
X/nmod/n : refNi#AvarN2-[varN2,refNi] ► p 93
X/nmod : Xv. Q. [a,a] ►a X : Q a 94
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latter because the "non-modified determiner" reading is only ever considered when the
coercion rule matches with something following the noun phrase which is not a post-
modifier but which can combine with a "plain" noun phrase.
Returning, then, to our particular example,
( "The man I saw 0 kicked the donkey." 87)
we now have a uniform means of incorporating both plain noun phrases and post-modified
ones into our translation when they appear in the input.
What we need next is a means of connecting the subject noun phrase of the subordinate
clause (category np), "I" in this example, with an item of category nmod in order that we
may start to combine the np postmodifier with its antecedent. We need such a connection
because of the absence of information from this kind of relative clause which would
normally arise from the pronoun - ie that explicit relative pronouns yield category nmod.
The coercion specified in 95 allows us to make the connection (r is a variable ranging over
references; u ranges over variable symbols). The coercion allows the transformation of a
phrase lacking an nmod into one lacking a relative-pronoun-less relative clause; it is
introduced by the attempt to combine an object of category X/nmod with one of category X
(or of any category which can be reduced to X by A-protraction), because the left hand side
of the general coercion application rule matches the combination.
XJ nmod : \u. Q. [e,r] ► r (X/(s\np/np))/np : Aa.AvarN. Q. [[varN,r],u] 95
So what we have here is a rule applicable to one particular category in certain
circumstances to produce a new form in order to enable a particular combination. As such,
it sounds very like (and as ad hoc as) Steedman's type raising. However, this is not
actually so.
First, the coercion is part of a more general mechanism; unlike type-raising, it does not
exist in isolation as a class of operation. Secondly, it is defined genuinely in the spirit of
CG - that is, the rule that introduces it is all the definition it needs - as opposed to the
general abstract precept that only some categories may be type-raised. Thirdly, it does not
introduce lexical ambiguity. Fourthly, and finally, this coercion enables the same
combination as is enabled by the existence of a translation of "which" or "that" in the
lexicon. The existence and effect of the coercion in a sense corresponds with that of the
relative pronoun in language; it may therefore be justified by the same linguistic
argument, and so has equally valid status in George.
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The effect of introducing a coercion mechanism in an adaptable system is to shuffle some
structural ambiguity into non-determinism over which coercion to apply. This is
preferable, first on the grounds that no early decision can generally be made on choosing a
correct unambiguous structure (so the representation needs to remain ambiguous and
adaptable), and secondly because coercions are demand-driven, so choice points are not
generated - the decision is simply delayed until enough information is received to make it
the correct choice, in line with the basic idea ofadaptability.
In conclusion, I should point out that coercion is orthogonal to protraction, in that the
actual transformation expressed by the combination rule only ever applies to the left hand
combinand, whereas that expressed by the protraction rule only applies to the right.
Therefore, because George performs an exhaustive search over the combinations
generated by the rules, it does not matter in which order we protract or coerce, even if the
operations are interleaved; eventually, the same result(s) will be achieved, albeit in a
different (but, in George, irrelevant) order.
5.3. Coercions used in George
There follows a list of the coercions allowed in the current implementation of the George
system. The coercions are classified according to function; the full expansion of the
category features has been included for completeness. As with the rules specified before,
this is a necessary set; however, it seems very unlikely that it might be sufficient.
One obviously missing set of coercions is that covering the verbs "to be" and "to have".
These could clearly make possible the replacement of the large number of lexical entries
for the numerous different semantic forms with one for each syntactic form, the
appropriate coercion from a general translation to a specific one being selected, through
unification with the coercion combination rule, by the attempt to combine with, say, a
subsequent adjective, noun phrase, or participle.
As before, upper case letters denote variables, and lower case, constants; Roman letters
describe (parts of) syntactic data and Greek letters, semantic data which can be viewed as
atomic in this context. denotes the unnamed variable, "don't care".
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Head noun anaphor (for colours only)
sort of is a relation mapping a reference, r, and an expression in GRL, a, containing r, to
the sort of r, o, as defined by a.
C/n( ): r#a ^ C:a <= sort of( r, a, o) A colour subsumes o
The subsumes predicate is as specified in Chapter 4. Recall the earlier note that this
coercion is an ad hoc approximation; the real conditions for application of this coercion are
much more complex. Nevertheless, they can be expressed in the arbitrary logical formula
in the right hand side of this rule.
Post-Modifiable NP conversion
X/nmod( , ): Xv. Q. [u,r] ►a ^ X: Q. a
Q denotes an arbitrarily complex nested set of quantifiers and abstractions; r ranges over
references, v over variable symbols.
Post-Modification byRelative Clauses withoutRelative Pronouns
X/ nmod(N, ): Xv. Q. [u,r] ► a
(X/(s\np(M,nom)/np(N,acc)))/np(M,nom): Ao.AvarP. Q. [[varP,r],u] ► a
N and M are variables relating the respective numbers of the parts of the references
together under unification.
Note that in all these cases, the effect of the coercion may be viewed as mapping from an
ambiguous representation to a more specific one - even the coercion for head noun
anaphors (above) can be viewed as changing an ambiguous category np/n to the more
specific category, n.
6. An Element ofNon-Uniformity
Now, unfortunately, there is one element of non-uniformity in these definitions: adjectives
(functional category n/n) are not defined semantically as abstractions. This violates the
principle assumed here (to make the A-protraction operation general) that the number of
abstractions in the semantics of a word be the same as the arity of its category, and
therefore must be treated as a special case. The problem is due to a specific design decision
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in George, which was made in order to facilitate the notation and incremental composition
of noun phrases: adjectives are treated as composing with determiners and quantifiers,
even though they do not have a functional semantic structure. It would disappear if, for
example, the George representation were adapted to one where nouns and adjectives were
considered as functions over determiners (as is becoming a prevalent trend among CG
users) rather than the other way round (which is the status quo). However, since this
imbalance does not adversely affect the central purpose of the George system (viz the
analysis of noun phrase reference), it is not necessary to to correct it here.
We do, however, need an extra, regrettably ad hoc rule to deal with the case (° denotes a
special semantic composition for adjectives, defined in Chapter 4, Section 7.1.4):
X/n: 4> + n/n: a —* X/n: 43 a 96
The consoling point about this is, of course, that the very irregularity of this rule adds
strength to the suggestion above that the problem is indeed derived from violation of the
principle of congruence between syntactic and semantic translations.
Note, incidentally, that instead of including a completely spurious composition rule, we
could have more uniformly written a second clause for the #-protraction rule to cover this
case. However, use of the composition rule indicates more clearly that this is genuinely a
special case, which is preferable.
7. Categorial Grammar and Adaptability
Now, I must return to the issue deferred from Section 2.3 of this chapter, regarding the
suitability of categorial grammar formalisms for George's kind of parsing. Why is
categorial grammar (or at least an equivalent formalism ) so well suited to parsing with
adaptable representations?
One feature of CG is its ability to express the syntactic form of any well-formed partial
sentence, rather than just that of constituents as in, say, Phrase Structure grammars. As
mentioned before, this latter function in itself is fundamental to strictly incremental
parsing. It is also fundamental to adaptability. To maintain full adaptability of
representation, we wish to define coercions, which are transformations between (partial)
translations. The specification of such a transformation would be much harder than it is
in George if one could not always be sure of the existence of a single, self-contained
translation of the sentence being parsed.
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Another important feature of categorial grammar in George is the explicit representation
of syntactic category in correspondence with the structure of the related semantic
information. This is important to adaptability at a practical level: in general, we need all
the information we can get if we are successfully to specify the preconditions of coercions.
In particular, it would not be helpful if the syntax were {eg) encoded in a tree, separate
from the semantic representation. The specification of coercions if either of the above
requirements were not met would be much less elegant than it is.
On these bases, categorial grammar is ideally suited for the work presented here, and for
incremental parsing with adaptable representations in general.
8. Summary
8.1. The George Parser
In this chapter, I have explained the following points about the George Parser.
1. The George process model is a loop, adding translations of new input, strictly word by
word, into each one of a set of possible translations-so-far. Failure of a possible
translation to combine with a new word causes the translation to be deleted. If a word
can combine in more than one way, an appropriate number of new translations
replace the old one. If the set of translations becomes empty, the parse has failed.
2. Within the possible translations, the discourse memory of previously parsed complete
utterances is maintained separately from the partial translation of the current
utterance in each.
3. On receipt of an end of sentence marker, successful utterance completion is detected
by checking for certain distinguished syntactic categories, and causes transfer of the
current translation and associated reference information to the discourse memory and
its reference information.
4. The Parser has no knowledge of the decisions made by the rest of the George system,
except where the reference analysis for a translation has failed, in which case the
Parser may be instructed to give up on that translation.




6. The output of the Parser is formulated in the George Representation Language which
is specially designed for the representation of referential expressions and the
application ofoperations fundamental to their analysis by the DeReferencer.
7. The strictly incremental, stack-free nature of the Parser enforces incremental
parsing. This provides a strict framework for experiment. It also means that we have
at all times a single self-contained (partial) representation of the current utterance,
which is a precondition for elegant adaptability.
8. In accordance with the "ambiguity" hypothesis of Chapter 3, Section 2.3, the Parser
maintains lexical ambiguity in translations until it is resolved in the input. Coercions
help make this possible.
9. Coercions are necessary for parsing adaptably. Incremental parsing requires a self-
contained representation of partial sentences. Therefore, CG is an ideal tool.
10. Improvements are made in determinism over existing approaches by systems
including either protraction or coercion.
11. Protraction replaces type raising and functional composition, and is demand driven.
12. Coercion allows adaptable representations of multiple readings in one GRL form to be
transformed into another representing fewer readings. Non-determinism is reduced
because disambiguation is demand driven
8.2. Parsing Rules
The combination rules for George are as follows. Note that the third basic combination
rule, for adjectives, is a special case necessary for this particular semantic representation.
The applicability of the combinations is determined by the following factors: unification of
the combinands with the left hand side of the rule; successful application of any conditions
applied to the rule (including the recursive calls in the protraction and coercion rules);




First word: 0 : 0 + X : <P
Forwards Application: XJY : <t> + Y : a
Backwards Application: Y : a + XYY : <I>
Composition for Adjectives: X/n : + n/n : a
End ofSentence: X: + 0:0
Combination withProtraction
X : + V/U : Xv.W -> Y/U : Ao.S «= X : 4> + V : V -► Y: 2
X : <P + V/U : r#V> -» Y/U : r#S <= X : <P + V : ¥ -> Y : 2
Combination with Coercion
X : ^ + Y : ip -> Z : < <= X : $ X': ? A X': V + Y : q; -» Z: £
8.3. Coercions
Head noun anaphor (for colours only)
C/n( ): r#a C:a <= sort of\ r, a, o) A colour subsumes a
Post-Modifiable NP conversion
X/nmod( , ): Xv. Q. [o,r] ► a X : Q. a
Post-Modification by Relative Clauses withoutRelative Pronouns
XJ nmod(N, ): Xv. Q [u,r] ► a
(X/(s\np(M,nom)/np(N,acc)))/np(M,nom): Ao.AvarP. Q. [[varP,r],u] ► a
9. Afterword
This chapter has discussed the operation of the George Parser in its full detail. This in
itself emphasises how simple and uniform a system George is. While there is a fair
amount of work which could still be done to follow up the possibilities of coercion driven
incremental parsing, enough has been done to enable an approach to the central work





—> X : <I> 4= distinsuishedi X
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Even in this embryonic form, the George parser has proved to be an efficient and reliable
framework within which to develop ideas about incremental reference evaluation. These






A general overview of the process model of the George DeReferencer is presented. The rules
which determine the behaviour of the process are introduced.
The rules are discussed in the same step-by-step style as in earlier work by Mellish. Each
linguistic possibility is dealt with separately, the relevant parts of the dereferencing
mechanism being introduced at the appropriate points.
I first deal with simple cases where each singular reference introduces a new entity and develop
this into definite singular reference. Post-modified noun-phrases are dealt with through the
idea of context extension, and, finally, the notation for and behaviour of plural references is
introduced.
In particular, this last is done with only minimal changes to the overall mechanism developed
initially. Thus, I conclude that the George DeReferencer is a particularly simple and uniform
solution to the basic problems of reference.
This chapter introduces a new treatment of noun-phrase post-modification, in particular by
relative clauses, and an associated view of pattern matching in this context which partly
vindicates the decision to separate references and entity tokens in George.
1. Introduction
It should be clear by this stage of our discussion that the aspects of this work related to
reference evaluation are heavily motivated by earlier advances with comparable ideas by
Chris Mellish. A detailed comparison with Mellish's work (and that of Bonnie Webber
[Webber, 1979], which is also fundamental to George) will be made in Chapter 8
This chapter explains the basic behaviour of the George system with respect to reference.
As such, it is largely devoted to the reconstruction of the ideas presented in [Mellish, 1981]
and [Webber, 1979], in a framework appropriate to the view of language understanding
presented in the first three chapters of this document. It is necessary, in particular, to
show that the use of adaptable representations need not compromise the ability of a
system to perform those reference analysis tasks which Mellish and Webber's systems
could perform. Beyond this, the view here is rather different from both of these earlier
theses, in that no attempt is made to find one general universal rule for reference
analysis. Rather the problem is divided up according to the linguistic properties which
define the data, and individual rules are formulated based on these properties.
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2. The George DeReferencer
2.1. The Top Level
In Chapter 3,1 explained that the George DeReferencer runs in (pseudo-)parallel with the
George Parser in each of the basic George systems making up the set of possible
translations for the input utterance. For convenience, Figure 2a, the schematic diagram of
the layout of the basic George system given before, is reproduced here.






The DeReferencer is a separate process from the Parser, autonomous, except that it is
dependent on the Parser for input and that should either process fail (and therefore die)
the other will kill itself in sympathy, along with the whole of the rest of the possible
translation. Direct input from the Parser to the DeReferencer is in the form of sets of
references - that is to say, reference symbols, as defined in Chapter 4, and the sort,
number, definiteness and context extension information associated with them by the
discourse input - extracted from the translation in GRL of the Parser's input. Either the
elements of these sets are new references or they already exist; this is detectable by
comparing reference symbols, which are unique to each reference in the discourse. If they
already exist, the new version, just received from the Parser, replaces the old version
known to the DeReferencer, on the grounds that it may have been adapted (eg by the
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noun-phrase post-modifier coercion) and that consistency between the different parts of
the system must be maintained. The DeReferencer is allowed read access to the Discourse
Memory, entity tokens, and bindings (both local to the current sentence and global across
the whole discourse) within the current translation. It may also write its own results - in
the form of creation, refinement and deletion of individual bindings and/or entity tokens
data - into the appropriate database. Finally, the DeReferencer has read access to
knowledge of discourse world sorts and axioms for (limited) real world deduction to enable
it to reason about reference.
Effectively, George simulates an interleaved or parallel execution of the Parser and
DeReferencer, which is certainly what is needed (having forbidden backtracking and
given an incremental evaluation of semantics) in order to enforce strictly incremental
evaluation of reference. While it would not be particularly fruitful to build such an
implementation in existing parallel (logic) programming languages (because the relevant
technology is still under development), it is clear, because of the almost trivially simple
protocols for inter-process communication in George (ie one unidirectional data stream
and one bidirectional suicide pact), that genuine parallelisation of the basic George
system on this coarse level would not be hard.
2.2. Some Terms
It will be useful here to (re-)explain some terminology and some of the structure ofGeorge.
Referring to the restated diagram above, recall from Chapter 5 that the Discourse Memory
is the repository for the "surface form" translations of the input to the Parser.
As mentioned above, the DeReferencer is able to write information into two logically
separate databases. One contains information about bindings - that is to say,
specifications of a (possible) mapping between the content of the Discourse Memory and
that of the Entity Tokens Database; the other, namely that same Entity Tokens database,
contains information hypothesised by the DeReferencer about the entities taking part in
the discourse.
The World Knowledge database supplies knowledge about the property/value pairs which
define sorts (Sort and SortDef, as defined in Chapter 4). Reasoning about the sorts is
performed in terms of consistency and subsumption (again, as defined in Chapter 4), and
is encoded in the George algorithm. The limited discourse world inference available in
George is also encoded in the program, though a genuinely separate database would be
preferable for theoretical purity.
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Bindings are relations between sets of references and sets ofentity tokens. It will be useful
to distinguish the case where the set of entity tokens has only one member. I will call this
a singleton binding.
Finally, the combination of the Discourse Memory, the Entity Tokens and the Bindings
databases gives us the finished translation, subject to the limitations of the current
George implementation, which does not include the Discourse Entity level of reference
mentioned in Chapter 3.
2.3. The George DeReferencing Algorithm
The top-level algorithm of the George DeReferencer is as follows. Parts marked ® to ©
are lower level sections which will be explained later, © being covered in Chapter 7. Input
is in the form of sets of references (output by the Parser, as explained in Chapter 3)
Output consists of creating and deleting bindings and entity tokens and their associated
information in the respective databases; and in causing a complete translation to fail if its
reference analysis fails.
On receipt of a set of references from the Parser, for each reference symbol in the set,
perform each one of the following actions.
If the reference symbol is new to the DeReferencer® then
1. a. create a new binding for it, then...
b. If its reference is definite®, find the entity token(s) to which it may refer®
and insert them into the binding;
c. If its reference is indefinite®, create a new entity token and insert it into the
binding;
otherwise
2. a. look up its existing binding, then...
b. Combine any new information® about the reference with that already
contained in the binding, discarding any erstwhile candidate entity tokens
which are now made inconsistent®. Check that entity tokens removed are
not left newly unbound; if any are, remove them from the Entity Tokens
database.
3. If the binding of this reference contains no entity tokens (ie if the reference is
completely new, or no existing token was found to be consistent, or all the tokens
previously found to be consistent were deleted on grounds of inconsistency on this
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latest iteration), search backwards through discourse memory for expressions
containing references bound to entity tokens of consistent sort with this reference.
Apply the underspecified reference mechanism® to each such expression until
one is found which yields success under that mechanism; then rewrite the
bindings and if necessary the expression itself to create entity tokens for the
bindings in the current sentence.
Finally,
4. If the reference is definite and its binding contains no entity tokens (ie if all the
tokens previously found to be consistent were deleted on grounds of inconsistency
on this latest iteration), create a new entity token with the appropriate
properties® and insert it into both the Entity Tokens database and the binding.
The aspects ofGeorge's operation which extend previous reference analysis work are to be
found in sections marked ® (in particular) and ®, and in part 3. These and the other
labelled sections will be explained in detail below, step by step; and a summary is
presented at the end of this chapter. Part 3 of the algorithm is the main focus of the work
presented here. It will be covered in Chapter 7.
As in the design of the George Parser, an attempt has been made here to divide the
operation of the DeReferencing system into a simple, general, repetitive procedure (given
above), and a set of more declarative rules which determine its exact action within that
procedure. The rules, defined in terms of primitives such as consistency (as in Chapter 4),
will be summarised later, when the ideas expressed in them have been developed through
example. This division is certainly desirable for the purposes of research, since it enables
us to see clearly which effects are caused by procedural interaction (which is important in
terms both of examining incremental parsing and reference analysis and of general
(pseudo-)parallel processing) and which effects result from our specification of the rules
defining the process.
These rules, then, define the operation of the sub-algorithms mentioned above; they will
be the focus of the rest of this chapter, since they and the behaviour they describe
constitute the central theme of this research.
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3. Analysing Noun Phrase Reference
3.1. Introduction
In this and the subsequent sections, I develop the process of reference analysis from the
simplest possible case to the most complicated kind of quantified reference covered by
George. As did Mellish, I will start with simple examples and elaborate, the idea being
that, having solved the most basic case, we can "try to retain the simplicity of the system
which works for this case, whilst gradually introducing more and more sophisticated
features to cope with the obvious drawbacks" ([Mellish, 1985], p38). In each case, I will
summarise the system's behaviour in a rule, which will be a formal restatement of part of
the algorithm specified in the last section. It is worth mentioning here that all the GRL
expressions and bindings used for the running example in this chapter were taken
directly from the output of the working system1. The full output is given in Appendix B.
3.2, The Simplest Case
3.2.1. Introduction
First, then, we must consider the very simplest case possible - that where a noun phrase
(ie in George terms, a reference) just introduces a new entity. This is, of course, to an
extent begging part of the original question - since we cannot in general detect when a
noun phrase really is introductory. I will in this respect make the common simplifying
assumption that an indefinite reference introduces a new entity token, and that indefinite
references are therefore never non-introductory.
Note, incidentally, that what we are dealing with here is not the simplest possible kind of
reference (for the first sentence of the example contains post-modified noun phrases), but
the simplest possible response by the DeReferencing system to the appearance of a
reference at the output of the Parser.
The example which Mellish gives at this point in his explanation is shown in 105.
"A particle ofmass b rests on a smooth table." 105
1: Some symbols and layout have been changed to improve readability.
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This example is specialised to the domain of data Mellish was considering (viz A-level
mechanics problems), and is inappropriate for my purposes because I have not considered
valued modifiers like "of mass b". Instead, I will explain the comparable, but more
suitable, example shown in 106.
3.2.2. Parsing a Simple Introductory Noun Phrase
So now let us consider the detailed trace of George's operation for sentence 106. As I
explained in Chapter 3, the input to the DeReferencer from the Parser is in the form of
sets ofGeorge references extracted by the Parser's output stage from increasingly (ie word
by word) detailed approximations to the complete translation of the input utterance.
The first datum received from the Parser arises from input of the word "A". It is a set
containing one simple unsorted indefinite reference (as defined in Chapter 4), simply
Now, we know that this reference is indefinite, because it does not contain the ! operator.
This is test © in the higher level algorithm given before. We also know that it contains a
new reference symbol (NB as opposed to referring to a new discourse entity, which is not
the same thing) simply because the DeReferencer has no previous record of it. This is test
© - a simple search and textual comparison. We conclude, therefore, we must add the
reference to the new bindings list. By definition, we now need an entity token to which to
bind it; so we create one, which is step © in the higher level algorithm. So far, we have
used Rule 1. (A complete list of the dereferencing rules is given for quick reference in
Appendix C.)
A new indefinite simple reference is always bound to a new entity token
created for that purpose.
Rule 1: Simple Indefinite Reference
In the top-level George algorithm given above, we have now completed a whole pass: for
the only reference supplied, we followed part la and then part 3. In doing so, we created a




new entity token, say el, which we must add to our Entity Tokens database, and a
corresponding binding. These are shown in 108a and b, respectively.
The general form of these bindings is as follows. The binding is an ordered pair of sets, the
first being of references, and the second of entity tokens. The binding may be thought of as
connecting the Discourse Memory with the approximations (viz entity tokens) George has
made to the discourse entities (specified by the entity tokens) in the discourse world. In
most of the examples in this chapter, I will omit to state the explicit list of entity tokens,
since it is trivially deducible from the bindings and only clutters the explanation.
In most cases, the set of references is singleton. The only possibility (in general) which can
give rise to a non-singleton set is that in which two or more references are explicitly
coreferential (eg are connected by an equative) and marked as such by the application of
the corefoperator in the Discourse Memory. The binding containing the set of references
may then be thought of as a conjunctive form, making the single binding equivalent to a
collection of bindings between each member of the set of references and the entire set of
entity tokens (see below) at the other end of the binding. The chosen notation is preferable
to separate bindings because it enables George to maintain consistency between such
coreferential references implicitly, which is much easier than if they were split into
separate bindings. (An alternative view might be one of unification of references.)
The set of entities at the other end of a binding is, in the same sense as in Mellish's use of
the term, a candidate set, that is to say, each entity token symbol contained therein is the
name of an entity token which is proposed by George as a possible referent for the
reference(s) in the binding. Various criteria determine whether such a binding is
referentially well-formed in the final analysis: for example, to be well-formed, simple
(singular) references must be bound to an entity token which was introduced by a simple
reference (so that a singular reference may not refer to a plural object). Note that the
candidate set is not always a disjunction, although it may look like one in the first simple
examples; indexed (plural) references may be bound to more than one entity token,
allowing reference to split, non-uniform sets, in which case the interpretation is
conjunctive. I will give examples of these in Section 6.4.








Now we apply our algorithm again, this time following option 2a first, because the
reference symbol is already known (test ©). We have simply to add to the binding the new
sort information (© in the higher level algorithm) to give:
({refl'man }, {el}) 110
The addition of the sort information to the reference in the binding, rather than to the
entity token directly, expresses the fact that the correctness of the binding is conditional
upon consistency of that sort information with any that may subsequently arrive from
other bindings to the entity token. If the new information is to be considered genuinely
applicable to any non-empty subset of the set of entity tokens in the binding, it must first
be consistent (in the formal way defined in Chapter 4) with any already applied by this
reference -otherwise, the reference is self-contradictory (as in "Colourless green ideas...")
and does not make sense in the current discourse world (test ®). Second, (and only in the
case of non-introductory reference, for obvious reasons) it must be consistent with any
sort and number information calculated and supposed to be correct (more about which
later) from previous and subsequent utterances, which is stored in the Entity Tokens
database.
In this case, the first of these conditions is trivially fulfilled, since there is no existing sort
information in the reference. The second is also trivially true, since this entity token was
introduced by this reference - and therefore there can be no information associated with it
by previous references with which it might be inconsistent.
Finally, certain criteria (covering effects like non-coreference within clauses, formally
stated in Rule 6) are applied to the binding. If they are successful, and if the binding, for a
singular reference, is singleton, the sort information passes from the reference part of the
binding to the entity token in the Entity Tokens database. In this example, the criteria
are successful. The binding can only be singleton, because of the way it was created; and so
the sort information passes immediately to the entity token. This was Rule 2.
New sort information applied to a simple reference is passed to the entity
token in its candidate set only when that set (and hence the binding) is
singleton. Otherwise, any candidate entity tokens which are inconsistent
with the new information are removed from the candidate set.
Rule 2: Sort Refinement
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3.3. Parsing a Relative Clause
The foregoing section, then, covers how we deal with indefinite introductory cases in
George. Now we move on to parse the next word in our example, "who". In George, "who"
has two lexical entries, one of which covers the usage where "who" is synonymous with
"whom" (ie where the relative pronoun does not refer to the subject of the subordinate
clause). For the sake of clarity in our example, I will explain only the behaviour of the
translation arising from combination with the entry leading to success when parsing this
sentence (viz that where the gap in the relative clause is in the subject position). The other
translation is expressed by a basic George system logically independent of the successful
one, and, anyway, dies after input of the next word - as we would wish - because of
unification failure between its own syntax and that of the new word. The set of references
resulting from the eventually successful combination is:
At this stage, if the context extension (the predicate to the left of the ► operator), were
closed (as defined in Chapter 4), the DeReferencer would compare the context extension
with previous sentences in the discourse in an attempt to use the information in it to
refine references. The detail of this comparison will be covered in Section 5.4. However,
since the expression contains the variable, varl, the predicate is not yet closed, and is
therefore too general to match meaningfully with a finished translation. Because of this,
the DeReferencer simply attempts to refine el by incorporating any further information
conveyed by the simple sorted reference embedded in the context extension, in the usual
way. In this case there is none, and so we have finished this pass of the higher level
algorithm.
When we read the word "is" we are presented with the following set of references (again,
for purposes of example, ignoring lexical entries leading to an incorrect translation):
The DeReferencer's behaviour with this reference is the same as at the previous stage
explained above, for the same reasons.
Finally, in this noun phrase, we read the word "unkind", and receive the following
reference from the Parser:
{[varl,refl"man] ► refl"man} 112
{coref( var2, refl"man) ► refl"man } 113
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{coref( ref2"unkind, refl "man) ► refl "man } 114
Now, the appearance of the coref operator states that the two references which are its
arguments are co-referential. Therefore, we can economically represent the reference by
transforming the binding given in 108 to that in 115a and applying the same criteria as
before to license transfer of the sort information to the entity token, yielding the entity
token set shown in 115b.
As explained before, the pair of references in the binding expresses the coreference of refl
and ref2; and the singleton set ofentity token symbols is the set of candidates for reference
by those references.
Now, as it does after reading every new word in the current sentence, the DeReferencer
again attempts to compare the context extension in 114 with the information already
conveyed by the discourse. (This attempt is included in part © of the higher level
algorithm.) In this case, the expression will not match with any preceding clause, simply
because none exists. The context extension therefore has no referential effect. Following
the successful application of the structural criteria mentioned before, the sort information
from the two reference symbols is free to be passed to the entity token.
So, we have now completed the first noun phrase. To summarise, we have a single
translation of the surface form of the referring expression, linked by an explicit binding to
a single database entry containing all the information known about the entity as it exists
in the discourse world.
3.4. Parsing a Transitive Verb Phrase
Let us now proceed quickly through the rest of our example sentence. We next read the
verb "beats". Within the Parser, this results (through protraction) in the production of a
fairly complicated A-expression; however, the set of references extracted from it by the
Parser's output stage is the same as that in 114 above. Therefore, there is no change in the
DeReferencer's behaviour. Next, we read "a", producing this set of references:




{coref( ref2"unkind, refl "man) ► refl "man, ref3 } 116
and this correspondent set ofbindings:
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{({refl "man, ref2"unkind}, {el}), ({ ref3 }, { e2})} 117
The binding to el is unchanged from before; the binding to e2 is produced in exactly the
same way as was the initial binding between refl and el. When we go on to read "brown"
and then "donkey" we are given by the Parser the sets of references shown in 118a and b
respectively, with the new information propagating along the binding, as it were, to arrive
at e2 in the Entity Tokens database at each stage. The propagation is licensed by the
singleton nature of the binding.
{coref( ref2"unkind, refl "man) ► refl "man, ref3 "brown} 118a
{coref( ref2"unkind, refl"man) ► refl'man, ref3"brown"donkey } 118b
In the final analysis, then, the output from the program at this stage is as shown in Figure
** George parser **
State 0:






ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
>>
Figure 6: George output for "A man who is unkind beats a brown donkey."
6 (except, as before, for minor textual alterations to improve readability). The user input,
once George has been started, is simply the text next to the >> prompt, terminated by a
full stop. The heading "State 0:" refers to a simple memory mechanism for storing
intermediate stages in a parse, for purposes of experiment. 0 is the empty condition.
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3.5. Simple Definite Reference Evaluation
We will now progress to the next simplest kind of reference - from George's point of view,
the kind which occurs when we know a definite reference to be singular. For the sake of
example (for at this point Mellish stops giving individual worked examples), I will
continue with our example of the brutalised donkey, with the input sentence in 119. Note
that the continuation aspect is important - George deals in discourses, not just in
individual utterances.
"A woman feeds the donkey." 119
The behaviour of the system for the first three words is as before (the sentence is designed
to make the example useful later as well as being interesting here). After processing
"feeds" we are left with the bindings shown in 120 and the entity tokens in 121.
{({ refl "man, ref2~unkind}, {el}), ({ref3"brown"donkey}, {e2 }),
({ ref4~woman }, {e3 })} 120
{el'man'unkind, e2"brown"donkey, e3"woman} 121
Next, we input the word "the". This introduces a new reference of a kind new to our
discussion of the DeReferencer: a simple unsorted definite reference. The reference is
shown in 122.
ref5! 122
When we attempt to dereference the set of references including this new one, the old ones
are dealt with as before, and there is no change in their bindings, because they are being
no further refined (ie their information content is not being changed) by the new input.
However, when we deal with the new reference, we follow a new path through the top
level algorithm; namely, part lb. In full detail, the reasoning is as follows. We determine
that the reference symbol is new (® in the top-level algorithm) from the simple fact that
we have no prior record of its reference symbol. We determine that it is definite (©)
because it contains the ! operator. Having done so, we need to find which entity tokens it
may refer to; and this process, ®, requires a little more explanation.
At this stage, the DeReferencer has very little to go on; it knows nothing about the entity
to which the new reference is bound except that it is definite and singular (and in the
latter I include syntactically singular generics, the referential properties of which would
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be dealt with on the level of token-entity specification in George, by co-specification
between entity tokens, which will be covered in Chapter 9). Therefore, the application of
rules about sort information will not cause refinement of the candidate set, because there
is no information yet available with which to make comparisons. The only rules we can
apply at this point are as follows. First, we know that the reference is definite - and this
has already affected our paths through the higher level algorithm, in choosing part lb as
well as part la. Second, we know that the reference is singular (or, formally, simple)
because it is not indexed. This means (according to Rule 4, below) that it can only be bound
to entity tokens which have been introduced by other singular (simple) noun phrases or
explicitly derived from existing sets (by the processes explained later in this chapter) -
these are the only entity tokens that we can be sure specify individuals.
So, under the weak constraints we have available at the moment, we can produce a
binding as shown in 123. Note in particular that all the possible candidates have been
identified, under non-contradiction; that is, we have an open world assumption. As no
constraining properties have yet been applied, Mellish's and Haddock's (closed world)
requirement of explicit consistency would not work here. (Exhaustively selecting
elements of a candidate set in this way is not a general solution on its own. The initial
selection ultimately needs to be filtered by a focus algorithm, as I explained in Chapter 2.)
Here, we can see explicitly for the first time that (as has been implicitly the case all along)
the set of entity tokens in the binding is a set of candidate entity tokens and not a set of
definitely selected bound tokens. This behaviour is encapsulated formally in Rule 3 which
The initial candidate set of a new simple definite reference always initially
contains all the entity tokens in the system which are both sort and number
consistent with the reference.
Rule 3: Simple Definite Reference
refers to the rule of number consistency, Rule 4.
Next, we add the word "donkey" to our input. This results in the presentation of a newly
refined sorted definite reference to the DeReferencer, as shown in 124.




1. Simple references may not have as candidates entity tokens which are
bound one-to-one to any indexed reference;
2. A binding involving an indexed reference must contain either
a) more than one entity token; or
b) at least one entity token bound singleton to an indexed reference.
3. Any two indexed references singleton bound to the same entity token
must have equal upper bounds.
Rule 4: Number Consistency
Following paths 2a and 2b in the higher level algorithm, and in particular sub-process ®,
we now add this new information to the reference in the binding above, and test for
consistency (as defined in Chapter 4) with the sorts of the entity tokens named in the
binding (and listed in full detail in the Entity Tokens database). Because of the particular
defining properties of the sorts involved here (man and woman, as opposed to donkey),
neither el nor e3 is consistent with the reference; therefore, they are both removed from
the binding. The binding is now one to one, so George assumes that the sort information
may pass from the reference to the entity token (which in this case tells us nothing new -
e2 is already a donkey), and we are left with the overall translation of the whole discourse
so far shown in Figure 7. This behaviour is governed by Rule 2.
Application of this rule is equivalent in principle to [Haddock, 1989]'s network node
consistency, which is in turn exactly equivalent to part of [Mellish, 1981 ]'s network
consistency algorithm. In practice, the behaviour is different because George uses its open
world notion of consistency (viz non-contradiction) for selecting candidates, rather than
Mellish's and Haddock's stricter closed world, explicit consistency requirement.
3.6. Summary of Simple (Singular) Reference in George
3.6.1. Introduction
Let us now pause for a moment and summarise the process covered so far. We have looked
at the behaviour of the George DeReferencer in two very simple cases. One of these,
invoked by a simple indefinite reference, is viewed purely as an introductory reference.
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ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
>>
Figure 7: Continued George output for "A woman feeds the donkey."
The other, introduced by a simple definite reference, is regarded as referential on the
assumption that it has at all times during processing of the discourse a non-empty
candidate set ofentity tokens to which it may be bound.
3.6.2. Simple Indefinite Reference
When a reference is encountered which does not contain the definite operator, it is
assumed to be introductory, so no attempt is made to find entity tokens introduced earlier
in the discourse to which it might refer. This results in the creation of an initially empty
binding for the indefinite reference, which is immediately filled by the creation of a new
entity token. Subsequently, new information leads to refinement of reference as detailed
below, with the advantage that this is a case where the binding is known by definition to
be singleton from the start.
The case where an indefinite reference is not (in the usual sense) introductory but, rather,
generic is dealt with by an operation not detailed here, called cospecification.
Cospecification is a relation between sets of entity tokens, and so treatment of indefinite
singular generics is covered by the introductory view explained above; the rest of the work
is done at the third layer of reference evaluation mentioned before, which would attempt
to determine from the semantics and pragmatics of the introductory sentence whether or
not cospecification was the correct operation to use. Cospecification will be covered in
more detail in Chapter 9.
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3.6.3. Simple Definite Reference
When a reference is encountered which does contain the definite operator, it is assumed in
the first instance to be referential. All the entity tokens with which it is referentially
consistent (see below) are collected and their names are placed in its binding.
If the reference is context extended and the context extension is closed (as defined in
Chapter 4), then the context extension predicate(s) is(are) compared with closed
predicates in the preceding discourse, in a way which will be explained in detail later. If
this comparison is unsuccessful, George hypothesises that the post-modifier which gave
rise to the extended reference is non-restrictive (more about which shortly).
Thenceforward, the information about the reference, both in its context extension and in
the main body of the reference, is refined in the same way as for any other reference.
The case where a definite reference is generic is rather harder to deal with than that of
indefinite generics. If it so happens that there is no entity token already existing to which
the reference may be bound, then the creation of a new one (see below) places us in the
same position as with the indefinite generic above. However, if this is not the case, we
must use similar measures at the entity token level as are suggested above at the level of
(co)specification, which, as mentioned before, is outside the scope of this discussion.
Finally, if the candidate set for a simple definite reference is empty, the reference is
assumed to be introductory and an entity token is created as in the indefinite case.
3.6.4. Referential Consistency
The overall concept of referential consistency at the binding level is divided into two parts.
First is the notion of consistency of sort defined in Chapter 4 under an open world
assumption; this needs no further coverage here. Second is consistency of cardinality
(Rule 4), which I will demonstrate further as I introduce more complex reference in our
running example. For the present, it is adequate to assume that all references are
consistent in cardinality, because, at this stage of our discussion, we can only introduce




Each time the DeReferencer receives an updated set of references from the Parser, a
change may have been made in the information contained therein. If a change has been
made (ie a word has been encountered which contributes to the information contained in a
reference), it will apply only to one reference, and therefore to one binding, because of the
incremental nature of the parsing process. If the new input made no such contribution
there will be no change (eg if the input was a verb - see Chapter 9 for a discussion of how
selectional constraints on verbs might be incorporated into George).
Initially, any new information is added to the reference "end" of the relevant binding.
Immediately, any entity tokens whose sorts are inconsistent with the new information are
removed from the entity "end". If the binding is subsequently contains only one entity
token, it is assumed to be correct, and all the information in the binding is passed directly
to the entity token itself in the Entity Tokens database. This may or may not result in the
addition of new information to the entity token - the information from the reference may
be subsumed by that already present.
3.6.6. Structural Criteria
So far, we have seen one structural criterion which may apply following the addition of
new reference information. We might call this the "closed non-co-reference rule"; it will be
formally specified as Rule 5, in Section 4.3. It simply states that no reference may be
bound to the same entity token as another appearing in the same closed predicate (ie the
same clause), unless the two have the same reference symbol. (Note that the corefoperator
is not an exception to this - a coref expression is not formally a closed predicate, because
the corefoperator is syncategorematic in GRL and not a member of Pred.) The rule makes
explicit the intuition that the references in, for example, "He kicked him." are not
normally coreferential, while those in "He kicked himself." definitely are. As it happens,
this rule does not affect the reference in our example so far; however, it is useful to
introduce it at this stage, so that the reader is aware of the existence and nature of these
integrity-constraint-like rules. It will be explained in more detail when it actually
applies, in the next example. Representation of reflexives will be discussed, as potential
further work, in Chapter 9.
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It is useful to express this rule separately from the other rules being applied here (eg sort
refinement), because it is different in that we need to apply it to every reference in the
discourse every time new information about any reference is introduced. The reason for
this will become clearer during the next example; suffice it to say for now that this rule
and its repeated application allows us to disambiguate some references which are not
disambiguable by sort or number information without resorting to harder concepts like
focus. The repeated application is justified in particular because some such ambiguity is
not resolved within the sentence in which it was introduced, but in subsequent sentences.
The application might be viewed as comparable with the enforcement of integrity
constraints in relational and deductive databases.
4. Context-Extended Simple Reference
4.1. Context Extension and Noun Phrase Post-Modification
Before we move on from the simple definite case, it will be useful to discuss another
possibility in the current simple context. In the initial sentence of this running example,
we saw George represent and analyse the reference of a relative clause without appeal to
the property of restrictiveness; in any useful language system, we will wish to account for
both non-restrictive and restrictive uses of noun-phrase modifiers. George deals with the
issue of the difference between these two kinds of relative (and, for that matter, the
corresponding adjectival and prepositional usage, too) in a new and very simple way.
Any relative clause translated into GRL is inserted into the Discourse Memory along with
the main clause to which it is subordinate; it is explicitly recognisable as subordinate from
its position to the left of a context extension operator, ►. However, in George, no further
distinction is made regarding the syntactic or semantic attachment of the modifier - it is
viewed as modifying the reference and not the noun or noun phrase (for restrictive and
non-restrictive, respectively), as some linguists might prefer. The reasons for this will
become clear below.
Before discussing those reasons, let us define the two different kinds of relative. First, a
restrictive relative is one which is intended to reduce the candidate set (or its intension) of
the reference of which it is part. Conversely, a non-restrictive relative is one which is
intended to contribute information to the description of the object(s) referred to by the
reference embedded in it. Note that this is not the same as saying that non-restrictives
and restrictives respectively do and do not impart new information about a referent. The
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addition to a referring expression of information which is inconsistent with some of a
candidate set of referents behaves restrictively in exactly the same sense as the addition of
information which is inconsistent with the same candidates but which was already known
about the others.
Now, in any discourse, we would normally expect a distinction to be made between
restrictive and non-restrictive relatives, either by intonation in spoken English or
punctuation in written. I suggest that, as long as this syntactic/pragmatic information is
felicitous - ie as long as it agrees with the practicalities detailed below - this information
is effectively irrelevant, and serves only as a secondary check on the semantic well-
formed-ness of the discourse. I justify this in the following way, in abstract terms. A
worked example is given in the next section.
This view of relative clause (non-)restriction is derived primarily from the practicalities of
language analysis. In a sense, the actual (as opposed to intended) restrictive or non-
restrictive nature of a relative is dependent on the entities available in a discourse, as well
as on the intention which may or may not be conveyed effectively by the speaker/writer.
For example, supposing we have one donkey, whose colour is unknown or whose colour is
known to be black, sentence 125 is effectively non-restrictive - it either just adds new
information or does nothing, respectively; if the speaker has indicated otherwise, then
something is wrong. Alternatively, given more donkeys, some of which are known not to
be black, the same sentence is de facto restrictive, whether or not the colour(s) of the non-
black donkeys is(are) known, and again, if the speaker has indicated otherwise,
something is wrong. Further, in this last case, if there are some donkeys which are not
known not to be black, the relative is effectively both restrictive and non-restrictive, in
that it rules out the non-black ones and imparts the information that (one of) the
remainder is black.
"The donkey which is black eats the carrot" 125
The question, then, is of matching the effect actually achieved with pragmatic
expectation. For example, we would not expect a reference which was intoned or
punctuated as a restrictive not to reduce the candidate set. Equally, we would not expect a
restrictive to apply to an already singleton set of candidates. In the event that such a
mismatch occurs, we need to detect it, so we can take some warning action (or at least be
prepared to do so in the event that the mismatch is not subsequently accounted for).
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Therefore, it may be worthwhile to consider a view where the effect of the relative is
derived from its pragmatic behaviour, and then to compare this with the effect inferred
from intonation, puncuation or whatever. This accords with the assumption expressed in
Chapter 1 that the speaker intends to make sense - so we simply add in the new
information, enforce consistency, and then check that the speaker really did say what s/he
apparently intended to.
4.2. George's Approach to Noun Phrase Post-Modification
George's approach to noun phrase post-modification is a new view which arises almost by
necessity from the system's fundamental assumptions. As with all other kinds of
reference, post-modified references are treated strictly incrementally. This forces us to
take a rather degenerate, but nonetheless effective, approach to the dereferencing of such
references. Note also that this line of reasoning, applied to the restrictive/non-restrictive
distinction in adjectives, is implicit in the choice of open world non-contradiction (rather
than closed world explicit consistency) for candidate selection.
The reasoning is as follows. Since we are working strictly incrementally, we must (by
definition) always reach and analyse the definiteness and sort information associated
directly with a reference by determiners, adjectives, and so on, contained in the main body
of the noun phrase, before we reach that contained in post-modifiers. Suppose, then, that
we follow the analysis approach already suggested as far as the end of the main body of the
noun phrase - ie up to the start of the post-modifier. By this stage, we have produced a set
(call it Sbefore) °f candidate references for the main noun phrase embedded in the post-
modified one. When we now proceed to analyse the post-modifier, using the same
algorithm as before, we will refine the binding- and therefore eventually the entity
token - in the same way as before with the information in the context extension (which
may or may not be new). Call this new candidate set Safter.
If the set Sbefore is the same size as Safter, the post-modifier was not in effect restrictive, by
definition - if it was intended to be so, it failed. Conversely, if Sbefore is strictly larger than
Softer, the modifier was deflnitionally effectively restrictive, and, if it was intended to be
non-restrictive, it failed. Either of these conclusions is reached in respect only of the




Why is this so? One convincing view of noun-phrase post-modification, arising from the
definitions given above, is that a non-restrictive modifier adds information to the objects
in the candidate set of the main body of the reference after that set has been found; and
that the restrictive modifier contributes to the information in the noun phrase which, all
together, subsequently selects the candidate set. This difference in timing seems to
suggest that two different syntactic analyses are appropriate. The two conventional
analyses for the head noun phrase of sentence 125 are shown in figure 8 -a) is the non-
a) np b) np
I I \ \ I I I \ \ I
The donkey which is black The donkey which is black
Figure 8: Two possible syntax trees for "The donkey which is black"
restrictive reading, b) is the restrictive.
Now, in a context of incremental reference evaluation, this distinction is immediately
vacuous, because both analyses always reduce to the same thing: that the candidate set of
a reference (or its intension if one so prefers) is initially (exhaustively) calculated and
subsequently refined word by word as the parse proceeds through the post-modifier.
Therefore, I suggest that we do not need to work out from non-referential effects (eg
intonation) which kind of post-modifier we dealing with. Following the reasoning process
outlined above (of which an example is given in the next section) we will produce the same
candidate set either way. In the George framework it is easy subsequently to compare the
nature of the reference deduced from these non-referential sources with the de facto effect
of the modifier by a simple textual comparison between the bindings and entity tokens
defining Sf,efore and Safter. We can then request clarification in the event that the intended
and the actual effect of the modifier do not match. The point is, though, that we do not
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need the syntactic/pragmatic information to work out the actual nature and effect of the
modifier in the first instance.
(For completeness, we must also note that this view works, by default, when the noun
phrase is introductory, be it so via an indefinite reference or (implicitly) via a definite
reference whose candidate has been restricted to nothing. In this case the modifier can
only be non-restrictive because there can only be one entity token in the candidate set.)
This argument leads me to conclude that, in an incremental context, we can view both
restrictive and non-restrictive post-modifiers as functions of noun phrases, instead of
viewing restrictives as functions of nouns, which is the view required by the more
traditional analysis outlined above. I suggest that this is preferable because we do not
need to decide in advance (or, strictly, at all) between non-restrictive and restrictive
readings. Also (and this might be said to back up my suggestion), this new view provides a
solution to the problem presented in the above traditional view by restrictives applied to
single word noun phrases. An example of this is shown in sentence 126 which admits both
restrictive and non-restrictive readings but cannot be subject to the syntactic analysis for
restrictives given in Figure 8, above.
"Someone who is kind feeds the donkey." 126
4.3. An Example of Post-Modified Noun Phrase Processing
As an example of the treatment of restrictive relative clauses and of the issues involved in
their processing (which are in fact the same as those of the relative in the first sentence of
the running example, 106), let us now consider the effect of a third sentence - that shown
below in 127 - on the George system. The example contains an uncontrovertibly
restrictive relative, and for the first time shows Rule 6, stated formally here, working.
Let E be a candidate entity token for a reference, R, within a closed predicate
containing other references R;, not identical with R, then:
E is deleted from R's candidate set if:
1. E is in a singleton binding with any of R,; and
2. R's candidate set is not singleton.
Rule 5: Non-Co-Reference within Closed Predicates
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"He hates the person who beats him." 127
First, on input to the Parser of the word "He", the Parser passes the following set of
references to the DeReferencer:
{ref7!~male} 128
This will give rise to the (singleton) set of bindings shown in 129.
{({ref7!"male}, {el, e2 })} 129
Note here, again, that the set of entity tokens is very definitely a candidate set, for the
following reason. Even though we already know that el specifies an entity which has the
property "gender is male" (or something equivalent - the exact detail is not relevant here),
e2 specifies an entity of sort "donkey", which has no implicit gender property. e2 may
therefore at some later stage acquire a contradictory property (perhaps "gender is female"
via a non-restrictive relative: "The donkey, who is female,...") and thus invalidate this
binding. This, again, is the open world assumption.
Now, we might argue that, at this point, something like focus (as in [Grosz, 1977],
[Sidner, 1979]) is required to decide between the two possibilities, and, indeed, this would
be intuitively satisfactory. However, focus is outside our discussion here - though the
George system has calls to focus functions included in part ® of the top level algorithm,
they currently do nothing.
The parse proceeds as before until we have a translation of the phrase "He hates the
person who beats". This gives rise to the set of references shown in 130. Note again, here,
that the "beat" information does not affect reference until the context extension of the
reference is closed.
{ ref7!~male, [beats,varl,ref8~person!] ► ref8~person!} 130
As before, the non-closure of the subordinate clause causes George to ignore the relative
information; and the DeReferencer calculates a set ofbindings like this:
{({ ref7!~male}, {el, e2}), ({ref8"person!}, {el, e3})} 131
Now, we are for the first time in this sentence in a position to try to apply Rule 5 (non-
coreference in closed predicates). The rule relates to the set of bindings shown in 131,
because el is held in common by both the bindings, and both the bindings appear in the
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closed predicate representing the main clause of the sentence (shown in 132 - here, we see
the DeReferencer consulting the Discourse Memory for the first time). However, at this
stage, we have no means (other than focus, which we are deliberately not using) of
deciding which (or, indeed, if either) of the two references should be bound to el. The
George DeReferencer, therefore, defers this problem, in the hope that the difficulty will be
resolved before the end of the discourse.
[beats,varl,ref8"person!] ► [hates,ref8"person!,ref7"male!] 132
So now we go on to read the last word of the sentence, "him". In doing so, we close the
context extension of the "person" reference, and so we are now able to attempt to use it to
refine the reference of ref8. The new set of references output by the Parser is shown in 133.
{ref7!"male, [beats,refl0"male!,ref8"person!] ► ref8"personl, reflCTmale!} 133
ref7 is dealt with as before. Next, the context extension of ref8 is considered, by matching
the subordinate clause against previous closed predicates in the discourse. In effect, this
candidate set refinement is only as incremental as [Mellish, 1985]'s approach, and less so
than that of [Haddock, 1989], because of this closure constraint. However, if the final noun
phrase of the context extension had contained more than one word, the effect would have
been more incremental. Note also that the comparision involves an assumption of a world
which is closed with respect to the discourse so far; only information already known can
restrict the reference of a noun phrase. This is an approximation - in general, one would
also wish to compare with apriori knowledge.
Matching, in this context, is a fairly loose term. At the simplest level it involves a simple
first-order typed term unification between the context extension predicate
"[beats,reflO...]" and any other closed predicate appearing in the Discourse Memory. Thus,
the matching is made to cover information introduced in subordinate clauses as well as in
main ones. The detail of the matching process is covered in Section 5.4.
The searching and testing outlined is encapsulated declaratively in Rule 6, which will
also be expressed in algorithmic form in Section 5.4. It is necessary to consider both the
reference information and the entity information mentioned in the rule because entity
tokens often contain information from more than one reference, so they may be more
restricted in sort than any given reference bound to them (so we need to look at the entity
tokens, and not just the references). However, discovering the relevance of a preceding
item of information depends on the reference of that information too, because of George's
use of non-inconsistency instead of explicit consistency for candidate selection.
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A post-modifier (or, in general, a clausal modifier) is considered to relate to
information already presented in the discourse if and only if:
la. There exists in the preceding discourse a sentence which expresses
the information referred to by the context extension predicate - it
has the same predicate and all corresponding references between
the old and the new predicate are referentially consistent.
and lb. The references in that preceding sentence are bound to entity
tokens which are referentially consistent with the corresponding
references in the context extension predicate.
or 2. Discourse world deduction allow us to generate an intermediate
closed predicate from the context extension for which parts la and
lb above hold.
Rule 6: Context Extension Matching
Application of Rule 5 corresponds with that part of Haddock's mechanism relating to
network arc consistency, and thence with the equivalent part ofMellish's system. As with
node consistency, the reason it is different is George's more liberal, open world approach to
the initial selection of candidates.
Returning to the current example, the effect of the context extension match is to rule out
the woman as a candidate for the "person" reference, ref8: there is a relevant expression
relating the man with beating the donkey in the Discourse Memory. This means that ref8
is now singleton bound to el, the entity token specifying the man. Therefore, Rule 5 now
excludes that entity token from the binding of ref7, the "He" reference. ref7, therefore, is
now bound unambiguously, and correctly, to the donkey.
George's output after processing the third sentence is shown in Figure 9.
5. Some Loose Ends
5.1. Introduction
Three issues were raised in the preceding sections which have not yet been explained in
full. To complete this discussion of simple reference we must deal, first, with George's
approach to referential failure and its relationship to introductory reference, and, second,
-146- PhD Thesis
The George DeReferencer
>> He hates the person who beats him.
End of Sentence











ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~brown~donkey~male
>>
Figure 9: Continued George output for "He hates the person who beats him."
with the necessity of maintaining consistency of reference throughout the entire
discourse. Finally, we must cover the detail of the comparison process involved in
dereferencing context extensions.
5.2. Introductory and Non-Introductory Reference
It has already been explained that, in George, simple indefinite references are always
viewed as introductory - that is, they always give rise to new entity tokens. This is an
approximation, to keep the theory manageable. A more general view is as follows.
Referring expressions in English may be divided up along three partly independent
dimensions. The first of these depends on the definite or indefinite nature of the
expression (denoted in GRL by application of the definite operator, !). The second
dimension is a less obvious distinction, which has in the past often been equated (for
purposes of experiment) with definiteness: it depends on whether the information in the
referring expression is "given" or "new" (in other words "already known" or "not already
known"). The third dimension is buried deeper still in the referential behaviour of the
expressions: it depends on whether the referring expression introduces a new entity into
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the discourse or if instead it refers to an existing one. This third dimension might be
further divided, depending on whether the entity introduced or referred to were generic or
an individual; this aspect I will bypass for the purposes of simplicity here.
The point is that, as I said above, these three dimensions are actually partly independent.
For example, while a definite singular noun phrase usually refers to an individual
already existing in the discourse, it may introduce a new entity. Equally, an indefinite
singular often introduces a new entity, but may well refer to one of an existing uniform
set. The dimension of given/new-ness is related as well - first, if a referring expression is
introductory, then the information in it must be new. If it is non-introductory then the
information often will be already known, but in many cases it will not.
George uses a combination of these factors which aims to capture the reality of these
aspects of human reference understanding more accurately than before. It is based on
Crain and Steedman's Principle ofParsimony (see Chapter 2, Section 3), which states that
analyses requiring less pre-supposition will be favoured over ones requiring more. First,
then, the statement of the abstract mechanism. Note that this analysis is given in the
abstract, ignoring issues of incremental parsing; these issues are incorporated in to the
statement of the George DeReferencer top level algorithm in Section 2.1 of this chapter.
In GRL, all references are labelled definite or indefinite with the ! operator. In
dereferencing we can always therefore case-split on the existence of that operator. In the
event that a determiner or quantifier is ambiguous over definiteness, we can supply two
different lexical entries for it - note that the coercion mechanism is inappropriate here,
because this ambiguity is not (usually) resolved by subsequent words, but by referential
consistency.
For the definite case, given a reference R, we proceed as follows.
If there is a set of entity tokens whose sorts are consistent with that of R and whose
cardinalities are correct for reference by R, let this be the candidate set ofR. If R is simple,
the set is interpreted as a disjunction; if it is indexed, the set is interpreted as a
conjunction (modulo focus, which I do not cover here). This choice requires no pre¬
supposition at all.
Otherwise, if there is a set of entity tokens whose sorts are consistent with that of R but
whose cardinalities are not correct for reference by R, attempt (by the procedure described
in Chapter 7) to find a (possibly singleton) subset of a set already existing in the discourse
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which has the right cardinality for reference by R. This choice requires the weak pre¬
supposition that a set may be decomposed into subsets and/or individuals.
Otherwise, if there is no entity token whose sort is consistent with that of R, create one.
This choice requires the much stronger pre-supposition that an entity exists which has
not been explicitly introduced.
The indefinite case is simpler.
If there is an entity token specifying a set whose sort is consistent with that of R, attempt
(by the procedure described in Chapter 7) to derive a (possibly singleton) subset of a set
already existing in the discourse which has the right cardinality for reference by R. If
there is such an entity token and the reference is felicitous this derivation will always be
possible. Again, this choice requires the weak pre-supposition that a set may be
decomposed into subsets and/or individuals.
If there is no suitable entity token, create one suitable for reference by R. Again, this
choice requires the strong pre-supposition that an entity exists which has not been
explicitly introduced.
As I said before, the indefinite case has been simplified in George, to the assumption that
indefinites are always introductory. This will cause a (not unsoluble) problem when we
come to deal with dependent set references, where indefinites are in the (conventional)
scope of quantifiers, in Chapter 7. Similar questions arise when indefinite reference
appears in negated expressions, and in commands and questions. In Chapter 9, I will
suggest possible extensions to GRL to account for these.
Finally, the sequence of tests and actions specified above begs one more question about
George. In Chapter 3, I stated that there is a "suicide pact" between the George Parser
and the DeReferencer, such that if one failed, so did the other. Where then, has this pact
gone? It would seem from the desciption above that it is impossible for the DeReferencer
to fail, in particular in the case of a definite reference whose candidate set has become
empty.
The answer to this question is in two parts. First, recall from the top level algorithm that
there is no option for replacement of an entity which has somehow been ruled out for




The more interesting part of the question depends on the choice of action when the
candidate set of a definite reference become empty. Here, I have stated that a such a
reference should be viewed as introductory, which is a view at odds with other
incremental approaches where failure of reference is sometimes used to rule out syntactic
parses. Why, then, do I not take that approach in George? Because I make here an
assumption that the speaker/writer intends to be felicitous (see Chapter 1) and that the
purpose of a system like George is not to make correctness judgments on his/her use of
reference, but to attempt to "understand" it. Since definite references can be introductory,
it is incorrect to rule out that possibility. (Having said this, one might certainly wish to
build a theory which was rather more selective than George about when it allowed such
introduction - as such, George is an approximation.) Also, other factors (eg discourse
world inference) might cause failure of the DeReferencer in a more complete
implementation.
Another use of reference is the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive
relatives. [Haddock, 1989] gives a treatment of relatives which relies on the emptiness or
over-fullness of a candidate set, and thence failure of the translation which gave rise to it,
to disambiguate. Essentially, he calls upon something like the Principle of Referential
Failure (see Chapter 2, Section 3) to do the disambiguation. I will argue in Chapter 8 that
Haddock's method is incorrect. In George, the Principle of Parsimony (which subsumes
that of Referential Failure) is built in to the order of the tests in the dereferencing
algorithm. Further, there is no syntactic difference between restrictives and non-
restrictives. Thus, disambiguation in the sense of failing possible translations is simply
not appropriate.
The point is that GRL is adaptable. Different possible syntactic parses will often be
written conflated in one ambiguous expression, and not enumerated separately. This just
does not fit in with the idea of referential failure causing (eg) backtracking or failure of a
possible translation in a breadth-first system. Rejection, for example, of the
restrictive/non-restrictive distinction in any sense other than as a retrospective check
means that the actual referential behaviour of a given noun phrase will never affect the
syntactic form of the sentence in which it is embedded.
I suggest, then, that this view of interaction between parsing and reference analysis
(subject to the comments regarding approximation, above) is a realistic one, and that it
fits in both with my own (reasonable) assumption that a speaker/writer intends to make
sense and with the Principle of Parsimony of Crain and Steedman, which is justified in
the original sources (eg [Crain & Steedman, 1985]).
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5.3. Consistency Maintenance in George
Because George is a strictly incremental system, it is necessary on some occasions to
ensure that old material is updated to make it consistent with new. Consider, for example,
the discourse in 134.
"Jim and Fred own a donkey. The thin man beats the donkey. Jim is fat." 134
After the second sentence, the candidate set for "The thin man" contains tokens specifying
Fred and Jim (recall that non-inconsistency is required, not explicit consistency, for
candidate set membership). Only when the information that Jim is fat is added to Jim's
entity token, in the third sentence, can we rule it out as a candidate for reference by "The
thin one". When we have done so, we have a singleton singular binding, so we must allow
the sort information in the reference to pass to the entity token, as usual. This constitutes
an inference from the discourse that Fred is thin. This process involves manipulation of
references older than those in the current utterance, which is not the case in the rest of
the top-level dereferencing algorithm, except for context extensions, more ofwhich below.
In general, this process must happen continuously (or at least continually) as the
references and entity tokens in the George system become more refined - this is the part
ofGeorge which aims to resolve referential ambiguity in context larger than the sentence
in which it arises. It can be implemented as a further parallel process within each basic
George system, or (as in the current implementation of George) as a procedure which is
called each time the Entity Tokens and Bindings databases are updated.
One rule in particular which is applied in this way is Rule 6, which precludes non-
reflexive referring expressions within a clause from co-referring. Note that the rule only
takes effect to rule out a candidate from one reference when there is no alternative to that
candidate being bound to a different reference - in weaker cases (eg when it is not known
which of a pair of references really is bound to a candidate) the rule has no effect.
5.4. Context Extension Comparison and Inference
5.4.1. Using Information in Context Extensions
As I mentioned before, in attempting to calculate the reference of context extended
references, George performs simple inference from the translation of the preceding
discourse. The pattern matching algorithm it uses to find suitable information from which
to do so is an area requiring further work, but, as in other such cases, enough has been
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done to show that the idea is sound. In this section, I will explain the algorithm, give a
simple example of its use, and show how it can resolve attachment ambiguity, in a way
comparable with that of [Winograd, 1972]'s system, SHRDLU.
It is important to understand that, while making an open world assumption with respect
to entities in the discourse world, George assumes a closed world with respect to situation
information in the discourse. Thus, only the translations of utterances from the discourse
contribute to the understanding of context extensions, and abduction is not allowed. Such
a rule is clearly not general, because it precludes a priori knowledge about situation
information common to both speaker and hearer from affecting reference analysis.
Nevertheless, it is a useful and safe simplifying approximation - in any case, a priori
shared knowledge can always be simulated by initial discourse. Note also that the closed
world with respect to which the context extensions are analysed is continually increasing
in size as the discourse proceeds, and, in particular, that context extensions, once
dereferenced, become part of that world.
5.4.2. Comparing Context Extensions with Discourse
In order to ascertain which (if any) of earlier utterances may be used as a basis for
inference about the context extended reference (which I shall call being relevant), George
follows the following procedure, first using the context extension itself, and then again
using other closed predicates deducible from it via backward-chained discourse world
inference (backward-chaining is used because it leads to a smaller search space than
forward chaining from each sentence in the discourse, as in [Mellish, 1981]). This
algorithm is an alternative statement ofRule 5.
Some more terminology: One of the references in a context extension always appears on
both sides of the ► operator (because of the way context extensions are constructed). This
reference is the one which is being refined by the information in the context extension; I
shall call it the topic of the extension. Other references are then non-topical. An earlier
expression being compared is a precursor. Note that precursors are considered in the
reverse order of that in which they were introduced into the system. This expresses the
assumption that new information is likely to be more relevant than old.
1. Is the predicate name in the context extension the same as in the precursor? If not, the
precursor is not relevant. (Note that this is a very coarse approximation - at least
temporal reasoning, and ultimately reasoning about such issues as the habitual
reading ofcontinuous tenses must be included here for a complete coverage.)
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2. Is the predicate arity the same? If not, the precursor is not relevant. (This is again an
approximation. For example, we might wish to include an optional instrument as a
third argument in the translation of some verbs, so a precursor whose predicate's arity
was different from that of a context extension omitting that instrument might still be
relevant.)
3. Are the references in the precursor consistent in sort and number with those in the
context extension? If so, the precursor is relevant. If not, it is irrelevant. This is a
check to determine whether the precursor could refer to the same discourse entities as
the context extension.
Once the precursor is shown to be relevant to the context extension, George computes the
intersection between the candidate set of each reference in the context extension and the
set ofentity tokens to which the corresponding reference in the precursor is bound. In each
case, this intersection is the new candidate set for the appropriate reference in the context
extension. If any candidate set is empty, the topic of the context extension cannot be (one
of) the candidate(s) of the corresponding reference in the precursor. George therefore
removes it from the candidate set of the topical reference, and proceeds in the attempt to
find a precursor which is relevant. In the event that the candidate set of the topical
reference is empty, a new entity token must be synthesised, as usual in George. Note that
the analysis presented here lacks in that it does not allow for the case where more than
one precursor is relevant.
Note also that this is one point at which the division in George between references and
discourse entities becomes crucial. Without it (for example, if entities were substituted for
references in the discourse as soon as bindings were established) the test procedure above
could not work. This is because both the notion of relevance and of candidate set
intersection determine whether a context extension is referentially consistent with a
precursor. For example, if a context extension is relevant to a precursor, but only one (of
the two, say) references in it refers appropriately then the topic context extension is
wrongly bound. This will become clear in the example, below. The method is more
complicated than the uniform constraint satisfaction used by Mellish and Haddock
because George picks candidates by non-contradiction and not explicit consistency.
5.4.3. An Example of the Use of Context Extension Information
Let us consider an example of such a search. Suppose we have the discourse, translation,
and bindings shown in 135a, b and c - the binding for ref8 having been refined only by sort
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and not by context extension at this stage. We must now analyse the effect of the context
extended reference in the final sentence; to do so, we perform the matching procedure
outlined below. If the post-modifier giving rise to the context extension is non-restrictive,
we will simply fail to match with a previous utterance; if we wish, we can check this
against any pragmatic information regarding restrictiveness in the modifier.
"Jim owns a donkey. (i)
Jim owns a house. (ii)
Liz owns a dog. (iii)
Fred feeds the dog. (iv)
Liz hates the donkey. (v)





[owns,reflO"animal!,refll"man!] ► [beats,reflO"animal!,ref9~Liz!] 135b
{({refl "Jim!}, {el "Jim}), ({ref2"donkey}, {e2"donkey }),
({ ref3"Jim!}, {el "Jim}), ( { ref4"house}, {e3"house}),
({ref5"Liz!}, { e4"Liz}), ({ref6"dog}, { e5"dog}),
({ref7~Fred!}, {e6"Fred }), ({ref8"dog!}, {e5"dog}),
({ ref9"Liz!}, {e4"Liz }),
({ reflO'animal!}, {e2"donkey, e5"dog}), t
({refl 1 "man!}, {el "Jim, e6"Fred})} t 135c
All of the reference evaluation in this example is trivial (modulo some assumptions about
proper names which would only cloud the issue here), except for that of reflO and refll
(marked t in the bindings in 135). reflO is the topic of the context extension in 135b.
Assume we have parsed this rather boring discourse up to and including the word "man"
in the last sentence. When the word "owns" appears, the context extension becomes closed,
and can therefore be used for reference evaluation. The extension is compared with the
five precursors (the foregoing sentences) in the following way. First, sentences (iv) and (v)
(about dog-feeding and hatred, respectively, and not about ownership) are ruled out by
test 1 in the procedure above. They are irrelevant at the coarsest possible level. Sentences
(i), (ii), and (iii) all pass both of the first two relevance tests.
Now we apply the third test to the three remaining candidate precursors. They are all
consistent in number with our context extension, because there are only only singular
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references in this example. However, sentence (ii) is ruled out, because "house" is
inconsistent with "animal". Sentence (iii), similarly, is ruled out because "Liz" is
inconsistent with "man". Sentence (i), though, passes test 3, so we are left with a single
relevant precursor. Now, replacing each of the candidate sets in the context extension
with the intersection between itself and those of the matching reference in the precursor,
we are left with the bindings for the whole discourse shown in 136, which are correct.
{({refl'Jim!}, {el "Jim}), ({ ref2"donkey}, {e2"donkey}),
({ref3"Jim!}, {el "Jim }), ({ref4"house }, { e3"house }),
({ref5"Liz!}, {e4"Liz }), ({ref6"dog}, {e5"dog}),
({ref7"Fred!}, {e6"Fred}), ({ref8"dog!}, {e5"dog}),
({ ref9"Liz!}, { e4"Liz}),
({[owns,reflO"animal!,refll"man!] ► reflO"animal!},{e2"donkey}), t
({refll'man!}, {el"Jim})} t 136
5.4.4. Resolving Attachment Ambiguity
This method also allows us to deal with the problems addressed by [Winograd, 1972] and
[Haddock, 1989] where dependent references, ambiguous in isolation, have unambiuous
meanings when taken together. Winograd's well-known example was set in the blocks
world. Given some boxes, some blocks, and a table, the problem is to work out the correct
reading of "...put the block in the box on the table.". George covers this class of examples,
as follows. (It will only be necessary here to show how one of the two readings is detected -
the other is simply the converse.) The possible translations of the problem sentence are
shown in 137. Note that the (unsatisfactory) representation of the position argument of
"put" and "keep" below was not formally defined as part of GRL in Chapter 4. This
notation is included here as a stop gap, since I have not attempted to find a "correct" way
to represent this kind of verb argument. One possible way might well be a situation
semantics-like approach of introducing a new reference to a position and a context
extension associating it with the reference in the introductory prepositional phrase:
"Jim puts the block in the box on the table" 137a
[in,ref3"box!,ref2"block!] ► [puts,[on,ref4"table!],ref2"block!,refl"Jim!] 137b
[on,ref4"table!,ref3"box!] ► [puts,[in,ref3~box!],ref2"block!,refl"Jim!] 137c
Suppose that we have a context arising from a preceding discourse like 138 (a is the
English, b the GRL and c the bindings). Suppose also that we can infer that if something is
kept in something it is in that something; this kind of inference is not really a feature of
the George system, although it is possible, and works in the implementation:
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{( { ref6"block}, {e2"block}), ({ref5"Jim!}, {el "Jim}),
< {ref9"box}, {e3"box}), ({ref8"it!}, {e2"block }), ({ ref7"male!}, {el"Jim}),
({ refll "table}, {e4"table}), ({ reflO'Jim!}, {el "Jim})} 138c
What happens, then, as we analyse the input in 137? The first two words, "Jim puts", are
parsed and dereferenced as explained before - nothing particularly interesting happens.
When the third word, "the", is read, the translation bifurcates, uninterestingly, into two
possible readings for singular and plural (which arguably should be represented once,
adaptably, anyway). This very local ambiguity is resolved at the next word, when the
plural reading is rejected. At this stage, we have the following adaptable partial
translation. The adaptability is in the representation of a post-modified noun phrase,
which will be coerced to a plain noun phrase in one possible reading, later.
Avar2.Avarl.[var2,ref2"block!] ► [puts,varl,ref2"block!,refl"male!]
{({refl'male!}, {el"Jim}), ({ref2"block!}, {e2"block})} 139
When we read the next word, "in", something more interesting happens. The new word
can combine with either the translation above as written, with the object noun phrase
post-modified, or after it is coerced to an unmodified phrase. This is because the
prepositional phrase can be interpreted either as a noun phrase modifier or as an
argument filler for "puts". We now have the following translations (remembering that
George does not use information in unclosed context extensions for dereferencing:
Avar3.Avarl.[in,var3,ref2~block!] ► [puts,varl,ref2"block!,refl"male!]
{({refl"male!}, {el "Jim }), ({ref2"block!}, {e2"block})} 140a
Avar4. [puts,[in,var4],ref2 "block!,refl'male!]
{({ refl'male!}, {el "Jim}), ({ ref2"block!}, {e2"block })} 140b
Again, the next word, "the", introduces uninteresting local ambiguity. It is resolved by
reading the associated noun, "box". This, and the associated dereferencing, leaves us with
two new possible adaptable readings in 141. In particular, note that the inner context
extension in reading a is closed; context extension matching and inference can therefore
proceed on it. When it is compared with the existing discourse, the only relevant
expression is that inferred from the fact that Jim keeps his block in his box: that the block
is in the box. Now, the candidates of the corresponding references in these two statements
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are identical and singleton. Thus, the matching process causes no change - as we would
wish, because the bindings were correct in the first place.
Avar5.Avarl.[var5,ref3"box!] ►
[in,ref3"box!,ref2"block!] ► [puts,varl,ref2~block!,refl "male!]
{({refl'male!}, {el "Jim}), ({[in,ref3 "box!, ref2 "block!] ► ref2~block!}, {e2"block}),
({ref3"box!}, {e3~box})} 141a
Avar5.[var5,ref3"box!] ► [puts,[in,ref3"box!],ref2"block!,refl'male!]
{({refl'male! },{el"Jim}),({ref2"block! },{e2"block}),({ref3~box! },{e3"box})}141b
Next, we read the word "on". The result is now three ways ambiguous, because, aside from
the two possible readings available from the whole sentence, there is the possibility that
the "on" phrase modifies "the box", and, with reading 141a, it is not possible to say at this
stage that this is not the correct interpretation. For the purposes of example here, I will
omit this spurious reading (which is ruled out by George at the end of the sentence). Next,
then, we consider these two partial readings, with no change in reference.
Avar6.[in,ref3"box!,ref2"block!] ► [puts,[on,var6],ref2"block!,refl'male!]
{({ refl "male!}, { el "Jim}), ({[in,ref3"box!,ref2"block!] ► ref2"block!}, { e2~block}),
({ ref3"box!}, { e3"box})} 142a
Avar6.[on,var6,ref3"box!] ► [puts,[in,ref3 "box!],ref2"block!,refl "male!]
{({refl'male!},{el "Jim}),({ref2"block!},{e2"block }),({ ref3"box!},{ e3"box}) }142b
Finally, we read the last noun phrase, "the table". This results in the following
translations and bindings before context extension matching and inference has been
applied.
[in,ref3"box!,ref2"block!] ► [puts,[on,ref4"table!],ref2"block!,refl "male!]
{({refl'male!}, { el "Jim}), ({[in,ref3~box!,ref2"block!] ► ref2"block!}, {e2 "block}),
({ref3"box!}, {e3"box}), ({ ref4"table!}, {e4"table })} 143a
[on,ref4"table!,ref3"box!] ► [puts,[in,ref3"box!],ref2"block!,refl "male!]
{({refl'male!}, {el "Jim}), ({ ref2~block!}, {e2 "block}),
({ref3"box!}, {e3"box}), ({ref4"table!}, {e4~table})} 143b
For reading a, context extension matching has already proceeded to completion; it causes
no further change in the bindings. For reading b, the story is more complicated. This is the
reading where the block is placed into some box already on the table, and is not
(necessarily) already inside one. Winograd's (closed world) view is that this reading is
infelicitous here, because there is no box on the table. In an open world, however, this is
not a correct solution - it is so only if we know there is no other box. Restricted use of a
closed world assumption would allow George to emulate SHRDLU here.
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In George, context extension matching and inference proceeds as follows. The discourse is
searched for a relevant precursor, and none is found: in the first instance, this implies that
the context extension is new information that the box was on the table all along. However,
there is another element to consider, which has not been built into George as presented
here. There is a simple inference to be made based on the semantic requirement of "put"
that the block cannot be put into a box which already contains it. On this basis, one or both
of the candidate sets in the context extension must be wrong. In either case, if we remove
the offending entity token, we are left with one or two empty binding(s); George's standard
response to this is to create appropriate new entity tokens, on the supposition that the
references in the empty bindings are therefore introductory. We can apply preferences to
these possibilities, as I suggested before. In particular, due to the nature of relative
clauses, it is more likely that the topic of a context extension will be introductory than
that non-topical references therein will be so. Equally, readings involving presupposition
of one new entity will be preferred (by Parsimony) over readings involving two or more.
Taking this course, we have one most likely possibility for this second attachment
structure: there must be a different box, resting on the same table. This constitutes a
correct alternative reading of the sentence, which was ruled out ofWinograd's analysis by
his closed world assumption. The analysis, again, accords with the Principle of
Parsimony; minimal presupposition is being imposed by the removal of just the topical
reference's entity token.
We now, finally, have these two readings. The new box is specified by e5 in reading b.
[in,ref3~box!,ref2"block!] ► [puts,[on,ref4"table!],ref2"block!,refl "male!]
{({refl "male!}, {el "Jim}), ({[in,ref3"box!,ref2"block!] ► ref2"block!}, {e2"block}),
({ref3"box!}, {e3"box}), ({ref4"table!}, {e4"table })} 143a
[on,ref4"table!,ref3"box!] ► [puts,[in,ref3"box!],ref2"block!,refl "male!]
{({refl "male!}, {el "Jim}), ({ ref2"block!}, {e2"block}),
({ref3~box!}, {e5"box}), ({ ref4"table!}, {e4"table })} 143b
What is more, viewing both translations, now, as they proceed in parallel, the first
requires (in a naive sense) less presupposition than the second (because it introduces no
new entities). As such, it can be favoured by yet another application of the Principle of
Parsimony, if a mechanism to allow this were built on top of George. Alternatively, use of
the closed world assumption is equivalent to enforced maximal parsimony.
This example has shown, then, that the view presented here of noun phrase post-
modification need not detract from the ability of a computational system to solve problems





The idea of indexed reference gives GRL the ability to represent plural utterances which
refer to sets. An indexed reference takes the same form as a simple (ie non-indexed)
reference, with the addition (as specified formally in Chapter 4) of a quantified variable,
or index, ranging over N, whose association with a particular reference symbol is
indicated by the strong and weak index application operators, ® and X. The distinction
between the two index operators will be explained in the next chapter; for the moment the
two can be viewed as the same. The operator symbols in a sense reflect the semantics of
the operation, which, in the simplest cases, is not unlike the elaboration of cross-products
of sets. The value of an index may be unbounded above or it may have an upper bound.
This upper bound may be explicit {eg introduced by a number quantifier) or implicit {eg
deduced from the entity tokens available for binding to a definite reference). The GRL
expressions in 144 are examples of GRL representations of English plural and quantified
noun phrases and sentences. Precedence is such that, in 144h, the quantifier dominates
the context extension operator.
"The men" Vindl.refl"man!Xindl 144a
"Some men" Vindl.refl "manXindl 144b
"Two donkeys" Vindl < 2.refl "donkeyXindl 144c
"The two donkeys" Vindl <2.refl "donkey!Xindl 144d
"A man owns some donkeys" Vindl.[owns,ref2"donkeyXindl,refl "man] 144e
"The men own the donkeys" Vindl .Vind2.[owns,ref2"donkey!X ind2,
refl "man! Xindl] 144f
"Every man owns a donkey" Vindl.[owns,ref2"donkey,refl"man!®indl] 144g
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it"
Vindl.[owns,ref2"donkey,refl"man!®indl] ►
[beats,ref3"it!,refl "man!® indl] 144h
In Chapter 4, I explained that it is the ranging of the index across (a contiguous subset
including 0 of) N which carries the force of the quantifier to the quantified reference. The
reason for choosing what might at first seem to be an obstruse notation is that that
notation, as it were, divides the quantification into two parts - there is the ranging over N,
and then there is the effect of this on the references. In itself, this is not very interesting,
but, in order to reason in full generality about set reference, we will want to consider
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interaction between references. This will not, in general, affect the behaviour of the
quantification, but it will affect the way the quantification affects the references. GRL
allows us to manipulate these aspects independently. An important example of the kind of
interaction I mean here is that between quantifiers conventionally expressed by
manipulating quantifier scope. I will explain the details of all this in Chapter 7.
For the moment, the use of indices ranging across N gives an indication of the intuition
involved here. We can represent a finite or countably infinite homogenous collection of
entities by a single entity token, thus making reference to the totality of a set (represented
by a single entity token) procedurally equivalent in the George system to reference to an
individual (or singleton set, also represented by a single entity token). This analysis
rather bypasses the question of whether a predication of a set is distributive or not. I
suggest, however, that the distinction is often irrelevant in discourse processing, and this
ambiguity is often left unresolved. In particular, distributive readings can be derived from
collective ones by spreading a relation across the members of a set, though this is not
always true the other way round. Therefore, a representation may be viewed as being
ambiguously distributive or collective, so long as there is a distinguishable distributive
representation to which it may be coerced. I will propose such a system in Chapter 7.
Let us now proceed with our running example, to demonstrate the behaviour outlined
above. At this rather simple stage, it will be seen that the behaviour of the DeReferencer,
beyond the inclusion of the index notation, is exactly the same for indexed references as
for simple ones, which is as we would like, given our step-by-step approach to the design of
the George DeReferencing system. The discourse so far is shown in 145.
"A man who is unkind beats a donkey.
A woman feeds the donkey.
He hates the person who beats him." 145
6.2. Introductory Indexed Reference
Suppose that we now input sentence 146 to the Parser.
"The woman gives the donkey some carrots." 146
The reference to "The woman" and "the donkey " here are dealt with in exactly the same
way as "the donkey" in the second sentence of 145, with corresponding results: we arrive
at two simple references bound to the existing entity tokens specifying the woman and the
donkey respectively. When we reach the final noun phrase, though, we have a different
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situation. The output from the Parser to the DeReferencer after reading "some" is as
shown in 147. Note that the alternative non-introductory reading of "some" (as in "some of
the...") has been omitted here, as before, because it will lead to a failed translation and
therefore serve no purpose in the example.
{ refll "woman!, refl3"donkey!, Vind5.refl5 Xind5} 147
Following the top level algorithm (which does not refer to indexing at all), this will cause
the creation of a new binding, and a new (as yet unsorted) entity token to be bound to
refl5. It would be labouring a point to show again in detail how the sort information from
"some carrots" arrives at the binding and then propagates to the entity token because of
the singleton nature of introductory bindings. The full detail can be seen in Appendix B;
and the final analysis is shown in figure 10.













ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el"man'unkind
reflO is bound to e2~brown~donkey~male
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
>>
Figure 10: Continued George output for "The woman gives the donkey some carrots."
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This example shows, then, how plural introductory references are made. The procedure,
formally stated in Rule 7, is exactly the same as for singular introductory references, the
A new indefinite indexed reference is always singleton bound to a new
entity token created for that purpose.
Rule 7: Indexed Indefinite Reference
difference being that the binding contains a quantifier and index in its references. Now,
with Rule 4 (number consistency), we have here all the mechanism we need to talk about
sets of the pragmatic kind covered by George. The next sentence in our example shows
how non-introductory indexed references fit equally uniformly into our existing
mechanism.
6.3. Non-Introductory Indexed Reference
Let us now examine the behaviour of the George system when we input sentence 148 in
context ofour running example (Figure 10).
"The donkey eats the carrots." 148
George's behaviour for the first three words is exactly as was demonstrated before. When
we input the second "the", the Parser passes the following set of references to the
DeReferencer (again, ignoring the unsuccessful translation arising from the singular
reading of "the").
{refl6"donkey!, Vind7.[var62,refl9! X ind7] ► refl9! X ind7 } 149
(The context extension here arises from the ambiguous representation of determiners and
quantifiers introduced in Chapter 5. At the end of this sentence, we will be left with an
item of syntactic category s/nmod. This will be coerced to s when the end of the sentence
has been flagged by the full stop, because of the "NP-Post-Modifier" coercion. The
corresponding semantic change is the removal of the context extension.)
Note that the quantifier is very much part of the reference, and not a separate part of the
expression containing it. It expresses the set nature of the reference. However, the
quantifier makes no difference to the treatment of the simple definite reference to "the
donkey" and its binding, which proceeds as described before for singular non-introductory
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references. When we analyse the determiner of the second noun phrase, we arrive at a set
of bindings (omitting those from previous sentences for clarity) like this. This was an
application ofRule 8.
The initial candidate set of a new indexed definite reference always initially
contains all the entity tokens in the system which are both sort consistent in
GRL and number consistent in George (Rule 4) with the reference.
Rule 8: IndexedDefinite Reference
Finally, we add the sort information "carrot" to refl9, which becomes inconsistent with el
and e3 as a result. The binding is now therefore a singleton binding (containing e4), and so
the sort information in the reference passes along the binding to the entity token. The
context extension is now coerced away because of the sentence ending, and we are left
with the bindings for this sentence shown in 151.
This example shows that, by viewing the reference as binding to some abstracted
representation (viz the entity token) of the things to which it refers in the discourse world,
rather than to those things themselves, we can defer the issue of which of them are
actually included in the referent set, on a demand-driven basis. When (or if) we attempt to
find which discourse entities are specified by this abstract representation we have
information regarding number readily available, in the binding, which will help us in
doing so.
This idea of binding to abstractions rather than to individuals captures exactly the
intuition that when we refer to sets, even in complicated discourse involving subsets and
unions, we do not in general need to know number information (though we may of course
use it to restrict our search space, if it is supplied). George's process of finding candidate
sets for bindings does not refer to number information except in the sense of consistency
checking defined in Rule 4. This consistency check can only exclude incorrect bindings; it
does not contribute to finding them, and thus prunes the search tree, as we would wish.
{({refl6"donkey!}, {e2}),
({ Vind7.[var62,refl9! X ind7] ► refl9! X ind7 }, {e4, e3, el })} 150
{({ refl6~donkey!}, {e2 }), ({Vind7.refl9"carrot! X ind7 }, {e4})} 151
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6.4. Indexed Reference to Unions of Sets
The very simple view of set reference presented above works well enough for discourses
which involve sets unless those sets are subsets or unions of sets. Since real discourse is
likely to include such more complex references frequently, we must now consider how
George deals with them.
Let us first consider references to unions of existing sets. This occurs, for example, when
we introduce two sets of people, maybe males and females, and then refer to the union
with, for example, "They". As such, unions of sets can only arise in George through non-
introductory reference, since introductory references are always bound to exactly one
entity token. As an illustration, I will return to our running example, reproduced in 152,
and consider the input utterance in 153.
"A man who is unkind beats a donkey.
A woman feeds the donkey.
He hates the person who beats him.
The woman gives the donkey some carrots.
The donkey eats the carrots." 152
"The people ride the donkey." 153
Taking, as before, only the successful (viz plural) reading of the definite article, on reading
the first word the Parser outputs a set of references like this:
{Vind8.ref21!Xind8} 154
which, according to the original top-level algorithm we followed before, gives rise to the
binding shown in 155.
{({Vind8.ref21!Xind8}, {el, e2, e3, e4})} 155
Here, then, as before, we have a candidate set which is a superset of the set we eventually
wish to achieve. Note that there is no difference between this and the singular definite
case where we require that the candidate set be singleton in the final analysis, because,
even in that singular case, George allows non-singleton candidate sets on the basis that
they represent ambiguous references which may be subsequently resolved. (Note again
the difference in interpretation of the candidate sets of singular and plural references -
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the former as a disjunctive set of candidates, the latter as a conjunctive set of correct
answers.)
On addition of the head noun to the input, the set is restricted to the two people by
application of the "person" sort, which is inconsistent with carrots and donkeys, leaving
us with the binding shown in 156.
We now have the correct candidate set for this example, the full output for which is shown
in Appendix B. A summary, including output for the previous example, sentence 148, is
given in Figure 11.
Applying this approach to the cases where the candidate set is fully specified by the
reference yields a correct set of entity tokens for the binding. In cases where the candidate
set is not fully specified (ie the reference is ambiguous), the result achieved, as elsewhere
in George, has the same status as candidate set results in [Webber, 1979] - the candidate
set represents what is available for reference. We will therefore subsequently need to apply
checks to see which of its elements are really bound to the reference. (Note, though, that
we apply the same process to all references. Ambiguity or otherwise is emergent from the
result.) For example, suppose the subject noun phrase in 153 had been replaced with a less
specific reference, as in 157.
In this case, we start off with the same binding as shown in 155, but, because there is no
sort information in the reference, the binding is not refined until the end of the second
noun phrase. At this point, the appearance of a singleton simple binding involving the
donkey allows its entity token to be ruled out of the indexed reference, by Rule 6 (non-
coreference in closed predicate). However, there still remains one clearly incorrect
candidate, the carrots. I suggest that the only real answer to this problem is discourse
world inference (eg \/x.carrot(x) =» -13y.rides(y,x) ); as such, the candidate set is serving
as a starting point for such inference, and thus restricting the potential explosion of
inferences necessary. This inference might be more neatly expressed by the specification
of selectional restrictions on predicates, as explained in Chapter 9, in which case there is
no question of search for a relevant inference rule. Such a means of expression fits neatly
around the existing George approach to composition of noun phrase semantics, which was
explained in Chapter 5. This kind of inference was possible in [Mellish, 1981 ]'s program.
{({Vind8.ref21 "person! Xind8 }, {el, e2 })} 156
They ride the donkey." 157
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ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref 8 is bound to el~man~unkind
ref 10 is bound to e2~brown~donkey~male
ref 11 is bound to e3~woman
COrHiwd)u is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref 15 is bound to e4"carrot
ref 16 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref 19 is bound to e4"carrot
ref 21 is bound to e3~woman
and el~man~unkind
ref 22 is bound to e2"male"donkey
>>
Figure 11: Continued George output for "The people ride the donkey."
Finally on the subject of unions of sets, note that, again, there is no difference in
treatment between entity tokens specifying individuals and those specifying sets. Thus,
we are still working with the very simple top-level algorithm presented at the beginning
of this chapter, to which we have added nothing beyond the rule needed to restrict
reference on grounds of number. The result of this is that George never does more work
than is strictly necessary to analyse set reference, because sets are treated internally as
individual objects (not unlike arbitrary objects - see [Fine, 1985]), and treated like any
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other such, until there is no alternative to viewing them as agglomerates - maybe because
sort information has been applied explicitly to some elements but not others. Dividing sets
into agglomerates of subsets is the subject of the next section. Note that this "lazy" view of
the language understanding operation is in perfect accord with the notion of adaptable
representation and incremental parsing and reference evaluation, because the
representation of sets is uncommitted as to the exact form of the application of any
relations expressed in the discourse to the members of sets. It also agrees with
[VanLehn, 1978]'s suggestion of postponed evaluation in humans.
6.5. Indexed Reference to Subsets
In referring to a subset of a set, there are broadly two possible referential behaviours. One
is where a previously uniform set (represented in George by a single entity token) is
divided into two by the discovery of new sort information about some (but not) all of its
elements. The other is where a union of sets, represented by more than one token, like
that discussed above, is broken again into subsets corresponding with the original tokens,
which is equivalent to referring to (one of) the original separate referents, and thus does
not present an interesting problem. In the former case, the information which selects a
subset by excluding those elements not in the subset need not be complete - it is enough to
know that they are not inconsistent with the negation of the new property. For example,
in "I own four t-shirts; two are blue." the two de-selected items simply acquire the
property [colour isnt blue]; we do not need to know any other t-shirt colours. If this
information is inconsistent with existing sort information in the excluded set, then the
members with the inconsistent properties should have been included in the selected
subset in the first place. The intermediate behaviour, where a union of sets is divided in
such a way that the set(s) specified by one or more of its existing entity tokens is(are)
divided may be viewed as a generalisation of the first case, above. Examples of these three
cases are given in 158. The explicit number information is added here to make the
examples clearer - the same effect is achievable without it. In each case the subset
reference is underlined.
"Five donkeys go on holiday. Three monkeys go with them.
The holiday-makers decide to fly to Majorca.
The ones with hooves have trouble getting on the plane." 158a
"Five donkeys go on holiday.
They set off for Majorca, but the two brown ones end up in Clacton." 158b
-167- PhD Thesis
The George DeReferencer
"Five donkeys go on holiday. Three monkeys go with them.
The holiday-makers decide to fly to Majorca.
The two fat animals have trouble getting on the plane." 158c
Here, then, we are faced with a situation not unlike one which has arisen previously. All
the way through this discussion, we have allowed sort information to propagate from
references along bindings and add to the information already included in entity tokens.
Subset reference can be treated in exactly the same way, except that in cases b and c of the
example above, one or more of the entity tokens involved must be divided into two new
tokens, one having the property defining the subset and one having its negation. These
will then specify the selected and de-selected subsets of the discourse entities specified by
the original entity token, respectively. Once we have accepted George's view of binding to
entity tokens rather than to explicit sets, such an approach is not unreasonable.
The obvious, brute force way to represent this in George would be by the creation of two
new entities with all the properties of the old one, and with the addition of the new
property, negated on one of them. This would represent explicitly the selected and de¬
selected subsets. The two new entity tokens could then be globally substituted for the old.
This idea works well enough in principle, but can be extremely inefficient if the discourse
is long - particularly if it involves many subset references, with which the number of
entity tokens increases combinatorially.
A more elegant approach would be to include a tree of entity tokens in the Entity Tokens
database from the point at which the set was divided, showing how the division occurred.
Such a tree could represent the relationship between the "parent" entity token (at the
root) and its more refined offspring (as leaf or branch nodes). Then, instead of an entity
token being removed immediately from a candidate set when it was found to be
inconsistent, we would first attempt to move "down" one of the branches of the tree to a
related, more specific token. Only after a branch has been followed to its leaf would we be
licensed to remove the entity token from the candidate set, by the need to move beyond
that leaf to find a suitable refinement of the entity token. This idea has the advantage
that information about the introduction of sets is preserved and easily available - it may
be necessary later in the discourse to know that all the elements of a set were introduced
at the same time, as in 159, in whose final sentence a (meta-)reference is made to the
initial form of a set, before it was divided by subsequent references:
"I bought five carrots last week. Some of them were rotten; some were fresh.
I bought five more yesterday. I gave the first batch to Pedro the donkey." 159
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This information is less easily available (or, indeed, it may be lost altogether) after the
global replacement required by the brute force method.
The tree representation is also potentially substantially more efficient than the brute
force approach suggested before. In particular, that approach requires that all occurences
of the old entity token in the existing bindings be replaced with the new tokens. This may
be a large task, especially if a set has been divided a large number of times - which is
frequently the case in real discourse. The tree representation, however, requires no
change to earlier bindings, because the relation between the old and the new entity tokens
is explicitly maintained. Less importantly, subsequent references to the whole set are
more efficient, because they are bound to one entity token and not to two (or more) with
the corresponding overhead. Finally, the tree representation is easily built in to the
George mechanism we have developed in this chapter, by a small addition to sub-process
® in the top-level algorithm, rather than a major change to the top-level algorithm itself,
as would be required by the brute force method.
I will refer subsequently to this divison of entities in trees as entity token partition and,
unsurprisingly, to the tree produced as an entity token partition tree. The operation of
entity token partition is very important in the process of reasoning about set reference
explained in Chapter 7. It is defined formally in Rule 9.
Let E be an entity token bound to an indexed reference. Then:
Select new entity tokens Ei ... En from Ent, apply to each the sort
information applied to E, and insert them in the Entity Tokens Database.
Add the pairs {( E, E;) 11 < i < n } to the partial order ?>.
The Entity Token Partition Tree of E is then defined as
{E;|l<i<n}U Ui<nTi
where E E; and T; is the Entity Token Partition Tree of Ep
Rule9: Entity Token Partition
7. Summary
In this chapter I have presented the following material.
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2. The rules involved in
Maintenance of referential consistency;
Reference refinement;
Context extension comparison and relevance assessment.
3. The emergent effect from the top-level algorithm of 1, above, of reassessment of a
default non-introductory view of a reference to be introductory in response to failure of
non-introductory reference.
4. The structural referential constraint rules and their maintenance, including
The "closed non-coreference" rule.
5. The application (NB not extension) of the ideas in 1, 2 and 3, above, to
Introductory indexed reference (to whole sets);
Non-introductory indexed reference (to whole sets);
Indexed reference to split sets;
Indexed reference to subsets.
6. The addition to structural referential constraints in 4, above, of
Number restrictions on reference.
The argument presented in this chapter includes a new treatment of noun-phrase
(post-)modification, and an associated view of matching data appearing in noun-phrase
post-modifiers which depends on, and therefore partly vindicates, the decision to keep
separate George references and Entity Tokens. Apart from this new aspect, most of the
work presented in this chapter has effectively been the casting of [Mellish, 1981 ]'s and
[Webber, 1979]'s work into an adaptable system suitable for the kind of manipulation
which I will present in Chapter 7, and showing that doing so need not compromise the
system's ability to perform the tasks performed by those systems. This said, the
presentation gives a rather different slant on the problem, in that it makes a virtue of
expressing dereferencing behaviour in a number of simple rules, rather than in the single




The ground work for presentation of George's approach to representing and reasoning
about references to underspecified sets is now complete. In the next chapter, I will explain
how George's use of entity tokens, bindings, and references in representation of discourse
facilitates such reasoning, and how the adaptability of GRL and George's set
representation makes a potential combinatorial explosion computationally tractable.
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The intuitions behind indexing of references are explained. The linguistic effects captured by
the two different kinds of index operator are introduced.
Index propagation and expansion, allowing explicit representation of the application of
predicates to elements of sets, are introduced, in conjunction with the notion of index
dependency. These operations allow the readings of ambiguous but fully specified weak
quantifiers to be enumerated.
The behaviour of underspecified set references is introduced, leading to the generalisation of the
index expansion operation to index partition. The behaviour of strong and weak indices under
index propagation is detailed.
Finally, index propagation is extended to deal with context extended reference, enabling
George to deal with "donkey sentences" and other dependent reference.
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will explain the main focus of the work in George, which is a means of
representing and reasoning about sets which are underspecified in number. The
explanation will follow on from that in the last chapter - the representation and general
philosophy used will be the same.
Before I attempt to explain the detail of representing underspecified reference in the
George style, it will be useful to discuss the intuitive ideas behind the representation,
which we can do with reference to examples presented in Chapters 1 and 4.
The work presented in this chapter is an example of how adaptable representations can be
used to facilitate automatic language analysis in situations, frequent in real discourse,
where ambiguity or vagueness is potentially so great that search through an immediately
enumerated space of possible readings is not in general computationally viable. Thus,
while the technique is presented as interesting in itself, the overall concept of
adaptability, of which number-underspecified set reference is just one aspect, is still the
primary underlying theme.
- 172- PhD Thesis
Quantified Reference to Underspecified Sets
2. Representation of Sets by Indexing
First, in explaining George's view of sets and underspecified reference to them, I must
reiterate exactly what I mean by underspecified set. The research presented here focusses
on set references which are in a sense ambiguous because they refer to sets whose
cardinality is unknown but whose members have known properties. I use the term
underspecified to describe such references, because there is a distinct intuitive difference
between this ambiguity or vagueness, where we know that our referent is a subset of some
definite known homogenous set of undifferentiable entities (eg "Half of them" in 160), and
the kind more often discussed, where we are attempting to choose from a number of
explicitly differentiable entities (eg "The fat one" in 161) or translations. This distinction
blurs when we have a set of distinct entities and we attempt to refer to some subset of
them; however, George can deal with this case too.
"Some men were in the room. Halfof them owned donkeys." 160
"Two thin men and one fat man were in the room. The fat one owned a donkey." 161
I mentioned in Chapter 1 that I am not concerned here with collective nouns, but only
with sets which are referred to by genuinely plural references. Dealing with collectives
(see Chapter 9) is a further level of linguistic abstraction, as it were, which would only
obscure the central theme of this research.
To start with, then, we need a general notation for making predications of elements of
sets, and, in particular, one which will allow us, should the need arise, to sub-divide the
sets - explicitly - and make further predications on the resulting subsets and their
members. Consider, again, the example given in Chapter 4, adapted from [Webber, 1979]:
"Jim bought two t-shirts. 162a
The blue one was faulty." 162b
I pointed out before that, since the set of entities is small, we could represent it something
like this (ignoring tense and reading © as "exclusive or"):
"bought! t-shirtl, Jim) A bought! t-shirt2, Jim ) A
( blue( t-shirtl) A faulty! t-shirtl ) © blue! t-shirt2 ) A faulty! t-shirt2 ))" 163
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However, especially ifwe want to represent large sets, we risk a combinatorial explosion if
we try to use this rather simplistic approach. More interestingly, if the cardinality of the
set is not defined at all, as in
"Jim bought some t-shirts. 164a
The blue ones were faulty." 164b
this solution is even less helpful, since we cannot make an exhaustive list of possibilities.
As I explained in the last chapter, this kind of "incomplete" reference is made available for
reasoning in George by separating the number information in the reference(s) defining
the set from the corresponding sort information. We view the latter as being part of a kind
of arbitrary object or prototype which, in conjunction with the number information, in
some sense specifies what is the set of discourse entities to which the reference(s) refer. By
doing so, we are able to talk about the properties of the entities in a set without
consideration of the number information available about the set - which seems, at least on
a naive intuitive level, to be exactly what happens when we listen to a discourse including
such information.
The translations into GRL, then, of these partial discourses are as follows.
162: Vindl <2.[bought, ref2~t-shirtXindl, refl "Jim! ] 165a
coref( ref4"faulty, ref3"blue) 165b
164: Vindl.[bought, ref2~t-shirtX indl, refl "Jim! ] 166a
Vind2.coref( ref4"faulty, ref3"blue! X ind2 ) 166b
(Remember that GRL does not directly represent the association between the entities of
the first and of the second sentence; this side of things is handled entirely by the
DeReferencer.)
Now, consider again example 164. When we have translated 164a to give 166a, we may
draw a diagram like Figure 12a to represent the bindings and entity tokens. The arrows in
Figures 12 represent bindings between references and sets of entity tokens, and may be
read as "refers to".
The quantifier is viewed as part of any reference with which its bound index is associated
by the index operator, and so the information it carries must appear in the binding. In
Figures 12, where the reference part of the bindings is shown in the boxes at the blunt end
of the arrows, quantification is represented by the application of the index operator and an
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refl "Jim! el "Jim
ref2"t-shirtXindl i indl<N r e2" t-shirt
Figure 12a: Entities and Bindings for Example 164a/166a
index. The information conveyed by the upper bound of the binding is then shown in the
box attached directly to the arrow. The set of entity tokens at the other end of the binding
is shown as one or more boxes at the sharp end of the arrow.
In the case of example 164a/166a, the upper bound on the quantification is unspecified.
Therefore, the upper bound is written (in the diagrams) simply as N or M, representing
some uninstantiated number in N.
The attachment of a number, N, to the arrows may be thought of as shorthand for N
bindings between N distinct but characteristically identical references to N distinct copies
of the entity token. In a case such as this where N is unspecified, it is impossible to draw
the complete expansion.
Now, consider what happens when we translate 164b to give 166b. After reading the first
noun phrase, we need to subdivide our set of t-shirts into those which are blue and those
which are not. We can represent this first stage with a diagram like Figure 12b, where M
refl "Jim! el "Jim
ref2" t-shirt Xindl
ref3~blue'.Xind2
Figure 12b: Entities and Bindings for Example 164b/166b
is the (unspecified) number of blue t-shirts. Note that the negated sort in the diagram is
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only a shorthand form, and would in fact be represented by a sort whose defining set
contained just the property value pair
[colour isnt blue]
rather than by a declarative application of a negation operator to a sort.
Finally, we are able to introduce the information from the coref predicate in 166b-
namely that the sort applied to ref4 applies to the entity(ies) referred to by ref3 - to






Figure 12c: Entities andBindings for Example 164b/166b
computing and representing set reference.
3. Using Indices to Reason about Quantification
3.1. Introduction
The examples in the last section show the simple intuition behind George's representation
of sets: that any quantified reference is a compact representation for some larger number
of references, and hence that a GRL expression containing such a reference is a compact
representation for some larger number of expressions. In particular, that larger number
may be unknown.
However, none of the worked examples presented so far have involved references to
subsets, undistinguished by sort, of homogenous sets. This makes reference particularly
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easy to analyse, as I showed in Chapter 6. Now we must consider what happens when this
more complex kind of reference occurs in an utterance.
Before starting this discussion, it is important to understand that the processes described
in the following sections are not gratuitously applied to sentences in George - that is, they
only apply when there is a reason for them to do so; when, for example, a reference is made
to an individual introduced as one of an homogenous set. In this event, George's Discourse
Memory may be altered to account for any deductions which can be made from the later
reference regarding the nature of that set. Thus, search through the very large space of
possibilities I will consider here is always guided, in the weak sense that the inference
process always has a target. Adaptability of the representation of those parts of entities
unaffected by the inference is not compromised. Therefore, as elsewhere, non-determinism
is kept to a minimum.
In particular, the reasoning which I will describe in the following sections takes place as a
sub-process of the overall dereferencing algorithm specified in Chapter 6: the algorithm is
reproduced below; the sub-process described in this chapter is part 3.
On receipt of a set of references from the Parser, for each reference symbol in the set,
perform each one of the following actions (the labelling is for convenience later).
If the reference symbol is new to the DeReferencer® then
1. a. create a new binding for it, then...
b. If its reference is definite®, find the names of the entity token(s) to which it
may refer® and insert them into the binding;
c. If its reference is indefinite®, create a new entity token and insert it into the
binding;
otherwise
2. a. look up its existing binding, then...
b. Combine any new information® about the reference with that already
contained in the binding, discarding any erstwhile candidate entity tokens
which are now made inconsistent®. Check that entity tokens removed are
not left newly unbound; if any are, remove them from the Entity Tokens
database.
3. If the binding of this reference contains no entity tokens (ie if the reference is
completely new, or no existing token was found to be consistent, or all the tokens
previously found to be consistent were deleted on grounds of inconsistency on this
latest iteration), search backwards through discourse memory for expressions
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containing references bound to entity tokens of consistent sort with this reference.
Apply the underspecified reference mechanism© to each such expression until
one is found which yields success under that mechanism; then rewrite the
bindings and if necessary the expression itself to create entity tokens for the
bindings in the current sentence.
Finally,
4. If the reference is definite and its binding contains no entity tokens (te if all the
tokens previously found to be consistent were deleted on grounds of inconsistency
on this latest iteration), create a new entity token with the appropriate
properties© and insert it into both the Entity Tokens database and the binding.
In the following sections, I will describe the processes involved in reasoning about set
reference referred to in part 3. In particular, I will suggest a means of deducing from an
ambiguous quantified expression a conjunction of expressions with a subset of the same
semantic interpretations. This will allow us to represent sets in the simple and tractable
way outlined before, but still deal with complicated situations where the exact detail of
the application of a predicate to the members of its domain is not specified. These
processes, therefore, have a status roughly equivalent to that of refinement of a set of
candidate entities in the easier referential cases explained before; they form part of the
process of inference about descriptions of entities in the discourse world. As such, they are
not unlike Webber's attempts [Webber, 1979] to discover what is "available for reference"
in a discourse.
However, it seems that this harder kind of set reference takes second place to more
straightforward readings. That is to say, in the event of ambiguity, a reading of a sentence
not involving the breakdown of existing sets will be chosen before one requiring such a
breakdown. In the last chapter, I explained that, for simple references, if we fail to find an
entity token suitable for binding (under the criteria given before) then we simply create
one. The process described in this chapter fits, in the George system, between such more
straightforward analysis of indexed reference (which I explained in Chapter 6) and the
decision to create a new entity token for a binding. Thus, the Principle of Parsimony is
upheld.
Once a reading has been deduced which fits the requirements imposed by the discourse,
we may partition entity tokens in our database, as explained before, to represent the new
(sub)sets created, and we may replace the original quantified expression in the Discourse
Memory with a new version, which may be differently quantified or not quantified at all,
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depending on the exact circumstances at the time. These details will be covered later in
this chapter.
3.2. Strong andWeak Quantification
Before proceeding with the examples and discussion of the effects of quantification
covered in George, I must introduce a new notion into the linguistic framework. This is
the distinction between strong and weak quantification.
I have already introduced operators to denote strong and weak indexing, but without
giving a motivation for doing so. The motivation, then, is that the two operators give us an
explicit way of representing the two forms of quantification, in line with the general
policy here of representing surface form as explicitly as possible. So what differing surface
forms we are representing?
In [Mellish, 1985], Mellish points out the need for different respective treatments of
ordinary plural noun phrases, and what he calls "each phrases"; such a distinction is also
implicit in the results of VanLehn's survey of rules for interpreting quantification in
natural language [VanLehn, 1978]. (This analysis does not include the classical
existential quantifier, whose semantics is rather different.)
The point is that different quantifiers allow us to express differences in the way the detail
of such quantification is worked out. For example, consider two simple discourses like
those shown in 167a and b.
These two have in common a set ofmen of arbitrary (possibly predetermined) cardinality,
a (possibly singleton) set of donkeys, and a relation between the two. In a, there is only one
reading, where there is only one donkey which is owned by all the men. In b, the most
easily accessible reading is where the mapping between the two sets is one-to-one - that is
to say, every man in the set of men owns a different one of the set of donkeys. There are,
however, a large number of other possible readings where each man owns some donkey,
but the relation is not one-to-one, because some donkeys are owned by more than one man.
One example of such a reading is that where there is exactly one donkey and every man
owns it. The difference, in abstract, lies in the cardinality of the set of donkeys, and in the
exact nature of the realtionship between elements of that set and the set of men. In the
first sentence, there is exactly one donkey; in the second, there is some number of them -
"The men own a donkey."
Each man owns a donkey."
167a
167b
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from one up to the same number as of men. This is particularly significant in view of the
fact that the surface form of the reference to the donkey(s) is the same in both sentences.
Further, 167a may be read collectively or distributively, while 167b does not admit the
collective reading.
I suggest that either or both of these effects may be meaningfully associated with the
notion of "strength" of quantification, so that "each" is a strong quantifier and "the" is a
weaker one. As such, it is appropriate within the George framework to use different
notations for the translations of the two words, just as we used different representations
for definite and indefinite references. (Indeed, one could go further, and say that we need a
real sliding scale of quantifier strength, to account for these effects in full. For the
purposes of experiment, however, it will be better to constrain the domain to weak and
strong quantifications, and establish a general principle. Then, the idea can be later
extended by closer study of the minutise involved.)
In order to denote these two strengths of quantifier, then, we need two symbols. It will
become clear from the explanation in the following sections that a good way to express the
behaviour we wish to discuss is not to quantify over sets of entities, but to view
quantification as something applied to references. Thus, we can use one basic notion of
quantification - applying predicates to the elements of sets, according with the linguistic
intuition expressed earlier - and change the way it is applied to express the difference
between strong and weak quantification. This, then, is why George uses indices instead of
conventional quantifiers and their associated domains and why the application of the
indices to references is denoted by two related but distinct operators, the strong and weak
index application operators, ® and X, respectively.
Finally, note that strongly indexed references (which represent strongly quantified
referring expressions) may only be definite - the non-definite reading of, say, "every" can
only be read as generic in the case where it does not refer to an existing set. The
connection between definites and indefinites and strong and weak indices seems to run
deeper than this, as will be seen later; however, it is not clear what is the exact
philosophical nature of the relationship.
In the following sections, I will explain how we can use this distinction to build a
generalisation of the behaviour of quantified references with respect to each other and to
other references. I will propose a mechanism which will enable us to produce the various
explicit readings available from the weak quantifiers by a mechanical process.
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I will start by considering the various combinations of quantifier in sentences containing
only two-place predicates, and then show that it extends to N-place relations. Finally, I
will extend the idea to cover dependent references - that is, references related to other
quantified references by subordination.
4. Restrictions on Quantified Reference
It is important to understand here that the expressions generated by the rules I will
formulate here are, in the same way as [Webber, 1979]'s discourse entities, what is
available for reference. In particular, the examples will contain relations, such as
ownership, which do not have any particularly strong pragmatic connotations. Some of
the readings which will be generated could, if they contained relations like "give", for
example, lead to pragmatic contradictions. For example, the sentence in 168a can only be
read meaningfully if each of the implicit giving actions takes place at a different time.
Such pragmatic effects are related to the strength of the quantification - the same
problem does not arise with 168b, because of the collective nature of the sentence,
reflected in the weakness of the determiner, "The". Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the need to rule out such spurious readings does not detract from the utility of the methods
presented here; indeed, such analysis might best be characterised as a process based on
the output of those methods. As such, it is outside the scope of this discussion.
5. Sentences containingmore than one Quantifier
In the last chapter, I discussed the behaviour of the George system in response to a
reference to a subset of a set previously introduced into the discourse. Such reference was
relatively uncomplicated, because the sets in question always appeared in relations with
individual objects, and because I did not discuss the exact form of the quantification. Thus,
the exact nature of the relation between the members of the set was never ambiguous.
In this and the following sections, I explain how George deals with the harder cases, where
relations are specified between two or more non-singleton sets of entities. In general,
linguistic specifications of such relations do not contain all the information needed to give
their full logical or mathematical detail. George's main feature is its ability to propose
"Every man gives a donkey the carrot."
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readings of such quantified sentences, so that subsequent references to the entities
involved may guide inference of the (more) exact nature of the relationship expressed by
the original sentence.
This process is characterised in George as a search through a space of possibilities. As
specified in the algorithm given earlier, the search only begins when the other, more
constrained methods of finding entity tokens to which references may be bound have
failed. Ifwe do have to call on this search, the sequences of search steps (which correspond
with sequences of inference steps in reasoning about the nature of set references) always
terminate, either when an appropriate token has been found, or when no further inference
steps can be applied. Search through this space of possibilities is non-deterministic. In the
event that a chosen analysis is proved incorrect later in the discourse, another choice is
sought which fits both the original constraint(s) and the new one(s) which rendered the
former analysis inadequate. As I mentioned before, maximal possible adaptibility is
maintained during the inference process, particularly of those parts of the discourse
representation not directly affected by it. Thus, resatisfaction of a search may not involve
actual backtracking in the system.
It will become clear in the examples later that this search can be guided to a large extent
by features of the existing discourse memory. However, such guidance has been left here
to an oracle. For the purposes of experiment, blind search is adequate, since it is not the
speed with which we generate our resulting expressions which is of interest here, but
rather the generation itself. Thus, pointers given through the following text as to why an
inference step is well-chosen are given with the benefit of higher level knowledge. George
cannot currently use them.
6. Weak Indexing
6.1. Introduction
Consider the discourse shown in example 169. This is the first sentence of the puzzle in
example 1, which will constitute the main running example of this chapter. It contains
only weak quantifiers.
"Some men own some donkeys."
Vind l.Vind2. [owns,ref2 "donkeyXind2,refl "manX indl]
169a
169b
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As before, if we had upper bounds on the indices, we could write out an exhaustive list of
sentences representing the meaning of the utterance. However - and this the whole point
here - there are many ways of doing so. Equally, in unbounded cases like 169, there is a
potentially large number of interpretations, each of which is impossible to write
exhaustively. Consider, for example, the following situations.
1. Each man owns exactly one donkey, and each donkey is owned by exactly one man.
2. Each man owns exactly one donkey, and at least one donkey is owned by more than
one man.
3. Each man owns a non-empty set of donkeys, and no donkey is owned by more than one
man.
4. Each man owns a non-empty set of donkeys, and any donkey may be a member ofmore
than one such set.
5. Each donkey is owned by a set of men, and the intersections between the sets are
empty.
This list is by no means complete, so if we are to find a general method of reasoning about
such statements, we need a very general representation and inference system. I will
therefore first present a naive solution to a rather easier, more specific example - that
shown in 170- where we can (NB for the purposes of argument only) enumerate the
various possibilities. I will then extend this to the greater generality of fully specified
reference, and thence, later, to the harder underspecified references shown above.
The five possible readings are shown diagrammatically in Figures 13a-e (spread
throughout the exposition), the ownership relation being indicated by the arrows. I will
discuss the possible readings and George's mechanism for obtaining them one by one.
Initially, to represent the five readings directly in GRL, we use the expression shown in
example 170b. As we have seen, this ambiguous representation is adequate for referential
purposes, until we need to talk about individuals or subsets. For the moment, I will
And so on...
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restrict our discussion to individuals (which are a special kind of subset - viz a singleton
subset).
The process I am about to describe can be divided into four sections, as follows. Its
application is caused by the failure of an indexed reference to refer successfully in number
to an entity to which it may refer successfully by sort, as defined in part 3 of the top level
algorithm.
1. Optional application of Index Propagation - manipulation of the application of
quantification to the various references in an expression. This gives the same
effect as changing quantifier scope in more conventional notations.
2. Optional application of Index Dependency - linking of two indices together to
indicate that the sets over which their quantifiers range are in one-to-one
correspondence with respect to the predicate in the expression. This operation
is analogous to [Mellish, 1981 ]'s "linked dependencies".
3. Optional application of Index Expansion or Index Partition - manipulation of
ambiguous references to sets to yield more specific (conjunctions of) references
to (sub)sets.
4. If Index Expansion was applied in 3, Reference Renaming - application of a
function mapping RefX N—»Ref (as defined in Chapter 4) such that the output
of the function is a unique reference symbol. This simply ensures that
different references in the system after index expansion do not have the same
name.
6.2. The Cross Product Reading: Weak Index Expansion.
The Cross Product reading of sentence 170 is that represented in Figure 13a, where each
of the two men owns both of the two donkeys. It is easily represented using conventional
logical (FOPC) notation, as shown in example 171a. 171b shows an alternative, expanded
reading, which might be more suited for subsequent reference analysis.
Vx.( donkey( x ) => Vy.( man( y) =» owns( x, y)))
3a.(donkey( a ) A 3b.(donkey( b ) A 3c.(man( c) A 3d.(man( d) A
owns( a, c) A owns( a, d ) A owns( b, c ) A owns( b, d)))))
171a
171b
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Discourse
World
Figure 13a: Each one of two men owns both of two donkeys.
To produce an explicit representation of this reading (where the quantifiers are expanded
into a conjunction of unquantified expressions like 171b), George uses Weak Index
Expansion. In Chapter 4, I defined indices as being variables over N or some contiguous
subset ofN including 0. In this example, we have upper bounds on both of the indices: they
both range over {0,1}. We would like a means of expanding the indices in such an
expression to give an equivalent unquantified set of expressions, replacing each index in a
sentence with each of its possible values. This would give us a more direct representation
of the relationship between the elements of the two sets.
Weak Index Expansion is defined in Rule 10. Example 172 shows the operation at work,
first expanding the indices (172b) and renaming the resultant references (172c, which also
shows the resulting entity token partition trees). Note that only steps 3 and 4 of the four
steps specified in Section 6.1 are being applied here.
Vindl < 2.Vind2 < 2. [own,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X indl ]
{({Vindl <2,refl X indl}, {el }), ({Vind2<2.ref2 X ind2 }, {e2})}
[owns,ref2 "donkey X 0,refl "man X 0]
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Let 11..-Ip, Ji...Jq be index symbols, I be a bounded index symbol with upper bound
N, and K be an arbitrary, possibly empty, string of I; and J; conjoined by X and 0.
Let R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm be references (n, m, p, q, N € N), and P be a predicate symbol.
Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
VIx...VIp.VI < N.VJX...VJq.[P,Rn-Ri,R x I x K,Sm...Si]
by creating N of copies of the expression each with I replaced by a different
member ofN less than N, iffN is instantiated with a known value, thus:
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...Ri,R x 0 x K,Sm...Si]
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x 1 x K,Sm...Si]
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,R„...Ri,R x (N-l) x K,Sm...Sx]
After rewriting, each reference symbol with an integer applied to it is
replaced by a new unique reference symbol; all occurrences of each
{reference symbol,integer) pair are replaced by the same symbol. Weak
index expansion causes a corresponding entity token partition (if one does
not already exist), so each new reference has its own distinct entity token.
Having done so, bindings containing the expanded reference must be
replaced by n bindings between the new references and entity tokens.
Rule 10: Weak Index Expansion
[owns,ref6 "donkey ,ref4~man]
{({ ref3 }, {e3 }), ({ ref4}, { e4}), < { ref5 }, {e5 }), ({ref6 }, {e6})}
{el e3, el > e4, e2 e5, e2 > e6} 172c
In a fuller implementation of GRL, the four resulting sentences might be written
conjoined, to express their common origin. Here, though, in the context of the GRL
semantics supplied in Chapter 4, they must be written separately, because conjunction of
closed predicates is not defined. This makes little difference here, because there is an
equivalent notion in the semantic translation algorithm - the Discourse Memory is
viewed as one big conjunction.
Note that the result of the expansion represents the semantics we require only if a
corresponding entity token partition is performed, as specified in the rule, because
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otherwise, the new references would simply refer to the same set as before, which would be
incorrect.
6.3. Weak Index Propagation
All other readings of sentence 170 involve more complicated interaction between the
quantifiers in the sentence. In many systems, this is represented by the application of
different quantifier scopes, affecting the syntactic structure of the sentence. In George, the
interaction is viewed as a propagation of the effect of one quantifier to another through, as
it were, the predicate connecting them. This is represented in GRL through the Weak
Index Propagation operation, specified in Rule 11. (The definition includes a reference to
Let I be an index symbol, R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sra be references (n, m 6 N), and P be a
predicate symbol. Then:
Given an expression of the form
VI.[P,R„,...,Ri,R x I,Sm,...,Si],
we can replace any number ofRjwith R; x I iff
1) the index I only appears once within this closed predicate (ie it has
never been propagated);
2) the Index Application Rule (Rule 18) holds for <left,Ri,R x I).
To maintain consistency, I must also be propagated to any identical
occurrences of R; in other expressions in the discourse memory. If
appropriate, quantifiers should be added.
Rule 11: Weak Index Propagation
Rule 18, the Index Application Rule of Section 16, which specifies the kinds of references
to which indices can propagate. Here, that rule is always satisfied, because we are only
moving weak indices to weak indexed indefinite references, which is always an acceptable
combination.)
Weak Index Propagation allows weak indices to move around the arguments in the closed
predicate in which they appear. Note that the operation is only defined on references
whose index is unique. This means that an index cannot propagate from a reference on to
which it has been propagated. Propagation allows an index to be copied, leftwards, onto
weak indexed references other than the one with which it is explicitly associated by the
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input, but within the same closed predicate. I will say that the newly arrived index then
dominates the older one (as in FOPC some quantifers dominate others).
It is important to note also that it is not possible to read sentence 170 in such a way that
two sets of two men own one each of a pair of donkeys. Therefore, weak index propagation
operation is only defined from right to left (ie from subject to object, and to indirect object,
if applicable) and not in the reverse direction.
6.4. The One-to-Many Reading: Weak Index Propagation
One of these more complicated readings of 170 is that illustrated by Figure 13b. This is
the reading where each man owns a distinct set of two donkeys. In George, the reading is
obtained by applying weak index propagation, and then weak index expansion, as shown
step by step in example 173. (In an attempt to make the examples in this chapter more
readable, I have omitted sort information from the bindings shown. This is merely for the
purposes of example, like the simplified notation used for predicate names here.) In
association with the corresponding entity token partition, as required by Rule 10, the
resulting conjunction represents the desired reading.
Discourse
World
Figure 13b: Each of two men owns both members ofone of
two non-intersecting sets ofdonkeys.
Vindl <2.Vind2<2.[own,ref2 donkey X ind2,refl"manX indl]
{({Vindl < 2.refl X indl }, { e1}), ({Vind2 < 2.ref2 X ind2 }, {e2 })} 173a
—index propagation—*
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Vindl < 2.Vind2 < 2.[own,ref2"donkey X ind2 X indl ,refl "man X indl ]
{({Vindl <2.refl Xindl}, {el}),
({Vindl < 2.Vind2 < 2.ref2 X ind2 X indl}, {e2 })} 173b
_index expansion—*
Vind2 < 2.[owns,ref2"donkey X ind2 X O.refl "man X 0]
Vind2<2.[owns,ref2"donkeyXind2X l,refl"manX 1]
{{{refl X 0 }, {e3}), ({Vind2 < 2.ref2 X ind2 X 0}, {e5 }),
({refl X1}, {e4}), ({ Vind2 < 2.ref2 X ind2 X1}, { e6})}
{el $> e3, el e4, e2 e5, e2 > e6 } 173c
—index expansion—*
[owns,ref2 "donkeyXOX 0,refl "manXO] [owns,ref2 "donkey X 1 X0,refl "manXO]
[owns,ref2~donkeyX0X l,refl"manX 1] [owns,ref2"donkeyX1X l,refl "manX 1]
{({ refl X 0}, {e3 }), ({ ref2 X 0 X 0}, { e7 } ), ({ refl X1}, {e4}),
({ref2X 0 X 1}, { e8}), ({ref2X1X 0}, {e9 }), ( {ref2X1X1},{elO})}
{el $> e3, el S> e4, e2 > e5, e2 e6, e5 e7, e5 §> e8, e6 > e9, e6 > elO } 173d
_renaming—»
[owns,ref4"donkey X0,ref2"man] [owns,ref5 "donkeyX0,ref2"man]
[owns,ref4 "donkey X l,ref3"man] [owns,ref5 "donkey X l,ref3"man]
{({ref2}, {e3}), ({ ref4X 0}, {e7 }), ({ref3 },{e4}),
( { ref4X 1}, {e8}), ({ref5x 0 }, {e9 }), ({ ref5X 1 }, {elO})}
{el P' e3, el S> e4, e2 e5, e2 e6, e5 e7, e5 e8, e6 > e9, e6 > elO } 173e
—renaming—*
[owns,ref6 "donkey,ref2 "man] [owns,ref7"donkey,ref2"man]
[owns,ref8 "donkey,ref3 "man] [owns,ref9~donkey,ref3"man]
{({ref2 }, { e3 }), < {ref6}, { e7 } >, < { ref3 }, {e4}),
({ ref8}, {e8}), < {ref7}, { e9 }), < { ref9}, { elO })}
{ el e3, el > e4, e2 > e5, e2 e6, e5 e7, e5 > e8, e6 e9, e6 > elO} 173f
6.5. The One-to-One Reading: Index Dependency
In the foregoing example, index propagation expressed the effect of one quantifier on
another (which we traditionally get from scoping in, say, FOPC); and expanding the
indices across N enumerated the elements of the sets. So far, the effect we have seen has
been unsubtle: it might, for example, be expressed just as well through use of conventional
universal quantifiers in FOPC. Now, we must consider more complicated relationships
between the quantified sets.
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The next reading we need to produce is that shown in Figure 13c. This is the reading
Discourse
World
Figure 13c: Each one of two men owns exactly one of two donkeys.
where the sets are in one-to-one correspondence, so each man owns exactly one distinct
donkey. To produce this reading, we use the notion of index dependency. The specification
of the index dependency transformation given here is not complete - I will generalise it
later (in Rule 12): for now this definition will suffice.
VindN1.VindN2.refN3XindNiXindN2 -indexdependency—* VindN2.refN3XindN2
Note how the index and quantifier associated with the dominated index disappears: the
dominating index has, as it were, gained complete control of the reference; this is like the
use of a one-to-one correspondent skolem function in FOPC. The operation is equivalent in
the George formalism to the use of linked dependencies in Mellish's MECHO.
The derivation of this reading is shown step by step in 174. The original sentence is shown
in a. After applying index propagation (b), then index dependency to the reference with
two indices (c), then applying index expansion (d) and renaming, we get the reading (e),
which corresponds with a universal quantifier dominating an existential in FOPC, or
with the use of one-to-one correspondent skolem functions.
Vindl < 2.Vind2 < 2.[own,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X indl]
{({Vindl <2.refl X indl}, {el}), ({Vind2<2.ref2Xind2 }, { e2} >} 174a
—index propagation—*
Vindl < 2.Vind2 < 2. [own,ref2'donkey X ind2 X indl,refl "man X indl ]
{({ Vindl < 2.refl X indl}, {el}),
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({ Vindl < 2.Vind2 < 2.ref2 X ind2 X indl }, { e2 })} 174b
_index dependency—*
Vindl <2. [own,ref2~donkey X indl,refl "man X indl]
{({Vindl < 2.refl X indl}, { el}), ({ Vindl < 2.ref2 X indl}, { e2 })} 174c
_index expansion—*
[owns,ref2~donkeyX 0,refl "manX 0]
[owns,ref2"donkeyX 1,refl "manX 1]
{({refl X 0}, {e3 }), ({ref2 X 0}, {e5}), ({ refl X 1}, { e4}), < {ref2 X 1}, { e6 })}
{ el > e3, el S> e4, e2 e5, e2 e6} 174d
174e
6.6. More Complicated Readings: Non-UniformQuantification
The are two more readings for which we must account. Both of them arise where the
quantification in the sentence is in a sense non-uniform. By this, I mean that not all the
members of the sets participating in the quantified relation take part in the same way; in
this two man/two donkey example, say, if one donkey is owned by one man, and another is
owned by two. In general, there are three ways this can happen, distinct from the readings
generated in the earlier sections; only two arise in this simple example, so the third will be
deferred for now.
The first of these readings, shown in figure 13d, arises when there is exactly the number of
participants in the relation as is stated in the surface form, but the men own different
numbers of donkeys (as in the figure). Note that this reading is unusual, in that it is the
only reading where the predicate does not range over the entirety of both sets. For this
reason, it is not derivable under index propagation, partition and/or expansion as defined
so far, because they can only generate readings by producing members or subsets of sets,
and do not allow some members of a set to be excluded. Therefore, this large class of
readings will require a special mechanism. The second reading, which Figure 13e
illustrates, can arise where each man owns a (different) subset of the complete set of
donkeys, the cardinality of which is given in the surface form, but the subsets intersect.
The required GRL representations of these readings are shown in 175 and 176
respectively.
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Figure 13d: One man owns two donkeys; another owns one of them.
Figure 13e: Each of two men owns one of
an intersecting pair ofsets ofdonkeys.
[owns,ref5 "donkey,ref3 ~man] [owns,ref5~donkey,ref4"man]
[owns,ref6"donkey,ref4"man]
{({ref5 }, {e5 }), ({ref3 }, {e3 }), < { ref6 }, {e6}), < {ref4}, {e4})}
{el > e3, el > e4, e2 > e5, e2 S> e6 } 175
[owns,ref5 "donkey,ref3"man] [owns,ref6 "donkey,ref3 "man]
[owns,ref6 "donkey ,ref4"man] [owns,ref7 "donkey,ref4"man]
{<{ref5 }, {e5 }), ({ref3 }, {e3 }), ({ref6}, {e6}), ({ref7 }, {e7}), ({ref4}, {e4})}
{el > e3, el > e4, e2 > e5, e2 e6, e2 e7} 176
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In order to generate these more obscure readings, we will first need to define a further
operation, Weak Index Partition, which will enable us to split the references and entity
tokens into smaller sections, and produce the meaning of the whole in terms of the parts,
in standard divide-and-conquer style. Weak Index Partition (in fact Index Partition in
general) is the linguistic analogue of the Entity Token Partition operation defined before
on George's intensional representation of the discourse world.
Inspection of the various translations presented in this section shows that they do indeed
represent the readings of this sentence we need. However, it is all too obvious that, while
they perform the function we need for this simple sentence, they cease to produce all the
readings we need as soon as we extend the size of our sets. Therefore, we must generalise
the functions. First, though, there is an important point to be made.
6.7. Choosing Index Operations
The issue is this. We have defined three index operations, expansion, propagation and
dependency, which we can try to apply to each reference in an expression, but we have no
decision procedure for choosing between them. We will apparently need such a decision
procedure at some stage, since it does not make sense for more than one sequence of these
index operations to apply to a reference at once - this would mean that we could give two
distinct correct readings of the vagueness in underspecified sentences at the same time,
which is never true. What is more (and this becomes worse in the more general examples
below) we can run into a seriously explosive situation if we try to make all the possible
expansions in parallel in different possible translations. The Index Partition operations
specified here, in conjunction with entity token partition will give us the means to propose
a representation based on that already used in George for sets, which will considerably
alleviate the burden of notating such an explosion, by allowing us to reduce the
adaptability of our GRL expressions, without doing so completely. Even so notation
cannot in general help us with the problem of searching through a potentially
combinatorially increasing search space.
However, the problem is in practice not as serious as it might first appear. While it is
certainly true that the potential for this explosion is very likely to occur in real discourse,
it is nevertheless rarely (if ever) realised. The tendency is for reasoning to proceed at an
abstract level (the level of sets) until complete grounding of the abstraction (to
enumerated individuals) is absolutely required - for example, picking out one member of a
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set by a singular reference need not lead to enumeration of all the members of that set.
The distinction between references and entity tokens allows us to capture this abstraction.
What is more (and this is very relevant to George's strictly incremental, adaptable
approach to discourse analysis) is that it is very unusual in English to cause such an
enumeration in one statement. Either we have to quantify {eg "All of them", "Some of
them", etc), which need not cause enumeration in George, or pick out subsets or
individuals; in the subset and individual cases, each new reference generally only adds
one step, or maybe a few steps, in the inference process from set to enumerated
individuals, in model divide-and-conquer style. Thus, to a considerable extent, the work is
done for us by the speaker in his/her use of language. Beyond this, for our purposes here, it
is enough to say that we need some oracle to choose the best path through a search space.
Having made this point, we can go on relatively safely to consider the generalisation of
the basic ideas presented above to a wider framework.
6.8. GeneralisingWeak Indexing
While the example concerning two men and two donkeys was useful to give an idea of the
concepts involved here, it was lacking in that the two-member sets have some special
properties, which are not true of sets in general. We now need to broaden our coverage to
an example whose sets do not have these properties. Consider the example sentence and
translation (before and after propagation) in 177.
"Three men own three donkeys." 177a
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X indl ] 177b
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2 X indl,refl "man X indl ] 177c
Applying expansion directly to 177b gives us the reading where all the donkeys are owned
by all the men, exactly as before. Applying index propagation and then index expansion
yields the other extreme, where each of the three men owns his own set of three donkeys,
again as before. Indeed, a little consideration of the mathematical nature of this procedure
soon suggests that these two correct readings will be obtained for any combination of
upper bounds. As in the previous example, index dependency (after index propagation and
before expansion) yields the one-to-one correspondence result painlessly - though the
informal definition given before is not fully general, as explained below. I have not yet
defined a mechanism for producing the other more complicated possible readings
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available in this situation (eg one man owns one donkey, the other two both own both of a
further pair of donkeys).
In the analysis of example 170, the various possibilities for mapping of relations between
individual references could be divided into three groups, according to the cardinalities of
the sets involved. There was one reading where there were two men and four donkeys.
There were three readings (one of which we have yet to generate) where there were two
men and two donkeys. Finally, there was one reading (which, also, has yet to be covered),
where there were two men, and some number of donkeys (in this case three) between the
minimal (two) and the maximal (four) sets. These different readings can also be
categorised in terms of the number and nature of divisions of sets they connote. The first,
for example, involves simply splitting the set of men once to give a relation between each
man and a set of donkeys; the last one involves splitting the men once, splitting the
donkeys twice, and establishing relations between each man and one of two distinct single
donkeys and then between both men and a third donkey. In the next section, this notion of
splitting sets will give rise to the means of dealing with the two harder dependencies.
It is in the nature of the expansion and propagation operations that they extend trivially
to larger sets. Let us now consider the status of index dependency, in the same
circumstance. By definition, the one-to-one correspondence reading produced by index
dependency is only possible when the upper bounds of the two quantifiers are equal, as
they have been in the two examples so far. (We may sometimes be in a position to use this
fact for inference when only one upper bound is known.) Therefore, we must be able to
restrict the application of the operation to cases where this is true. To do so, I introduce a
monadic operator, upb, on index symbols, which will return the maximum value
attainable by the index given as its argument (or, in the event that such a value is not
immediately available, a variable which can later be associated with it through
unification). This operator corresponds with the mapping IndexRange in the definition of
the Discourse State in Chapter 4. Armed with it, we can express index dependency in the
full generality shown in Rule 12, and, for the first time, create a Bounding Constraint (an
arithmetic equation between upper bounds of indices).
We can now in general generate the three more obvious readings of our underspecified
sentences in a straightforward mechanical way. However, we have yet to answer three
fundamental questions - first, what about the more complicated readings? - second, how
do we deal with sets which are too large to enumerate practicably in this way - and, third,
how do we deal with the central issue here, that of underspecified sets?
-195- PhD Thesis
Quantified Reference to Underspecified Sets
I
Let Ii and I2 be index symbols respectively, R be a simple reference, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm
be references (n,m(N> 0), and let P be a predicate symbol. Then:
To express index dependency, we can rewrite an expression of the form
VIj.Vl2.[P,Rn—Rl»R x I2 x Ii,Sm...Si]
by replacing R x I2 x Ii with R x U iff (upb Ii = upb I2) to give
VIj.[P,Rn...Ri,R x Ii,Sm...Si]
This gives rise to the new Bounding Constraint
upb Ii = upb I2
Rule 12: Index Dependency
6.9. Weak Index Partition
Conveniently, using little more than the facilities already available to us, we can deal
with all three problems using the same mechanism. In Chapter 6,1 introduced the idea of
entity token partition, to allow us to represent newly distinguished subsets of previously
homogenous sets while still capturing the common origin of the subsets. The solution to
the questions posed above lies in the extension of this idea to weak index partition - that is,
the explicit partition of ranges of indices to restrict the expressions produced from them
through the various index manipulations explained in this chapter; such a restriction
corresponds with a reduction in the vagueness in a quantified expression.
As before, this idea follows the intuition that reasoning about sets at the level of
intensions (or arbitrary objects, or prototypes) can often remove the need to consider their
cardinality. Examples of this were given in Chapter 1, where sets were introduced, but
never referred to as anything other than conglomerate individuals. Let us now return to
the original example of this chapter, reproduced below, and consider how index partition
works.
( "Some men own some donkeys." 169a
Vindl. Vind2. [owns,ref2 "donkey Xind2,refl~manX indl] 169b)
To recapitulate our motivation here: remember that indefinite references like these are
viewed as introductory. As such, we are always free initially to assert the unexpanded
indexed translation, 169b, in our Discourse Memory - because, by definition, these sets
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have never been divided. However, when we come to refer back to them, just as we may
need to split up (ie partition) the entity tokens representing them in response to the
arrival of new sort information, we may also need to partition the indices correspondingly
to express information learned about the sets from subsequent references. For example,
suppose we have the bindings and entity tokens for 169b, as shown in 178a and b.
{({ Vindl.refl Xindl}, {el }), ({ Vind2.ref2Xind2}, {e2 })} 178a
{ el"man, e2~donkey} 178b
and suppose we add sentence 179a (with the non-introductory reading of the number
quantifier). The appearance of the indefinite quantifier is a clear indication that the
reference is not to the entire set; a less stilted form might be "Five of the..." where it is
even clearer that the reference is to a subset. Thus, part 3 of the top level dereferencing
algorithm is called into play; an attempt is made to find an existing entity token, bound
singleton to an indexed reference whose sort is consistent with that of the five donkeys.
The only one such is e2. e2 is therefore divided into two new entities, e3 and e4, one of
which (the choice is arbitrary, because the two are identical) is bound to the new
reference. The other is left unbound for the moment.
"Five donkeys escape." 179a
Vind3 <5. [escape,ref3 "donkey'.X ind3] 179b
{({ Vindl.refl'manX indl}, {el}), ({Vind2.ref2 "donkey Xind2 }, {e2}),
({Vind3 < 5.ref3 "donkey X ind3 }, { e3 })}
{el"man, e2~donkey, e2 S> e3"donkey, e2 > e4"donkey} 179c
After analysis of this sentence, we are left with two disjoint subsets of the initial set of
donkeys, one set of five, the other's size unknown, though related in the obvious way to
that of the original. This information is shown in 179c; first, the bindings show ref3 bound
to a new entity e3; then two new entities, e3 and e4 are shown, partition from e2 being
denoted by >. Now, though we have no sort information which will definitionally set the
absconding donkeys apart from the others, as led to entity token partition before, we do
have a different distinguishing property of number. Number is fundamentally different
from sort because it is a property only of the set of donkeys, and not of individuals in the
set ([Haddock,1989] classes uniqueness of referents of definites as a "meta-constraint" -
that is to say a constraint on the candidate set, which is the extension of a constraint set).
Even so, the division produced by the application of a number property to a subset of a set
is clearly analogous with that produced by application of sort properties, in as far as it
requires creation of disjoint subsets, and thence entity token partition - otherwise, we
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would be specifying two different sets with the same entity token, which is meaningless in
the George framework.
Given this analogy, it makes sense to represent the division of the set in a way analogous
with entity token partition. In this reference context, though, we do not need the historical
aspects of that other kind of partition; references in George are only used once. Therefore,
no partition tree structure (partial ordering ^>) is needed. Instead, we can divide the
domain of a quantified reference between the two (or more) sets produced by the division.
Since the index of an indexed reference directly represents the selection of a particular
reference from its domain ofquantification, the most intuitive way to do this is directly to
divide that range. We already have a representation for this, in the form of association of
upper bounds with indices.
It is important to state that this act of index partitioning is not strictly necessary in
processing example 179. Indeed, it only really becomes necessary in certain subsequent
circumstances (see below) - and therefore, in line with George's general "lazy" approach,
we wish to defer it until it is necessary. To be more specific, introducing index partition on
the initial introductory sentence will allow us to represent the new information we have
about the whole set ofdonkeys - namely that there is one group of five, and another, which
may or may not be empty (that point is debatable, but unimportant here). It does not tell
us any more about the existing references as they stand. What is does do, though, is give
us a convenient means of inferring information about the size of the original donkey set.
Suppose that we introduce the sentence shown in 180 (see Figure 14 for translation and
bindings).
"The three donkeys who do not escape stay in the paddock." 180
and that we are asked the question 181
"How many donkeys are there?" 181
We now have a fully number-specified quantified reference to each of the entity tokens, e3
and e4, partitioned from e2, above (one in 179, one in 180). In response to question 181, we
need to find a way of calculating the cardinality of the set, which is by definition equal to
(upb ind2) in 178a. One way to do this is by performing index partition on expression 169b,
so as to reflect the entity token partition which has already happened. The result of this
operation (GRL expression, Bindings and Enities) is shown in 182.
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Vind 1.Vind2 .[owns,ref2"donkey X ind2 ,refl~man X ind 1 ]
_weak index partition—»
Vindl.Vind4.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind4,refl"man X ind 1 ] A
Vindl.Vind5. [owns, ref2 "donkeyXind5,refl "manXindl]
{({Vindl.refl"manXindl}, {el}),
({Vind4.ref2 X ind4}, {e3 }), ({ Vind5.ref2 X ind5}, {e4})}
{el"man, e2"donkey, e2 e3"donkey, e2 e4"donkey} 182
In doing so, we produce two new indexed references, whose upper bounds are (unknowns)
M and N, such that (M + N) equals (upb ind2), because they are respectively bound to the
two entity tokens which specify all the members of the set specified by the token from
which they were partitioned. This equation constitutes a Bounding Constraint, as was
defined in Chapter 4; as such, it must be added to the Discourse State. Now, Rule 4
(defined in Chapter 6) states that two indexed references singleton bound to the same
entity token must have the equal upper bounds (expressing the fact that a given set can
have only one - albeit unknown - cardinality). We can therefore infer that M and N equal
5 and 3 respectively, and thence, via the bounding constraint, that (upb ind2) equals 8.
This example, then, is one basic motivation for generalising the idea of index expansion to
index partition - the former is the special case of the latter where all the indices have been
partitioned until there is exactly one candidate discourse entity for each reference. The
general form of index partition for weak indices is defined in Rule 13.
In the above example, we saw the top level view of a simple application of index partition.
Let us now look at the actual mechanism of index partition, and show why the above
example is the very simplest application of the idea. To recapitulate, the discourse so far is
shown in 183.
"Some men own some donkeys.
Five donkeys escape.
The three donkeys who do not escape stay in the paddock." 183
Figure 14 shows the translation of the first three sentences of the example discourse and
the corresponding bindings. (Note that the translation of "in the paddock" is not proposed
as philosophically correct, but merely as adequate for experimental purposes.)
What we have at this stage, then, are George's usual collections of entity tokens and
bindings. The entity tokens are informally divided into two kinds: a simple one each for
the set of men and the paddock, and a compound one, specifying the whole set of donkeys,
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Let I, Ii...In» Jl - Jp» Ki...Kq be index symbols, R, Ri...Rr, Si...Sm be references
(n, m, p, q, r £ N), and P be a predicate symbol. Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
VJ1...VJn.VI.VK1...VKq.[P,Rr,...,R1,R x I,Sm Si]
by dividing the domain of I into n parts, allowing new indices Ii...In to range





This creates a new Bounding Constraint
upb I = upb Ii + upb I2 + ... + upb In
Whenever such an index partition is performed, a corresponding entity
token partition must also be executed (if one does not already exist), and
new bindings must be created to replace that of R x I.






** s:Vind4<3. [not escape(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),




refl is bound to el~man
ref2 is bound to e2~donkey
ref3 is bound to e3~donkey (e3 C e2)
ref4 is bound to e4~donkey (e4 C e2)
ref5 is bound to e5~paddock
Figure 14: George output for the escaping donkey discourse.
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partitioned into two others specifying the absconded and present donkeys respectively. We
have a set of bindings linking the tokens with the appropriate references in the
translation of the discourse. Finally, we have a bounding constraint, representing the
cardinality relationship between the divided set and its subsets.
When we applied index partition to the first sentence, we obtained this expression (where
M, N stand for members of N such that M + N = upb ind2 (returning to my usual
shorthand notation for predicate symbols):
Vindl.Vind5 <M. [owns, ref2 "donkey X ind5,refl"man X indl ]
Vindl.Vind6 <N.[owns,ref2~donkey X ind6,refl "man X indl] 184
Specifically, ind5 and ind6 were generated by renaming ind2 to new unique index
symbols. M and N have been introduced to allow us to refer succinctly to upb ind5 and
upb ind6. Recall that quantifier scope in GRL is such that all the quantifiers apply to both
conjuncts; however, only indl affects both, because ind5 and ind6 are only applied (by the
index application operator) to one conjunct each. Now, the references in this expression
are all new, because by definition refN XX is unique, because, when X is instantiated to a
constant according to the definition of index expansion, the resulting reference is renamed
uniquely. When we analyse the reference in the expression, we can directly use the
information presented to us in the tree representing the partitioned entity token, because
it is built in to the top level dereferencing algorithm that existing entity tokens will be
used instead of creating new ones wherever possible (in line with the Principle of
Parsimony). We can therefore arbitrarily choose an entity token (because they are
indistinguishable) specifying one of the subsets for each reference (in general, making the
correct choice would involve a little search; this is not a problem, because the search space
is tightly constrained by the sorts of the references and entities, and the existence of the
entity token partition) and create the new bindings shown in 185:
{({ Vind5<M.ref2X ind5 }, {e3 }), ({Vind6<N.ref2X ind6}, {e4})} 185
Now, this means that the new references are bound to the same entity tokens as ref3 and
ref4, respectively. Furthermore, all the bindings are singleton. Therefore, we can infer
that M is 5 and N is 3 (Rule 4 (Number Consistency) in Chapter 6), so the binding is now
fully instantiated. Finally, for the moment, we must choose whether to replace the
original translation of our first sentence with the partitioned version, and to replace the
corresponding binding with the new ones, or whether to add in the new cardinality
information to the quantifier of the old version (which can easily be done by the existing
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unification matching in George, if we use a representation where unbounded indices are
denoted as bounded by some uninstantiated variable).
6.10. Compound IndexManipulation
So far, this section has introduced the idea of weak indexing, the associated operations of
weak index expansion and partition, index dependency and the idea of bounding
constraints (which applies to both weak and strong indices). Weak indexing has only so
far been discussed in terms of two-place predicates, both of whose arguments are weakly
quantified; other possible combinations of arguments will be covered later, along with the
equivalent strongly indexed combinations.
First, however, I must suspend our current example, while I fill in the gap in the foregoing
exposition of weak index manipulation. This will complete our discussion of the
interactions between weak indices.
Earlier, I presented the idea of using indices and the operations defined on them to express
more or less of the detail of partially specified relations between members of sets in a
discourse. I gave detail of how three possible readings of a sentence containing two
underspecified set references can be generated. However, I also pointed out that there are
harder readings, like those represented, for the two men/two donkey ownership situation,
in Figures 13d and e. The figures are reproduced below.
The reason that generation of these two classes of reading has been left until now is that
we can express the more complicated manipulations necessary more or less in terms of the
other simple ones, if we are allowed the use of index partition, which had not been defined
before. I will call the new, more complex operation defined here compound index partition
to express the fact that it is made up of a number of other operations. As well as covering
the two readings illustrated in the figures, I will explain a simple third situation not
explicitly mentioned before. This dependency arises when a relation exists between
members of two sets in such a way that both existing sets can be divided so that no
member of a resulting set stands in the relation to a member of more than one other
resulting set. More on this later.
These manipulations may best be considered in the context of the input sentence given
before in 177, which is reproduced for convenience below with its unpropagated and
propagated translations, respectively.
-202- PhD Thesis
Quantified Reference to Underspecified Sets
( "Three men own three donkeys." 177a
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X indl] 177b
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3. [owns, ref2 "donkey X ind2 X indl ,refl "man X indl] 177c)
The first reading to cover here arises from situations in the same class as that expressed
for the two men/two donkey sentence in Figure 13d (reproduced below): the situation
(Figure 13d: One man owns two donkeys; another owns one of them.)
where not all of the men own an equal number of donkeys, but the number of donkeys is
that specified in the surface form of the sentence. In the two/two situation there was only
one way in which this could happen, because there were only two donkeys to be owned -
each man owned either one or two of them. In the current example, however, there are
three men, three donkeys, and (therefore) a lot more possible combinations. For example,
two men might own three of the donkeys, and one two of them; or one man might own one,
another two, and a third three. Note, though, that the defining feature of this class of cases
is that at least one of the men owns all the donkeys - if this were not the case, this would
be an example of the third compound relationship, which is explained below.
The problem with representing the kind of relationship seen in Figure 13d in our existing
framework is that not all the donkeys are in the relation with respect to all the men. That
is to say, some donkeys may be owned by one man, and some may be owned by all three.
With the existing index manipulations we can only represent relationships where the
relation applies to every member of both sets - ie all the donkeys were owned by all the
men, or each donkey was owned by exactly one man, and so on. One point to note is that all
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the donkeys must stand in the relation to at least one man, and vice versa; otherwise the
sentence is no longer true of the sets in any reading.
The key to solving this issue is very similar to that in the earlier, simpler worked
examples, with the difference that sometimes we will need to allow some entity tokens,
produced in response to index partition, not to be included in the relation. This is a rather
dangerous facility to have around - one can imagine, for example, arriving at readings
where a predicate is only applied to half a set, and the other half is left unpredicated,
which would be an incorrect interpretation of a sentence like, say, "The men run.". For
this reason, we must consider the preconditions of this final weak index manipulation rule
very carefully.
To be specific, the operation must only apply when two or more indexed references appear
in the same sentence, as with our current example. Thus, it might be viewed as a kind of
interaction between indices, like some of the other effects considered here; and therefore,
it should be defined in terms of index propagation .(Rule 11), or at least the index
application rule (Rule 18), which govern such interaction. It should also be defined in
terms of the existing index partition, rather than expansion - otherwise, it will not work
on unbounded indices. Beyond this, the rule is fairly simple. Index partition can proceed
roughly as before on both the sets, with its associated entity token partition. The
difference in the new operation is that, for one or other of the two sets, some of the
rewritten expressions may be discarded, so that some entity tokens are left without
references to which to be bound. Thus, some elements of the set are left uncovered. This
will become clear in the example below. The definition of Compound Index Partition is
given in Rule 14.
For example, consider a reading of example 177 (reproduced below) where two out of three
men both own all three donkeys, and third man owns just one. In GRL, we could write this
as shown in 186a with the bindings given in 186b.
( "Three men own three donkeys." 177a
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X indl] 177b
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2 X indl,refl "man X indl] 177c)
[owns,ref4"donkey,refl "man] [owns,ref4"donkey,ref2"man]
[owns,ref5 "donkey,refl "man] [owns,ref5 "donkey, ref2"man]
[owns, ref6 "donkey,refl "man] [owns,ref6"donkey,ref2~man]
[owns,ref4"donkey,ref3"man] 186a
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Let Qi, Q2 be (possibly empty) strings of quantifiers, I, Ii...In, J, be index
symbols, R, Ri...Rr, S, Si...Sp, Ti...Tq be references (n, m, p, q, r £ N), and P be a
predicate symbol. Let k; be in N for 1 < i <n, such that 1S k; <m. Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
Qi.VI.VJ.Q2.[P,Rn,...,Ri,R x I,Sp,...,Sj,S x J,Tq...TjJ
iff the index application rule (Rule 18) holds of (left,R x I,S x J), as follows.
1. Divide the domain of I into Ii...In by weak index partition (Rule 18);
2. Divide the resulting expression containing Ij by weak index partition of
J into
3. Divide the domain of J in each remaining expression resulting from step
1, above, into the same index partition as in 2, replacing the expression
by kj copies with J; substituted for J, to give (where l<i<n and
l<kj<m)
Qi.VIj.VJi.Q2.[P,Rn,—,Ri,R x Ij,Sp,...,Si,S x Ji,Tq...Tj]
Q1-VIj.VJ2.Q2.tP.Rn>—.Ri»R x Ij,Sp,...,Si,SxJ2,Tq...T1]
Qi-VIj.VJk..Q2.[P,Rn,—,Ri,R x Ij,Sp,...,Si,Sx Ji^.Tq-.Ti]
New bindings must be created, to replace that of S x J, between
S x J2...S x Jk and the 2nd...k;th of the m new entity tokens, respectively.
The rule also applies in the reverse direction (ie with I and J interchanged).
|
Rule 14: Compound Index Partition
{({refl}, {el"man }), ({ref2}, {e2"man }), ({ref3 }, {e3~man}),
({ ref4}, {e4"donkey}), ({ref5}, {e5"donkey}), ({ ref6 }, {e6"donkey })} 186b
Suppose, now, that given the underspecified form, 177b, in an existing discourse, we
subsequently analyse a sentence for which we need to derive a discourse state equivalent
to 186 under the translation algorithm. One way this might happen is the introduction of
a sentence starting "The man who owns one donkey..."; recall, again, that the processes of
inference discussed here only take place when simpler forms of dereferencing have failed,
according to the Principle ofParsimony. As I said before, it will often be the case (as in this
example) that the reference causing the further elaboration of the underspecfied form will
give some clues as to the shape that elaboration could take; which is just as well, since, in
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general, the search space is combinatorial. To produce this particular expanded reading,
we proceed as follows. I start with the original unpropagated sentence.
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X indl ]
{({ Vindl<3.reflXindl}, {el"man}),
({Vind2<3.ref2Xind2}, {e2"donkey })} 187a
First, we perform compound index partition on indl and ind2. This can be divided into two
separate weak index partitions. The first runs like this. We partition indl (into ind3 and
ind4), and perform the corresponding entity token partition on el (into e3 and e4) to give
187b. The translation includes a bounding contraint connecting the old index to the new
ones. For clarity, I have substituted values for the upper bounds in the GRL expressions,
as though by unification.
Vind3 < 2.Vind2 < 3. [owns, ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X ind3]
Vind4 < l.Vind2 < 3.[owns,ref2~donkey X ind2,refl"man X ind4]
{({Vind3<2.refl Xind3 }, {e3"man}), ({Vind4< l.refl Xind4}, { e4"man } ),
({Vind2<3.ref2Xind2 }, {e2"donkey })}
upb indl = upbind3 + upb ind4 187b
The second weak index partition applied as part of the compound operation is on ind2 in
the first expression resulting from the first partition above, to give (including a new
bounding constraint):
Vind3 < 2.Vind5 < 1. [owns,ref2 "donkey X ind5,refl "man X ind3]
Vind3 < 2.\/ind6 < 2. [owns,ref2 "donkey X ind6,refl"man X ind3]
Vind4< 1 .Vind2 < 3. [owns,ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "man X ind4]
{({Vind3<2.refl Xind3 }, {e3~man}), ({ Vind4<l.refl Xind4}, {e4~man}),
({Vind2<3.ref2Xind2}, {e2"donkey}),
({Vind5< l.ref2Xind5 }, { e5"donkey}), ({Vind6<2.ref2X ind6}, {e6"donkey})}
upb indl = upb ind3 + upb ind4
upb ind2 = upbind5 + upb ind6 187c
The final part of the operation requires us to apply the same index partition to ind2 in the
third expression, but gives us the option of omitting any of the resulting expressions
beyond the first. In this case, there is only one expression we can omit - the second - which
leaves us with
Vind3 < 2.Vind5 < 1 .[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind5,refl "man X ind3]
Vind3 < 2.Vind6 < 2. [owns, ref2 "donkey X ind6,refl "man X ind3]
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Vind4 < 1.Vind5 < 1. [owns,ref2 "donkey X ind5,refl"man X ind4]
{({Vind3 < 2.refl X ind3}, { e3 "man}), ({Vind4 < 1 .refl X ind4 }, { e4"man}),
({ Vind5< l.ref2Xind5}, { e5"donkey}), ({Vind6<2.ref2Xind6 }, {e6"donkey})}
upb indl = upb ind3 + upb ind4
upb ind2 = upb ind5 + upb ind6 187d
The remaining derivation steps are all trivial index expansions. First ind4:
Vind3 < 2.Vind5 < 1 .[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind5,refl "man X ind3]
Vind3 < 2.Vind6 < 2.[owns,ref2"donkey X ind6,refl "man X ind3]
Vind5 < 1. [owns, ref2 "donkeyXind5,ref3"man]
{({Vind3<2.refl Xind3}, {e3"man }), ({ref3 }, {e4"man}),
({Vind5< l.ref2Xind5 }, {e5"donkey}), ({ Vind6<2.ref2Xind6}, {e6"donkey})}
upb indl = upb ind3 + upb ind4
upb ind2 = upb ind5 + upb ind6 187e
Next, expanding ind5 gives:
Vind3 < 2.[owns,ref4"donkey,refl "man X ind3]
Vind3 < 2.Vind6 < 2.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind6,refl"man X ind31
[owns,ref4"donkey,ref3~man]
{({Vind3 <2.refl Xind3 }, {e3"man }), ({ref3 }, {e4"man}),
({ref4}, {e5"donkey}), ({Vind6<2.ref2X ind6}, {e6"donkey})}
upb indl = upb ind3 + upb ind4
upb ind2 = upb ind5 + upb ind6 187f
At this point, we have gone as far as we need to give suitable entity tokens (e4 and e5) to
which the references in our new input ("The man who owns one donkey...") can be bound.
Later on in the discourse, however, we might well have to go further - maybe in response
to a reference to "One of the men who owns three donkeys...". One way to do so would be to
expand ind3, again renaming the resulting reference symbols and perform the
corresponding partition on e3 (into e7 and e8) to give:
[owns,ref4"donkey,ref5"man] [owns,ref4"donkey,ref6~man]
Vind6 < 2. [owns,ref2 "donkeyXind6,ref5"man]
Vind6 < 2.[owns,ref2"donkey X ind6,ref6"man]
[owns,ref4 "donkey ,ref3"man]
{({ref5 }, {e7"man}), ({ref6}, {e8"man}), ({ref3 }, {e4"man}),
({ref4}, {e5"donkey}), ({Vind6<2.ref2X ind6 }, {e6~donkey})}
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upb indl = upb ind3 + upb ind4
upb ind2 = upb ind5 + upb ind6 187g
Finally (maybe in response to "Both the other men own each donkey..."), we expand ind2,
renaming the resulting reference symbols and performing the corresponding partition on
e6 (into e9 and elO) to give:
This is a renaming of expression 186, equivalent under the translation algorithm, which
is what we were trying to derive. I emphasise again that these manipulations are intended
to characterise the search space, and not (necessarily) to optimise search through it.
It is important to emphasise that this rule is not introduced ad hoc, just to produce the
example reading above. Rather, it covers a very large class of readings (indeed, I will use
it in the next class of example), where underspecification in set references is, in a sense,
more extreme than in those readings where the correct specific translation can be
produced by enumeration, as in the other rules. The rule is constrained to produce only
those readings where a) all the individuals involved appear at least once in the relation,
and b) where there is at least one individual whose part in the relation is not the same as
that of all the others. Condition a) is enforced by part 1 of the rule, and condition b) is
enforced by the upper bound on kj in part 3. Thus, this rule cannot generate incorrect
readings where some individuals do not appear at all in the relation (from a), and it cannot
generate the same readings as the other rules (from b). Finally, the rule cannot apply to
cases where there is not interaction between two or more set references, because it is
defined in terms of the index application rule, which is by its own definition dependent on
the presence of at least two indexed references.
Note also that this rule can introduce considerable non-determinism. Much of this non-
determinism is encoded in the equational, arithmetic bounding constraints. Efficient,
non-enumerating reasoning about such constraints is well within the capabilities of
existing technology.







{({ref5 }, { e7~man}), ({ref6}, { e8~man}), ({ref3 }, { e4"man}),
({ref4}, {e5"donkey}), ({ ref7 }, {e9"donkey}), ({ref8}, {elO'donkey })}
upb indl = upb ind3 + upb ind4
upb ind2 = upb ind5 + upb ind6 187h
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Let us now look at the situation represented (for two men/two donkeys) in Figure 13e
(reproduced below). This situation is different from the ones covered before because the
Discourse
World
(Figure 13e: Each of two men owns one of
an intersecting pair ofsets ofdonkeys.)
reference is such that there are actually more donkeys than are apparently specified in
the sentence, but there is not a different set of donkeys for each man. The generality of
this reading is a case where each man owns the same number of donkeys, but the sets of
donkeys related to each man intersect in some arbitrarily complicated and unspecified
way. For our example, let us take a case where there are actually five donkeys. One man
owns the first three, the second man owns the second, third and fourth, and the third man
owns the third, fourth, and fifth. This situation is explicitly represented in 188.
[owns,ref4~donkey,refl "man] [owns,ref5 "donkey,ref2"man]
[owns,ref5 "donkey,refl "man] [owns,ref6"donkey,ref2"man]
[owns,ref6~donkey,refl~man] [owns,ref7"donkey,ref2~man]
[owns,ref6 "donkey,ref3"man] [owns,ref7 "donkey,ref3 "man]
[owns, ref8 "donkey,ref3 "man] 188a
{({refl }, {el "man}), ({ref2 }, {e2"man }), ({ref3 }, {e3~man}),
({ref4 }, {e4"donkey}), ({ ref5 }, {e5"donkey}), ({ref6 }, {e6"donkey }),
({ ref7}, {e7"donkey }), < {ref8 }, {e8"donkey})} 188b
The key to solving this issue lies in the description above: any such relation must be
expressible as a collection of (different) relations between members of one set (the men)
and a number of subsets of the other (the donkeys). In George, we already have a
mechanism for converting our existing relation into such a collection of relations, by
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dividing the sets between which the relations hold - namely, weak index partition, and
the associated partition ofentity tokens.
The motivation for the derivation which follows is as before: these inferences only take
place when other attempts to dereference subsequent references have failed (according to
the Principle of Parsimony, as encoded in the top level DeReferencing algorithm), and
they only proceed until a situation has been reached where the current requirements of
bindings and bounding constraints are satisfied. At each stage, I have underlined the
parts of the expression to be affected by the next operation, to make the whole easier to
read.
I start with the underspecified expression:
Vindl < 3.Vind2 < 3. Towns ,ref2 ~donkev X ind2, refl ~man X ind 1]
{({Vindl<3.refl Xindl}, {el"man}),
({Vind2<3.ref2Xind2 }. {e2~donkev})} 189a
The first step, here, is to partition ind2 (into ind3 and ind4). This expresses the fact that
some donkeys stand in a different relationship to the men than others. Correspondingly,
the entity token, e2, must be partitioned (into e3 and e4). The result is:
Vindl < 3.Vind3 < l.[owns,ref2~donkey X ind3,refl "manX indl]
Vindl < 3.Vind4 < 2,Towns,ref2 "donkey X ind4,refl "man X indll
{({Vindl <3.refl X indl }, {el "man }),
({Vind3<l.ref2X ind3 }, {e3"donkey}),
({Vind4 < 2.ref2 X ind4}, {e4"donkey})}
{ e2 $> e3, e2 e4} 189b
Now a rather trivial expansion of ind3 (whose upper bound is unity) gives us a statement
that one donkey (specified by e3) is owned by all three men (specified by el) - maybe in
response to the reference "The donkey which all the men own...".
Vindl < 3.[owns,ref3 "donkey,refl "man X indl]
Vindl < 3.Vind4 < 2. [owns, ref2 "donkey X ind4.refl "man X indl ]
{({Vindl <3.refl X indl }, {el "man }), ({ref3 }, {e3"donkey}),
({ Vind4< 2.ref2 X ind4}, {e4"donkey})}
{ e2 e3, e2 > e4 } 189c
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One possible next step is to compound partition indl with ind4 in the second expression.
The first stage of the compound partition - partition of indl - leaves us with this
intermediate result and new entity token partition.
Vindl < 3.[owns,ref3 "donkey, refl "man X indl ]
Vind5 < 2,Vind4 < 2,[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind4,refl "man X ind51
Vind6< l.Vind4<2.[owns,ref2~donkeyXind4,refl "manX ind61
{({ Vindl < 3.refl X indl }, {el "man}), ({ref3 }, {e3"donkey } ),
({Vind5<2.refl Xind5 }, {e5"man}), ({ Vind6< l.refl X ind6}, {e6"man}),
({Vind4 < 2,ref2 X ind4}, {e4~donkev})}
{e2 > e3, e2 e4, el P e5, el > e6 } 189d
The second phase of the compound partition operation is to partition ind4 so that one of
the resulting indices covers the whole of the indl partition above, while some of the others
do not. One way of realising this is as follows.
Vindl < 3.[owns,ref3"donkey,refl "man X indl]
Vind5 < 2.Vind7 < 1 .[owns,ref2 "donkeyX ind7,refl "man X ind5]
Vind6 < 1.Vind7 < 1. [owns,ref2 "donkey X ind7,refl"man X ind6]
Vind5 < 2,Vind8 < l.[owns,ref2 "donkey X ind8.refl "man X ind5]
{({Vindl <3.refl X indl}, {el "man}), ({ ref3 }, { e3"donkey }),
({Vind5<2.refl Xind5}, {e5"man}), ({Vind6< l.refl Xind6}, {e6"man}),
({Vind7< l.ref2Xind7 }, {e7"donkey}), ({Vind8< l.ref2Xind8}, {e8~donkev})}
{e2 > e3, e2 $> e4, el > e5, el > e6, e4 > e7, e4 > e8} 189e
We can now pick out another particular subset of donkeys: that whose members are owned
by exactly one man. We do this first by expanding ind8 in the last expression.
Vindl < 3.[owns,ref3"donkey,refl "man X indl ]
Vind5<2.Vind7< 1.[owns,ref2"donkey X ind7,refl "manX ind5]
Vind6< l.Vind7 < 1.[owns,ref2"donkey X ind7,refl "manX ind6]
Vind5 < 2.[owns.ref4"donkev,refl "man X ind51
{({Vindl <3.refl Xindl}, {el"man}), ({ref3 }, {e3"donkey}),
({Vind5 <2.refl Xind5 }, { e5"man}), ({Vind6< l.refl X ind6 }, {e6"man}),
({Vind7< l.ref2X ind7 }, {e7"donkey}), ({ref4}, {e8"donkey })}
{e2 e3, e2 > e4, el > e5, el > e6, e4 S> e7, e4 e8} 189f
The next step is to propagate ind5 to ref4, giving 189g, expressing a one-to-one relation
between a pair ofmen and a pair of donkeys not referred to elsewhere in this derivation.
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V ind 1 < 3. [owns ,ref3 "donkey ,refl"man X indl ]
Vind5 <2.Vind7 < 1 .[owns, ref2 "donkey X ind7,refl "man X ind51
Vind6< l.Vind7 < l.[owns,ref2"donkeyXind7,refl"manXind6]
Vind5 < 2.[owns,ref4"donkey X ind5,refl "man X ind5]
{< {Vindl <3.refl Xindl}, {el"man}), ({ref3 }, {e3"donkey}),
({ Vind5 <2.refl Xind5 }, {e5"man}), ({Vind6< l.refl Xind6}, {e6"man}),
({Vind7< l.ref2Xind7 }. {e7"donkey }). ({Vind5 <2.ref4Xind5 }, { e8"donkey})}
{ e2 e3, e2 e4, el S> e5, el e6, e4 e7, e4 e8 } 189g
We can now expand all the indices upper bounded by unity and rename accordingly.
Vindl <3.[owns,ref3 "donkey,refl "manXindl]
Vind5< 2.Towns,ref5 "donkey,refl "man X ind51
Towns, ref5 "donkev,ref6"man]
Vind5 < 2.[owns,ref4"donkeyX ind5,refl "man X ind5]
{({Vindl <3.refl Xindl }, {el"man}), ({ref3}, {e3"donkey}),
({ Vind5<2.refl Xind5 }, {e5"man}), {{ ref6 }, {e6"man}),
({ref5 }, {e7"donkev }). ({ Vind5<2.ref4Xind5 }, {e8"donkey })}
{ e2 e3, e2 > e4, el e5, el e6, e4 e7, e4 e8} 189h
To complete the required relation, we wish to create a one-to-one ownership sub-relation
between the set specified by e7 and that specified by e5, and an ownership sub-relation
between the individual specified by e6 and the members of the set specified by e5. The
mechanism existing in George to do this is index propagation (as used earlier in this
derivation). Propagating ind5 to ref5 in the second expression gives the one-to-one
relations; the resulting appearace of ind5 and a suitable quantifier in the third expression
(to maintain consistency of ref5) gives the two-to-one relation.
Vindl < 3.[owns,ref3"donkey,refl "man X indl]
Vind5 <2. [owns, ref5 "donkeyXind5,refl "manX ind5]
Vind5 <2,[owns,ref5 "donkey X ind5,ref6"manl
Vind5 <2.[owns,ref4"donkey X ind5,refl "man X ind51
{({ Vindl <3.refl X indl}, {el "man}), ({ref3 }, { e3"donkey}),
({Vind5<2.refl Xind5 }, {e5"man }), ({ref6}, {e6"man}),
({ Vind5<2.ref5Xind5}, {e7~donkev )). ({Vind5<2.ref4Xind5 }, {e8"donkey})}
{e2 e3, e2 e4, el e5, el > e6, e4 > e7, e4 e8} 189i
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The available operations are now much more tightly constrained. Next, we expand ind5
and perform corresponding partitions of e7 and e8.
Vindl < 3.rowns.ref3 "donkev.refl "man X indl 1
[owns,ref9~donkey,ref7"man] [owns,reflCTdonkey,ref8~man]
[owns,ref9"donkey,ref6"man] [owns,refl CTdonkey,ref6 "man]
[owns,refll "donkey, ref7"man] [owns,refl2"donkey,ref8"man]
{({Vindl < 3.refl X indl}, { el "man }). ({ref3 }, {e3 "donkey}),
({ ref7}, { e9"man }), ({ ref8 }, {elO"man}), ({ ref6}, {e6"man}),
({ref9 }, {ell "donkey }), ({reflO}, {el2"donkey}),
({refll}, {el3"donkey}), ({refl2 }, {el4"donkey})}
{e2 e3, e2 e4, el e5, el ^ e6, e4 §> e7, e4 e8,
e5 > e9, e5 > elO, e7 > ell, e7 > el2, e8 > el3, e8 > el4 } 189j
Finally, we expand indl, using the existing partition of el, to give an expression with
semantics identical with that of our target, 188, under the translation algorithm defined
in Chapter 4.
[owns,ref3~donkey,refl3"man] [owns,ref3 "donkey,refl 4 "man]




{({ refl3 }, { e6"man }), ({ refl4}, {e9"man }), ({refl5 }, {elO"man}),
({ ref3 }, {e3"donkey}), ({ref7}, {e9~man }), ({ref8}, {elO'man }),
({ ref6}, {e6"man}), ({ref9}, {ell "donkey}), ({reflO}, {el2"donkey }),
({ refl 1}, { el3"donkey }), ({ refl2 }, { el4"donkey})}
{e2 e3, e2 > e4, el e5, el e6, e4 e7, e4 S> e8,
e5 8> e9, e5 elO, e7 $> ell, e7 > el2, e8 el3, e8 el4 } 189k
Now, it is certainly the case that this derivation is extremely unwieldy. However, it must
be borne in mind that the entirety of such a derivation would only happen in the most
extreme cases in a discourse, where an underspecified reference is introduced, and then,
subsequently, specified in full, bit by bit. It is unlikely, then, that such an extended
sequence of operations would occur in a real discourse. Even if it did arise, sequences of
inferences of this kind can only happen a few steps at a time, as more information becomes
known about the relations in the sets. Therefore, given the adaptable nature of George's
parsing, the system will never need to perform the search necessary to find the above
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derivations in one go, because, as always, inference stops when a state has been found
which is consistent with the reference of the discourse - ie in which no reference remains
unbound.
The final kind of compound index manipulation is easier to imagine and to generate. It
arises in the case where the sets are divisible into two separate relations. An example of
this is given in Figure 16, where there is one man who owns exactly one donkey, and two
Figure 16: "Three men own three donkeys."
other men who own two other donkeys collectively. To represent this situation, we
propagate and simultaneously partition the indices and entity tokens corresponding with
the two sets, to give a conjunction of two new underspecified expressions. The references
in the new expressions can then be dealt by recursive application of this ancl/or the other
index dependencies.
7. Strong Indexing
In loose terms, strong indices, applied to the references which they index by the strong
index application operator, ®, express a similar referential idea to that captured by weak
indices - that is to say, the selection of individuals from the domain of quantification of a
predicate. Strongly indexed references are used to express quantification where the
quantifier (eg "each") gives a more constrained quantification than the weaker plurals,
like "the". For example, 191 shows such a sentence and its translation. Let us suppose that
the correct reading is that where every man owns exactly one donkey, but the particular
donkey is unspecified, and no donkey is owned by more than one man. This is a valid
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reading, so we need to generate it for some possible discourse; in this section, I will show
how this is done. For clarity, this example includes the explicit unbounded index
representation suggested above for "Each man", Q being the uninstantiated upper bound.
The new sentence is presented in the context provided by the foregoing "escaping donkey"
discourse, which is restated in 190. The George translation is given in Figure 14, which is
reproduced below for convenience.
"Some men own some donkeys.
Five donkeys escape.






** s:Vind4<3. [not escape(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),




refl is bound to el~man
ref2 is bound to e2~donkey
ref3 is bound to e3~donkey (e3 C e2)
ref4 is bound to e4~donkey (e4 C e2)
ref5 is bound to e5~paddock
(Figure 14: George output for the escaping donkey discourse.)
"Each man owns one donkey." 191a
Vind7<Q.Vind8< 1. [owns,ref7 "donkeyXind8,ref6"man!® ind7] 191b
The point of this different representation is that it enables us to use a different set of
operations over the indices. The full detail of this set is covered later (Rule 18ff), but for
this example, we only need to know that strong indices always propagate leftwards on to
indefinite references, as specified in Rule 15, unlike weak ones, which may or may not.
After the propagation, we have a new logical expression as shown in 192:
Vind7<Q.Vind8< 1. [owns,ref7~donkey X ind8®ind7,ref6~man!®ind7] 192
There is a further important difference between the behaviour of weak indices and strong
ones. In the operations we have defined so far on weak indices, there is an assumption that
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Let I be an index symbol, R, Ri...Rn, Sj-.-Sm be references (n, m € N), and P be a
predicate symbol. Then:
Given an expression of the form
VI.[P,Rn,...,Ri,R®I,Sm,...,Si],
all of R; must be replaced with R; <8> I, and all of Sj with Sj <S) I, iff
1) the index I appears exactly once in the expression (ie it has not already
been propagated); and
2) the Index Application Rule (Rule 18) holds for (left,Ri,R ® I) or
(right,Sj,R® I) as appropriate.
To maintain consistency, I must also be propagated to any identical
occurrences of R; in other expressions in the discourse memory. If
appropriate, quantifiers should be added.
Rule 15: Strong Index Propagation
manipulation of references corresponds one-to-one with manipulation of the entities in the
discourse. This can see seen in the Rules 10 and 13, where entity token partition is
introduced as part of the definition. For strong indices this is not the case. During the
following examples, then, it should be borne in mind that when we expand strong indices
we are creating multiple references and not multiple entity tokens; this notion will be
formalised later. These references are free to be bound within the existing rules of the
George system, subject to the correspondent entity token partition introduced in Rules 16
and 17.
Now, let us return to the running example, starting from sentence 169, ^jj.d place the new
sentence, 191 in that context. To analyse the reference of this sentence, there are four
options potentially left open to us - namely weak index expansion and index partition of
ind8, and some equivalent operations for strong indices on ind7. The option which leads to
* **
.
the derivation we need in this case is index expansion of ind8 (in 192), which gives us 193a
as an intermediate stage. Subsequently, we rewrite ref7X0 with a new, unique reference
symbol - here ref8 will do - to give 193b.
Vind7 < M.[owns,ref7~donkey X 0<8>ind7,ref6~man!<8>ind7] 193a
Vind7 < M.[owns,ref8~donkey®ind7,ref6~man!i8>ind7] 193b
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We now have a statement representing the fact that the relation between man references
and donkey references is one to one. This behaviour would not have arisen from the weak
indexed forms shown earlier, because of the numerous possible ways to generate relations
between indexed references. The difference accords with the difference between strong
and weak quantifiers in language {eg "each" and "the", respectively).
Now, in Chapter 6, Section 5.2, I mentioned that my assumption that all indefinites are
introductory would cause problems later on. This is the first point at which it does so. For
the purposes of explanation, therefore, I will from now on assume that non-introductory
indefinite behaviour is available in George, as well as the existing introductory, giving
explicit notice each time I do so. This is a reasonable step to take because the
manipulations generating the various readings are not dependent on the introductory or
non-introductory nature of the references and can be presented without reference to it.
When we analyse the reference of the expression, with our more general treatment of
indefinites, we get the set of bindings shown in 194, where el and e2 are the entity tokens
already existing in the discourse:
{({ Vind7 <M.ref6~man!®ind7 }, {el}), ({Vind7 <M.ref8~donkey®ind7}, {e2 })} 194
We know that the upper bound of one reference bound singleton to e2 is 8. Therefore,
again applying Rule 4 (number consistency) to ref8®ind7, we can show that M is 8.
Because M is the upper bound of both indices, the cardinality of el is now known to be 8.
Therefore, for this reading, we can deduce the cardinality of the original set ofmen.
Even so, we have not yet needed to introduce a partition of that set of men. The final
example in this sequence, 195, is a case where we need to introduce entity token partition
in response to a weak index partition, rather than the other way round; in it, we need to
use the partitioned expression directly to motivate the creation of new tokens. Note that
the slight stiltedness of the language in this example is introduced to avoid the need for
temporal reasoning, which is not covered in George. It does not affect the referential
issues under discussion here.
"The men who own the donkeys who escape are angry."
Vind9<M.VindlO <N.[escape,ref9~donkey! X indlO] ►
[own,ref9~donkey!X indlO,ref8"man!X ind9] ►




Quantified Reference to Underspecified Sets
Now, we can deduce from this statement that there is a subset of the men who are angry,
and that this subset is (from the previous sentence) in one-to-one correspondence with
some subset of the set of donkeys - namely, the ones who escaped. George performs this




** s:Vind3<5. [escape ( pres , pres , per f, ac t, ind ic ) ,
ref3~donkey! Xind3]
** s:Vind4<3 . [not escape(pres,pres,perf,act,indic ) ,




refl is bound to el~man
ref2 is bound to e2~donkey
ref3 is bound to e3~donkey (e3 C e2)
ref4 is bound to e4~donkey (e4 C e2)
ref5 is bound to e5~paddock
ref6 is bound to el~man
ref8 is bound to e2~donkey
Figure 15: George output for the escaping donkey discourse.
The first few attempts, as George reads the initial words, to dereference "the men" in 195
will merely find the obvious binding with el, because the context extension associated
with the relative clause "who own the donkeys..." is not yet closed. Only when we reach
"the donkeys" do we get a complete context extension about which we can reason. At this
stage, the references to be analysed are as follows.
{ Vind9<M.VindlO<N.[own,ref9"donkey!X indl0,ref8"man!X ind9] ► refS'man!X ind9,
VindlO<N.ref9"donkey!x indlO} 196
Following the dereferencing algorithm explained before, we arrive at these bindings:
{({Vind9<8.VindlO<8.[own,ref9"donkey!X indl0,ref8"man!Xind9] ►
ref8"man! X ind9 }, {el }),
({VindlO <8.ref9"donkev! X indlO }, { e2})} 197
Note that the upper bounds of the two indices have been instantiated during the context
extension comparison, and that the precursor of the context extension here may be either
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the first sentence or the last - the different quantification structures of the two sentences
defining the ownership relation does not affect the context extension comparison
algorithm (qu, Chapter 6).
The next point of interest in the parse is at the end of the second relative clause. We now
have the following references to deal with:
{Vind9 <M.VindlO <N.[own,ref9~donkey!X indl0,ref8~man!X ind9] ► refB'man!X ind9,
VindlO<N.[escape,ref9~donkey'.Xindl01 ► ref9 "donkey! XindlO} 198
The reference to donkeys is now much more strongly constrained: in fact, it no longer
refers to e2, but can only refer to e3. Therefore, the context extension matching algorithm
leads us to infer that the original assumption that the "men" reference was to el was
wrong, but that some subset of that specified by el, in correspondence with that specified
by e3, is a valid candidate. By the same reasoning, the new context extension rules out
any existing entity token as a candidate for binding to ref6. The correct response to this is
to attempt to find a statement about e3 which will allow the production of a suitable entity
token. With the usual backwards search, the first expression found in the Discourse
Memory is the strongly indexed ownership relation, 191. We know that e3 is a token
partitioned from a token bound in this expression, from the partition tree in the Entity
Tokens database. Therefore, it is possible that the expression can lead us to a partition of
el such the references in our current utterance can be dereferenced. (Again, this higher
level knowledge is external to George; the correct choice would really be found by simple
search.) Therefore, we partition the indices in the sentence, guided in the obvious way by
the existing partition of e2, so that the two "donkey" references in the resulting conjoined
expression are bound to e3 and e4 respectively - that is to say, like this:
Vindll <5.[owns,refB"donkey!<8>indll,ref6~man!<8>indll]
Vindl2<3.[owns,ref8~donkey!<8>indl2,ref6~man!<8>indl2] 199
Now, we already have suitable entity tokens for ref8 to be bound to, but those for ref6 are
missing. Therefore, as usual, we create some by entity token partition - which is a safe
operation here, since it does not change the semantics of previous expressions in the
system. Now, when we attempt to dereference "the men", we have a precursor in the first
expression of 199. Therefore we can associate the set of men with the newly created entity
token representing the five whose donkeys escaped. Finally, the coref operator in the main
clause allows us to add the sort information "angry" to that entity token, thus completing
the expression of the meaning of the discourse.
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This extended work-through has shown a solution to the problem posed in Chapter 1,
example 1. It has been useful because it shows the motivation behind this kind of analysis.
However, in presenting it, I have left some gaps in the detail of the index manipulation
operations, particularly with respect to strong indices. Therefore, I will now return to the
more general level to complete the story.
8. Index Propagation on to Simple References
So far, I have only discussed the behaviour of index propagation on to quantified (indexed)
references. For generality, though, and for full linguistic coverage, we need to discuss
what happens when indices propagate to simple references.
Consider, first, sentence 200, in the context where there is already an entity token
specifying a set ofmen, el.
"The men own a donkey." 200a
Vindl. [own,ref2 "donkey,refl "man! X indl] 200b
The bindings produced under the algorithms already explained are thus, where e2 is a
newly introduced entity token specifying the donkey:
{({Vindl.refl "man! X indl }, {el}), ({ ref2"donkey}, {e2})} 201
This translation represents the only correct reading of the example, where there is exactly
one donkey and each man owns it. If we were to apply index propagation as before, we
would produce a reading with a set of donkeys in one-to-one correspondence with the set of
men. Therefore, weak index propagation onto simple indefinite references (such as this) is
not allowed (see Rule 18).
If we now look at sentence 202 in the same way, we find that strong indexing produces a
different effect.
"Each man owns a donkey." 202a
Vindl.[own,ref2~donkey,refl ~man!®indl] 202b
The idea of weak index propagation was introduced earlier to allow us to express the
existence of complicated relationships between quantified references and other kinds of
reference. Here, we wish to express a corresponding intuition regarding the effect of
strongly quantified references. However, the detail of the intuition is different. In this
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strong index case, the effect of the quantifier on the indefinite reference is to produce, as it
were, a set of references, one corresponding with each man, just as before. Unlike the
weak index case, though, there is no associated requirement that each reference is bound
to a different entity in the discourse - all the men could own the same donkey. Also, as in
the treatment of example 191, we see the problem introduced by my simplifying
assumption that indefinites are introductory, because, in many interesting readings, the
indefinite noun phrase "a donkey" is non-introductory. As before, I will gloss over this
shortcoming, and assume the non-introductory behaviour. Consider, for example,
discourse 203:
"There are ten men and five donkeys. Each man owns a donkey." 203
The interesting point about this example is that the indefinite singular reference to "a
donkey" in the second sentence of 203 refers to (a subset of) the entity introduced by the
plural reference to "five donkeys" in the first sentence.
To capture this intuition in George we need a definition of index propagation for strong
indices where the index always propagates to indefinite references, unlike weak indices.
Using it, we can, as it were, make the surface form of the reference agree with the
referent. We also need definitions of strong index expansion and partition, to enable us to
rewrite the "shorthand" quantified expression as the more specific collection of
expressions for which it stands. The rewriting must allow for different behaviour
regarding entity token partition, from that associated with the weak index operations,
because here that partition need not exactly correspond with the index partition - more
than one man may own a given donkey.
Returning to example 202, then, after index propagation, we can produce the new
translation and bindings shown in example 204, the appearance of the index on ref2
licensing its binding to e2 under Rule 4 (number consistency). I will define the strong
index partition and expansion operations formally later in this chapter.
Vindl.[own,ref2~donkey®indl,refl ~man!<8>indl] 204a
{({ Vindl.refl ~man!®indl}, {el}), ({\/indl.ref2~donkey®indl }, {e2})} 204b
Next, we must consider index propagation to simple definite references. Before,
propagating of weak indices to a simple (ie singular) definite reference was unacceptable,
because doing so would imply that the individual bound to the reference was in some sense
divisible into elements in the same way as a set. This would suggest either that such a
singleton-bound entity token was not really specifying a singleton in the first place, or
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that it is possible arbitrarily to multiply singleton entities in a discourse. So neither
possibility is true (or even sensible); therefore, we ruled out weak index propagation to
simple definite references. The same reasoning shows that we do not want strong indices
to propagate on to simple definite references. If they did so, we would be allowing a
singular definite noun phrase to refer to several things at once, which is impossible.
There is one more set of cases to consider in this section. So far, I have considered index
propagation only leftwards. The motivation for this is that weak quantification of the
subject of a sentence may affect the quantification of the object(s), but not vice versa -
recall the point made with the two men and two donkeys example at the beginning of this
discussion: there can only ever be two men, even though there can be up to four donkeys.
However, with strong quantifiers, this is not the case. Consider sentence 205; b is an
intermediate unpropagated translation, and c is the final translation.
Here, as in the previous example, the intuition is that there is a different "man" reference
(NB reference, not entity) for each donkey, so 205b fails to capture the meaning of the
sentence. We need index propagation rightwards as well as leftwards, to give 205c, the
correct translation. This accords with the notion that strong quantification is in some
sense more virulent than the weak kind - in that strong quantification of a direct object
can affect a subject, where weak quantification could not. Then, the expansion and
partition rules for strong indices can be defined so that entity token partition takes care of
associating the references with the correct entities in the discourse.
By the same reasoning as before, we will rule out rightwards propagations to definite
references.
9. Sentences containing only Strong Indices
Just as I began this discussion with a sentence containing only weak indices, it will be
useful to consider those containing only strong ones before we go on to look at mixed
indices. Consider the sentence and translation shown in 206.
"A man owns every donkey."
Vindl. [owns, ref2 "donkey !<8>indl,refl "man]




Each man owns each donkev." 206a
Vind !.Vind2.[owns,ref2 "donkey !<8>ind2,refl "man!® indl] 206b
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Now, there is only one reading for this: that where the mapping is a cross product of the
two sets. We can achieve this reading directly by an equivalent of the existing weak index
expansion operation, with the same intuition: we view the indexed form as standing for
some number of expressions which could state the relation in more detail; the expansion is
then the operation ofwriting out this more detailed form. Note that the behaviour of these
definite strongly indexed references is different from that in the indefinite cases in the
last example. There, the number of entities in a set arising from a singular indefinite in
the scope of a strong quantifier was indeterminate; here, there is no such vagueness.
Therefore, our expansion of the indices must be complete and symmetrical to give the
correct reading, exactly as for the reference in 205 which introduced the quantifier. This
leads me to suggest that strong indices do not interact with each other like weak ones.
Therefore, strong index propagation on to strongly indexed references is not allowed in
either direction, which accords with the intuition that strong quantification is somehow
extreme - as though it had in some way used up all the "quantifiability" of the index
which it applies.
Rule 16 is the definition of strong index expansion, where references are rewritten and
renamed, as in weak index expansion, but the associated entity token partition may be
only partial in the indefinite case (see Section 8). One noteworthy point is that index
expansion of an indefinite strongly indexed reference has no associated entity token
partition. The intermediate cases between complete entity token partition and no
partition are covered in the strong index partition operation.
10. Sentences containing both Strong and Weak Indices
Sentences 207 and 208 characterise the only two ways in which a mixture of strong and
weak indices can occur in two-place predications.
,e "Every man owns some donkeys." 207a
Vindl.Vind2.[owns,ref2"donkey X ind2,refl "man!® indl] 207b
"Some men own every donkey." 208a
Vindl. Vind2. [owns, ref2 "donkey! ® ind2,refl"man X indl ] 208b
The exact readings we wish to derive here are where (in 207) each man in the set owns at
least two donkeys, but it is known neither which donkeys he owns, nor if any or all of them
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Let Ii...Ip, Ji...Jq be index symbols, I be a bounded index symbol with upper bound
N, and K be an arbitrary, possibly empty, string of Ij and J; conjoined by X. Let R,
Rl...Rn, Si...Sm be references (n, m, p, q, N € N), and P be a predicate symbol. Then:
Given an expression of the form
VIx.-VIp-VI <N.VJ^.VJq.[P,Rn...Ri,R x K®I,Sm...Si]
we can creating N copies of the expression, each with I replaced by a




Then, if R is definite, we must partition its bound entity token so that there
is a new, unique token bound to each copy of R; if R is indefinite, we must
bind each new reference to the single existing entity token.
After this rewriting, each reference symbol with an integer applied to it
must be replaced by a new reference symbol; all occurrences of each
(reference symbol,integer) pair are replaced by the same symbol.
Rule 16: Strong Index Expansion
is owned by any other men and (in 208) each donkey is owned by at least two men, but it is
not known which.
In these example, the index propagation rules give us the same propagation options as
before. First, we propagate the strong index in 207 leftwards. This gives us:
Vind l.Vind2. [owns,ref2 "donkey Xind2® indl,refl~man!®indl] 209
As before, on expansion or partition we require this to give us a set of donkeys for each
man, the exact form of that set (eg disjoint, intersecting, equal) in relation to the others
being unspecified.
In this example, leftward propagation of the weak index cannot apply because of the
sentence structure - there is no argument leftwards to which itmight propagate.
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In example 208, one possible move would propagate a weak index left so that it dominated
a strong one. As the terminology suggests, this is not acceptable - and, indeed, the
readings it produces are erroneous, because they allow the generation of a different,
disjoint set of donkeys for each man. Just allowing the alternative rightward propagation,
where strong dominates weak, we can produce the reading shown in 210, again
remembering that we must view the expansion of the indices as production of a set of
references and not of a set ofentities.
Vindl.Vind2. [owns,ref2"donkey !®ind2,refl"manXindl®ind2] 210
Here, under strong index expansion, we have a set of men for each donkey, but no
indication of which set is associated with which donkey, or if some sets of men own more
than one of them. I will give a worked example of this process in Section 11.
By the same reasoning as before, when we replace the indefinite weakly quantified
references in 207 and 208 with definite ones, we will no longer want strong indices to
propagate. As before, this would imply that it were possible for a definite plural reference
to refer to more than one set of things at once.
11. Strong Index Expansion and Partition
11.1. Introduction
Now that I have covered the possibilities of strong index propagation for every
combination of kinds of reference, we have the data required to fill in the detail deferred
before of the strong index equivalents ofweak index expansion and partition.
The definitions of weak index partition and expansion include corresponding entity token
partition. When we partition entity tokens to correspond with partition of weak indices,
we are capturing the notion of dividing sets taking part in relationships, in order to
describe the nature of those relationships more precisely, in a standard "divide and
conquer" style. This idea extends to expansion from partition because expansion is
nothing more than an extreme form of partition. Because of this division, we can justify
the entity token partition - the act of weak index partition produces references which are
non-coreferential, because it represents the division of sets into subsets.
When we have interaction between the two strengths of index, or between a strong index
and a simple reference (which interaction could not arise with weak indices), we have a
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rather different situation. The strong index is still certainly applying quantification to
references, and thence to entity tokens, but the quantification seems to apply at a
different level, or at least with a different emphasis.
11.2. Strong Index Expansion
Let us first look at strong index expansion, and consider the nature of the operation we are
trying to define. The first thing to emphasise here, again, is the distinction between the
divison of the sets specified by entity tokens into subsets or individuals, and the division of
sets of references, as denoted by strong indexed references in George, into individual
references.
In the definitions of weak index expansion and partition, the parallel partition of entity
tokens represented the idea that the references being expanded and partitioned were
manipulated at the same time and in the same way as the sets themselves. For the strong
index operations, however, this is not always the case. In particular, expansion of strongly
indexed indefinite references (generable, it seems, only by index propagation, and not by
lexical lookup) does not always cause a parallel entity token partition, because (English)
indefinite referrring expressions, within the scope of strong (English) quantifiers, do not
exhibit this behaviour.
As a first approximation to a strong index expansion rule, then, we already know that
strong quantifiers will not interact with other quantifiers in the way that weak ones will
and that an associated entity token partition does not necessarily take place. Beyond this,
we need to consider each possible kind of reference to which an index may be propagated,
in order to find what action needs to be taken in the respective cases. However, it seems
from the foregoing examples that the fundamental operation of strong index expansion is
exactly the same as that of weak index expansion - that is, if the strong index has an
upper bound, N (which may be supplied by reference to an existing bounded set), we can
rewrite the quantified expression as a collection ofN expressions, each with the quantifier
removed and the index replaced by a distinct member of N, less than N. The difference
comes entirely in the behaviour of the entity tokens in response to this.
The only kinds of reference on to which strong index propagation may take place are the
simple and weak indexed indefinite ones. However, strongly indexed defmites can also
arise directly from the input; these references always contain exactly one index.
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First, let us deal with the simplest case, that of strongly indexed definite references. The
intuition I am trying to capture is that the (English) strong quantification makes a
relation true for each individual in its domain in isolation; no more subtle interaction
between sets or collective interpretation (as in weak quantification) is allowed. The
existing index expansion idea captures this in full; indeed, when we substitute members
ofN for indices and then rename reference symbols, we are doing more than just capturing
the idea- we are performing exactly that operation. Therefore, when we expand a
strongly indexed definite reference, we must decompose the entity token specifying the
original set so each new reference has its own new entity token, just as for weak indices.
For indefinite strongly indexed references, the situation is different. When we expand
such a reference, there is no associated entity token partition. This reflects the fact that,
in 202, there may be as many donkeys as men, with each man owning a distinct one, or as
few as one donkey, with each man owning it; the sentence is true, regardless.
( "Each man owns a donkey." 202a
Vindl.[own,ref2"donkey,refl "man!®indl] 202b)
Likewise, weakly indexed indefinites, once a strong index is applied, behave like definites.
Again, we need to view the resultant reference as a set of references to some unspecified
number of sets. However, this time the problem is more complicated. An example of this
extra complication is found in sentence 211, where it is not only possible for the sets of
donkeys to be non-distinct, but also for them to intersect.
"Every man owns some donkeys." 211a
Vindl. Vind2. [owns,ref2 "donkeyXind2®indl,refl "man!®indl] 211b
This behaviour is represented in George by the existence of bindings to more than one
entity token, where some entity tokens appear in more than one binding. Such a situation
can be achieved in George by the application of (weak) index partition to the set of
..donkeys before the expansion. This leaves us with two or more sets of donkeys, each of
which is in a different relation with the men (in particular, some are owned by more men
than others). The kind of reasoning involved here, characterised as successive, alternate
partitions of entity tokens and their bound references, was shown in full in the worked
examples concerning weak index manipulations in Section 10. The formal definition of
strong index expansion was given in Rule 16, in Section 9.
-227- PhD Thesis
Quantified Reference to Underspecified Sets
11.3. Strong Index Partition
The definition of strong index expansion is different from the weak index equivalent
because of its alternative treatment of the entity token partition associated with the
expansion operation. When we generalise expansion to partition, as we did with the
equivalent weak index operations, we arrive at a rule which is similar to the expansion
rule. The definition is shown in Rule 17.
Let I, Ii...Iic Ji...Jp, Ki...Kq be index symbols, R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm be references
(n, m, p, q € N), and P be a predicate symbol. Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
VJ1...VJn.VI1.VK1...VKq.[P,Rn R!,R®I,Sm Si]
by dividing the domain of I into k parts, allowing new indices Ii ... Ik to
range over them, and replacing the expression by n copies with Ii ... Ik
respectively substituted for I, to give
VJ1...VJn.VIl.VK1...VKq.[P,Rn R^R^.S™ St]
VJ1...VJ„.VI2.VK1...VKq.[P,Rn R i,R® I2,Sm,—,Si]
VJ1...VJn.VIk.VK1...VKq.[P,Rn,...,R1,R®Ik,Sm,...,Sil
This creates a new Bounding Constraint
upb I = upb Ii + upb I2 + ... + upb In
Whenever a strong index partition is performed upon a reference R, a
corresponding entity token partition must also be executed on the token
bound to it.
Rule 17: Strong Index Partition
12. Summary of Index Behaviour in Two-Place Predicates
The foregoing text, then, covers the behaviour of both strong and weak indices in all
possible configurations within two-place closed predicates. In the following sections I will
go on to cover their behaviour first in predicates of higher arity, and then in more complex
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linguistic constructions, in particular where closed predicates are related by the context
extension operator.
First, though, we can summarise the operations now available over the domain so far
discussed with Table 1. The references between which propagation is carried out are
identified in the table by the operators which define their relevant properties (in the case
of simple indefinites, no identifier); a in the propagation column means the operation
is not applicable for pragmatic reasons (ie there is no index to propagate). It is useful to do
this now, because we will see later that the information is also correct for the more
complex linguistic input.
The table shows a pattern which we can encapsulate in three constraints, which define
Rule 18, in conjunction with the index propagation operations defined in Rules 11 and 15.
Let Rj be references and Ij be indices. Let P be a predicate symbol, and D be a
direction, such that D € {left, right}. Then:
An index may be propagated in a direction D from to R2 (denoted by
( D,Ri,R2 )) unless precluded by one of the following:
1. No index may propagate on to a strongly indexed reference.
2. No weak index may propagate on to a simple reference.
3. No strong index may propagate on to a definite reference.
Rule 18: Index Application
13. Index Behaviour in Closed Predicates
with more than Two Arguments
13.1. Representing N-Place Predicates in GRL
In this section I will discuss the operation of index propagation in closed predicates
containing more than two arguments. This will lead to a generalisation of some of the
behaviour explained in the foregoing sections.
The function of predicates with more than two arguments in GRL is to allow
representation ofwhat we might call slot-fillers of verbs other than subject and object - for
example, the indirect object in a verb like "to give". However, I will place a restriction on
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! ! - -
X ! illegal -
® i illegal -
X - illegal
i X - illegal
X X illegal optional
X compulsory illegal
<8> ! x illegal illegal
® - compulsory
I ® - illegal
X ® illegal compulsory
! x illegal illegal
® illegal illegal
Table 1: Applicability of Index Propagation in Two-Place Predicates
the kind of verbs covered in George - namely that only mono- and di-transitives can be
represented using closed predicates of the appropriate arity- and let other instances of
verb modification be covered by the context extension operator, as will be explained below.
Indeed, there is an intuitive divide between the kinds of verb modifiers represented in
George as extra arguments to closed predicates, and those represented by closed
predicates with context extensions. This distinction will be covered in Chapter 9.
For the purposes of this section, then, we need to cover three-place predicates and context
extended predicates. One-place predicates are not interesting in terms of propagation,
since, by definition, it cannot take place within them.
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In the next sections, I will show the utility of the intuitive division introduced above by
highlighting different behaviour of these different kinds of information under index
propagation.
13.2. Index Propagation to Indirect Objects
The first thing to note when we come to consider the propagation of indices to indirect
objects is that the majority of di-transitive verbs are severely constrained in the readings
they make available by the semantic nature of the events they describe. For example, the
notion of a physical transfer of a single objects to each member of a set as in 190, connotes
an ordering in time, which GRL cannot represent. Therefore, as before, I will constrain
this discussion to producing those readings which are valid candidates as abstract
translations, but which may subsequently be ruled out by real world inference.
"Every man gives the donkey the carrot." 190
We now need to consider the same combinations of propagations as before, but
propagating weak and strong indices from subject and object on to the indirect object, and
vice versa. The general detail of this, elaborated by the same reasoning as for two-place
predicates, is identical with the two-place predicate version. For this reason, I will only
explain here the differences, and suggest solutions to them.
As it happens (and as we would wish), the index propagation behaviour in two-place
predicates is entirely subsumed by that in three-place; however, those properties of the
general operation pertaining to propagation between non-adjacent arguments do not
apply to two-place predicates (simply because there are no non-adjacent arguments in two
place predicates). First, then, we must define the generality of propagation, and then the
behaviour of the particular operators, both dominating and dominated, within that
context. In particular, the behaviour of the strong index operator will need some
refinement.
13.3. Sentences containing less than three indices
13.3.1. Introduction
First, consider some index propagating through a three-place predicate, of the form shown
in 191 (where ind is applied by an indexing operator to one of { argl arg2 arg3 }).
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Vind.[pred,argl,arg2,arg3] 191
Suppose, then, that the index appears on arg3 in the initial translation of the sentence.
Then, we can move it to arg2, as before. Alternatively, we can move it to argl; or to both of
arg2 and argl, remembering that each of these will be subject to constraints defined in
terms of the kind of reference making up the argument. Since the respective behaviours of
strong and weak indices are different, we will discuss them separately.
13.3.2. Strong Index Propagation in Three-Place Predicates
Consider sentence 192a, which, in the first instance, before any propagation has been
applied, gives the translation shown in 192b:
"Each man offers a donkey a carrot" 192a
Vindl. [offers,ref3 "carrot,ref2 "donkey,refl ~man!<S>indl] 192b
Vindl. [offers, ref3 "carrot <2) indl,ref2 "donkey<8>indl,refl~man!®indl] 192c
Now, in our definition of strong index propagation on two place predicates (Rule 15), we
said that strong indices always propagate, subject to the index application rule, Rule 18. If
we apply that propagation, we get expression 192c, which, as before, we can view as a
shorthand form for some number of similar expressions. Strong index partition (Rule 17)
can then give us the various readings available from this sentence, since, at each
partition, any entity token can be viewed as specifying either one or a (separable) number
of donkeys.
The readings correspond with sets ofentities in the discourse world, like this:
N men, M donkey, P carrots, 1<M<N,1<P<N.
Alternatively, the readings can be notated in FOPC using classical universal and
existential quantifiers in the conventional way, thus:
3c.carrot( c ) A 3d.donkey( d ) A Vm.man( m ) => offers( c, d, m )
3c.carrot( c ) A Vm.man( m ) => 3d.donkey( d ) A offers( c, d, m )
3d.donkey( d ) A Vm.man( m ) => 3c.carrot( c ) A offersf c, d, m )
Vm.manf m ) 3c.carrot( c) A 3d.donkey( d ) A offerst c, d, m)
This is to be expected. Strong index expansion is exactly like taking all possible
assignments in a model of a quantified expression in FOPC; and this is the behaviour
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required by strong quantification - a separate application of the predicate to each
individual in the domain of quantification. Certainly, therefore, the theory embodied in
George would be inadequate if it did not yield these readings. However, while the FOPC
expressions above are adequate for expressing the behaviour of the references within an
isolated sentence, they introduce problems if we attempt to extend the discourse beyond
this one statement; also, manipulation of such expressions is less convenient than for their
equivalents in GRL; I will discuss these problems fully in Chapter 8.
Returning to our discussion of strong index propagation in George: in the case where arg2
(in 191) is indexed, the same rules apply. Consider sentence 193a, translated (before
compulsory index propagation) as 193b.
"A man offers every donkey a carrot." 193a
Vindl.[offers,ref3~carrot,ref2"donkey!0indl,refl"man] 193b
The only reading available here (produced by leftward and rightward propagation) is
represented in 194. Again, the sets of references are in one-to-one correspondence, by
nature of the strong quantifier, though some or all of the references may be bound to the
same entity token(s). Informally, this expresses the required idea that each donkey is
associated with some carrot and some man by the relation, but exactly which carrot and
which man is not specified.
Vindl.[offers,ref3~carrot®indl,ref2"donkey!®indl,refl"man®indl] 194
Finally, in the case where argl (in 191) is indexed, we must propagate its index
rightwards both one and two places, depending again on the legality of such an operation
applied to the particular index operator(s) concerned. Consider 195
"A man offers a donkey every carrot." 195a ^
Vindl .[offers,ref3 "carrot! <8>indl ,ref2 "donkey, refl"man] 195b
The finished translation here is shown in 196. Again, it denotes all the correct readings for
the sentence, where some donkey and some man is associated with each carrot, but exactly
which is not specified.
Vindl. [offers,ref3 "carrot! 0indl,ref2 "donkey®indl,refl "man0indl] 196
The complete rule for strong index propagation was given in Rule 15. It will become clear
in the next section that extension of these ideas to sentences containing more than two
quantifiers does not affect the behaviour of strong indices.
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13.3.3. Weak Index Propagation in Three-Place Predicates
Let us now consider weak index propagation in three-place predicates by taking again
sentence 191 and supposing the existence of a weakly indexed reference in each of the
argument places. An example corresponding with this structure is given in 197 - all the
references are this time weakly indexed, so that we may, according to the Index
Application Rule (Rule 18), propagate any weak index leftwards on to them. By applying
our existing rule for weak index propagation (Rule 11) to each argument position we can
produce the readings shown in 197b-j - note that readings i and j result from different
ordering of the same propagation operations; under the semantics given in Chapter 4,
they are equivalent.
"Some men offer some donkeys some carrots" 197a
Vind 1.Vind2.Vind3. [offers,ref3 "carrot X ind3,
ref2 "donkey X ind2 ,refl"man X ind 1 ] 197b
Vind 1.Vind2.Vind3. [offers,ref3 "carrotX ind3,
ref2 "donkey X ind2 X indl,refl "man X indl ] 197c
Vindl.Vind2.Vind3. [offers, ref3 "carrot X ind3 X indl,
ref2"donkey X ind2,refl "manX indl] 197d
Vindl.Vind2.Vind3.[offers,ref3"carrotXind3X indl,
ref2 "donkey X ind2X indl,refl"man X indl] 197e
Vindl.Vind2.Vind3.[offers,ref3~carrotX ind3X ind2,
ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "manX indl ] 197f
Vindl.Vind2.Vind3. [offers, ref3 "carrot X ind3 X ind2,
ref2 "donkey X ind2 X indl ,refl"man X indl ] 197g
Vindl.Vind2.Vind3. [offers,ref3 "carrot X ind3 X ind2 X indl,
ref2 "donkey X ind2,refl "manX ind 1 ] 197h
Vindl. Vind2. Vind3. [offers,ref3 "carrotX ind3 X ind2 X indl,
ref2"donkey X ind2 X indl,refl "man X indl] 197i
Vindl .Vind2.Vind3. [offers,ref3 "carrotX ind3 X indl X ind2,
ref2 "donkey X ind2 X indl,refl"man X indl ] 197j
English paraphrases of these are as follows:
b: All the men offer all the donkeys all the carrots,
c: Certain men offer all the carrots to certain donkeys,
d: Certain men offer all the donkeys certain carrots.
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e: Certain men offer certain donkeys carrots particular to the men.
f: All the men offer certain donkeys certain carrots.
g: Certain men offer certain donkeys carrots particular to the donkeys.
h: All the men offer all the donkeys carrots particular to both men and donkeys.
i j: All the men offer certain donkeys carrots particular to both men and donkeys.
Note that the two readings i and j above, given by applications of the same set of index
propagation operations in different orders, denote the same set of possible readings. This
is because of the symmetrical nature of the index dependencies and the index expansion
operation. In Chapter 4, such variants were defined to be equivalent.
An infinite number of different readings is available from these expressions, because the
cardinality of the sets is not fixed; therefore, I will not enumerate them here. The
important point is that the propagation operation is, as before, expressing a general
dependency between the elements of the sets. Examination of the sentences above shows
that they do indeed cover all the possible relations, on this general level: either the
relationship denoted by the expression is simply between all the elements of a given two
sets (where there is no propagation between them) or it is somehow more complicated -
and must be dealt with by propagation, partition and/or index dependency.
As before, weak indices cannot propagate rightwards. This expresses the intuition that
while sentence 192a can yield a unique set of donkeys and/or carrots for each man in the
(single) set ofmen, the converse is not true: that is to say, the expression cannot give rise,
for example, to a reading where there is one set of donkeys, each member of which is
offered a carrot by a set ofmen unique to that donkey.
To summarise, weak quantification in three-place predicates behaves exactly as before in
two-place predicates, even when there are more than two quantifiers in a sentence.
Application of index dependency to references containing more than two indices will be
covered in the next section.
13.4. Sentences containing more than two Indices
We are now able, subject to Rule 18 (index application) to produce GRL expressions
containing references bearing three indices. Such expressions are always derived from
input containing more than two quantified references within one clause.
In fact, the index application rule constrains the possibilities considerably - the only legal
constructions are of three weak indices, or of one strong index dominating two weak ones.
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We have already covered the behaviour of a strong index dominating a weak one, and of
two weak indices together. Let us consider the possibilities, as before, to cover the full
range of input data.
First, I will consider threefold weak indices, and index dependency. Consider the
expression shown in example 198a. Supposing that the preconditions on the dependency of
upper bound equality are not contradicted, we can rewrite this in two stages to give first
198b and then 198c. The rewrite could be performed in the opposite order, with no change
in the resulting expression.
Vindl.Vind2.Vind3.[...,refl X ind3X ind2X indl,...] 198a
Vindl.Vind2.[...,refl Xind2Xindl,...] 198b
Vindl.[...,refl Xindl,...] 198c
This new expression expresses a one-to-one correspondence between members of the three
sets, exactly as in the twofold indexed version.
Finally for weak indices, note that the definition of multiply indexed references does not
include an order on the indices. Thus, a single application of index dependency to 199a can




Vind2.Vind3.[...,refl X ind3 X ind2,. .] 199d
These options express readings where two out of three sets are in one-to-one
correspondence, and the third indexed reference denotes a set of individuals for each of the
correspondent pairs in the other two sets.
When a strong index applies to two weak ones, we have a similar, though slightly simpler,
situation. Index dependencies can apply to the two weak indices, as we would expect, but
none can apply to the strong index - as always, this is expanded or partitioned directly,
because that is the nature of strong quantifiers. Therefore, from an expression like 200b,
the unpropagated translation of 200a, we can derive the reading in 200c. Together, b and c
represent all the correct readings of the original sentence.
"Every man offers some donkeys some carrots. " 200a
Vind l.Vind2.Vind3. [offers,ref3 "carrot X ind3Xind2<8> indl,
ref2~donkey X ind2®indl,refl "man!<8>indl ] 200b
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Vindl.Vind2. [offers, ref3 "carrot X ind2® indl,
ref2"donkey X ind2®indl,refl "man!®indl] 200c
Expression b represents the (many) readings where each one of a set ofmen offers some set
of donkeys some set of carrots. Expression c is produced from b by application of index
dependency, assuming the upper bounds of the indices are equal. It represents the reading
where each one of a set ofmen offers a set ofdonkeys its own set of carrots.
13.5.Ordering Index Propagation
I have already mentioned that, in the case of weak indices propagating to weak indices,
ordering of the propagations is unimportant. However, now that we have the possibility of
more than one index appearing in any quantified expression, we must consider the
ordering of the operation manipulating such an expression in full generality. For
example, consider sentence 201a, and its propagated translations, 201b and c.
"Every man offers a donkey every carrot." 201a
Vindl.\/ind2.[offers,ref3"carrot!®ind2,ref2"donkey® indl.refl "man!®indl] 201b
Vindl.Vind2.[offers,ref3"carrot!®ind2,ref2~donkey® ind2,refl "man!® indl] 201c
According to our rules, we must propagate indl left, but we must also propagate ind2 right
(both subject to the Index Application Rule). However, either one of these precludes the
other, because strong indices cannot propagate to strongly indexed references.
Nonetheless, we need to consider the readings produced in both cases.
If we perform left propagation on indl, we get reading b, where each one of a set of men
offers some donkey each of a set of carrots. This is a correct reading, characterisable in
FOPC as
Vm.man( m ) =s> 3d.donkey( d ) A Vc.carrot( c) =£ offers! d, c, m )
If we propagate ind2 right, we get reading c, where each one of a set of men offers a
particular carrot to a particular donkey. This, too, is correct; the FOPC equivalent is
Vc.carrot! c ) => 3d.donkey( d) A Vm.manf m) => offers! d, c, m )
Note that, if we applied both propagations, we would be representing a reading where
each man offers each of a different set of carrots to a different donkey. This would be
incorrect. The correct reading where there is only one donkey can be obtained (if
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necessary) through partition of entity tokens representing the sets, as specified in Rules
I conclude, therefore, that we must allow the index propagation operations to be carried
out in any order. This accords with the idea, made explicit in the last section for index
dependencies, that propagation is an operation between two references, and that
propagation in larger lists of references is composed of a sequence of propagations between
two references.
Note that if we were relying on quantifier scope shuffling alone in FOPC, we would
overgenerate, because the incorrect reading mentioned above would be generated when
the existential was inside the scope of both universals.
14. Sentences containing Context Extensions
14.1. Quantifier-Free Context Extensions
By extension of the earlier argument regarding the nature of indirect objects and other
predicate modifiers, now that I have dealt with three-place predicates, we must cover
context extensions, which are the alternative possibility. This is particularly important,
because, in the next section, 1 will use context extensions to cover dependent reference,
like the "donkey existential" in the donkey sentence.
Consider sentence 202a. This example is rather contrived, because more natural examples
tend to contain more definite references, which do not exhibit interesting behaviour in
this context; nevertheless, it is a well formed sentence. Note the ambiguity between
readings, mentioned earlier, where the donkeys are in the paddock and where the seeing
(ie the man) is in the paddock. The unpropagated translations are shown in 202b and c,
respectively.
Vindl.[in,ref3~paddock,refl~man] ► [saw,ref2~donkey!®indl,refl"man] 202c
Consider first the body (to the right of the ►) of 202b, in isolation.
There is no question of leftward propagation of the index, because there is no reference on
the left to which to propagate it. However, since refl is indefinite, we must, according to
16 and 17.
"A man saw every donkey in a paddock."
Vind1.[in,ref3"paddock,ref2"donkey!®indl] ►
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the index application rule and the definition of strong index propagation, propagate the
index right. This leaves us with reading, 203, where there is some number of men,
between 1 and the number of donkeys.
Vindl.[saw,ref2~donkey!®indl,refl~man<8>indl] 203
Now, take the context extension of the same expression. We propagate leftwards, to get
reading 204, where the number of paddocks is between 1 and the number of donkeys.
Vindl.[in,ref3~paddock<2>indl,ref2~donkey!<8>indl 1 204
The combination of these two ambiguities gives us the multiple readings we need. Figure
17 represents the extremes of these where we have either one or the maximum number of
Figure 17: Extreme readings of "A man saw every donkey in a paddock."
a) One man saw several donkeys, all in the same paddock.
b) One man saw several donkeys, each in a distinct paddock.
c) Each donkey in the paddock was seen by a distinct man.
d)Each donkey was seen in its own paddock by a distinct man.
donkeys and/or paddocks. Solid arrows denote seeing; broken ones denote location.
Next, consider sentence 202c. In the vast majority of cases, the location of an actor
specifies the location of the action taking place - here, I will make this generalisation as a
simplifying approximation, so both the man and the seeing are in the paddock. This time,
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we cannot consider the body of the expression and the context extension separately,
because the two have a reference symbol in common.
Each reference symbol in a GRL expression in George is associated (by binding) with a
particular reference in the input. Therefore, it does not make sense for two occurrences of
that symbol in a GRL expression to be different, unless one was derived from the other by
index partition. (Otherwise, we would be saying that one reference in the input could take
two different surface forms at once, which is nonsense. Therefore, the rules of strong and
weak index propagation require that if an index propagates to one occurrence of a
reference symbol, it propagates to all occurrences, and new quantifiers are inserted if
necessary.) Taking the references in the body first, then, we apply rightward propagation
of the strong index in the example to give the intermediate expression 205.
Vindl.[in,refl"man® indl ,ref3"paddock] >
[saw,ref2"donkey!®indl,refl "man® indl] 205
Note, this propagation has affected the occurence of refl in the context extension as well
as that in the body, as per the definition of index propagation. We now treat this indexed
reference in the usual way under index propagation: that is to say, we allow rightward
index propagation, giving us the reading in 206.
Vindl.[in,refl"man<8>indl,ref3"paddock®indl] ►
[saw,ref2"donkey!® indl,refl ~man®indl] 206
The extremes of the readings denoted by this translation are represented in Figure 18.
14.2. Quantifiers in Context Extensions
Finally, this approach gives us the correct behaviour when the "optional argument" of the
predicate (the location in example 202) is quantified. Consider, for example, sentence 207a
(which gives us the same attachment ambiguity as before, as shown in 207b and c).
Remember that the quantifier covers the whole context extended expression.
"A man saw a donkey in every paddock." 207a
Vindl.[in,ref3~paddock!®indl,ref2"donkey] ► [saw,ref2~donkey,refl "man] 207b
Vindl.[in,ref3"paddock!®indl,refl "man] ► [saw,ref2"donkey,refl "man] 207c
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Figure 18: Extreme readings of "A man saw every donkey in a paddock."
a) In one particular paddock, one man saw several donkeys.
b) In each ofseveral paddock, one man saw several donkeys.
c) In a particularpaddock, each ofseveral men saw a distinct donkey.
d) In each ofseveral paddocks, a distinct man saw a distinct donkey.
Let us take reading 202b first. First, we must propagate the index in the context extension
rightwards. When we do so, as before, we must replace the ref2 reference in the body with
the new indexed version of ref2. This leaves us with expression 208:
Vindl.[in,ref3"paddock!<8>indl,ref2"donkey®indl] ►
[saw,ref2~donkey®indl,refl~man] 208
Now, we must propagate the new index rightwards in the expression body, to give 209:
Vindl.[in,ref3"paddock!<S>indl,ref2"cfonkey®indl] ► *■'"
[saw,ref2 "donkey® ind 1 ,refl "man® indl ] 209
The English gloss of this translation is "A particular man saw a particular donkey in each
of several paddocks.". This reading is correct; no others are available.
Now we will take reading 207c. As before, we must propagate the index in the context
extension leftwards; as before, it carries through to the body. Since the new index is now
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on the rightmost argument of the predicate, we must propagate it leftwards according to
the index propagation rule. This leaves us with 210, which is indeed the only correct
reading.
"Each of a set ofmen saw a particular donkey in a particular paddock." 210a
Vindl. [in,ref3 "paddock!®indl,refl"man0indl] ►
[saw,ref2"donkey0indl,refl"man0indl] 210b
14.3. Sentences containing Dependent References
Finally, we must discuss the behaviour of indices when applied to dependent references.
Dependent references are (often pronominal) references occurring near (often in the same
sentence as) another reference which in some sense determines their meaning. Sentences
containing what I have called the "donkey existential" (see Chapter 1) are an example of
this problematic kind of sentence - see [Kamp, 1985]. George does not currently have the
ability to deal with dependent references in examples where the dependent reference is
not in the same sentence as the reference upon which it is dependent. However, the
behaviour within sentences is correct; the extension of this behaviour to inter-sentence
dependence is beyond the scope of the work presented here, and is therefore deferred to
Chapter 9.
14.4. Index Propagation to Dependent References:
Donkey Sentences
The essential problems with donkey sentences were discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. They
are embodied in the reference of the pronoun in sentence 211a, and in references to the
same entity by subsequent referring expressions. In the example, the sort "it" expresses
the property of not being a person - as usual, this translation is merely presented as
adequate for experimental purposes, and not as necessarily philosophically correct.
Expression 211b shows the initial form of the translation, before application of index
propagation or expansion.
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In Kamp's analysis, the first interesting issue is the singular surface form of the referring
expressions "a donkey" and "it" - even though these references are apparently singular,
there is a readily achieved reading where there is a set of donkeys, and the pronoun refers
to each member of the set. This effect is produced by the scope of the quantifier in "Every
man". Now, this is exactly the kind of behaviour George is designed to deal with. So how
does it deal with donkey references?
As always, the first thing we must do is apply any of the index manipulation rules which
are applicable here. Index expansion cannot apply, because the index, indl, is unbounded.
Weak index propagation cannot apply, because there are no weak indices. Strong index
propagation, however, is applicable. Applying it, we get just one expression, that shown in
212, the derivation proceeding as follows. The strong index propagation rule (Rule 15)
says that indl must propagate left in both the body and the context extension subject to
the index application rule (Rule 18). Propagation on to the indefinite reference in the
context extension is therefore successful. However, the index application rule precludes
propagation of an index on to a simple definite reference. Therefore, indl cannot
propagate left on to ref3.
Vind 1. [owns,ref2 ~donkey® indl,refl"man!® indl] ►
[beats,ref3 "it!,refl "man!® indl ] 212
If we allow a binding of ref3 to an entity already in the discourse, then this is certainly a
correct interpretation of the sentence - consider example 213, where the pronoun refers to
an entity introduced earlier:
"In order to reduce cruelty to animals, the town council has bought a whipping horse.
Every man who owns a donkey beats it." 213
However, we also need to produce the alternative reading where there is a set of donkeys
in some underspecified relationship with the men (which is already expressed by 212) and
the pronoun is specific to each man - ie it refers to "the donkey which the man owns". One
.. i.-'
solution to this might be that we need to treat pronouns differently from other referring
expressions here - indeed, in general, this is a common view (eg [Webber, 1979]).
However, the problem behaviour is also found in the (clumsy, but nonetheless well-
formed) sentence:
"Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey." 214
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Therefore, using the pronominal nature of the reference does not solve the problem in
general. In fact, we will need to introduce a final new piece of behaviour into the system to
deal with such references. The behaviour is described in terms of the combination of
quantification and context extension; it produces the required reading for both the
pronominal form (211a) and the (non-pronominal) definite noun phrase (214). The full
definition is given in Rule 19.
Let E2 ► El be a context extended expression. Let R1 be a reference in El, and R2 a
reference in E2, both before index propagation. Then:
If the set of entities sort consistent with R1 is a superset of the set of entities
sort consistent with R2, R1 may optionally be indexed with any strong index
associated with or propagating on to R2. The candidate set of R1 is then
; reduced to be the same as that of R2.
Now, how does this work? Consider again 211b. Compare the references in the context
extension (E2 in the rule) and the body (El in the rule). First, the "men" references are
identical, so the new rule applied to refl is vacuous. The "men" reference in the body
cannot corefer with the "donkey" reference (R2 in the rule) in the extension because of
both sort and number inconsistency. However, the "it" reference (R1 in the rule) can do so.
Therefore, when we follow the strong index propagation rule (Rule 15) and apply indl to
ref2, we may also optionally apply it to the "it" reference, ref3 The option gives us the
required ambiguity between the two readings detailed earlier in this section. Note that we
can analyse the translation of sentence 214 in exactly the same way; the nature of the
reference, other than that it is consistent (ie has the same candidate set) with the
appropriate reference in the context extension, is immaterial. Thus, the same reasoning
process works for the plural equivalent of 211, shown in 215:
Note that this rule is not symmetrical - propagation may only take place rightwards: the
direction indicated by the context extension operator. This means that we still get the
correct (unique) reading for a sentence like 216:
Rule 19: Index Propagation through Context Extension
Every man who owns some donkeys beats them." 215
"Every man who owns it beats a donkey." 216
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where the pronoun can only refer to an entity introduced previously. If we could pass
indices from the body to the context extension (ie Rule 19 in reverse), we would be able to
infer that "it" was a set reference to the donkeys intoduced in this sentence, which would
certainly be incorrect.
For completeness, I must state that no equivalent operation is available for weakly
indexed references. The reason for this, fitting with the intuition of our nomenclature, is
that the weak quantifiers do not affect each other through the division caused by
subordination. Consider example 217:
"Some men who own some donkeys beat them." 217
The point is that in the donkey sentence we have a singular surface form ("every") with a
plural semantics; ordinary singular surface forms coreferring with it must therefore be in
some sense converted so that they can refer to the set correctly. This is the motivation for
the notational division in GRL between number and sort information: the two must often
be treated separately. Now, in 217, all the sets are plural already. (This leaves us with
more work to do to decide which man owns which donkey(s) and which man beats which
donkey(s), as and when necessary. However, I have already shown, in Section 10, how to
perform such elaboration.)
This, then, accounts for the first of Kamp's donkey problems: accounting for reference by
the singular pronoun to all of the members of the set of donkeys. The second, in George, is
solved as a direct result of the solution to the first. The second problem is this. Compare
the two discourses 218a and b.
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
The donkey is sad." 218a
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
The donkeys are sad." 218b
Kamp'^st^gestion is that the first discourse is referentially ill-formed, while the second is
well-formed, because the agreement between the subject of the second sentence must be
with the set of donkeys. Now consider the analysis of the two discourses in George. They
both start with the translation and bindings shown in 219a and b, assuming the prior
existence of a set ofmen, specified by e 1.
Vind 1. [owns.ref2 "donkey®indl,refl"man!®indl] ►
[beats,ref3 "it! ® indl ,refl"man!® ind 1 ] 219a
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{({ Vindl.refl"man!®indl}, {el"man}),
({Vindl.ref2"donkey<8>indl}, {e2~donkey}),
({ Vindl.ref3"it!®indl}, {e2~donkey})} 219b
Now, consider what happens when we introduce the second sentence of 218a. This gives us
the translation in 220.
coref( ref5"sad, ref4~donkey!) 220
Now, we follow the George dereferencing algorithm given in the foregoing sections. First,
we know that ref4 and ref5 refer to the same entity, and therefore share the same binding.
Second, we look for an entity token in the entity tokens database which is compatible in
sort with ref4 and ref5. The only one which is so is e2, which specifies the set of donkeys
from the first sentence. However, we have a rule (Rule 4) which states that simple (ie
singular) references may not be bound to entities appearing in singleton bindings with
indexed (ie plural) references. Therefore, e2 is ruled out as a candidate, as required.
When we consider the second sentence of 218b, we have the converse situation. e2 is
selected by sort consistency as a candidate as before. But the reference to the donkeys is
now indexed, so Rule 4 does not rule out the binding. We therefore achieve the required
translation, as shown in 221.
Vindl.coref( ref5"sad, ref4~donkey!®indl) 221a
{({ ref5"sad, Vindl.ref4"donkey!<8>indl}, {e2"donkey "sad})} 221b
The reason why this works is simple. George changes the representation of sentences like
this to fit their correct readings. Thus, when there is a set of donkeys, the set is explicitly
represented as such, and the original singular reference from which it was created is
discarded. Therefore, there can be no incorrect referent for subsequent references to refer
to.
As I said before, it is possible to imagine a solution to the harder, more general problem in
example 222, where the quantifying effect of the "Every man" reference passes to the next
sentence. This would require a notion of focus - I therefore merely present it here as a
possible extension, and will give detail in Chapter 9.
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
He often mistreats it in other ways, too." 222
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Finally, to show that the behaviour described in this section is not confined to an isolated
simple case, consider sentence 223.
"Every man who offers a donkey a carrot gives it to him." 223a
Vindl.[offers,ref3"carrot,ref2"donkey,refl "man!®indl] ►
[gives,ref4"it!, ref5"male!, refl "man!®indl[ 223b
There are four possible readings here, generated by the two-way ambiguity in each of the
pronoun references: either, both, or neither of them may refer to entities already existing
in the discourse. In the current George implementation, there are no selectional
restrictions on predicate arguments - therefore, the example has been contrived so that
the pronoun references are not ambiguous in any way other than the way we are studying
here. This does not affect the operation of the theory; if the references were ambiguous,
more possible readings would be produced.
So, let us apply the rules as before. First, we have the compulsory leftward propagation of
the strong index in the context extension to the other arguments. This yields reading 224.
Vindl.[offers,ref3"carrot®indl,ref2"donkey®indl,refl "man!® indl] ►
[gives,ref4 "it!,ref5 "male!,refl" man! ® ind 1 ] 224
Given the definition of strong index partition and expansion, this denotes all the
acceptable readings, if, for each of the pronoun references, either there is an existing
entity which is a candidate for binding or the corresponding reference in the context
extension has not gained an index by propagation. For example, 224 is a correct
translation if there is an existing singleton entity token consistent with sort male, to
which ref5 can be bound, and either there is another consistent with "it", or ref4 is bound
to the same token as ref3.
However, we may also apply the new operation of index propagation through context
extensions (Rule 19). This will allow us optionally to propagate indl to ref5 or to ref4 or to
both, in 224. These readings may also be correct, again depending on the current context.
In particular, 224 gives the reading we are most interested in here, where "him" refers to
the donkeys, and "it" refers to the carrots.
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14.5. Over-Generation from Dependent References
It seems, then, that our extension to index propagation gives us the readings we need. But
we must also ask the question: does it give us more than we need? The question is more
pertinent here than elsewhere in this discussion, because we are appealing to an idea
other than enumeration of sets to give us our readings. Before, generation could only go as
far as exhaustive enumeration, which was a desirable extreme. Now, we have the
wherewithall to generate references by another process, so we must check that process for
over-generation.
First, let us consider when the donkey existential phenomenon appears. Looking at the
standard donkey sentence in 211, we can get an immediate picture of the circumstances
necessary. First, we must refer to a prototypical entity ("a donkey") inside the scope of a
strong quantifier ("Every man"). Then, we must refer to that entity, with surface form
syntactic agreement (so it may be an individual or a set) also within the scope of the same
strong quantifier.
This analysis of the state of affairs giving rise to the donkey sentence behaviour is
actually very constrained. First, we must have two potentially coreferring references in
the scope of the same strong quantifier. But referring expressions appearing in the same
clause cannot normally corefer (in the general linguistic context, not just in George).
Therefore, the donkey sentence must consist of at least two clauses, both of which must be
in the scope of the quantifier; the coreferring expressions must be in different clauses.
Now, because an entity cannot be referred to until it has been introduced into a discourse,
the introductory reference must appear in the surface form before the reference to it.
English syntax is such that relatives immediately follow the noun phrase which they
modify. Therefore, the introductory reference must be in the relative clause.
Let us now translate this into George terms. We need two clauses in the scope of the same
quantifier. The only way of achieving this is through context extension. One of the two* .V.
ways a context extended expression can be introduced is by translation of a relative
clause. If we have an input sentence containing a strong quantifier, then its translation
contains a strong index, whose scope is the whole translation. Finally, because the
introductory reference in the input is in the relative clause, it appears in the context
extension of the GRL translation, as required by Rule 19, defining this new kind of index
propagation.
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Thus, the concepts defined in George have allowed us to define a single rule (Rule 19)
capturing this behaviour exactly. To demonstrate this further, another more obscure
example is given below.
Consider sentence 225a, whose initial propagated translation is given in 225b.When we
perform this propagation, the rule of referential consistency forces us to rewrite the
occurrence of refl in the body of the expression as well.
"A man who owns every donkey beats it." 225a
Vindl.[owns,ref2~donkey!<8>indl,refl~man<8>indl] ►
[beats,ref3 "it!,refl ~man<8>indl] 225b
This translation is correct on its own, if and only if there is an entity consistent with "it"
already in the discourse. This reading gives us some number of men, each of whom owns a
set of donkeys, and each of whom beats some other thing, unspecified in the example
above. However, we may now apply Rule 19 to propagate indl from ref2 along the context
extension to ref3. This leaves us with the final translation, 226.
Vindl.[owns,ref2"donkey!<8>indl,refl~man®indl] ►
[beats,ref3" it! <8> indl,refl ~man® indl ] 226
This expression represents the only possible reading of the sentence, other than that given
for 225, above. The reference containing ref3 may be bound to some set appearing earlier
in the discourse, or to the entity token introduced or referred to by ref2. This gives us the
reading where each donkey is owned by some man (maybe the same, maybe different for
some or all donkeys), who beats the donkey he owns.
15. Summary
In this chapter, I have presented a new view of quantification in natural language and an
associated set of operations which allow the reduction of vagueness in adaptable
representations of underspecifed quantified references.
The theory rests on the notion that quantification is a property applied to references,
rather than a property of the references themselves. This notion admits direct and explicit
representation and manipulation of interactions between quantifiers appearing in the
same sentence.
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I have presented a first approximation to a view of quantifiers couched in terms of the
concept of "strength". Quantifier strength determines the ability of a quantifier to affect
the behaviour of other quantifiers, and the nature of any effect it has. I have shown how
the notion of quantifier strength may be used to categorise the manipulations, and
facilitate their use in deriving more specific referential expressions from vague ones.
I have shown how the adaptable nature of GRL and the George system allow step-by-step
manipulations, rendering representations more specific a little at a time. This has allowed
the approach to cover extremely ambiguous sentences which would be difficult under
conventional approaches based on early enumeration of readings.
16. Afterword
This and the preceding three chapters have presented George's contribution to linguistic
theory in isolation. It now remains to place this contribution in context of related work
towards the same aims. Such a context, with an overall summary of the work presented in
these four chapters, is supplied in the next chapter.
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There are four main areas in which the George system and the associated theory extend or
improve upon existing work. These are: incremental categorial parsing; incremental analysis of
noun phrase reference, and the associated adaptable representations; and reasoning about
reference to subsets of underspecified sets.
Each of these is compared with the existing approaches, especially with the work presented in
Chapter 2. The notion ofadaptability is summarised, and presented as a useful new idea.
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will compare the theory of the George system, presented in the foregoing
five chapters, with the work of those researchers introduced in Chapter 2. I will suggest
that the theory presented in this document constitutes progress in automatic parsing, in
automatic analysis of reference (particularly in an early/incremental context), and-
primarily - in automatic analysis of and reasoning about set reference.
I will also argue that the discussion of representation here explicitly addresses issues
recognised as fundamentally important in the work of other researchers in a clearer and
more useful way than before.
Recall from Chapter 1 that I aim to substantiate three main claims, which are as follows.
1. We need to be able to analyse, reason about, and represent reference to sets which are
subsets of other sets existing in a discourse, but not fully specified therein, in
particular in terms of number.
2. We cannot, until the end of an input discourse, fix substitutions for names of discourse
world entities for the referring expressions in our input, because it is not possible to be
sure that a candidate entity is the correct choice until it is known that no more
information is forthcoming. Thus, representations must be adaptable.
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3. As a corollary of 2, we need to produce partial representations in order that we may
represent intermediate stages along the path to the eventual analysis.
The organisation of this chapter is such that the issues are presented in order of
increasing importance.
2. Incremental Parsing with Adaptable Representations
2.1. Introduction
In Chapter 5,1 introduced a new means of parsing natural language using an extension of
the Categorial Grammar of [Adjukiewitz, 19351, and presented an implementation, the
George Parser. In theory, the George Parser is designed to be strictly incremental - that is
to say, it is intended to combine new word meanings with its existing interpretation of the
input with no possibility of non-lexical indeterminism - which is made possible by
allowing ambiguity in the input to be implicit in the representation which constitutes its
output. In fact, however, it has proved necessary to restrict this implicit ambiguity of
representation to certain forms of ambiguity only (which, I will argue later in this section,
is desirable in the final analysis).
Because the parser is strictly incremental (those readings which are not representable
ambiguously being evaluated in parallel), mechanisms are required to replace the
operation of the stack used for temporary storage of partial constitutents in (for example)
more conventional shift/reduce parsers. Also, the notion of deliberate implicit ambiguity
in a representation itself requires the addition of a mechanism for deriving one or more of
the possible readings when (if) this becomes possible.
Aside from these two new mechanisms, I must be able to account for the apparent
preference for certain readings which [Crain & Steedman, 1986] suggest may best be
expressed by parallel elaboration of different possible meanings with a preference
attached to certain interpretations. Without such a notion a future extension of the
George system will fail to account, for example, for the problem of garden path sentences.
To place the George Parser in context of the chosen existing researchers' work, I will
briefly discuss Mellish's DCG-based parser, focussing in more detail on Haddock's deeper
writing on the subject of parsing, and on Steedman's Combinatory Grammar which
Haddock uses. Webber did not discuss the issue of parsing per se, though she specifies a
very high level algorithm which might be interpreted as specifying (in Mellish's terms) an
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incremental evaluation process taking place only after a complete syntactic analysis
([Webber, 1979, pp 2-61,2-62]).
2.2. Determinism in Parsing
I explained in Chapters 3 and 5 that the motivation for choosing incremental parsing
without backtracking for the George Parser is to provide a strict framework for
experiment in the incremental evaluation of reference and adaptable representation of
discourse. A secondary goal is to improve efficiency by reducing the overhead of
maintaining various possible readings during phases of local ambiguity; this can reduce
(eg) the need to recalculate the reference of referring expressions translated identically in
different enclosing parses. Mellish and Haddock have both shown that some considerable
degree of early/incremental evaluation can be formally modelled; and strong evidence
exists that the human sentence processing mechanism is incremental.
Note, now, that it is far from clear that the parsing in either Mellish's or Haddock's system
was in the strong sense incremental. [Haddock, 1989] correctly argues that Mellish's
system is certainly not strictly incremental. Mellish's parsing is performed traditionally
top-down, with a DCG parser, so application of constraints arising from verb phrases
dominating the noun phrases on which he concentrates happens after the noun phrases,
and not interleaved with them, as would be the genuinely incremental case; he does not
present the parsing in his system as incremental, but just the reference evaluation. This
does not detract from the theory, though, because the mechanism is still incremental
enough to be interesting, and anyway Mellish intended to be incremental only at the level
of noun phrase evaluation, which was a useful first approximation in his seminal work.
[Haddock, 1989] claims to be rather more strongly incremental, to the extent that
V.
Haddock conflates Mellish's distinct terms, early and incremental, into just incremental:
¥ /»
within a given reading, he parses word by word, which is maximally early in all cases.
However, for purposes of experiment, Haddock uses a backtracking shift/reduce parser,
and sacrifices many of the potential gains of incremental parsing to a desire for simplicity.
He does, however, devote much attention to issues of parsing, proposing a chart parser as
a good solution to the incremental parsing problem.
I have argued, as did Haddock, that an obvious choice of grammar for such a parser was an
enchanced Categorial Grammar. This brought with it some problems which I addressed in
an unconventional way. In particular, the issues of stacking of partial results, of spurious
ambiguity, and of searching between different syntactic parses were raised. I proposed the
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solutions of protraction and coercion to cover the first and last of these. By making
possible and enforcing strictly incremental parsing, one a priori removes the so-called
spurious ambiguity, which can only arise when words in a sentence may be combined in
more than one order.
At the coarsest level, the George Parser has two mechanisms for dealing with form-class
ambiguity: either simple transference of the ambiguity into the output representation, or
forking of the entire parsing process. I have not attempted to characterise in general
which option is taken when, but there are certain broad statements one can make. For
example, in the case of a syntactic constituent which appears optionally in a sentence the
rest ofwhose structure is unaffected either way (eg a relative clause), we can represent the
sentence assuming it will be present, and then remove it when it proves to be absent (or,
arguably, the converse). This is the approach taken in Chapter 6 to noun phrase post-
modifiers. More generally, a line can be drawn between syntactic forms which (in George)
are easily conflatable (like np and np/nmod) and those which are not (like passive
participle and active verb, as in the garden path sentence, 227). Of course, the ease with
which representations can be conflated is entirely dependent on the choice of
representation language.
"The horse raced past the barn fell." 227
2.3. Adaptability and Ambiguity
In Chapter 5, I explained that, in George, there is a distinction between ambiguous
representation and multiple translations proceeding in parallel. Thus, George's position
on adaptability is, because of practical factors, not absolute; not all ambiguous input is
translated as ambiguous GRL.
«v"
Now, it would seem that in a completely adaptable representation system wKich always
maintained ambiguity in full it would be impossible to simulate effects (like garden
pathing) which arise from preferences for certain readings, because there are no distinct
translations to which preferences may be attached. If this is so, I cannot claim that such a
system is a good emulation ofhuman behaviour.
If we follow [Crain & Steedman, 1986]'s line and attempt to make judgements of
preference between possible readings composed in parallel, we can account for the garden
path effect in 227 even in the partially adaptable framework I have presented here, as
follows. There are two relevant lexical entries in George for "raced", because the two
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translations are sufficiently different not to be conveniently representable in the same
ambiguous form. Therefore, after the head noun phrase, the parse forks and each
translation of "raced" is incorporated into a different possible partial translation of the
whole.
Crain and Steedman suggest that we should attach some likelihood value to these two
readings, which will presumably be based on the word "raced" (since it is the pivot, as it
were, between the possible readings). In this example, the active reading is preferred over
the passive.
When we reach the closure of the preferred reading, after "barn", we may assume that we
have found a correct reading; we might therefore dispose completely of the other reading
(which is in fact the correct one). Thus, when we attempt to incorporate the word "fell", we
no longer have an appropriate partial sentence into which to incorporate it, so the parse
fails, simulating the most extreme garden path behaviour in humans. Different, weaker
ways of disposing of the less favoured reading can simulate different degrees of garden-
pathed-ness. This kind of approach would be much harder (or maybe even impossible?) if
we insisted on ambiguous representation for all ambiguities.
Thus, George's use of adaptable representations does not, as one might expect, remove the
option of preference between readings; and the above argument lends weight to the
suggestion that while deliberate ambiguity (and hence adaptability) is desirable, there
are limits beyond which it becomes counter-productive. Perhaps, then, the garden-path (or
not) nature of an ambiguous sentence can be a guide as to the better way to deal with any
ambiguity in the words it contains; and what seemed in abstract to be a limitation in the
theory is maybe in reality a positive feature of the system. . <,
While the issue of implementing such a facility is left for further work, it is important to
state that the issue has been considered. This psycho-linguistically motivated division
V
between explicit and implicit representation of ambiguity may well coincide with a
similar practically motivated one, depending on the choice of representation.
2.4. Removing the Need for a Stack - Protraction
What is the issue about stacks for temporary storage (eg storing a head noun phrase while
its verb phrase is being parsed) in incremental analysis? Quite simply, it is that I wish to
have a single (partial) representation of the discourse we have analysed so far after the
incorporation of each new word. Only then can I treat a partial representation in the same
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way as a complete one for the purposes ofmanipulation and inference; if I cannot do this, I
cannot easily claim that my representation is adaptable in any strong (and therefore
interesting) sense.
Recall (from Chapter 5) that the main reason this is a problem at all is the entrenchment
of the A-notation for semantic functions. Because we generally wish our semantic
functions to correspond structurally with our syntactic categories (Montague's "Rule-to-
Rule" hypothesis), we therefore impose a directional nature on syntactic, as well as on
semantic, combination. In [Lambek, 1957]'s linguistic calculus, syntactic combination
was bi-directional with no imposed order, and so the problem did not arise - but then,
Lambek gave no semantic analysis. Given the widespread use of the A-notation, and the
accepted modern direction-ordered style of categorial grammar, there seems little choice
but to work around the problem, rather than confront it directly.
The main existing solutions to this are the use of a shift reduce parser (in the strong sense,
where we may leave constituents on the stack while composing others) and the idea of
type-raising (which I introduced, with its associated problems, in Chapter 5) and the
related generalised composition
The point is, though, that any approach we take to this problem will have somehow to
encode the behaviour of a stack. Type-raising does so by introducing an extra
A-abstraction. Steedman's Composition and Generalised Composition operations (see
[Haddock, 1989]) do so by higher-order manipulation of syntactic categories, again
introducing a delay in evaluation by manipulation of A-terms.
In Chapter 5, I proposed an alternative mechanism for this purpose: protraction. I claim
that this is a better view than all the above for the following reasons. First, protraction
allows us to build a single partial representation for any left-complete sub-sentence,
unlike a stack based parser. Second, it is a fully general mechanism usable anywhere in a
parse, unlike type-raising, which is applicable ad hoc at certain points only (eg subject
noun phrase, nominal); and its use does not significantly non-determinism, because it is
only applied on demand, unlike type-raising. Finally, it allows us to do away altogether
with the idea of function composition in categorial grammar, making the grammar
simpler and more efficient to use for parsing; in particular, generalised composition,
introduced to allow treatment of right-extraction of arbitrary syntactic components, is
rendered unnecessary, and thus the problems it introduces (see [Haddock, 1989, pp60,121-
123]) are discharged.
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2.5. Supporting Ambiguous Representations - Coercion
It seems, then, that a primary potential gain from the use of ambiguous adaptable
(partial) representations is an increase in effective determinism in a parser, simply
because fewer distinct possible translations need to be considered. However, in order to
allow the disambiguation of these representations if and when it becomes possible, we
must introduce a mechanism, beyond that which performs straightforward combination of
existing partial representations and fresh lexical items arising from new input. This new
mechanism must adapt the ambiguous representation in such a way that it becomes more
specific. However, if we do this in an unprincipled way we run the risk of reintroducing
and even increasing the indeterminism which we wanted to remove in the first place.
One good solution to this - corresponding closely with the incorporation of protraction into
the grammar's combination rules, and the associated improvement over arbitrary type-
raising of lexical items - is to introduce the mechanism in such a way that it is only ever
called when it is known to be needed. This embodies exactly the idea that disambiguating
adaptations should be made only when the correct disambiguation is known. In the
George Parser, because the disambiguating mechanism, coercion, is only ever called when
we attempt to combine two items, the form of the second can determine how the first is
coerced (and the second is never coerced because it is a lexical entry - see Chapter 5).
2.6. Summary
In this section I have argued the following claims about how the use of ambiguous
adaptable representations and strictly incremental analysis can improve over existing
parsing techniques.
1. (Section 2.2) Adaptable ambiguous representations can increase determinism in
parsing and thus improve efficiency over any kind of parser which represents
ambiguity explicitly, particularly when semantics and reference are evaluated in
parallel with syntax.
2. (Section 2.2) Strictly incremental parsing removes the spurious ambiguity inherent in
categorial grammars parsed in other ways.
3. (Section 2.3) The incomplete adaptability of GRL and the George system, and its need
to work out some ambiguities as distinct possible translations need not detract from
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the elegance and utility of the system. Indeed, there is probably a point beyond which
it is linguistically and philosophically appropriate to represent ambiguity explicitly,
in order that preferences between different readings may be expressed; George would
be able to take advantage of this without major change.
4. (Section 2.4) Two unsatisfactory mechanisms in categorial grammar, generalised
composition and the ad hoc type-raising, may be rendered unnecessary by the addition
of a single uniform mechanism, which I have called "protraction". Protraction can
improve both parsing efficiency and clarity of grammar specification, because its use
simplifies the set of categorial combination rules.
5. (Section 2.5) Adaptable ambiguous representations require some means of
disambiguation. Disambiguation should only occur when there is explicit justification
for it. Coercion is one means of such controlled disambiguation.
3. Adaptability in Evaluation ofReference
3.1. Introduction
In the last section, I justified the use of a loose notion of adaptability from the point of view
of efficient parsing. Now I will consider adaptability with a more specific slant towards
evaluation of reference.
[Mellish, 1981] uses the terms early and incremental to describe the evaluation of
reference in the MECHO system. Early refers to the addition of information into the
representation, and inference of its consequences, sooner after it appears at the input than
in more conventional systems, in particular before the end of the sentence. Incremental
means that the representation and/or the evaluation process must be geared to allow the
repeated addition of small pieces of information (from individual words or phrases), rather
than the incorporation of one large translation (from, say, a complete sentence). If a
system uses early evaluation then there is a requirement that it be in some sense
incremental. This is the reason that [Winograd, 1972]'s SHRDLU fails to cope with
underspecified definite singulars - its evaluation is early, but not incremental.
[Haddock, 1989] takes a rather stronger position than Mellish in that his incremental
evaluation is at the level of words within noun phrases, rather than of noun phrases
within sentences. He then uses the word incremental in such a way as to mean "early and
incremental" in Mellish's terms. Significantly, Haddock claims that a cut-off point can be
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placed on the evaluation of definite noun phrase reference, so the incremental nature of
his system is deliberately limited - especially since he only considers singular definite
noun phrases.
One major claim of this thesis is that incremental evaluation and/or representation of
reference alone are/is not enough. In Chapter 1, I defined the term strictly incremental
parsing to mean parsing where word meanings are incorporated into a single partial
translation precisely when they appear at the input to a parser, and the term adaptable
representation to mean a representation which implicitly includes ambiguity and which
may be manipulated in certain well-defined ways to take advantage of the fact while
representing the semantics and reference of partial or complete discourses. How, then,
does this adaptability idea differ from the existing notions?
3.2. Adaptable vs Early/Incremental
It is mainly the idea of deliberately implicitly representing non-referential ambiguity
which makes the difference between Mellish's and Haddock's incremental evaluation and
my evaluation of adaptable representations. It is certainly the case that the candidate sets
of MECHO and of Haddock's system can represent referential ambiguity, by having more
than one member, when the associated referring expression is singular, for example.
However, Mellish and Haddock represent syntactic ambiguity in general explicitly by
backtracking, there is no question of adaptable implicit representation of ambiguity at
any other level. As I said before, adaptability in some degree is required by any early
evaluation system, in order that information may be added as parsing proceeds.
Both Mellish and Haddock consider only discourses where "new" information is added to
existing discourse entities, and "given" information serves to select between (sets of)
them. Because both researchers use explicit known properties (rather than non¬
contradiction, as explained in Chapter 2) to select candidates, a candidate for reference
' <»
cannot be ruled out by addition of information to its own definition, as opposed to addition
to the referring expression in whose candidate set it appears. This is because a candidate
is always known to have the required properties when it is first added to the candidate set.
Thus it is nonsensical to add to the candidate's definition a feature which contradicts some
assumption made when including the candidate in the first place, because such a feature
would be inconsistent with the existing information in the referring expression.
In George, there is no distinction between new and given information: instead, there is the
notion of introduction (or not) of entities by introductory (or non-introductory) references
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and (crudely) of definiteness in a reference. Any sort and number information is merely
incorporated uniformly, whether or not it is new, as long as it does not contradict
information already known.
In other words, in Mellish's and Haddock's incremental evaluation, we can always add
previously unknown information; but that information can only constrain candidate sets.
In an adaptable representation (in the widest sense), we can do more: we can change from
a more ambiguous representation to a less ambiguous one, or, at least in principle, vice
versa; we can pull individuals out of candidate sets by the direct addition of new
information to their definitions. In the strongest case, we can in principle change the form
of a partial translation altogether, so long as we have a linguistic justification for doing so,
arising from the subsequent word. This difference is suggested by the nomenclature:
incremental connotes "adding to" or "increasing"; adaptable connotes an ability to change
more freely. Note, though, that George's adaptability always procedes towards more
specific readings.
One implication of all this is that a generally adaptable representation requires rather
more structure than Mellish's and Haddock's constraint networks - if we are to adapt
representations, we need to know exactly what information came from where; in
particular, it is often the case that verbs carry new information, while definite noun
phrases usually carry given information. Even this basic information is discarded in the
constraint network approaches. I will return to this issue in Section 4.
Adaptability of representation is particularly important in analysing set reference. As I
showed in Chapter 7, cases can very easily arise where it is necessary continually to re¬
evaluate and make more specific mappings between elements of sets. Given this, we need
to be able to make representations carrying in some sense a large amount of information -
all the possible readings of a relation bejjjveen sets - and then prune this down, not as a
process of candidate set refinement, but by adapting the representation to a more specific
reading, rt is not clear how this would fit in with purely incremental evaluation with
candidate sets, which does not address this problem of the exact mapping of underspecified
relations. I will return to this issue in Section 5.
3.3. The Extent ofAdaptable (or Incremental) Evaluation
One point which I must cover here is the question of when to stop being adaptable. I
suggest that, in fact, there is in general no point at which one can say that all the
reference in a discourse has been analysed correctly. This is also Mellish's view: although
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he would like candidates for definite singulars to be unique, he neither enforces the
requirement, nor uses it as a well-formedness judgement. Haddock, however, takes a
different view, which is worth pursuing here.
A perennial issue in the discussion of noun phrase references is the notion that the
referent of a singular definite referring expression must be in some sense unique - or at
least that the candidate set of the reference must be singleton if the reference analysis is
to be said to be successful. Preoccupation with this notion led [Winograd, 1971] to specify
inadequate analysis routines in SHRDLU (his requirement being that, if a unique
referent could not be found at the end of the noun phrase, the analysis failed and flagged
an error), and to a serious problem in the generality of Haddock's mechanism, which is
exacerbated by Haddock's use of uniqueness of definite referents to select between
different syntactic analyses. Haddock himself gives a clear description of this uniqueness
problem with SHRDLU (see [Haddock, 1989] ppl29-130)- there seems little point in
repeating this here - and raises a problem example of his own ([Haddock, 1989], pl58).
Haddock's proposal is that
"a definite NP should refer uniquely by the time it is syntactically closed".
He demonstrates how this rule can be used to deal with sentence 228 in various contexts
([Haddock, 1989] ppl32-137).
"The woman saw the boy with the telescope." 228
The idea is that the uniqueness of definite reference, expressed as a constraint on the
syntactic closure of a noun phrase (or closure constraint), can select between readings
obtained through different syntactic analyses. In particular, consider Haddock's two
possible analyses of 228 where a) the prepositional phrase modifies the main verb; and b)
the prepositional phrase modifies the object noun phrase. In a context where there is a
non-singleton set of boys exactly one of whom has a telescope, only b) is felicitous; where
there is only one boy, the prepositional phrase is read as given because Haddock's system
does not allow new information in definite references. In the former context, reading a) is
ruled out by the definite closure constraint - by the time the closure is reached, after
reading "the boy", the candidate set of that noun phrase is not singleton, and so the
analysis fails, leaving the syntactic alternative as required. This technique also applies to
the disambiguation of the restrictive or non-restrictive nature of the pp modifier.
Haddock claims that his implementation is an embodiment of [Altmann, 1986]'s Principle
of Referential Failure (see Chapter 2, Section 3), because "an analysis which treats
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subsequent material as [modifying] will be favoured over one which does not". While it is
certainly true that Haddock's system conforms with that principle, the converse is not the
case - in Haddock's system, only an analysis which treats immediately subsequent
material as modifying is favoured over one which does not. If the modifying material is
outside the noun phrase in which the disambiguee phrase is embedded, Haddock's theory
labels it ill-formed. To see how this can be a serious failing consider the following
discourse. The points at which Haddock's theory would reject it as an ill-formed discourse
are marked t.
"A farmer owned two donkeys.
He kept one of the donkeys in a field, and the other in his farmyard.
He made Jim, who is a stable boy, get really filthy the other day.
He made the poor boyf fetch the old donkeyt, which he had decided to sellf
Jim got so dirty because it was raining really hard.
The old donkey' was kept in the muddy fieldV 229
First, using Haddock's own candidacy rule, that each property required by a referring
expression must be explicitly true of each candidate, the parse fails at the introduction of
"poor" in the third sentence, because no known entity is poor (ie the "poor" information is
not given). If we were to use the more liberal non-contradictory rule (used in George, and
in [Charniak, 1972]), the parse fails at end of the next noun phrase, because there are two
indistinguishable possible referents. Similar effects occur throughout the discourse - note
in particular the failure of both readings of the fourth sentence, the non-restrictive
reading after "donkey", and the restrictive after "sell".
The problem for Haddock's theory, in this example, is that the disambiguation appears
two sentences after the ambiguous reference, and not as part of the same noun phrase. To
allow Haddock's theory to admit this discourse, we would need a rather exotic syntactic
analysis.
Now, I suggest that in fact this is a perfectly well-formed discourse, if a little convoluted
and clumsy. Further, it seems that vagueness of this kind is widespread in natural
language. Therefore, inability to analyse such vague reference, or worse, principled
rejection of it, constitutes a serious flaw in Haddock's theory.
Having said this, one can certainly imagine improvements which might alleviate the
problem to some considerable extent (or even completely). For example, by making the
uniqueness constraint enforcible (perhaps by simply throwing away some candidate(s)),
and by specifying a moderately intelligent means of reasoning about the enforcement, one
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could account for the discourse in 229, though it is not immediately clear how general is
the scope of this proposal.
Haddock himselfacknowledges that there are problems with the theory, and suggests that
Mellish's more liberal approach is maybe more appropriate. Indeed, the discourse above
seems to suggest that there is very little mileage in Haddock's definite closure rule at all.
In the George system, I have followed Mellish's assumption that it is never possible to
state that a referential analysis is correct. It would seem hard to make a proof of this view,
but there is plenty of evidence that making fixed assumptions is dangerous. One extreme
example is raised by [Hirst, 1981]:
"... in the novel Even cowgirls get the blues [Tom Robbins, Bantam, 1977] the
character named The Countess is introduced on page 63. It is not until page 66
that we find out that The Countess is male, and we are told this only implicitly by
the author's referring to him by the pronoun he when there is no other possible
referent. A human reader is momentarily fazed by this, but finds recovery easy."
A good approach, therefore, is to remain uncommitted on reference, but to assume that the
analysis one has is correct in the absence of evidence to the contrary. So, at any stage in
analysing a discourse, we need to be able to fix and extract the intermediate truth
functional content of an adaptable representation (at least of complete sentences), but also
to sustain that representation in order that we may use it to apply and control adaptation
if necessary in future. This is the approach used in the George system.
What is more, this approach implicitly agrees with Altmann's Principle of Referential
Failure: any new information appearing after an ambiguous reference is viewed as
potentially disambiguating that or any other reference (though most of it will have
nothing to do with that reference); if the information is not new, then it simply causes no
change in the system. And the extra restriction of locality imposed by Haddock's rule is
removed, so, if we use a candidate selection rule based on non-contradiction (as is the case
in George), the discourse in 229 can be analysed correctly.
Finally, we can deal with the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive modifiers
in the degenerate way described in Chapter 6, so we do not lose anything in that respect by
discarding Haddock's definite closure rule.
3.4. Mutually Dependent References
Having claimed that Haddock's rule is incorrect, I must now answer the problem which it
was designed primarily to solve, that of references like those in 230.
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[Haddock, 1989]
[Winograd, 1971]
"The rabbit in the hat" 230a
"Put the block in the box on the table" 230b
The issue here is that there can be contexts where the embedded simple noun phrases in
the examples do not refer uniquely, but the enclosing complex phrases do. Why is this a
problem? For both Winograd and Haddock, the issue is an issue at all because of their
rejection of ambiguity (and therefore adaptability) beyond the syntactic closure of a noun
phrase; thus, in both cases, the theories are able to solve this referential problem in spite
of themselves, rather than by their particular merit.
Suppose a context for 230a where there are two hats and two rabbits, and one of the
rabbits is in one of the hats. If we take the more relaxed view of definite reference in
MECHO and George, the Find that, as we parse the example, we arrive at a constraint
involving one of a set of two rabbits, and one of a set of two hats. It is in the nature of this
kind of constraint (called, in George, a context extension) that the entities taking part in it
are mutually dependent. The incorrect choices can be ruled out, because they do not take
part in such a relationship. This approach was covered in Chapter 6. In fact, we could go
further, and rule out the other rabbit as soon as we read the word "in": we know that that
rabbit is not in anything. I will expand on this in Chapter 9.
The same approach can be used to disambiguate the attachment ambiguity in 230b, based
on the situation modelled in the representation of the discourse world; although it should
be noted that here is another case where we might wish to introduce preference. The
obvious cases are where there is a block in a box, which must be put on a table; and where
there is a block which must be put in a box which is already on a table. The less obvious
case is where "the box" is introductory; the block is to be put in a newly introduced box
which is on the table. George's view of these three is that one of the first two is available
immediately, depending on referential consistency. The third is derived only when the
other two fail, by creation of a new entity token to fill an empty candidate set, which is a
linguistically defensible position. I gave a fuller explanation of this class of example in
Chapter 6, Section 5.4.4.
3.5. Summary
In this section I have argued the following points.
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1. (Section 3.2) The early, incremental analysis of reference requires adaptability of
representation. Otherwise, it would be possible to represent neither new information,
as it appears incrementally in the system, nor its effects.
2. (Section 3.2) The existing incremental approaches cover only the incremental analysis
of noun phrase reference, whereas adaptable representations have other uses as well.
In particular, representation of and reasoning about predications between individuals
within underspecified sets does not fit easily into Mellish's incremental framework.
3. (Section 3.3) There can be no safe limit to adaptability, within a given discourse. It is
always possible that hypothesised referents for referring expressions will prove
incorrect at a later stage in the discourse. In particular, the need for adaptability can
easily extend beyond the end of the referring expression.
4. (Section 3.4) Adaptability of representation need not compromise our ability to
analyse problem references of the kind explored by [Haddock, 1989].
In Section 5, I will give more specific details regarding the evaluation of reference to
(underspecified) sets.
4. Representation of Semantics and Reference
4.1. Introduction
So far, I have argued on a very general level why adaptable representations are useful in
parsing and in basic noun phrase reference evaluation. In this section, I will pin these
points down rather more firmly, and, in particular, justify in more detail the choice of
*
representation for the George system.
4.2. Modelling Discourses and Situations
Before we can make any attempt to represent events or situations described in a discourse
on a computer, we must have a clear and correct view of what it is we are trying to
represent. I make this point because it is far from clear that such a view is always found.
In particular, it is often the case that researchers blur the distinction between, on one
hand, the world model and the relationships between entities in it and, on the other, the
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relationships specified between the referents of referring expressions in the discourse
itself.
For example, in his very useful survey of the work on anaphora current in 1976-81,
Graeme Hirst [Hirst, 1981] seems to exhibit a particular lack of precision which is
widespread. First he defines that
"ANAPHORA is the device ofmaking in discourse an ABBREVIATED reference
to some entity (or entities) ... The reference is called an ANAPHOR and the entity
to which it refers is its REFERENT or ANTECEDENT."
In the very next sentence, he then claims that
"A reference and its referent are said to be CO-REFERENTIAL."
To paraphrase: a reference and the entity it refers to are co-referential, which is not the
case by definition. A reader would probably know what Hirst meant, but I suggest that
this (and other examples in Hirst's and others' writing) indicates that there is a certain,
widespread lack of distinction, at least in thought, between the phrase which introduces
an entity (which is what is really coreferential with the anaphor) and that entity itself.
Such a theoretical distinction (ideally made explicit) is fundamental to the notion of
availability for reference which Webber highlighted in her thesis (which I outlined in
Chapter 2, Section 4.2). It is also fundmental to adaptability.
4.3. Amalgamation
[Webber, 1979] makes a compelling argument for an explicit separation between entities
in the world model and reference to them in a discourse. Nevertheless, the entities in
Webber's world are denoted by tokens which may themselves appear in the representation
language (which Webber thinks of as a logic, though no proof of its status as such is
given). This amalgamation (or mixture) of nam<S& (qua referring expressions) and objects
(qua discourse entities) is similar to that found in (eg) [Kim & Kowalski, 1990]'s wgrk on
V.
meta-logical reasoning. Many logicians (eg [Burt etal, 1990]) feel that it is fundamentally
undesirable in a logic because of the issues of reflection it raises - there is always the
question ofwhether one is making predications of an object or of its name. In particular, if
we simply replace a name by the object it refers to, we have fundamentally changed the
nature ofour representation, in an unmotivated way.
Webber proposes a framework where entities are described and references are made to
them as two distinct but related processes. She writes:
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"Discourse model synthesis and anaphor resolution are complementary
processes."
The invoking descriptions (in Webber's terminology) are maintained as logical formulae
along with the associated discourse, and linked to it by the naming predicate evoke, so an
entity is described in terms of its properties and of the fact that it is the one referred to in
certain sentences in the discourse. Webber describes reference analysis as a process of
refinement of the sort of the definitely (1) quantified variables appearing in her
translation of the discourse, and their eventual replacement by the entities which they
denote.
An example ofWebber's notation and analysis is given in [Webber, 1979, pp 2-64-2-67].
This example is particularly relevant here, because it includes the notion of vagueness in
definite reference. The example discourse, viewed as a continuation of an existing
discourse, is as follows:
"Bruce found a banana.
It belonged to a woman he knew.
Bruce remembered that the banana had been stolen
from her Monday by a marauding monkey." 231
After analysing the first sentence Webber arrives at the translations shown in 232a and b
(where "Bruce" is introductory or anaphoric, respectively; in the former case, the
description of 643 is created by this sentence):
S92 (3x:Banana). Found Bruce, x 232a
S92 (3x:Banana). Found 643, x 232b
643 Bruce
644 ix: Bqnana x & Found e43,x & evoke S92, x «>: 232c
j1 r




S93 (3x:A(u:woman)[Knew HE,u]). Belonged iT/x ; 233
Next, she converts this "Level 1" (surface form) representation to a "Level 2" (reference-
analysed) form where
"its pronouns are resolved (or at least a bound variable or parameterized
individual interpretation ruled out)."
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First, assuming that the resolution is successful, with HE referring to 643 and IT referring
to 644, she produces this representation:
S93 (3x: A(u:Woman)[Knew PRO = e43,u]). Belonged PRO = e44,x 234
(Note here that Webber acknowledges the need to maintain a representation of the
pronominal nature of the anaphors, but does so by this extra-logical syntactic hack.)
Webber's rule for extracting descriptions of new entities then gives the following
identifying description for the woman:
e46 ix: A(u:Woman)[Knew PRO = 643,u] x & Belonged PRO = 644.x & evoke S93, x 235
The translation is now complete. This analysis leaves one question unanswered: why is
the entity name associated with the woman, e46, not substituted into S93, and similarly for
the banana and Bruce in S92? It is still far from clear that this sentence contains an
explicit existential, so why should one appear in a logical translation, especially when
there is a viable alternative?
The alternative, where the two entities are not resolvable runs as follows. The Level 2
representation includes explicit pronouns as before, but they are associated with
"unknown" discourse entities, arbitrarily labelled "?", thus:
S93 (3x:A(u:Woman)[Knew HE = e?i,u]). Belonged IT = e?2,x 236
The rule for extracting descriptions then yields this description of the woman:
e46 ix: A(u:Woman)[Knew HE = e?i,u] x & Belonged IT = e?2,x 237
However, Webber makes no attempt /to suggest a semantics for these "vague" entities,
simply comaventing that they may be replaced by fully specified ones when this becomes
possible. There is a weak correspondence between these and Mellish's reference entities,
but, because of the lack of a formal definition, it is hard to say what they really mean.
What seems certain is that they perform very little function at all in the system, other
than enabling the early construction of an identifying description. Regrettably they are
not associated with the notion of a candidate set, which would have been a good solution to
this problem. To be fair, I should mention that there is a fairly strong flavour of
adaptability about this feature ofWebber's system; even though she seems to view it as a
remedial hack, rather than a feature.
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The point, at a more general level, is this. One must have some mechanism performing the
same function of Webber's substitution and evoke, or one will never be able to make
connections between the entities and the (referring expressions in the) discourse.
However, the necessity of amalgamation within a representation is questionable,
especially since it actually makes more work for the analyser, rather than less. In
particular, each time a variable is replaced by an entity, or the description of a new entity
is detected, the reference of all the variables must be re-evaluated, which is a non-trivial
task involving search through the entire discourse representation. This would not be the
case if the evaluation were treated as constraint network satisfaction, as in MECHO; and
the constraint network approach requires that the representation not be amalgamated (at
least in this sense). An alternative view of this approach is to view the entities themselves
as (in some sense) arbitrary objects (see [Fine, 1985]) whose specifications become more
precise as the discourse proceeds, or as though they were merely pieces of discourse with
associated candidate sets (as in George). In particular, these roughly equivalent ideas
admit early (partial) evaluation of reference even in ambiguous cases, which is not
possible in Webber's framework.
What is far worse is that Webber justifies the above use of the evoke predicate by drawing
a comparison with an explicit reference to a discourse like "You know the man I was
talking about yesterday...", and suggesting that one could use it directly in the
representation of such an utterance. This seems to be a direct contradiction of her first
"strong claim" to represent linguistic structure separately from reference information. In
doing so, she seems to show a complete lack of awareness of the amalgamation issue.
That same issue appears again, in a different sense, in Mellish's program; some of the
output terms specify situation relations in the discourse world (eg "supports"), which do
not define the nature of entities, some specify sorting information (eg "isa"), which do
define entity nature, and some specify naming relations (eg "hasname", which indicates
what words were used to refer to which entities). Now,' the confusion we saw (above) in
Webber's system over the status of of the naming relation evoke does not appear in the
/
same way in Mellish's work, because his output does not represent the structure of the
discourse in the same strong sense. Thus, "hasname(particle, particlel)" is merely one of a
collection of pieces of information about particlel (viz that it was referred to as a
"particle") and there is no strong claim about translations of virtual utterances like "the
particle I was talking about in the last sentence".
Nevertheless, this issue of correct division, both logical and practical, between references
in a discourse and entities in a discourse world still arises. In particular, in Mellish's
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work, it appears in the distinction between the treatments of indefinite and definite noun
phrases, and seems very similar to the confusion mentioned earlier in [Hirst, 1981].
Mellish's program admits the notion of the discourse entity, and also the notion of the
explicit reference, so it is possible to write terms like "on(ref(l),ref(2))" which denotes the
"on" relationship between two definite reference entities (sic - as opposed to the
relationship between their referents); the information contained in those noun phrases is
expressed by other predications of the ref symbols. What is maybe less straightforward is
the idea that a reference entity (which seems to be used to mean "the meaning of a
referring expression") is an entity in the discourse world - eg [Mellish, 1985], p43:
"... semantic routines are to be able to handle unevaluated references in the same
way as other entities in the world model...".
Like Webber, Mellish goes on to make various points about representation of linguistic
structure; for example, he too points out the need for explicit representation of the definite
or indefinite nature of a noun phrase. In MECHO, this difference is notated with reference
symbols, "ref(N)" where N is a unique integer, for definites, and with tokens like
"particlel" for indefinite entities (sic). Note, however, that the status of discourse entities
has been subtly changed. Unlike Webber's entities, which are abstracted, independent of
the language, and to which we may assign certain properties, these entities are grounded
much more firmly in the language itself, to the extent of viewing them as arising directly
in the discourse, so an indefinite noun phrase denotes an indefinite entity, as above. Thus,
we have indefinite entities and set entities, which may appear in the candidate sets of
reference entities, which seem to be notionally on the same level. Thus, while there is still
a clear attempt to separate out the meaning of a discourse from the objects discussed in it,
that attempt partly fails, because either the different levels are not specified clearly
enough (so reference and indefinite entities really are different classes of objects) or
because the confusion in [Hirst, 1981] is again present, and the entity introduced by an
introductory phrase is being confused (in quite a subtle sense) with the phrase itself.
Also, we see another more serious example of amalgamated representation in Mellish's
denotation of sets. A set entity (much like a reference entity) is usually introduced by a
plural noun phrase. There are, however, instances of set references which have singular
surface form (eg "Each" phrases). These must be marked in some way, because subsequent
reference to them must agree with the surface form. Mellish uses a notation where the set
entities in the world model acquire this linguistic surface form marking, almost as though
the description of an entity affected its real world nature. This and the other points above
lead me to suggest that this confusion between discourse and discourse world is
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potentially considerably more dangerous and insidious than in the work of Webber,
because it is implicit in the notation and terminology, rather than arising from deliberate
(mis)use of explicit logical facilities. In [Mellish, 1985], Mellish apologises for the need to
maintain all these different logical entities denoting the same discourse world entity(ies),
and, quite correctly, justifies it on account of the existence of the different candidate sets
for different references before those references are fully resolved. But the only reason an
apology is necessary is because of the confusion between representation of linguistic
references and of discourse world entities.
Finally, it is Mellish's stated intention to treat indefinite entities and reference entities
with the same mechanisms. While this seems a sensible aim, it is hard to understand, in
that reference entities are associated with candidate sets and indefinite entities are not
(rather, they (together) constitute candidate sets), and it is the constraining of the
candidate set which captures the referential behaviour of a noun phrase.
If Mellish were to say that his indefinite entities represented introductory referring
expressions and to give another level at which the actual discourse entities were to be
represented, he could account cleanly for candidate sets in terms of the division into those
same levels. The issue of representing the singular or plural surface form of reference to
sets would also be diffused, because he would be representing referring expressions at one
level, and referents at another, so syntactic markings could be safely made at the former
level without polluting the latter. And indefinite, set and reference entities could all be
treated in the same way, because they would all have (in some cases degenerate)
candidate sets.
This is the approach taken in George.
4.4. Representation of Surface Structtlre and Reference
It seems, then, that the intention of both Mellish and Webber is that there should be a
division between language and discourse world. What is not so obvious is whether either
of these researchers made the correct choice in their representation - I argued in the last
section that they did not, whether deliberately or otherwise, mainly because of their use of
amalgamated representations. The view embodied in the George system and theory is also
that there should be a division between representation of language and representation of
discourse world, on abstract philosophical grounds; however, it is the stronger view that
such a division should be as complete as possible. I have argued this point at various
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stages in this document. The choice of a strongly separated representation implies four
basic requirements, which are as follows.
1. There must be two distinct (though not necessarily different) languages for
representing the discourse and the hearer's model of the world it describes.
2. There must be an explicit connection between the two representations - otherwise it
would be impossible to represent the full meaning of a discourse. This meaning is not
expressible within either of the distinct representations, because it includes elements
of each, so must be external to both.
3. This connection can never be discarded, because it is never possible to take objects in
the world and substitute them into the language.
4. There must be either an inference mechanism over the combined languages, or a
means of translating the combination into an alternative self-contained conventional
form, to confer a meaning upon the representation (which is always true of non¬
standard representations).
The approach ofmaking this division in general carries with it at least the following five
advantages.
1. On a theoretical level, it removes the problem of distinguishing between names of
objects and the objects themselves: all the logical objects on the linguistic side are
names (at the meta-level with respect to the discourse world, if one cares to see it that
way), while all those on the discourse world side (even, in principle, relations between
discourse entities) are objects in the representation of that discourse world.
2. It is possible to represent linguistic features which determine referential behaviour
without affecting the nature of the discourse world; thus, for example, the distinction
in behaviour between "Each" phrases and ordinary plural referring expressions can
be represented in the linguistic representation without polluting the discourse world.
3. It is easy to represent candidate sets of referring expressions, and the representation
has a clear status, distinct from both the discourse and the discourse world, in the
connection between the two representations.
4. There is never any requirement to substitute entities for referring expressions, and so
no decision about reference is ever irreversible. In the event that re-evaluation of
reference becomes necessary, it is always possible, because no information is ever lost
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through substitution. It is possible (and easy) to manipulate the mapping between the
discourse and the discourse world without changing either of them.
5. It is easy to represent the obscure notional division between information which
defines entities (such as "donkey-ness"), information which selects entities (as in "the
donkey on the left") and information defining the situation described by a discourse,
which is highly desirable from the point of view of analysing reference.
We can also argue that, if we are attempting to represent linguistic structure, we need to
include in our representation aspects of language like subordination and definiteness,
simply for completeness - otherwise it is harder to claim that what we have really is a
representation of the discourse, and not some more intensional logical object. This is ideal
for the representation of a discourse with a view to reference analysis.
Use of the George Representation Language, as described in Chapter 4, together with
bindings to entity tokens, as described in Chapter 6, accords with the four basic
requirements, and also the final suggestion, above, of a "complete" representation of
discourse features and structure. This design decision is primarily motivated by a desire
for a pure (ie non-amalgamated) representation of discourse into which the notion of
candidate sets would neatly fit, via the mapping between discourse and discourse world.
However, there are more advantages still to such a "complete" representation when one
works in a context of adaptable representations. In particular, when one is representing
partial sentence semantics ambiguously, it will usually (one would hope!) be necessary to
disambiguate the representation before the end of the sentence, or at least before the end
of the discourse. Now, there are important cases where information about linguistic
structure is largely irrelevant. One such case is the representation of unresolved definite
noun phrase reference by candidate sets, as proposed and studied by [Mellish, 1981]. This
is so because the semantics is represented as a series of constraints which are repeatedly
augmented, in parallel with a repeated reduction in th& size of the candidate set; this
requires no change to the linguistic representation other than the addition of new sort
information from the input, which is part of the standard parsing process anyway.
Consider, in contrast, George's treatment of noun phrase post-modifiers. In Chapter 5, I
showed how a single representation can be used for the two categories np and np/nmod,
given a suitable coercion to map from it to the correct category, which is determined by the
subsequent word in the parse. Essentially, if the subsequent word does not contribute to a
noun phrase post-modifier (nmod), the ambiguous representation (which is of category
np/nmod) is coerced to an unambiguous one of category np.
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The relevance of this to the argument here lies in the structure of the ambiguous
representation. For reasons argued in Chapter 5, the ambiguous syntax:semantics pair
representation for np and np/mod is this (where Q is a possibly empty string of quantifiers
and p is a GRL reference):
np/nmod : \v. Q. [c,p] ► p 238
As it happens, this representation is the same as the unambiguous representation of a
post-modified noun phrase. Now, we want to coerce this to a noun phrase by removing the
information specific to post-modifiers from the semantics. This we simply could not do if
those parts of the representation were not in some sense explicitly visible. Note also that
we cannot dismiss this issue as arising from the particular grammar implementation in
George, since, as I explained in Chapter 5, there is no other way to represent this
ambiguity in a strictly incremental parse (ie without backtracking and/or the ability to re-
decompose partial representations).
A perhaps more obvious benefit of exhaustive linguistic representation is the ability to
distinguish between definite and indefinite noun phrases. George uses the (acceptable but
generally inadequate) assumption that indefinite phrases introduce new entities (or
rather entity tokens, in George terminology). In the event of referential failure, deflnites
and indefinites need to be treated differently. George's parsing algorithm allows the
candidate sets of definite references to become empty if the context so requires, and
responds by creating a new entity token, on the grounds that the reference was really
introductory; and, in particular, this can happen some time after the phrase was parsed.
On the other hand, if the candidate set of an indefinite (qua introductory) reference
becomes empty, an error is flagged, because the discourse state is therefore such that the
phrase cannot refer to the entity which it introduced - which is necessarily wrong.
Without explicit representation of definiteness, such behaviour would not be possible. I
emphasise again that this is an adaptability requirement; the notion of introductory
deflnites is not admitted in Mellish's early/incremental theory, and it is not clear that the
idea of adding new entities to candidate sets fits comfortably within thpt view of the
reference problem.
Note again, incidentally, that there is no question of making Hirst's confusion between
antecedent entities and introductory referring expressions here. The two are clearly
separated, one in each language.
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In the next section, I will demonstrate the still greater adaptability required in order to
reason about underspecified sets.
The main message of this subsection, then, is that for a representation to be truly
adaptable, there are two fundamental and absolute requirements. First is a separation
between discourse and discourse world, in order that either may be manipulated without
disturbing the other. Second, but no less important, is the recording of a maximal amount
of linguistic information, in order that it be possible to define preconditions and
postconditions for whatever structural coercions are necessary in terms of the linguistic
surface form representation. The four requirements listed at the beginning of this section
arise from these.
4.5. Existential Quantification
In [Webber, 1979], Webber uses the familiar existential quantifier of (presumably
classical?) logic to denote the semantics of indefinite (qua introductory) noun phrases.
Thus, "A man runs." is translated thus, assuming the noun phrase is identified as non-
generic and introductory:
Si 3(x:Man) [Runs x]
ei ix : Man x & Runs x & evoke Si, x 239
Now, as we saw in the example quoted in Section 4.4, when the change is made to a Level
2 representation (in Webber's framework) the entity name is not substituted for the
introductory existential, on the grounds that the initial existentially quantified variable
is the introduction of the entity. This kind of notation for introductory phrases, or, indeed,
simply for indefinites, is very widespread in the linguistics community.
Let us consider the logical implications of this. FMrst, are wd making a strong claim about
the meaning of introductory phrases? Does "A man..." really mean "There exists a man...",
v and is it false if there is not? If so, why do we need constructions like "There is a man...",
where there is an explicit existential content?
Also, consider the effect of negation on existentials. If we negate an existential logical
expression, we get "There does not exist an x..." or "For all x, it is not the case that..."
which constitute the negation not of "An x..." but of "There is an x..."; again, the
existential is rather stronger than in the plain indefinite. In "A man did not come in"
there is even a reading where the entity said to exist is something other than a man (eg "I
-275- PhD Thesis
Discussion and Relation to Existing Work
opened the door, expecting the brush salesman. However, a man did not come in. The
vendor was a big hairy monster.").
An alternative view of this use of the existential is that it is really just a syntactic
declaration for a variable (or, more generally, logical object) which names an entity in the
discourse world, and that it specifies the legal scope of that variable. This view, too, has its
problems. It means that (at least in a purely logical representation) any subsequent
reference to the same entity will need eventually to be represented by the existentially
quantified variable which names it, unless the representation of reference is left to the
assignment in the model representing the discourse world, which seems a counter¬
productive solution, because of the resulting complication in performing inference. Thus,
the scope of the existential is not the sentence in which it appears, but the whole of the
subsequent discourse. This has undesirable implications for those linguists who would
like to generate different readings of sentences containing "each" by manipulating
quantifier scope. Note that Webber's approach, above, is one stereotypical solution to this
problem; but that it uses the extra-logical facilities of her representation.
Why, then, do linguists so frequently represent introductory phrases with existential
quantifications? Clearly, one answer lies in history - because the existential quantifier
was already defined in classical logic, we have attempted to force natural language
semantics directly into such a framework, simply because nothing better existed. This
attempt, it must be said, is not unmotivated - there are advantages to representing
semantics in a well-understood system, not least the existence of a standard, well-
understood inference system over (and/or semantics for) the language. There are of course
other, potentially more task-specific benefits, such as (some linguists would say) the
ability mentioned above to represent different readings of some utterances through
different combinations ofquantifier scope over the same expression.
Even so, I would suggest that the association of truth-functional semantics with a
linguistic effect which is primarily pragmatic - namely, the creation or moving into focus
of a discourse world entity - is misguided. Thus, the representations of such utterances as
"there is a donkey in the jacuzzi..." are justifiably existential, but the representation of
utterances such as "a donkey in a jacuzzi..." are simply references which happen to have
the property of (usually) introducing discourse entities.
This view is particularly appropriate in George's context of linguistic representation, in
that we are not, anyway, attempting to represent truth functional semantics, but
something much closer to the discourse itself. Again, looking at Webber's and Mellish's
work, we find an implicit treatment of the same issue. Webber introduces her discourse
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entities, and substitutes their names for subsequent reference to the object of the
existential; there is an explicit connection between the original quantified expression and
the entity (via evoke), which seems to serve no purpose than to perpetuate the quantifier;
therefore, since Webber certainly does not appeal to the quantifier's logical meaning, the
two might as well be conflated. Mellish uses his indefinite entities - ignoring for now the
issue of whether they are linguistic or discourse world entities, the fact remains that they
are quantifier-free, and neatly capture the weak existential nature of indefinites simply
by existing in the representation system.
This is the approach taken in George. Representation of "strong" existentials is left as
further work.
Further, in Chapter 7,1 argued that the use of the classical universal quantifier alone is
inadequate to represent the multiplicity of plural and quantified references which exist in
English, and that we really need at least two kinds of quantification for effective
representation of natural language. Given this, the conventional use of quantifier scope to
generate different readings cannot necessarily be depended upon, and is therefore less
effective as a justification for existential quantification.
The final argument against the (straightforward) use of the existential quantifier for
representing language semantics is the behaviour of the familiar "donkey sentence". I
will discuss this in Section 5 of this chapter, since the effect is related to set reference.
4.6.Summary
In this section, I have made the following points.
1. (Section 4.2) If we wish to represent discourses and the situations they describe on
computers effectively, we must be very clear about the theoretical distinction between
the two.
2. (Section 4.3) Amalgamated representations, where representations of the discourse
are mixed with those of the world, implicitly or explicity, deliberately or otherwise,
can lead to over-complicated, difficult-to-manipulate or just plain wrong analyses.
3. (Sections 4.3 and 4.4) Given the aim of explicitly representing the discourse, and not
just its semantics, it is quite easy to justify inclusion of linguistic information (eg
definiteness) which might not normally be included in a semantic representation, but
which can be useful.
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4. (Section 4.4) Separated (ie non-amalgamated) representations are particularly
suitable for use as adaptable representations, because the separation admits
independentmanipulation of the discourse and of the world.
5. (Section 4.4) Separated representations are suitable for use as adaptable
representations, because they facilitate storage of a maximal amount of linguistic
information, which is needed to guide coercion (see 3, above).
6. (Section 4.4) Both [Webber, 1979) and [Mellish, 1981] take steps towards separated
representations, but seem to regard this, or its consequences, as failures in their
systems. Webber hints at the desirability of adaptable (or at least incremental)
representation; Mellish's work hinges on the idea of incremental evaluation, but does
not extend to issues requiring full adaptability.
7. (Section 4.5) The use of the classical existential quantifier in conventional semantic
representations to represent the introduction of an object (by binding a corresponding
variable) is arguably misguided. A better approach is to use the existence of an object
in the representation to denote introductory reference.
5. Representation of and Reasoning about Set Reference
5.1. Introduction
The issue of set reference in discourse is one which has received surprisingly little
attention in the work of Natural Language reseafcchtrrs. Here, of the work singled out for
attention in Chapter 2, we again need primarily to discuss the work of [Webber, 1979] and
[Mellish, 1981] - for [Haddock, 1989]'s work relates only to singular noun phrases.
By way of further restriction on the domain of data under consideration,' I have covered
only sets introduced and referred to by what we might call quantified references. I will not
cover those referred to or introduced by collective nouns, because the syntactic and
semantic behaviour of such references is quite different from that of the quantified ones,
and does not fit into the framework proposed here (note, though, that the framework can
in principle be easily extended).
It should be remembered (from Chapter 1) that the primary goal of this research is to
produce a computational account of reference to underspecified sets and their subsets; as
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such, the work stands alone, since none of the related work reported here addresses the
same issues; indeed, I am not aware of any existing work which does so.
5.2. Sets and Quantification
5.2.1. Introduction
The first issue to discuss here is that of quantification. I argued in Section 4.5 that the
existential quantifier is not necessarily the best way to represent non-explicit existentials
in language. Also in that section, I referred to the argument in Chapter 7 that there are at
least two different kinds of "universal" quantification in natural language; for purposes of
simplification I have considered here just two, characterised as strong and weak
quantification, corresponding with "each"- and set-type quantification in English and
with strong and weak indexing in the George Representation Language.
Both Webber and Mellish (as well as many others) acknowledge a distinction
corresponding with this one. Webber, however, is unusual in that she attempts to
represent it explicitly in her translation; Mellish represents it explicitly too, but arguably
for some of the wrong reasons (see Section 4.3). In this section, I will explain these two
views in detail. The main point is that quantification in George behaves as a function
applying to references to produce, effectively, new references; the other approaches do not
explicitly subscribe to such an exotic view.
5.2.2. Webber's Approach to Set Reference
[Webber, 1979] takes a fairly conventional means of representing sets based on universal
quantification. To maintain uniformity, she needs a type system for sets like that already
specified for individuals (which I introduced in Section 4.3). Such a^system may be
generated from the existing system by means of a parametric type constructor, which
Webber calls set. Webber views set simply as a function mapping from a type with an
extension E to a new type whose extension is the power set of E, 2E. She also defines a
related function, maxset, which performs a similar mapping, but such that the extension
ofmaxset( T ) is the largest member of 2E, where E is the extension ofT.
For example, in Webber's own terms (where L stands for "lifted"):
"if
A(v:Man)[(3y:Piano). L v, y]
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is a predicate true if its argument is an individual who lifted a piano, then
A(v:set(Man))[(3y:Piano). L v, y]
is a predicate true if its argument is a set ofmen such that the set of them lifted a
piano. On the other hand,
set(A(v:Man)[(3y:Piano). L v, yj)
is a predicate which is true if is argument is a set of men such that each of them
lifted a piano. "
Webber goes on to show how these predicates can be used as types of variables to restrict
the range of existential and universal quantifiers, as for the base types (see Section 4.3).
She also emphasises again differences in interpretation corresponding with differences in
quantifier scope:
"Indefinite plurals can be represented just like indefinite singulars using the
existential operator and an appropriate predicate for the quantifier restriction.
For example,
(i) (3x:A(v:set(Man))[(3y:Piano). L v, y])
"some men who (together) lifted a piano"
(ii) (3x:set(A(v:Man)[(3y:Piano). L v, y]))
or
(3x:A(v:set(Man))[(Vu€ v)(3y:Piano). L u, y ])
"some men who (each) lifted a piano"
Definite plurals can be represented like definite singulars using the definite
operator and either the set or maxset function.
(iii) ix:A(v:set(Man))[(3y:Piano). L v, y]x
"the men who (together) lifted a piano"
(iv) ix:maxset(A(v:Man)[(3y:Piano). L v, y])x
"the men who (each) lifted a piano"
In (iv) the definiteness of the plural is captured by the fact that the maximal set of
individuals satisfying any given predicate is always unique."
One criticism arising here is the production of two different readings for the same
expression in (i) and the first reading of (ii). The two readings denote different
interpretations: collective and distributive, respectively. Now, while Webber is certainly
correct that these two are distinct readings with different logical properties, it is not clear
that representing them as such as soon as they appear is a constructive thing to do. Here is
one issue where adaptability can be a real bonus: the collective/distributive distinction
arises in the majority ofplural references, and, if represented explicitly, can easily lead to
a combinatorial explosion of readings of a discourse. If we allow an adaptable, ambiguous
representation of sets, which may be coerced to a more specific one when we have grounds
for so doing, we can remove a large amount of potential non-determinism from our system.
What is more, it is easy to construct examples where this particular distinction makes no
difference at all to the meaning, because inferences based on it are not required.
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Therefore, it seems doubly pointless to represent it explicitly, at least in the first instance.
This is the approach, made possible by adaptability, taken in George. (In fact, the
distributive/collective distinction has been largely ignored here, on the grounds that this
postponement is possible, and that the index partition and expansion operations can give
rise to explicitly distributive readings where this becomes appropriate. Beyond this, the
position is that the indexed reference is an indeterminate representation for either
reading.)
Webber does not explain her separate representation of collectives and distributives until
she discusses universal quantification, later on. This time, she includes explicit number
information, in a way justified because
"it might be useful to indicate it so as to be ignorable when identifying candidate
antecedents for "one"-anaphora".
Webber comments that the use of the set type instead of the universal quantifier may be
regarded as counter-intuitive, but points out that English obviously does maintain the
distinction (if one views the universal quantifier as denoting distribution of properties). In
particular:
"Adopting the above conventions permits a separation of the notions of focussing
the listener on a set of things and of saying something about that set or about its
individual members. To attribute some property to each member of some set, I
would merely add in a universal quantifier cf
49. Three men ate a pizza.
(3x:set(Men))(3y:Pizza). Ate x, y & Ixl = 3
50. Three men each ate a pizza.
(3x:set(Men))(Vw€x)(3y:Pizza). Ate x, y & Ixl = 3
51. The three men ate a pizza.
(3y:Pizza). Ate ix:maxset(Man)x & Ixl = 3, y
51. The three men each ate a pizza.
(Vwdix:maxset(Man)x & Ixl = 3)(3y:Pizza). Ate w, y"
** <-»•
These examples raise a number of issues. First^Webber uses maxset to denote
definiteness, and to echo the requirement for singular definites that the candidate entity
is somehow unique. She also requires that number information be represented separately
from type information, so that the two can be considered separately. She considers plural
references as references to sets, and sometimes explicitly as references to individual
members of sets. All of these decisions seem justifiable in isolation, and are all present as
assumptions in the George DeReferencer; and it seems to me that the set type models very
neatly what seems to be going on, and is therefore not counter-intuitive at all. Maybe
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Webber feels that the traditional reliance on logical quantifiers I mentioned earlier is
somehow more aesthetic.
However, it is noteworthy that Webber makes no attempt to deal with the kind of
examples of underspecified set reference discussed in Chapter 7. This is probably because
her interest is focussed on "what the discourse makes available for reference" - and, while
underspecified sets certainly fit in this category, it is arguable that candidate entities for
the kind of set reference I am covering here are not made available directly by the
discourse, but by some kind of inference from it (which was the subject of Chapter 7). Also,
though it seems hard to contradict the design decisions made above, some of them do
themselves beg questions, not addressed by Webber, which seem unavoidable.
For example, take the issue of number representation. Webber claims to be representing
something close to the surface structure of a discourse, including, for example,
subordinate structure in her compound types, and that this is a particularly desirable
feature of her system. Here, however, she takes information imparted by a quantifier and
gives it the same status as a main clause in the representation. One would hope that this
does not arise from a strong claim that the translation of "The three men" is the same as
that of "The men ... and there were three of them" (cfWebber's justification of the evoke
predicate), and as such is not so unreasonable; however, it does bring us back to the
apparently unavoidable issue of the division between the information defining and
distinguishing objects in a discourse world and that specifying the situation described by a
discourse. It seems unlikely that one would ever in general be able to draw a clear line
between these two. However, I suggest again that the division Webber makes (explicitly,
with importance attached) is at best sloppy and at worst incorrect.
Having said this, I suggest that one area in which Webber is very distinctly correct is in
her attempt generally to represent the kind of a reference (viz simple plural or quantified
reference) made to an entity in the logical form of her translation. This is particularly
important in the use of the sets and universals to denote distinction between references to
sets and their individual members respectively. What is more, the representation allows
explicit composition of sets from subsets along certain dimensions defined by the
discourse, which Mellish shows to be desirable (see Section 5.2.3), because it is possible to
associate a V with each quantifier in the input, and view the whole set as the cross product
of the subsets over which these quantifiers range.
In summary, then, Webber's view of quantification is a fairly conventional, intuitive one
(even if she feels otherwise!). Sets are viewed as individuals or sets of individuals,
depending on the form of the reference; selection of individuals in the latter circumstance
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is achieved through universal quantification. The approach to numbered sets is again the
obvious one: numbers are included in the logical form if they are present; otherwise, they
are not.
One important part of the domain of reference in English that [Webber, 1979] does not
cover is that of reference to subsets of the sets denoted by her entities. In particular, no
notion of the elaboration of the detail of the relationships between individual members of
sets taking part in set predications is specified, or even acknowledged as necessary. This is
particularly disappointing, as it is easy to see, for example, how interactions between
juxtaposed "each" references emerge correctly from Webber's representation.
5.2.3. Mellish's Approach to Set Reference
As I explained in Section 4.3, Mellish views set references as a special case of references,
and introduces special entities into his world model to represent them (I have already
commented on the philosophical issues of amalgamation inherent in this). Each set entity
is annotated with a flag indicating whether or not it was introduced by a singular surface
form (in particular, a noun phrase quantified by "each"); the presence or otherwise of this
flag determines the required surface form of subsequent reference entities denoting the
same set (either plural, for standard set references, or singular for "each" references). So,
in Mellish's model, there are set entities, which may appear in candidate sets for set
references. The surface form flag determines how the reference is treated in terms of its
interaction with other references, which I will explain below.
Each of Mellish's entities is associated with a dependency list. This is a collection of pieces
of information specifying how (if) the entity relates to other entities in the world model,
and specifically those related by explicit predications. The entity representing the
referent of 240a (from [Mellish, 1985, pp64-66]) is shown in 240b.
The example noun phrase introduces six pulleys (three in each of two blocks). The
reference entity standing for the pulleys is therefore dependent on that standing for the
blocks - otherwise there would be only three pulleys. Now, Mellish states that
"In general, an indefinite NP entity can decompose into separate dimensions for
"...two blocks each containing 3 pulleys..."
set entity: set(l),





Discussion and Relation to ExistingWork
1. The possible "external" set elements.
2. Each distinct universal quantifier that governs it."
These possible decompositions are denoted by the dependency list. In this case, there is
one division into two, arising from the set entity "blockl", and a division into three arising
"externally" from the information explicitly given in the introductory noun phrase. In
general, the number in the dependencies may be unspecified, simply because it is not
calculable from or present in the language input (cf in Webber's system: the modulus part
of her set description is optional).
The third slot in the dependency list is a usage indicator, taking values T or F, denoting
"true" or "false". Mellish tells us that
"This is a flag that tells whether this dependency has been the basis of a non-
trivial division into sub-classes."
This is a distinction between a noun phrase like "two particles ofmass a and b" and simply
"two particles"; in Mellish's terms the latter division is trivial, whereas the former is not,
and is based on a particular dependency between the particles and their masses (which are
also world entities in Mellish's model). Now, Mellish goes on to say that
"A dependency cannot possibly be marked "used" unless its number has been
established, for it is impossible to consider the subsets separately until it is known
how many there are."
I suggest that this analysis is incorrect, on the following grounds. While it is certainly the
case that we cannot identify all the elements of such a divided set if we do not know how
many there are, we can certainly pick out some subsets or individuals to leave a set whose
number is still unknown. For example:
"Some blocks, each containing some pulleys, are placed in a line on a table.
A light cord is threaded into the leftmost pulley of each block." 241
Here, there is a non-trivial subdivision, in which one pulley acquires a unique
distinguishing property, which is not dependent on how many pulleys there are. The
pulleys are therefore non-trivially dependent on the blocks, and the cords are non-trivially
dependent on both, even though no number information is given in either dependency.
The reason that this example works is that the "leftmost" property always selects exactly
one entity in a collection.
This point leads us on to the issue of notating choices between subsets and individuals
within a set. Mellish's solution to this is
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"the syntactic device of subscripting. This has the advantage that
it can always be determined syntactically what relation an entity has to one of
its sub-entities
sub-entities can be used only as needed, without an explicit step of 'creation'."
The idea, embodied in the dependency list, is that sets of entities can be split up into
subsets along dimensions; that is to say, along some measure indexed by the quantifier(s)
applying to them. Thus, if we have three pulleys, say, we can refer to them as pulley
number 1, pulley number 2, and pulley number 3; then, if there are two wheels in each
pulley, we can label those as number 1 and number 2, but we must do so with respect to
context - ie which pulley they are in. Thus, in Mellish's terms, wheel number is one
dimension, pulley number is another. This idea corresponds with George's indexing.
What Mellish's arrangement does not give us is the ability to divide the range of an
individual subscript, so that it is possible {eg) to refer to subsets of a particular uniform
set, whose members may be indistinguishable, as in "Some of the men were tall... The
others were short...". In order to do this, Mellish would have needed to introduce
arithmetic relations between his subscripts, and to allow more than one subscript to range
over each dimension, thus taking a step towards true adaptability of set representation -
as it is, one can only represent incrementally what becomes explicitly available as the
discourse proceeds, and not what is inferred from it. This more adaptable idea is the
approach (with indices, index application and bounding constraints) taken in George.
Given this mechanism, in example 241 above, we could have a collection of unknown
number and refer to "the leftmost" or some other such uniquely defining property by
means of an arbitrary mapping from spatial arrangement to subscript (Mellish's term).
This very explicit approach to the "unfolding" of a set along a particular dimension leads
to another question: that of the relationship between references joined by relations in a
discourse, which I discussed in Chapter 7. Mellish takes a severely simplified view of this
issue, the simplification being justified by the form of references in his domain of data (A-
level mechanics questions). In general, however, Mellish's simplification is much too
extreme.
The simplifying assumption is that relations between sets referred to by ordinary plurals
are one-to-one correspondences, and that relations between sets referred to by "each"
phrases are cross-products. Combination of the two kinds of reference results in a relation
between each individual in one set and the entirety of the other set, whether
distributively or collectively. The one-to-one correspondence case is denoted by the
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existence of linked dependencies - dependencies associated with the two references whose
subscripts have been unified. Thus, moving a subscript along a linked dimension in one
reference results in a corresponding movement in the other. I will discuss this issue
further in Section 5.
In Chapter 7,1 presented a solution to the more general problem where relations between
plural-referenced sets are arbitrary, which allowed us automatically to generate
representations of the most specific readings possible, given a context, of such references.
The approach allowed us to do so practically and efficiently, by viewing the
representations as (initially) heavily ambiguous and (subsequently) adaptable, in order
that the resulting potential combinatorial explosion should not present a problem.
Finally, adaptability was necessary in Chapter 7's analysis, where I allowed references to
sets to be replaced first by references to unions of subsets, and then by conjunctions of
references to those same subsets, in order to generate the underspecified mappings
between plural references. This leads me to question Mellish's comment, reproduced
above, that it was a good thing for sub-entities (representing subsets) to be used only as
needed, without an explicit creation step. My objection is this. Webber has argued
convincingly that we need to view reference analysis as the complementary tasks of
finding what is available for reference, and then what refers to it. This comment of
Mellish seems to contradict Webber's view completely, although he subscribes to it
elsewhere. In particular, if we have referred to a subset of an existing set in a discourse,
then that subset is much more firmly in focus (ie available for reference) than another to
which we have not explicitly referred; in a working system, we certainly want to represent
this fact in some way. It would seem impossible to do so without using a representation
which is logically equivalent to creating a new entity*® represent the subset. This last is
the approach taken in George.
Alternatively, one might read Mellish's comment as saying that one does not wish to
create entities before they are referred to - that is, a set should be thought of as an
individual object unless or until one or some of its elements are referred to. This
interpretation is effectively an argument for adaptability of set representation and is
therefore completely in accord with the theory presented here.
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5.2.4. The George Approach to Set Reference
In the foregoing chapters, I presented an alternative view of quantification, where
predicates were applied to the members of sets by applying numerical labels, generated
from N, to referring expressions, rather than directly to entities in the discourse. Because
there are (at least) two different kinds of quantification, there need to be (at least) two
different kinds of application of the labels. In George, quantification is expressed through
conventional universal quantification (V) over the natural numbers, and associated with
the references themselves through the two index application operators, X and 0; the use
of two operators is a simplification for research purposes.
Quantification and index application in GRL are equivalent to Mellish's subscripting in
most ways (in terms of both what they do and how they do it). They result in exactly the
same device of numbering individuals (although the numbering is achieved in George
through manipulation of the surface form, rather than of the entities) and they allow the
same division into dimensions, because each index corresponds with a quantifier, just as
in MECHO each dependency corresponds with a quantifier. The justification for
performing the numbering via the surface form (or George derivations from it) is simple:
we are trying to deduce what is being referred to from the discourse, and to make the
reference fit with what we already know (exactly as in Webber's characterisation of
discourse reference). A neat way of doing this, given the basic ability to infer the existence
of individuals and undivided sets, which we have in George, is to manipulate the discourse
representation so that we are able to use that existing basic mechanism on the resulting
(new) representation. This manipulation is the function of the operations on. indices
explained in Chapter 7. The manipulation might be viewed corresponding with the
attempting to paraphrase ambiguous English into more specific versions.
To summarise, then, GRL and the associated manipulations are adequate for notation of
[Mellish, 1985]'s approach to set reference (which subsumes [Webber, 1979]'s), but it also
allows more. The index and entity token partition operations, .coupled with the ability to
rewrite expressions in the discourse memory, and with the entity token partition tree data
structure (covered in Chapters 6 and 7) allow us adaptably to represent sets and reference
to them in a motivated and well-defined way. Index dependency, which fulfils the same
function as Mellish's linked dependencies, and the various index propagation operations,
with the index application rule, give us the means of generating all the possible readings
which Mellish rules out with his simplifying assumption about plural reference.
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I must emphasise again that this approach to representation of set reference is entirely
dependent on adaptability, in two ways. First, and most obviously, we need to be able to
notate the fact that a relation which at first appeared to be quantified across the entirety
of two sets may subsequently turn out to be much more complicated - the representation
must therefore change, as it were, non-incrementally - information has not just been
added; it has changed fundamentally. Secondly, if we were to allow explicit representation
of all possible readings, the resulting explosion of non-determinism would probably be, in
all but the most trivial cases, computationally intractable. The adaptability of this system
allows us to represent all and only the information we have, in one (ambiguous)
representation. Even so, this ambiguity does not detract from the correctness of the
translation in the same way as ambiguity in resolving a definite reference; it is merely an
acceptable vagueness. Thus, we might argue that ambiguity of the adaptable
representation is justifiable, and even desirable, because it denotes underspecified
references which are meaningful in spite of their underspecification. This seems to accord
(in a loose sense) with the human ability to reason about underspecified sets.
[VanLehn, 1978]'s conclusion regarding the postponement of scope evaluation adds
strength to this argument.
5.3. The "Donkey Existential"
5.3.1 Approaches Based on Conventional Logic
In Section 4.5,1 suggested that existential quantification is not the best way to represent
introduction of entities by indefinite referring expressions. One of the strongest pieces of
evidence for this view is the so-called "Donkey Sentence", 242, and the problematic
indefinite referring expression therein, which I have called the "Donkey Existential".
tt
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it." 242
"'•As
A major part of the problem with the donkey sentence, quite apart from the analysis of its
meaning, is in correctly representing that meaning once it has been deduced. One might
at first sight expect 242 to be translated (in FOPC with set predicates; upper case
variables range over sets) as something like 243.
Vm.[ man( m) =» 3d.[ donkey( d ) A owns( d, m) ] =£ beats( d, m) ] 243
However, there is a scoping error in this translation - the last occurrence of d lies outside
the scope of the quantifier which introduced it. The error arises from the attempt to
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represent the dependence of the donkey's being beaten on its ownership by the man, and
therefore on the donkey's existence (paraphrasing the original sentence as "If a man owns
a donkey, then he beats the donkey he owns"). This is the essential problem with the
Donkey Sentence; it must be tackled if we are to emulate the human reference analysis
mechanism, which clearly has no difficulty with sentences of this kind. Three other
possible logical representations are shown in 244.
* Vm.[ man( m) => Vd.[ donkeyi d) A owns( d, m) => beats( d, m) ] ] 244a
* Vm.[ man( m ) A owns{ 8(m), m) A donkeyi 8(m)) => beatsi 8(m), m) ] 244b
* Vm.3o.[ man( m ) A 3d.[ owns( d, m) A donkey(d) A o = d ] => beats( o, m ) ] 244c
In translation a, the existential quantifier, 3, has been replaced by the universal, V, which
ranges over the whole set of entities in the discourse (or at least those in focus, if we
acknowledge that concept). The force of the existential is then maintained by selecting, as
it were, each man and testing the ownership by him and the donkey-ness of each of the
entities in the discourse. However, in the event that there is a donkey which a man does
not own, this formula implies that he beats that donkey as well, by ex falsio quod libet.
This does not capture the meaning of the English sentence.
In translation b, the function 8: men —* donkeys is a skolem function; the expression is
said to be skolemised. 8 maps the each man on to the correct donkey. However, this just
postpones the issue: in a real implementation, we may often need to know which donkey,
and 8 does not give us a way of calculating that. What is more, 8 is a function, and so must
be defined for all men - but the meaning of the sentence is such that not every man
necessarily owns a donkey.We need something like 38(m) in the condition of the =>, and it
is not at all clear what is the logical status and nature of such an existential.
Translation c uses a dummy variable to denote each donkey. However, if there is some
object, not a donkey, which the man owns, the formula implies that he beats it, again by ex
falsio quod libet. This does not capture the meaning of the English sentence.
All of these attempts at representation have in common the same problem: they do not
capture the explicit conditional nature of the relative post-modifier in the original
sentence. In particular, truth functional correctness is only achieved by default, as it were,
through ex falsio quod libet on the implication. Thus, we can get away with the lack of
clear meaning of the variables d and o in 244a and 244c and the inaccuracy of the function
8 in 244b, because it no longer matters what is the truth value of the conclusion of the
implication - the implication is vacuously true anyway. This is essentially unsatisfying,
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because it fundamentally fails to capture the dependence of the beating upon the existence
of the donkey as well as its ownership by the man.
One step towards a solution to this problem is to use a system which discriminates
between explicit discursive use of the existential as in 245:
"If there is a spare carrot, the donkey will eat it." 245
(which is a simpler, more obvious form of the usage found in the donkey sentence), and the
more conventional logical usage, as in 246, where, as I said before, it simply serves the
same function as a variable declaration in a programming language.
"Jim is a man." 246a
3j.[ called{ j,"Jim") A man( j ) ] 246b
This discrimination is in part the approach taken in George. In GRL, references are
simply references; they are not variables denoting discourse world objects. They refer to
(or rather, are bound to) entity tokens. If no binding can be made, and it is not appropriate
to assume that the reference is introductory, then the discourse analysis has failed, in a
procedural sense - truth and falsehood do not arise; in particular, there is no question of
real existential statements representing introductory references. (Neither is there,
however, a notion of explicit existential in GRL, meaning something like "existence in the
discourse world" as defined here; this is a feature which, though clearly necessary for full
generality, is not vital to the use of the system for studying underspecified set reference.)
5.3.2 Approaches Based onMulti-Level Representation
Webber's approach to the more specific question of the "donkey existential" is to see the
donkey as a prototype. In a sense, the entity arising from that reference is the intension of
the donkey, which extends neatly to the original, more complicated donkey sentence (242k
Here, the prototype can be viewed as "the prototypical donkey which each man owns".
Webber's translation of this is shown in 247; M stands for Man, D for Donkey, and S73.1
refers to the subordinate clause.
"Every man who owns a donkey beats it."
Level 1: S73: (Vx:A(u:M)[(3y:D).Own u,y]).Beat x,IT
Level 2: (Vx:A(u:M)[(3y:D).Own u,y]).Beat x, ly: Dy & Own x,y & evoke S73.1, y 247
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Mellish takes a similar view, in that, given the inference that the quantification in the
sentence applies to "a donkey" and "it" as well as to "Every man", MECHO-style set
reference entities with linked dependencies can be introduced to represent the sets.
In George, the view is rather more uniform. The entity token bound to each reference, as
always, specifies a set (whose number is, in this case, unknown). Thus, it can equally be
viewed as the intension of the set of donkeys, and so serve effectively as a prototype. Then,
we can think of the successive index operations applied to the reference as leading to "less
prototypical" representations, all without changing our view of indexed references as
maximally ambiguous representations, as the special kind of ambiguity in the donkey
existential is resolved.
The conditional nature of the relative post-modification in the donkey sentence is
captured in the notion of context extension, where the validity of the sentence in the
discourse (and hence of the discourse itself) is dependent not only on the truth of the
condition given suitable bindings, but also on the existence of the bindings themselves.
Thus, the force of the existential is lifted out of the linguistic representation, which seems
correct, because judgement on correctness of reference is external to the language of the
discourse itself.
Webber's approach to this kind of reference (which she calls dependent reference) extends
beyond just donkey sentences. Regrettably, though, while she gives a means of
representing the forms, after they have been detected, she does not show how such
detection is achieved. In George, adaptability (and at some points Crain and Steedman's
Principle of Parsimony - see Chapter 2, Section 3) mean that explicit detection is
unnecessary. For example, the singular "a donkey" reference of the donkey sentence is
adapted to a set reference by strong index propagation; this in turn enables the adaptation
of the "it" reference, and so on (see Chapter 7 for details). Thus, the prototypical nature of
the reference is in a sense emergent from the behaviour of the system, and does not need to
be spotted in advance; and, as I said above, the subsequent behaviour of a prototypical (or
intensional) reference is anyway subsumed in George's standard adaptable behaviour.
5.3.3 An Approach Based on Discourse Repesentation Theory
In Chapter 7, Section 18.4, I explained how George's approach of rewriting expressions to
explicitly represent the effects of quantifiers on each other gives an answer to the
questions raised by [Kamp, 1981]. I have not, however, commented otherwise on the
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relation between Kamp's work and that presented here. Part of the reason for this is that
Kamp does not address the issues of reference to subsets of sets and underspecified
reference. Nevertheless, it is worth giving a briefcomparsion here, for completeness.
Discourse Representation Theory is a procedural attempt to explain inter-sentential
reference in a framework also able to cope with intra-sentential reference. It focuses on
problems of quantifier scope, as does the work presented here, particularly on difficult
examples like donkey sentences. The major difference between DRT systems and George
is that the output given by the DRT creation procedure is viewed as a logical form (though
it is usually represented graphically), and that (English) quantifier scope is allowed
directly to determine the form of an analysis. In particular, universal quantification (with
its scope), and subordination both give rise to structures "correspond[ing] roughly to
implication in first order logic" [Johnson & Klein, 1986]. I have already argued that
conventional implication is not adequate properly to represent the implication-like
connection between the sets ofmen and donkeys in the donkey sentence. An example, the
DR state representing the donkey sentence, is given in Figure 19.
Figure 19: DRT representation of "Every man who owns a donkey beats it."
The point of using the boxes is to represent the scopes of variables, and their availablity
for reference. In particular, a variable is available for reference in any boxes within the
box in which it is declared (m and d are declared in box L in the example), and in any box
which is a logical consequence of it - like R in the example, and nowhere else. Thus, m and
d and available in boxes L and R but not elsewhere in S. This expresses the fact that the
set ofmen, say, can only be accessed by a reference in the scope of the quantifier.
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Note, however, that this tells us nothing of the actual relation between the men and the
donkeys, and if we use conventional truth functional readings of the =£> operator, we have
the same problems with derivation from false as before.
Further, this representation does not directly address the root of the peculiar referential
behaviour of the dependent references. The issue arises not just because of the dependence
(which is represented clearly by the DRT notation), but also because of the linguistic fact
that a singular reference is being used to refer to a set entity. The correct intuition is that
the plural nature of the quantification is being passed to the syntactically singular
donkey existential, and therefore it is not subsequently available for binding to singular
references. This intuition is expressed explicitly in George by the strong index
propagation operation.
5.4. Representing English Quantifier Scope in GRL
In Section 5.3, I suggested that we should remove the existential quantifier from our
language. What implications does this have with respect to what is left?
The point which most readily springs to mind is the representation of the scope of the
quantifiers in the natural language input. As it turns out in GRL, we notate all
quantification in our discourse representation with the application of labels generated by
(possibly bounded) ranging over the natural numbers. How, then do we reproduce the
effects of conventional quantifier scoping?
The simple answer to this is that quantifiers themselves in GRL co-relate in the most
naive and least interesting way possible. We have explicit mechanisms (index
propagation) for expressing the interrelation of set references. Thus, subject to these
mechanisms, the interaction of the (natural number) quantifications themselves is
immaterial. This is expressed in the quantifier expansion operation defined in Chapter 4
and used in examples throughout this document to construct GRL expressions - no matter
where quantifiers originate in an expression, their scope is the whole of that expression.
This obviously begs the question: why have quantifiers at all? Why not just assume the
quantification from the existence of the indices. The easiest answer is that we wish to
express bounds on the quantification, and we need a standard place at which to do so.
Thus, we have a representation in GRL which has the necessary capabilities (like both
Webber's and Mellish's) and which makes quantification explicit, in the form of indices,
and therefore - and this is the crucial point - directly available for automatic
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manipulation. Finally, by allowing the specification of upper bounds on the quantification
(again like both Webber and Mellish), we have a device for dividing ranges of quantifiers
(and in this George stands alone), which, in conjunction with arithmetic constraints on
the bounds and rules for reasoning about them, allows us to express the kinds of division
in sets which concern us here.
Finally on this issue, I must cover the issue of adaptability per se in quantified reference.
The claim is that, to enable an adaptable representation of set reference, we need a
representation in which the scope of English quantifiers is indeterminate. The simple
reason for this is that many of the possible readings we wish to conflate into one
ambiguous translation will be distinguishable (in conventional terms) only by quantifier
scope. One way of doing so, is by the freely-generating algorithmic method of
[Hobbs & Shieber, 1987], maybe augmented in the style of [Lewin, 1990]. These
approaches have much in common with that in George, except that they produce logical
forms from an initial intermediate form, rather than a more specific discourse
representation from a less specific one. However, they do not acknowledge the idea of
adaptable ambiguous representation, except in their initial supposition of a maximally
ambiguous form from which all other legal non-ambiguous forms can be generated.
5.5. Underspecified Relations between and Reference to Sets
Finally, I must discuss the central issue of this thesis: the automatic generation of possible
readings of sentences describing underspecified relations between sets. In Chapter 7, I
showed how the George system enables complex derivations involving series of inferences
regarding the nature of such relations, using the adaptability of the representation
system to avoid combinatorial explosion.
The issue of reasoning about underspecified set reference has not been addressed before.
In particular, both [Webber, 1979]'s and [Mellish ,1985]'s work stop short of the problem.
It is not clear that Mellish's system is capable of this kind of reasoning without additions
which would render it equivalent to George. None of this kind of reasoning is
demonstrated in Webber's exposition, and, though it is fairly clear how the representation
of these complicated relations would proceed at a general level, the details are obscure. I
suspect that new mechanisms (eg set membership and subsumption) would be needed.
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6. Summary - The Contribution of this Thesis
In this document, and specifically in this chapter, I have argued the following points
(some of which are repeated from the earlier section summaries).
1. (Section 2.2) Use of adaptable representations can increase determinism in parsing
systems.
2. (Section 2.2) Strictly incremental parsing removes the problem of so-called spurious
ambiguity inherent in categorial parsing.
3. (Section 2.3) Use of adaptable representations need not rule out assessment of
preference between readings, as required by some theories of language analysis.
4. (Section 2.4) To take advantage of implicit ambiguity in adaptable representations, a
disambiguation mechanism is necessary. Coercion is one such mechanism.
5. (Section 2.4) The mechanism of Steedman's enhanced categorial grammars may be
simplified by the addition of the protraction operation.
6. (Section 3.2) Early, incremental reference evaluation requires an adaptable
representation.
7. (Section 3.2) Representation of and reasoning about predications between individuals
within underspecified sets does not fit easily into existing incremental frameworks.
8. (Section 3.3) There can be no safe limit to adaptability, within a given discourse. The
need for adaptability can easily extend beyond the end of a referring expression.
9. (Section 3.4) Adaptability of representation need not compromise our ability to
analyse problem references of the kind explored by [Haddock, 19891.
10. (Section 4.2) In representing discourses and situations, we must be clear about the
theoretical distinction between the two.
11. (Section 4.3) Amalgamated representations can lead to incorrect analyses.
12. (Sections 4.3 and 4.4) In explicitly representing the discourse, and not just its
semantics, we can include useful linguistic information which might not normally be
included in a purely logical semantic representation. This can be used both for
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semantic and referential purposes and to aid parsing. Thus, in particular, separated
representations are suited to adaptability, because they facilitate storage of a
maximal amount of linguistic information, which is needed to guide coercion.
13. (Section 4.4) Separated representations are suited to adaptability, because separation
admits independent manipulation of the discourse and of the discourse world.
14. (Section 4.4) Both [Webber, 1979] and [Mellish, 1981] take steps towards separated
representations. Webber hints at the desirability of adaptable representation;
Mellish's work hinges on the idea of incremental evaluation.
15. (Section 4.5) Use of the classical existential quantifier to represent the introduction of
an object is misguided. It is better to use the existence of an object in the
representation to denote introductory reference, with an explicit strong existential
where necessary.
16. (Section 5.2) Purely logical languages, with only the conventional quantifiers, are
inadequate to represent natural language discourse for the purposes of reference
analysis. Both [Webber, 1979] and [Mellish, 1981] subscribe to this view. Neither
Mellish nor Webber proposes a system which can analyse underspecified set reference.
17. (Section 5.2.4) The George system uses a notion (indexing) of application of
quantification similar to that ofMellish's subscripting, but more general.
18. (Section 5.2.4) The correct behaviour of the George quantification mechanism is
entirely dependent on adaptability.
19. (Section 5.3) Neither use of adaptable representations nor removal of the classical
existential quantifier precludes correct analysis of dependent reference (eg the
"donkey existential").
20. (Section 5.4) George's indexing mechanism allows adaptable ambiguous
representation of readings conventionally differentiated by quantifier scope.
21. (Section 5.4) The use of adaptable ambiguous representations allows us to represent
multiplicities of readings which would probably often be intractable otherwise.
22. (Section 5.5) The issue of underspecified reference to sets has been an open question.
I suggest that the work on set reference presented in this document is necessary (because
underspecified set reference occurs frequently in real discourse), novel (because the
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problems covered seem to be previously unaddressed) and at least partially correct (on
account of the examples and justification presented in Chapters 6 and 7). As such, it
contributes a first step towards a more complete coverage of natural linguistic phenomena
than before.
The wider context of parsing and translating with adaptable representations presented in
Chapters 3 to 7 also seems to contribute a useful new view. The idea is an extension or
generalisation of the incremental approach of [Mellish, 1985], which has been justified
here and elsewhere as psycholinguistically useful in its own right. Further, it is beneficial
on a practical, computational level, in that it enables more efficient and less explosive
parsing of heavily ambiguous utterances. On this basis, it provides a framework in which
the set reference analysis mechanism can realistically operate; without ambiguous
representation, the indeterminacy inherent in the mechanism and the data it covers
would quickly get out of control; without adaptable representation - not necessarily the
particular representation used here - such ambiguous representation would not be
possible. Finally, it seems possible (and this is an area for further investigation) that this
view could emulate the human ability to reason about underspecified sets.
There exists an implementation which embodies many of the ideas presented in this
document. Its behaviour, at a simple experimental level, confirms many of the
suppositions made in the foregoing chapters.
7. Afterword
This chapter has presented the contribution to knowledge of the George system and its
associated theory. Even so, there are many more issues which might be studied in this
context, some of which touch on ideas discussed in this document. In the next (final)
chapter, I will briefly discuss possible future extensions and improvements of the theory






Various shortcomings of the Geogre system are discussed, and possibilities for further work
based on it are proposed.
1. Introduction
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses some theoretical
shortcomings of the George system as presented here. The second follows up a number of
issues which were left more positively in the main body of this document as subjects for
further work. As such, it is merely a sketch of some interesting ideas, and should not be
read as anything more. Most of the issues covered here are to do with extensions of the
George system and theory to cover more linguistic phenomena.
2. Shortcomings of the George System
2.1. Introduction
In this document, I have presented a number of examples of manipulation of GRL
expressions involving index propagation operations. In particular, some of these
propagations were on to one occurrence of aTeference appearing a number of times in the
discourse memory. In these cases, it was necessary explicitly to ensure that appropriate
indices and, if necessary, quantifiers, were associated with these other occurrences of the
reference. Now, even though the success of the examples might be said to suggest that this
is necessary, the existing characterisation is not a clean one. Consideration of this issue
will raise a few related points, eventually leading (in principle) to a more general view of
reference to quantified sets.
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2.2. Representation ofUniversal Quantification
In Chapter 8, I cast doubt on the conventional use of the existential quantifier in
representations of discourse, and on the traditional use of logical quantifier scope to
represent interaction between references and quantifiers in language. In particular, I
suggested that the scope of a universal quantifier was, in some sense, the whole of the
expression in which it appeared, and that interactions usually expressed in terms of scope
might be be expressed by applying and then manipulating GRL indices.
In fact, this approach is insufficiently general. The reality of the situation is that the scope
of a universal quantifier needs to be not just the expression in which it appears, but
(potentially) the entirety of the remaining discourse; this is the approach taken in the
GRL-FOPC translation algorithm given in Chapter 4. To see why this is so, consider
generalising the usual donkey sentence to the pair of sentences in 248.
"Every man owns a donkey. He beats it." 248
Here, the quantifying effect of "Every" has (in one reading) propagated not only to "a
donkey" but also to the first noun phrase in the second sentence, "He", and thence to the
second, "it". Thus, the notion of scope manipulation within sentences to represent
readings is plainly inadequate for the task for which it is so frequently used.
2.3. Universal Quantification in George
As far as George is concerned, this realisation is not as painful as it would be for a system
which used quantifier scopes to generate readings. It does, however, beg the question of
how correctly to characterise referential interaction of the inter-sentential kind
exemplified in 248. Already in George, there is the requirement mentioned above that
propagation of indices be consistent for any one reference, and there is Rule 19 (Index
Propagation through Context Extension), both of which have some flavour of the kind of
operation we need here. In the next section, I will suggest a rule which will subsume
example 248 and the more usual donkey sentence.
First, though, we must address the issue of quantification itself. In this document, I have
presented quantification as something local to a given sentence, and I have used a fairly
conventional quantifier notation (V) to do so. The question now is whether such a localised
notation is appropriate at all.
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In general, the philosophy in George has been to maintain a representation close to the
surface form of the linguistic input, or at least something derived directly from it by index
manipulation. The justification for this is that in an adaptable system we wish to keep as
much information as possible about our input, to facilitate adapability. On this basis,
then, one might make a good argument for keeping an explicit quantifier notation on the
GRL form of the sentence which introduced the quantifier, to record where the
quantification came from.
The quantification information itself, however, needs to be more generally available, and
there already exists in George an obvious place to store it. The information expressed by
the existing indexed form is: what kind of quantification is applied (strong or weak),
which references it is applied to, and what (if any) upper bound it has. The first of these is
of necessity determined in the reference itself. The second is represented by the index
symbol which is unique for each quantifier. The third is represented by the upper bound
associated with the quantifier.
In the George system described here, there is a database of arithmetic equations between
these upper bounds - the Bounding Constraint database. There is an operator, upb, which,
when applied to an index symbol, returns its upper bound. One obvious way of
representing the quantifier is to place an equation between the upb of each index and its
value in that database as a bounding constraint. This then places solution of the equations
resulting from index manipulations firmly into the domain of numerical constraint
satisfaction, soluble in well-understood ways such as the Simplex algorithm. The kind of
complex manipulations performed on indices and their upper bounds in Chapter 7
immediately become rather more accessible.
2.4. Inter-Sentential Index Propagation
Finally, then, we need a rule which will constrain propagation of indices between
sentences to generate the correct readings.
First, the rule applies only to strong indices - ordinary (weak) plurals simply do not
exhibit this effect: consider "Some men own a donkey. He beats it." where the effect of 248
does not occur. Second, we need a notion of topic or thread - consider "Every man owns a
donkey. The women like him." where the interaction between "Every man" and "him"
does not occur. Thirdly, as shown by the last example, there must be an intersection
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between the sets of entities with sorts compatible with the two references (regardless of
apparent number considerations).
All this sounds remarkably like Rule 19, except that, instead of requiring an explicit link
by context extension, the only constraint is that the reference to which the index
propagates should have appeared at the input after the quantifier. It would also seem that
the within-sentence strong index behaviour already described would apply here too, since,
in 248, the "it" reference may or may not be affected by the quantifier, as in my treatment
of the donkey sentence in Chapter 7.
The last factor involved would presumably be a preference for this operation which
decreased with time - it seems unlikely that a quantifier would normally affect a
reference in another sentence when several unaffected sentences were interposed.
2.5. Some other Shortcomings
There are many factors in George which could be improved. I will suggest approaches to
some of these in Section 3.
The general linguistic coverage of the coercive parser needs to be extended. One
particularly interesting class of examples which would seem to present a problem for the
coercive approach are those involving coordination. Also, surface reference anaphors (eg
"the former", "the first", and reflexives) need to be covered - I will suggest an approach to
reflexives later.
Another large hole in the explanation is the lack of discussion of the level of Discourse
Entities, where the intensional reasoning about entity tokens is mapped into the
discourse world. Again, I will discuss this briefly in the next section.
Finally, the whole issue of parsing with coercions and adaptable representations is worthy
of considerable further investigation. In this document, I have listed a number of
linguistic cases which are candidates for ambiguous encoding (eg various meanings of
"is", and verbs with variable numbers of argument slots). Linguistic phenomena
involving crossed composition in other CG frameworks should also be looked at further,
and the backward version ofmy protraction operation (introduced in Chapter 5) should be
investigated. In general, any linguistic behaviour involving stacking of constituents in
conventional shift reduce parsers must be investigated, since embedment of such
constituents within self-contained partial translations, and their resultant
unavailability, in an incremental parser is always a potential problem.
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3. Extensions to GRL
3.1. Introduction
The rest of this chapter is rather more positive. It proposes various extensions to George,
some of which cover shortcomings listed above. In particular, in Chapter 4, I defined a
representation language, GRL, which, in conjunction with a multi-level view of discourse
representation, allowed implicit representation of ambiguity in discourse. In Chapters 6
and 7, I showed how the features represented explicitly in that language (sort,
definiteness, strong and weak index application) allowed symbolic manipulation under
various rules to generate possible readings of heavily ambiguous set reference.
In defining the representation language, I deliberately ignored some features which must
be present in a general language understanding system, because they were not relevant to
my presentation, and would merely have clouded the issue. In particular, the following
important classes of utterance were excluded from George's coverage: explicit existentials,
interrogatives, negatives, imperatives and compound utterances (by which I mean
utterances containing conjunctions, disjunctions, implications, and so on); there are of
course many others.
The main basis for the design of GRL was that the linguistic features used in determining
reference should be explicitly represented (hence, eg, the definite operator, !). This
approach seems to have proved fruitful. Therefore, the approach to covering the above
issues in GRL would be along the same lines.
The final point regarding extensions to GRL here is the improvement of the GRL notions
of abstraction. In particular, I will suggest a means of improving the language so that
some A-abstractions are replaced by an extended and improved notion of # abstraction,
including unification. This will admit application of selectional restrictions on verbs.
In this section, when I refer to GRL, I mean the language as presented in Chapter 4.
Extensions will be named GRLx where X is a comma-separated string of symbols




At various points in this document I have argued against the use of the conventional
logical existential quantifier for the introduction of variables into expressions. This is
because of the difference between (eg) "A man..." (only weakly an existential statement)
and "There exists a man..." (a strongly existential statement). For this reason, I did not
include the existential quantifier in the definition of the language.
I commented at the time that a notion ofexplicit existential was needed for full generality.
I suggest that such a notion may be better introduced by means of a predicate, like "runs"
or "beats" which we have seen often in this document, than by using the conventional
quantifier, 3. One motivation for this is that predicates describe situations in the
discourse world, and that the existence of an entity in the discourse world is certainly a
situation therein. Contrast this with the essentially mathematical behaviour of the
(conventional) universal quantifier, which affects the behaviour of a predicate in relation
to the members of a set, without affecting the nature of that set itself; remembering that
existence in this context means that such a set is inhabited.
Another argument for using a GRL predicate to represent strong existential statements is
that such statements may be tensed and modal. It is not possible to represent this with the
conventional quantifier without the addition of modal operators, which are unnecessary
elsewhere, and, along the same lines as the argument above, this is not really the kind of
information we want to associate with a quantifier anyway.
3.3. Binary Logical Connectives
The further (binary) connectives required in GRL are the four conventional .
syncategorematic operators, and, inclusive or, exclusive or, and implies, which could be
written A v © =» respectively. These connectives apply to well-formed GRL expressions
to produce other well-formed GRL expressions. I include exclusive or as a distinguished
symbol because of the prevalence of exclusive disjunction in English - the word "or" rarely
means inclusive or.
These new operators may be used to combine closed predicates (see below) or other logical
combinations in the much same way as in those in FOPC. There is, however, an important
difference. GRL is used in George to represent the discourse input, and not just its truth-
functional semantics. Thus, the interpretation of the GRL connectives may be different
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from the conventional interpretation of the corresponding connectives in FOPC,
particularly in cases where the success or failure of reference affects the truth of an
utterance. Such a difference in interpretation would be reflected in extensions to the
translation algorithm specified in Chapter 4.
3.4. Negation
Negation in a representation system like GRL is an interesting problem. There are two
distinct kinds of negation, one of which affects reference directly.
The less interesting kind is what might be called truth-functional negation. This is
negation more or less exactly as in FOPC, as in sentences like 249. Note that the negation
in this sentence does not affect the reference of the embedded noun phrases. Like the
binary operators in Section 3.3, it is possible (though unlikely, here) that the semantic
translation for this operator may yield something more complicated that just FOPC
negation.
"Jim didn't beat his donkey yesterday." 249
This kind of negation could be written in the same way as in FOPC, by the addition of a
unary negation operator, ~1, (not) applying to GRL or GRLg closed predicates.
The much more interesting form of negation is that where the negation affects the
reference in a sentence. The strongest example of this is sentence 250a. To cover this form
of negation, I propose the notion of referential negation, which could be denoted by a unary
operator j applying to GRLg -, references, giving the expression in 250b.
"No man beats the donkey." 250a
[beats, ref2 "donkey !,refl~manj] 250b
There are two readings of this sentence. In one, where "No man" is*referential, the
meaning is "For all men x, x does not beat the donkey" where x ranges over the set of men
referred to. The other is equivalent to "There does not exist a man who beats the donkey"
which means something different from the first reading in some circumstances. A first
approximation to the second reading would be that the "man" reference must have an
empty candidate set; alternatively, it could be represented directly by negation of the
existentials in GRLg -,, which might involve an empty candidate set as well. This,
however, does not capture the first reading, which would be directly representable in the
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GRL-,. The form in 250b might then be regarded as an adaptable ambiguous
representation, and be coerced to the correct specific reading when (if) possible.
When we introduce quantifiers and/or dependent references, the problem becomes harder.
Consider the sentences in 251.
In sentence a, the negation of the subject can introduce an explicit strong negated
existential into the meaning of the sentence - to mean something like "forall men x, there
does not exist a donkey which x beats.". This is representable in GRLg -,. An alternative
reading is where the phrase "a donkey" is introductory - consider the continuing sentence
"The donkey is quite pleased about this.", which refers successfully. Again, then, we have
an ambiguous form, which it may be appropriate to represent ambiguously in an
extension of GRL. I suggest that rules like those governing set reference manipulation in
George might well be definable to allow the effect of the j operator proposed above to
propagate in a way similar to indices.
Similarly, in sentence 251b, we would wish to define an operation to express the meaning
of the sentence: "Some of the men beat the donkey and some do not.". This might be
characterisable in terms of the entity token and index partition operations in conjunction
with the i operator, in much the same way as different set interactions are captured by the
strong and weak index operations.
3.5. Interrogatives and Imperatives
Some interrogative references in GRLg,-,^ might be represented by a query operator, ?.
This would apply to references in the same way as the definite operator, with an almost
identical effect. George^ould then neatly capture Wh-questions, by the addition of extra
behaviour to the higher level parts of the George system, as follows.
li
Such a queried reference would never be introductory, but would cause an attempt to find
a set of candidate entity tokens as per definite references. The answer (the need for which
would be detected at a higher level in the George system, from the presence of the ?
operator) could then be given as the expression was added to the discourse memory (ie at
the end of the sentence). The form of the answer, of course, would depend on the form of
the reference (ie indexed, bounded, simple), and the content of its binding (no entity
"No man beats a donkey."
Not all the men beat the donkey."
251a
251b
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tokens, an expected number of tokens or a token specifying a set of an expected size, or
some unexpected result).
The other kind of interrogative, characterisable as questions about the predicates
describing discourse situation could be captured in the Discourse Memory by the addition
of further predicate modifier symbols to the language, again with a detection machanism
at the higher level to allow questions to be answered.
This approach would also work for imperatives, with some form of action simulation
mechanism (maybe like SHRDLU's robot) instead of the question answering mechanism.
3.6. Extending #-Abstraction
The current form of #-abstraction is rather limited, and, in fact, not perfect for the
purposes of early reference analysis. In particular, as I explained in Chapter 6, George
does not produce context extensions in a form suited to comparison with the existing
discourse until all the argument positions in them are at least partially filled, and GRL is
unable to express selectional constraints on verb positions.
The reason for this is that verb positions are filled by A-reduction, and not #-reduction. In
GRL, partial noun phrases are represented by #-abstractions, and partial verb phrases by
A-abstractions. The two do not interact.
A better solution would be to represent the verbs as #-abstractions, with the reference
symbols already built in to them, so the lexical entry for "runs" would look like this:
runs := s\np : refl#[runs,refl"runner] 252
where "runner" is a compound sort restricting the reference to refer to something
consistent with "river" or something consistent with "[has legs, is animate]" for example.
(Formalisms for such compound sort manipulation, which fit in with the style of the
George taxonomy, already exist - eg KL-ONE [Brachman & Smolze, 1985].)
The composition of noun phrases could then proceed in the same way in as the current
George system, viewed as agglommeration of noun phrase properties on some basic
reference symbol. This information would then be passed to the reference symbol in the
verb on arrival of the verb at the input, by sorted unification of the existing reference and
the reference in the verb translation (see 252). (The case where unification would be
required rather than, say, sort application, is detectable directly from the syntax ofGRL.)
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The unification algorithm would require consistency between the sort information
already in the verb and that in the noun phrase. This would allow application of
selectional constraints, as in 252.
This approach is more suited to context extension comparison than the A-abstracted
version because that comparison is defined over expressions containing references and not
GRL variables. The existing matching operation and subsequent inference would proceed
correctly on such expressions without modification.
Note that, even with this extension, GRL will still need A-abstraction to allow for
manipulations of discourse such as that already used in the construction of context
extensions (see Chapter 5) or proposed in Section 4 of this chapter.
3.7. Summary
In this section I have proposed the addition of operators and predicates to GRL as
presented in Chapter 4, to allow representation of the conventional binary logical
connectives, negation (both truth-functionally and referentially), interrogatives, and
imperatives. I have sketched out how they might affect the behaviour of an extended
George system.
I have also proposed a necessary extension to the idea of #-abstraction to allow a more
incremental analysis of the reference of context extended expressions, and to admit the




It is a basic principle of the George Representation Language that linguistic effects,
particularly those which affect reference, should be explicitly represented. This requires
us to consider various special forms of reference which must, therefore, be represented
specially. This has the advantage that all the information in the discourse is always
available to us in making inferences about the meaning conveyed by the discourse. The
particular forms I will discuss here are reflexives and what [Webber, 1979] calls "one"-
anaphora, though there are many others.
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I class these phenomena under the heading "Meta-Linguistic Functions" because they are
references whose meaning is defined in terms of other references - in a sense, for example,
the meaning of a reflexive reference is that it is a reference to the same thing as the actor
reference of the clause in which it appears.
4.2. Reflexive Pronouns
The correct way to implement reflexives in George is an open question. The most obvious
method, duplication of the reference co-referential with the reflexive by the parser, by use
of a higher-order or meta-level translation of the reflexive, is analogous with Steedman's
W combinator solution, where the argument to a function is replicated, effectively by
application of the A-term (Xf.Xa.faa). It would involve the introduction of meta-terms into
the George Representation Language, which is undesirable because of the theoretical
complications involved.
Given the nature of reflexives and the information they convey, it seems likely that any
treatment involving special manipulation of the discourse translation to duplicate
references will involve higher-order operations as part of composition. Such treatment
might therefore be considered undesirable, because of the complexity of those operations.
Perhaps the best solution, then, is to use a special GRL notation for reflexives, and let the
DeReferencer handle the referential analysis - which is after all its function - as a special
case. This is in keeping, too, with the idea of representing (something close to) surface
form in GRL, with a special symbol for each linguistic feature.
4.3. "One"-Anaphora
[Webber, 1979) gives a method of resolving "one"-anaphora, as seen in "There were two t-
shirts; I liked the blue one.". Webber requires that the head noun of a noun phrase be
given a special status in her representation, because (she claims) it is necessary to identify
the head noun in order to deal with one-anaphora. [Webber, 1979, page 3-13] gives
translations of sorts like this:
"T-shirt" as T-shirt (short for A(u:T-shirt)[True])
"cotton T-shirt" as A(u:T-shirt)[Cotton u]
"T-shirt that Wendy gave Fred" as A(u:T-shirt)[Gave Wendy, Fred, u] 253
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The representation distinguishes the head noun ("T-shirt") from any modifiers applied to
it, as well as separating the information contained in the determiner (not represented
here) from that in the nominal.
However, this separation of the head noun is not generally adequate for the purposes on
account of which it is justified. Consider, for example, the discourse in 254.
"There are three donkeys in a field, two brown and one black.
The cruel farmer beats the large brown donkey. He also mistreats the small one." 254
One possible reading of this discourse is that the "one"-anaphor in the final noun phrase
refers to the entity described by "brown donkey". As such, Webber's representation is
inadequate, since she does not distinguish between adjectives in the same way as between
adjectives and nouns. I suggest that what is really needed here is a pragmatic view like
that which I applied to the dereferencing of context extended references in Chapter 6.
A first approximation to the behaviour of the non-introductory "one"-anaphor (call it O) is
as follows. There must be a non-singleton set, S, ofentities which have some common sorts
and some differentiating sorts. This set, or a subset of it, must be bound to a reference, R,
recently preceding 0, but not in the same clause, whose sort does not subsume that of O. O
must then be bound to the entity, if one exists, which is selected uniquely by taking the
intersection of the candidate set of O treated as an ordinary reference and the candidate
set of a reference R' where R' is R with any information contradicting the information in
the "one"-anaphor removed.
To clarify this, consider 254. To analyse the "one"-anaphor, we proceed as follows. The
candidate set of the anaphor treated as an ordinary reference contains the black donkey
and the non-large brown donkey, but not the farmer, which is the referent of "He" in the
same clause, or the other (large) donkey, which is inconsistent with the sort of the
reference. The non-singleton set, S, is the set of brown donkeys, one of which is known to
be large. The reference R is the "large brown donkey". R' is therefore a reference to a
"brown donkey" ("large" is removed because it is inconsistent with "small") - its candidate
set is therefore both brown donkeys. The intersection of the two candidate sets leaves us
with the non-large brown donkey, which can now be marked as small.
The method also works in a degenerate sense when there are no explicit contradictions
between the reference R and the anaphor O. If the "one"-anaphor had been "the old one"
for example, the set S would simply have been the three donkeys, with the candidate set of
0 being the same until some donkeys were found not to be old.
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The method is based on the same assumption as Webber's, that some reference is needed
to the surface form of the preceding discourse, but the view is more general, in that it is
not limited to head nouns.
5. The Discourse Entity Level and (Co-)Specification
All the manipulations demonstrated in this document operate on discourse memory
entries, entity tokens, and/or bindings. However, I mentioned in Chapter 3 that we need a
further theoretical level of reference information beyond the entity token level - that of
the discourse entity - and that an entity token and the number and sort information
associated with it by its defining reference(s) may be viewed as specifying the (possibly
singleton) sets ofdiscourse entities with which it is related.
This is because the entity tokens are in a fairly strong sense intensional, and the
specification relation, above, is rather like extension of the tokens. In particular, this
further level is needed so that we can distinguish between utterances which refer to "real"
entities in the discourse world, specified by entity tokens, and utterances which refer only
to intensional entities, or, if one prefers, prototypes. A good example of this latter kind of
utterance is generic reference. Consider the discourses in 255.
"A man beats a donkey.
A donkey is a faithful animal.
He still loves the man who beats him." 255
It is possible to treat the reference in this examples exactly as the reference in Chapter 6
was treated, regardless of whether the utterances are generic or not; "He" in the third
sentence is simply either bound to the "real" donkey entity token or to the generic one,
which can be expressed in the usual George-.way. The difference comes only when we try
to follow inference through the discourse. The two possible sequences of inference are
based on the two possible readings of "He", above.
Where "He" refers to the "real" donkey, the inference is as follows: x beats y. All s in S are
faithful, x is in S. Therefore x is faithful. Therefore x loves y.
Where "He" refer to the generic, the inference runs this way: x beats y. All s in S are




The interesting point here is the inference that the predication(s) applied to the generic
also apply to the "real" donkey. This fact needs to be represented explicitly in George. To
do so, and assuming (rather freely, since this is a hard question) that we can detect
generics, I propose the idea of cospecification, under which two entity tokens may specify
(some of) the same discourse entities by virtue of their own (the entity tokens')
equivalence (in some sense). In general, we might say that the generic entity token
cospecifies with any specific entity token with which it is consistent by sort.
Thus, the entity token of the generic is indirectly associated with the discourse entity of
the ordinary introductory reference. This coincides with the intuition that generics refer
to individuals merely by virtue of the individuals' explicit introduction into the discourse
in which the generic occurs. More formally, it is useful to take the view that
cospecification is actually a mapping from generic entity tokens to specific entity tokens,
because this view makes explicit the difference between the introductory entity token's
specifying its own discourse entity and the generic's specifying a discourse entity
introduced with a different entity token.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the view taken in George as presented here is
consistent with the notion of adaptability: the entity token behaviour is the same whether
references and entities are individual or generic.
6. Summary
In this chapter, I have sketched proposals for the extension of the George system and
theory in various ways.' This intention has beento give a flavour of possible extensions,
rather than full detail.
I have covered extensions of GRL for representation of explicit strong existentials,
compound expressions such as conjunctions and disjunctions, negation, interrogatives $nd
imparatives. I have suggested an improvement of the #-abstraction mechanism defined in
Chapter 4. I have suggested a view of reflexives and "one-anaphora" which places them in
a category of references to or about references, and, finally, I have sketched a possible




This discussion of possible extensions completes my presentation of the George Parsing
and DeReferencing System and the theory behind it. My hope is that at least some of these
extensions will be investigated further and implemented in the not-too-distant future.
The work presented here constitutes a fairly radical step outside computational linguistic
convention. As such, there are bound to be large numbers of open issues. I have tried in
this document to give a good feel for the solutions to an interesting and wide-ranging
selection ofphenomena within the George framework.







Barwise, J; Perry, J
Bobrow, R; Webber, B
Bobrow, R; Webber, B
Brachman, R; Smolze, J
Brailsford, D; Walker, A
Bundy, A; Byrd, L; Luger, G;
Mellish, C; Palmer, M
Burt, A; Hill, P; Lloyd, J
Bibliography
1935 Die syntaktische Konnexitat
in ''Polish Logic", Oxford University Press, 1967
1987 Memory and Context for Language Interpretation
Cambridge University Press
1987 On being led up the Garden Path
School ofEpistemics, University ofEdinburgh
1986 Reference and Resolution of Local Ambiguity:
Interaction in Human Sentence Processing
PhD Thesis, University ofEdinburgh
1983 Situations and Attitudes
Bradford Books
1980 PSI-KLONE: Parsing and Semantic Interpretation
in the BBN Natural Language Understanding
System
in "Proceedings of the Canadian Society for
Computational Study of Intelligence", pp 131-142
1980 Knowledge Representation for Syntactic/Semantic
Processing
in "Proceedings of the Canadian Society for
Computational Study of Intelligence", pp 131-142
1985 An Overview of the KL-ONE Knowledge
Representation System
Cogitive Science, #9, pp 171 -216
1979 Introductory Algol 68 Programming
Ellis-Horwood
1979 Solving Mechanics Problems Using Meta-Level
Inference
in "Proceedings of the 6th International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence", Tokyo,
Japan
1990 Preliminary Report on the Programming
Language Godel
Technical Report TR-90-02, Department of
Computer Science, University ofBristol
-313- PhD Thesis
Bibliography
Carter, D 1988 A Shallow Processing Approach to Anaphor
Resolution
PhD Thesis, Technical Report No 88, University of
Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Cambridge





Unification Categorial Grammar: A Concise,
Extendable Grammar for Natural Language
Processing
in ''Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Computational Linguistics",
Budapest
1972 Towards a Model of Children's Story
Comprehension
PhD Thesis, MIT AITR 266
1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
1940 A Formulation of a Simple Theory ofTypes
Journal ofSymbolic Logic, #5, pp 56-68
1941 The Calculi of Lambda Conversion
Princeton University Press; reprinted in 1963 by
University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan,
USA
Clocksin, W; Mellish, C
Crain, S; Steedman, M
Dowty, D
Fine, C
Gazdar, G; Klein, E;
Pullum, G; Sag, I
Grosz, B
1981 Programming in Prolog
Springer Verlag
1985 On Not Being Led Up The Garden Path: The Use of
Context in the Psychological Parser
in "Natural Language Parsing: Psychological,
Computational, and Theoretical Perspectives", eds.
Dowty, Kartunnen & Zwicky
Dowty, D; Wall, R; Peters, S 1981 Introduction to Montague Semantics
Synthese Series, D Reidel
1985 Type Raising, Functional Composition, and Non-
Constitutent Conjunction
in "Categorial Grammars and Natural Language
Structures", eds. Ohrle, Bach & Wheeler; D Reidel
1985 Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects
Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 3, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford
1985 Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar
Basil Blackwell, London
1977 The Representation and Use of Focus in Dialogue
Understanding







1985 Computing Noun Phrase Reference
Working Paper 182, Department of Artificial
Intelligence, University ofEdinburgh
1987 Incremental Parsing and Combinatory Categorial
Grammar
in "Edinburgh Working Papers in Cognitive
Science", Vol 1, eds. Haddock, Klein & Calder,
Centre for Cognitive Science, University of
Edinburgh
1989 Incremental Semantics and Interactive Syntactic
Processing
PhD Thesis, University ofEdinburgh
van Harmelen, F; Simpson, A; 1990
Giunchilia,F; Serafini, L;
Smaill, A
A Discussion about Naming Relations
Report RFL/UvA/I.4/1, ESPRIT/BR Action P3178
Halliday, M
Hirst, G
Hobbs, J; Schieber, S
Johnson, M; Klein, E
Kamp, H
Kowalski, R




1967 Notes on Transitivity and Theme in English: II
Journal ofLinguistics #3:199
1981 Anaphora in Natural Language Understanding: A
Survey
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, #119,
Springer-Verlag
1981 An Algorithm for Generating Quantifier Scopings
"Computation Linguistics" #13, numbers 1-2,
January-June 1987
1986 Discourse, Anaphora and Parsing
"Proceedings of the 11th International Conference
on Computational Linguistics", Bonn, 1986
1981 A Theory ofTruth and Semantic Representation
in "Formal Methods in the Study of Language",
Vol. 136, eds. Groenendijk, Janssen & Stokhof;
Amsterdam: Mathematical Centre Tracts
1979 Logic for Problem Solving
North-Holland Elsevier
1990 An Application of Amalgamated Logic to Multi-
Agent Belief
in Proceedings, META-90, Leuven. Belgium, ed. M
Bruynooghe
1958 The Mathematics of Sentence Structure
American Mathematical Monthly, #65, pp 154-170
1990 A Quantifier Scoping Algorithm without a Free
Variable Constraint
in Proceedings, CoLing-90, Helsinki, Finland
1987 Foundations of Logic Programming
Symbolic Computation Series, Springer, Berlin
-315- PhD Thesis
Bibliography
Marcus, M 1980 A Theory of Syntactic Recognition for Natural
Language
MIT Press
Marslen-Wilson, W 1975 Sentence Perception as an Interactive Parallel
Process
"Science", #189, pp 226-228












The Temporal Structure of Spoken Language
Understanding
"Cognition", #8, pp 1 -74
1987 Functional Parallelism in Spoken Word
Recognition
"Cognition", #25, pp 71 -102
1981 Coping with Uncertainty: Noun Phrase
Interpretation and Early Semantic Analysis
PhD Thesis, University ofEdinburgh
1982 Incremental Evaluation: An Approach to the
Semantic Interpretation of Noun Phrases
Ellis-Horwood
1984 Incremental Semantic Interpretation
in "Parsing Natural Language", eds. Sparck-Jones
& Wilks, Ellis-Horwood
1984 Computer Interpretation of Natural Language
Descriptions
Ellis-Horwood
1973 The Proper Treatment of Quantifiers in Ordinary
English
in "Approaches to Natural Language", eds.
Hintikka, Moravcsik & Suppes; D Reidel
1988 Categorial Investigations: Logical and Linguistic
Aspects of the Lambek Calculus
Foris Publications
1987 Combinatory Grammar, Logic Programming, and
Natural Language Processing
in "Edinburgh Working Papers in Cognitive
Science", Vol 1, eds. Haddock, Klein & Calder;
Centre for Cognitive Science, University of
Edinburgh
1988 Chart Parsing Categorial Grammars
PhD Thesis, University ofEdinburgh
1988 Problems in Local Semantic Processing
in "Proceedings of the AISB Conference", ed.
Brady, University ofEdinburgh
1982 The On-line Resolution ofPronominal Anaphora
















Wilks, Y; Huang, X; Fass, D
1979 Towards a Computational Theory of Definite
Anaphora Comprehension in English Discourse
PhD Thesis, Departemnt of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science, MIT
1983 Focussing in the Comprehension of Definite
Anaphora
in "Computational Models of Discourse", eds. M
Brady, R C Berwick; MIT Press
1985 Dependency and Coordination in the Grammar of
Dutch and English
Language, Vol.61 pp 523-568
1987 Combinatory Grammars and Parasitic Gaps
in "Edinburgh Working Papers in Cognitive
Science", Vol 1, eds Haddock, Klein & Calder
Centre for Coginitive Science, University of
Edinburgh
1977 The On-line Effects of Semantic Context on
Syntactic Processing
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour,
Vol. 16 pp 683-692
1978 Determining the Scope of English Quantifiers
Technical Report TR-483, AI Lab, MIT, Stanford
1972 Generating Semantic Descriptions from Drawings
of Scenes with Shadows
Technical Report, MIT
1979 A Computational Approach to Discourse Anaphora
Harvard University Press
1983 So what can we talk about now?
in "Computational Models of Discourse", eds. M
Brady, R C Berwick; MIT Press
1971 ''Language as a Cognitive Process, Vol 1
Harvard University Press
1972 Understanding Natural Language
Edinburgh University Press
1973 A Procedural Model of Language Understanding
in "Computer Models of Thought and Language",
eds. R C Schank, KM Colby; publ. Freeman
1975 A Preferential Pattern-seeking Semantics for
Natural Language Inference
Artificial Itelligence #6 pp53-74
1985 Syntax, Preference and Right Attachment
in "Proceedings of the 9th International Joint
Conference on Artificial Itelligence", pp779-784
-317- PhD Thesis
Bibliography
Woods, W 1970 Transition Network Grammars for Natural
Language Analysis
Communications of the ACM, Vol 13, pp 591 -606
Zeevat, H; Klein, E; Calder, J 1986 Unification Categorial Grammar
in "Edinburgh Working Papers in Cognitive
Science", Vol 1, eds. Haddock, Klein & Calder;







The removal of an GRL object from an expression, coupled with the annotation of
that part of the expression as lacking information. GRL has two forms of abstraction:
# abstraction for references and X abstraction for other GRL objects.
Adaptability
The property of a representation system which allows it to represent partial and/or
ambiguous information in such a way that completing and/or disambiguating
transformations can be (subsequently) applied.
Application
The association of a function with an argument, prior to evaluation.
Binding
A relation between a set of co-referential references and a set of entity tokens (the
candidate set of the reference(s)), expressing that the referring expressions
represented by the references refer to the discourse entities specified by the entity
tokens.
Bounding Constraint




A collection of entity tokens each of which is consistent in number and sort with a
reference.
Coercion
A transformation, applied to the syntax and semantics of a partial translation in
GRL, and guided by the syntax (and sometimes semantics) of a newly input word.




The association of one function with another prior to evaluation.
Consistency
The property of two GRL references of being able to be bound to the same entity
tokens. Characterisable by number consistency rules and sort consistency defined by
movement around a sort hierarchy.
Context Extension
That part of a GRL expression or reference which arises from subordinate noun
phrase modification.
Coreference
Reference by two or more GRL references to the same entity token(s).
Definiteness
The property of GRL references, denoted by the ! operator, which requires them to be
non-introductory, if possible. Ultimately, definiteness requires uniqueness of
reference in the singular case and totality of reference across a set in the plural.
DeReferencing
The process of finding and constraining the candidate set of a GRL reference.
Discourse Entity
The object with which George would represent the actual things in the discourse
world. Discourse entities are of the same form as entity tokens; it is only the purpose
they serve that is different. Discourse entities are related to entity tokens by the
specification mapping, qv.
Discourse State
The state of the George system after processing any particular input utterance.
Composed of Discourse Memory, Bindings, Bounding Constraints and Entity
Tokens.
DiscourseWorld
The world in which the discourse is set. May or may not coincide with the real world.
Early
The property of a language analysis system of incorporating information received at
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Glossary
the input into the representation of the discourse sooner than is conventional, in
particular before the end of a sentence.
Entity Token
The entity token is the point at which the constraint information gleaned from the
various references within a discourse to a particular entity collects. It may be viewed
as something like the sense of the entity or entities to which reference is being made.
Evaluation
Manipulation of GRL expressions after application and composition into a canonical
form.
GRL
The George Representation Language.
Incremental
The property of a language analyser that allows information to be added piecemeal.




A GRL variable ranging over N, sometimes with an upper bound. Applied to GRL
references by the strong and weak index operators, <8> and X respectively. Used to
represent and reason about the relations expressed by sentence containing set
references.
Index Application
The application of GRL index to a reference, with one of the index application
operators, ® and X.
Index Expansion
The rewriting of expressions containing an index with upper bound N by N copies,
each with a reference to a member of a set ofN members referred to by the expression
before rewriting.
Index Propagation
Movement of indices between references according to certain rules. Part of the




The size of a set.
Precursor
A GRL expression in the Discourse Memory which a context extension may match.
Predicate
A relation between entities in the discourse world.
Predicate Symbol
The name of a predicate.
Protraction
The George operation allowing strictly incremental parsing where constituents
would normally be stacked in a non-incremental system.
Quantification
Strong Quantification is the application of predicates to sets in such a way that the
predication is exclusively of the individuals and not of the set as a whole. Examples:
Each, Every.
Weak Quantification is the application of predicates to sets so that predication may
be of the individuals or of the collective set. Example: Some, The (both plural).
Quantifier Expansion
The GRL operation of textually moving quantifiers embedded in an expression to the
front of that expression.
Reduction
Part of the evaluation operation. An abstracted expression and an argument of the
right type may be reduced to a new, less abstracted expression.
Refinement
The addition of information to GRL references and George Bindings and Entity
Tokens. Often results in the constraining of candidate sets.
Relevance




The representation in GRL of a referring expression in English. NB: not the same as
the reference of a noun phrase in the common linguistic sense.
Situation Information
Information defining relationships in the discourse world between the entities
taking part in a discourse. The boundary between this and sort information is fuzzy.
Sort
Information defining the basic properties of the entity tokens available as candidates
for binding to a GRL reference.
Sort Association
Association of sort information with a GRL reference symbol or George Entity token.
Specification
The relation between George entity tokens and the discourse entities in the discourse
world.
Topic
The important reference in a context extension; corresponds with the gap in a
relative clause.
Underspecification
The property of being incompletely defined. Mostly applied to set reference here.




1. The Simplest Case
?- listen.























refl is bound to el'man




Avar 3.Avar4.[[var4,var3] ,refl"man] ► refl"man)
refl is bound to el~man
» is
Next word: is
np(sing,_)/(s/np( s ing,nom)):Avar2.[var2,ref1"man] ► refl~man
+ s/np( sing,nom)/np(sing,nom):AvarlO.Avarll.coref(varlO,varll)
—» np(sing,_)/np(sing,nom):
Avar 10.coref(var10,ref1"man) t refl~man
refl is bound to el~man
np(sing,_)/(s/np(sing,nom)):Avar2.[var2,ref1"man] ► refl~man
+ s/np(sing,nom)/(n(_)/n(_) ) :ref2#Avarl2.coref(ref2,varl2))
np(sing,_)/(n(_)/n(_) ):
ref2#coref(ref2,ref1"man) ► refl~man
ref2 and refl^'are bound to el'man
np(sing,_)/(s/np( sing,nom)):Avar2.[var2,ref1"man] ► refl"man
+ s/np(sing,nom)/part(pres,pres,cont,act,indic):
Avar 13.Avar 14. [var13,var14]
—* np(sing,_)/part(pres,pres,cont,act,indic):
Avar 13. [varl3,ref1"man] ► refl~man








—> np(sing,_):coref(ref2~unkind,ref1"man) ► refl'raan
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
>> beats
Next word: beats
np( sing,nom):coref(ref2~unkind,refl~man) ► refl~man
+ s/np(sing,nom)/np(_,acc):
















ref2 and refl are bound to el"man~unkind














ref2 and refl are bound to el"man~unkind




ref2 and refl are bound to el"man'unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~donkey
Vx. (donkey(x) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(man(x) => gender ( x ,mascul ine) ) A Vx.(man(x) => type ( x, human) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => nature ( x, animal) ) A
3vl. (donkey(vl) A 3v2.(man(v2) A unkind(v2) A beat(vl,v2 ) ) )
>> ~D !! End of input Stream!!




2. Simple Definite Reference
?- listen.
** George parser **
State 1:
** s : coref(ref2~unkind,ref1~man) ►
[beat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),ref3~donkey~brown,refl~man]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind





ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~donkey"brown






—> np(sing,_)/nmod(sing ,_) :
Xvar18.[var18,ref4"woman] ► ref4~woman
ref2 and refl are bound to el"man'unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"brown











ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~donkey~brown










ref2 and refl are bound to el"man'unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"brown
ref4 is bound to e3~woman











ref2 and refl are bound to el"man"unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~donkey"brown
ref4 is bound to e3~woman











Avar 23. [var23,ref5"donkey!] ►
[feed(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),ref5~donkey!,ref4~woman]
ref2 and refl are bound to el"man"unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"brown"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman





ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
Vx. (donkey(x) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(man(x) => gender ( x,mascul ine) ) A Vx.(man(x) =4> type ( x, human) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => nature ( x, animal) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) => gender ( x , feminine) ) A
\/x. (woman ( x ) => type ( x, human) ) A Vx.(woman(x) => nature ( x , animal) ) A
3vl. { woman (vl) A 3v2. (donkey ( v2 ) A 3v3.(man(v3) A
unkind(v3) A beat(v2,v3) A feed(v2,vl) ) ) )
>> "D!! End of input Stream!!




3. Definite Post-Modified Reference
| ?- listen.





ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3"woman





ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"brown"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2~brown~donkey










ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2"brown"donkey











ref8#Avar30.[var30,ref8 ! ] ►
[hate(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),ref8!,ref7~male!]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2~brown~donkey
(if e2 is consistent with [male])
or to el~man~unkind












ref2 and refl are bound to el ~"man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2~brown~donkey
(if e2 is consistent with [male])
or to el~man~unkind












Avar30. [var30,ref8"per son!] ►
[hate(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),ref8~person!,ref7~male! ]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"brown"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2"brown~donkey
(if e2 is consistent with [male])
or to el~man~unkind









+ nmod(sing,rel) /( s\np( sing, nom)):lambda(var32,var32)
-> s/( s\np( s ing, nom) ) :
Avar32.[var32,ref8"person!] ►
[hate(pres,pres,per£,act,indie),ref8~person!,ref7~male! ]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
re£7 may be bound to e2~brown~donkey (if e2 is consistent with
[male])
or to el~man~unkind
ref8 may be bound to e3~woman
or to el~man~unkind
s/nmod(sing,rel):
Avar 30. [var30,ref8"per son!] ►
[hate(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),ref8~person!,ref7~male!]
+ nmod ( s ing , rel) /( s\np(_, nom) /np( s ing , acc ) ) /np( nom) :
Avar33.Avar 34. [var34,var33]
—> s/( s\np(_, nom) /np( s ing , acc ) ) /np(_, nom) :




ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown"donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2~brown~donkey
(if e2 is consistent with [male])
or to el~man~unkind














ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"brown~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"brown"donkey
ref7 may be bound to e2 ~brown~donkey (if e2 is consistent with
[male] )
or to el~man~unkind










Avar 37. [var37,ref10"male!] ►
[beat(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),reflO~male!,ref8~person!] ►
[hate(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),ref8~person!,ref7~male!]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male 1
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey~male
ref7 is bound to e2~brown~donkey~male
ref8 is bound to el"man"unkind









ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~brown~donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2"brown~donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"brown~donkey"male
Vx. (donkey ( x) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.{male(x) => gender ( x ,mascul ine ) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => gender ( x,mascul ine ) ) A Vx.(man(x) =£ type ( x , human) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => natur e ( x, animal) ) A
\/x. (woman] x ) =S> gender ( x , feminine ) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) => type(x,human) ) A Vx.(woman(x) => nature ( x, animal) ) A
3vl.(woman(vl) A 3v2.(donkey(v2) A male(v2) A 3v3.(man(v3) A
unkind(v3) A beat(v2,v3) A feed(v2,vl) A
beat(v2,v3) A hate(v3,v2 ) ) ) )
>> "D !! End of input Stream!!














ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~donkey~male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2~donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man"unkind
reflO is bound to e2~donkey"male






ref2 and refl are bound to el"man"unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el "man"unkind
reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male




ref 12#Avar 39.Vind3 . [ var 39 , ref 12 ! X ind3 ] ► refl2!Xind3
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el"man"unkind
reflO is bound to e2~donkey~male








—* np{sing,_126557)/nmod(sing,_12 6560) :
Avar38.[var38,ref11"woman!] ► refll~woman!
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~donkey~male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2~donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male













ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2 "donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~donkey~male









ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
•reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male














ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2 "donkey"male
ref8 is bound to e1"man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male
refll is bound to e3~woman






ref13#Avar52.[var52,refl3! ] ► refl3!
—» s/np(_l27699,acc)/nmod(sing,_128482)/n(sing) :
ref 13#Avar 52.Avar44 . [var52,ref13!] ►
[give(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),refl3!,
var44,refll"woman!]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref7 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male
refll is bound to e3~woman








ref14#Avar53.Vind4.[var53,re£14 ! Xind4] ► ref14 ! Xind4
-* s/pp(dir)/nmod(piur,_l28434)/n(plur):
refl4#Avar53.Avar41.Vind4. [var53,refl4 ! Xind4] ►
[give(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),var41,
refl4 ! Xind4,ref11"woman!]
ref2 and refl are bound to el"man"unkind
re£3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~donkey~male
ref7 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male
refll is bound to e3~woman











ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"donkey"male
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~donkey~male
re£7 is bound to e2~donkey~male
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"donkey"male
refll is bound to e3~woman







ref 13#Avar 52.Avar41.[var52,ref13!] ►
[give(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),var41,refl3!,refll~woman!]
+ n(sing):donkey




ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2~male""donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey








ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male~donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2 "male"donkey
refll is bound to e3 "woman














ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4
» carrots
Next word: carrots






Avar54 Vind5. [var54,ref15~carrotXind5] ►
[give(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),refl3~donkey! ,
refl5"carrot Xind5,ref11"woman!]
ref 2 and refl are
ref 3 is bound to
ref 4 is bound to
ref 5 is bound to
ref 7 is bound to
ref 8 is bound to
reflO is bound to
refll is bound to
ref 13 is bound to











ref2 and refl are bound to el"man"unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2~male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male~donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
Vx. (car rot ( x) =» colour (x, orange) ) A
Vx.{carrot(x) =*> nature(x,vegetable) ) A
Vx. (donkey(x) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(male(x) => gender(x,masculine) ) A
Vx.(man(x) gender ( x,mascul ine ) ) A Vx.(man(x) =£ type ( x , human) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => nature ( x, animal) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) => gender ( x, femi nine ) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) => type ( x, human) ) A Vx.(woman(x) =$■ nature ( x, animal) ) A
3V1. ( ( Vvl.vl€Vl => carrot(vl)) A 3v2. ( woman (v2 ) A
3v3. (male (v3 ) A donkey(v3) A 3v4.(man(v4) A
unkind(v4) A beat(v3,v4) A feed(v3,v2) A beat(v3,v4) A
hate(v4,v3) A (Vv5.v5CVl => g i ve (v3 , v5 , v2 ) ) ) ) ) )
!! End of input Stream !!
** Terminating parse **
-344- PhD Thesis
Program Execution Traces
5. Non-Introductory Indexed Reference
| ?- listen.









ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2 ~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey







ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot




refl7#Avar56.Vind6. [var56,refl7! Xind6] ► refl7! Xind6
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot













ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male~donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male~donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot









ref 2 and refl are
ref 3 is bound to
ref 4 is bound to
ref 5 is bound to
ref 7 is bound to
ref 8 is bound to
reflO is bound to
refll is bound to
ref 13 is bound to
ref 15 is bound to












ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3"woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male~donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
refl6 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl8 may be bound to e3~woman
or to el~man~unkind
s/np(plur,acc):





refl9#Avar62.Vind7. [var62,refl9! Xind7] ►
[eat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),refl9!Xind7,refl6~donkey!]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el"man"unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
refl6 is bound to e2~male~donkey












Avar 62 . \/ind7 . [var62,refl9~carrot! Xind7] ►
[eat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic) ,
ref!9~carrot!Xind7,refl6~donkey!]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
ref 10 is bound to e2 ~male~donkey
ref 11 is bound to e3 "woman
ref 13 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 15 is bound to e4 "carrot
ref 16 is bound to e2 "male"donkey













ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male~donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
refl6 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl9 is bound to e4~carrot
Vx. ( car rot ( x) => colour(x,orange)) A
Vx. (car rot(x) => nature(x,vegetable)) A
Vx. (donkey(x) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(male(x) => gender(x,masculine ) ) A
Vx.(man(x) =£ gender ( x,mascul i ne ) ) A Vx.(man(x) => type ( x, human) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => nature ( x , animal) ) A
Vx.{woman(x) => gender(x,feminine ) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) =£ type ( x, human) ) A Vx.(woman(x) =£ nature ( x, animal) ) A
3V1.(( Vvl.vl^Vl => carrot(vl)) A 3v2. (woman (v2) A
3v3. (male(v3) A donkey(v3) A
3v4.(man(v4) A unkind(v4) A beat(v3,v4) A feed(v3,v2) A
beat(v3,v4) A hate(v4,v3) A
(Vv5.v5€Vl => g i ve ( v3 , v5 , v2 ) ) A
(Vv6.v6€Vl =» eat ( v6 , v3 ) ) ) ) ) )
!! End of input Stream !!
** Terminating parse **
-350- PhD Thesis
Program Execution Traces
6. Indexed Reference to Unions of Sets
| ?- listen.
** George parser **
State 5:
** s : coref(ref2~unkind,ref1"man) ►
[beat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic)/re£3~donkey,refl~man]
** s:[feed(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),ref5~donkey!,ref4~woman]
** s:[beat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),reflO~male!, ref8 ~person!] ►
[hate(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),ref8~person!,ref7~male!]
** s:Vind5.[give(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),refl3~donkey!,
refl5~carrotXind5, ref 11 "woman ! ]
** s:Vind7.[eat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),
refl9~carrot! Xind7,refl6~donkey! ]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref8 is bound to el"man'unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4"carrot
re£16 is bound to e2~male~donkey







ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
re£3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el"man"unkind
ref 10 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 11 is bound to e3 "woman
ref 13 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 15 is bound to e4 "carrot
ref 16 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 19 is bound to e4 "carrot




ref21#Avar64.Vind8. [var64,ref21! Xind8] ► ref21!Xind8
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
ref 10 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref 11 is bound to e3"woman
ref 13 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref 15 is bound to e4 "carrot
ref 16 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref 19 is bound to e4"car rot









ref 21#Avar64.Vind8 . [var64 , ref 21! X ind8] ► ref21!Xind8
+ n(plur):person
—* np(plur,_126414)/nmod(plurf_126417 ) :
Avar64.Vind8.[var64,ref21~person!Xind8] ►
ref21~person!Xind8
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
re£3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4"carrot
refl6 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl9 is bound to e4~carrot







+ s\np(plur,nom)/np(_128274 ,acc ) :
Avar65.Avar66.[ride(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),var65,var66]
—> s/np(_128274 ,acc) :
Avar65.Vind8.[ride(pres,pres,perf,act, indie),
T' var65,ref21"per son!Xind8]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2~male~donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
refl6 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl9 is bound to e4~carrot












ref22#Avar69.Vind8 . [var69,ref22!] ►
[ride(pres,pres,perf,act,indie) ,
ref22!,ref21~person!Xind8]
ref2 and refl are bound to e1"man~unkind
ref 3 is bound to e2~male"donkey
ref 4 is bound to e3~ woman
ref 5 is bound to e2~male"donkey
ref 7 is bound to e2~male"donkey
ref 8 is bound to el~man~unkind
ref 10 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 11 is bound to e3 "woman
ref 13 i s bound to e2 ~male~donkey
ref 15 is bound to e4 "carrot
ref 16 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 19 i s bound to e4 "carrot
ref 21 is bound to e3 "woman
and el~man~unkind







ref23|Avar70.Vind9. [var70,ref23 ! Xind9] ► ref23!Xind9
—> s/nmod(plur,_)/n(plur ) :
ref 2 3#Avar 70.Vind8 .\Zind9.[var70,ref23!Xind9] ►
[ride(pres,pres,perf,act,indie),
ref23! Xind9, ref21~person! Xind8]
ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref 3 is bound to e2~male "donkey
ref 4 is bound to e3~ woman
ref 5 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref 7 is bound to e2~male~donkey
ref 8 is bound to el~man~unkind
ref 10 is bound to e2 ~male ~donkey
ref 11 is bound to e3 "woman
ref 13 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 15 is bound to e4 "carrot
ref 16 is bound to e2 "male"donkey
ref 19 is bound to e4 "carrot
ref 21 is bound to e3 "woman
and el~man~unkind















ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male~donkey
ref8 is bound to el"man'unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male"donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
refl6 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl9 is bound to e4~carrot
ref21 is bound to e3~woman
and el~man~unkind







** s: [beat(pres,pres,perf,act,indic),refl0~male!,ref8~person!] ►







ref2 and refl are bound to el~man~unkind
ref3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref4 is bound to e3~woman
ref5 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref7 is bound to e2"male"donkey
ref8 is bound to el~man~unkind
reflO is bound to e2"male~donkey
refll is bound to e3~woman
refl3 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl5 is bound to e4~carrot
refl6 is bound to e2"male"donkey
refl9 is bound to e4~carrot
ref21 is bound to e3~woman
and el~man~unkind
ref22 is bound to e2"male"donkey
Vx. (carrot(x) colour ( x, or ange) ) A
Vx. (car rot(x) => nature(x,vegetable)) A
Vx. (donkey(x ) => nature(x,animal)) A
Vx.(male(x) => gender ( x,masculine)) A
Vx.(man(x) =£ gender ( x ,mascul ine) ) A Vx.(man(x) => type ( x, human) ) A
Vx.(man(x) => nature ( x, animal) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) => gender ( x , feminine ) ) A
Vx.(woman(x) => type ( x, human) ) A Vx.(woman(x) =» na ture ( x, animal) ) A
3V1. ((Vvl.vl^Vl => carrot(vl)) A 3v2. ( woman) v2 ) A
3v3.(male(v3) A donkey(v3) A
3v4.(man(v4) A unkind(v4) A
beat(v3,v4) A feed(v3,v2) A
beat(v3,v4) A hate(v4,v3) A
(Vv5.v5CVl => g i ve ( v3 , v5, v2 ) ) A
(Vv6.v6€Vl => eat(v6,v3)) A
ride(v3,v2) A ride(v3,v4 ) ) ) ) )
!! Save discourse state ! !





A new indefinite simple reference is always bound to a new entity token
created for that purpose.
Rule 1: Simple Indefinite Reference
New sort information applied to a simple reference is passed to the entity
token in its candidate set only when that set (and hence the binding) is
singleton. Otherwise, any candidate entity tokens which are inconsistent
with the new information are removed from the candidate set.
Rule2: Sort Refinement
The initial candidate set of a new simple definite reference always initially
contains all the entity tokens in the system which are both sort and number
consistent with the reference.
Rule 3: Simple Definite Reference
-358- PhD Thesis
The George Rules
1. Simple references may not have as candidates entity tokens which are
bound one-to-one to any indexed reference;
2. A binding involving an indexed reference must contain either
a) more than one entity token; or
b) at least one entity token bound singleton to an indexed reference.
3. Any two indexed references singleton bound to the same entity token
must have equal upper bounds.
Rule 4: Number Consistency
Let E be a candidate entity token for a reference, R, within a closed predicate
containing other references R;, not identical with R, then:
E is deleted from R's candidate set if:
1. E is in a singleton binding with any of R;; and
2. R's candidate set is not singleton.
Rule 5: Non-Co-Reference within Closed Predicates
-359- PhD Thesis
The George Rules
A post-modifier (or, in general, a clausal modifier) is considered to relate to
information already presented in the discourse if and only if:
la. There exists in the preceding discourse a sentence which expresses
the information referred to by the context extension predicate - it
has the same predicate and all corresponding references between
the old and the new predicate are referentially consistent.
and lb. The references in that preceding sentence are bound to entity
tokens which are referentially consistent with the corresponding
references in the context extension predicate.
or 2. Discourse world deduction allow us to generate an intermediate
closed predicate from the context extension for which parts la and
lb above hold.
Rule 6: Context ExtensionMatching
A new indefinite indexed reference is always singleton bound to a new
entity token created for that purpose.
Rule 7: Indexed Indefinite Reference
The initial candidate set of a new indexed definite reference always initially
contains all the entity tokens in the system which are both sort consistent in
GRL and number consistent in George (Rule 4) with the reference.
Rule 8: IndexedDefinite Reference
-360- PhD Thesis
The George Rules
Let E be an entity token bound to an indexed reference. Then:
Select new entity tokens Ei ... En from Ent, apply to each the sort
information applied to E, and insert them in the Entity Tokens Database.
Add the pairs {( E, E;) | 1 < i < n } to the partial order $>.
The Entity Token Partition Tree of E is then defined as
{E;| 1 < i < n} U U j<n T;
where E > E; and T, is the Entity Token Partition Tree of E;.
Rule 9: Entity Token Partition
Let Ii...Ip7 Ji -.Jq be index symbols, I be a bounded index symbol with upper bound
N, and K be an arbitrary, possibly empty, string of I; and J{ conjoined by X and 0.
Let R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm be references (n, m, p, q, N € N), and P be a predicate symbol.
Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
VIl...VIp.VI < N.VJj...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x I x K,Sm...Si]
by creating N of copies of the expression each with I replaced by a different
member ofN less than N, iffN is instantiated with a known value, thus:
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x 0 x K,Sm...Si]
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x 1 x K,Sm...S!]
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...Ri,R x (N-l) x K,Sm...Sj]
After rewriting, each reference symbol with an integer applied to it is
replaced by a new unique reference symbol; all occurrences of each
{reference symbol,integer) pair are replaced by the same symbol. Weak
index expansion causes a corresponding entity token partition (if one does
not already exist), so each new reference has its own distinct entity token.
Having done so, bindings containing the expanded reference must be
replaced by n bindings between the new references and entity tokens.
Rule 10: Weak Index Expansion
-361- PhD Thesis
The George Rules
Let I be an index symbol, R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm be references (n, m £ N), and P be a
predicate symbol. Then:
Given an expression of the form
VI.[P,Rn,...,R1,R x
we can replace any number of R; with R; x I iff
1) the index I only appears once within this closed predicate (ie it has
never been propagated);
2) the Index Application Rule (Rule 18) holds for (left,Ri,R x I).
To maintain consistency, I must also be propagated to any identical
occurrences of R; in other expressions in the discourse memory. If
appropriate, quantifiers should be added.
[
Rule 11: Weak Index Propagation
Let Ii and I2 be index symbols respectively, R be a simple reference, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm
be references (n, m d N), and let P be a predicate symbol. Then:
I
To express index dependency, we can rewrite an expression of the form
VIi.VI2.[P,Rn...Ri,R x I2 x luSm...Si]
by replacing R x I2 x Ij with R x Ij iff (upb Ii = upb I2) to give
VIi.[P,Rn...Ri,R x Ii,Sm...Si]
I
This gives rise to the new Bounding Constraint
upb Ii = upb I2
I
Rule 12: Index Dependency
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The George Rules
Let I, Kj.. Kq be index symbols, R, Ri...Rr, Sj...Sm be references
(n, m, p, q, r £ N), and P be a predicate symbol. Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
VJ1...VJn.VI.VK1...VKq.[P,Rr,...,R1,R x I,Sm,...,Sj]
by dividing the domain of I into n parts, allowing new indices Ii—In to range






This creates a new Bounding Constraint
upb I = upb Ii + upb I2 + ... + upb In
Whenever such an index partition is performed, a corresponding entity
token partition must also be executed (if one does not already exist), and
new bindings must be created to replace that of R x I.
Rule 13: Weak Index Partition
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The George Rules
Let Qi, Q2 be (possibly empty) strings of quantifiers, I, Ii-..In, J, be index
symbols, R, Ri...Rr, S, Si...Sp, Ti...Tq be references (n, m, p, q, r € N), and P be a
predicate symbol. Let ki be in N for 1 < iS n, such that 1 < k; < m. Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
Q1.VI.VJ.Q2.[P,R„ Ri,R x I,Sp,...,Si,S x J,Tq...T!]
iff the index application rule (Rule 19) holds of (left,R x I,S x J), as follows.
1. Divide the domain of I into Ii...In by weak index partition (Rule 19);
2. Divide the resulting expression containing Ii by weak index partition of
tj into J
3. Divide the domain of J in each remaining expression resulting from step
1, above, into the same index partition as in 2, replacing the expression
by kj copies with J; substituted for J, to give (where l<i<n and
l<kj<m)
Qi.VIj.VJ1.Q2.[P,Rn,...,R1,R x Ij,Sp,...,S1,SxJ1,Tq...T1]
Qi.VIj.VJ2.Q2.[P,Rn»—.Ri,R x Ij»Sp,...,Si,S x J2,Tq...Ti]
Qi.VIj.VJk..Q2.[P,Rn,—,Ri»R x Ij,Sp,...,Si,Sx J]<j,Tq...Ti]
New bindings must be created, to replace that of S x J, between
S x J2...S x Jk and the 2nd...k;th of the m new entity tokens, respectively.
The rule also applies in the reverse direction (ie with I and J interchanged).
Rule 14: Compound Index Partition
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The George Rules
Let I be an index symbol, R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm be references (n, m £ N), and P be a
predicate symbol. Then:
Given an expression of the form
VI.[P,Rn,...,Ri,R0I,Sm,...,Si],
all ofRj must be replaced with R; <8> I, and all of Sj with Sj <S> I, iff
1) the index I appears exactly once in the expression (ie it has not already
been propagated); and
2) the Index Application Rule (Rule 19) holds for <Ieft,Ri,R ® I) or
<right,Sj,R® 1} as appropriate.
To maintain consistency, I must also be propagated to any identical
occurrences of R; in other expressions in the discourse memory. If
appropriate, quantifiers should be added.
Rule 15: Strong Index Propagation
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The George Rules
Let Ii-. Ip, Jj...Jq be index symbols, I be a bounded index symbol with upper bound
N, and K be an arbitrary, possibly empty, string of It and Jj conjoined by X. Let R,
Rl...Rn, Si...Sm be references (n, m, p, q, N 6 N), and P be a predicate symbol. Then:
Given an expression of the form
VI1...VIp.VI<N.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,RxK®I,Sm...Si]
we can creating N copies of the expression, each with I replaced by a
different member of N less than N, thus:
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x K®0,Sm...S1]
VI1...VIp.VJ1...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x K® l,Sm...Si]
VI1...VIp.VJi...VJq.[P,Rn...R1,R x K®(N-l),Sm...SiJ
Then, if R is definite, we must partition its bound entity token so that there
is a new, unique token bound to each copy of R; if R is indefinite, we must
bind each new reference to the single existing entity token.
After this rewriting, each reference symbol with an integer applied to it
must be replaced by a new reference symbol; all occurrences of each
(reference symbol,integer) pair are replaced by the same symbol.
Rule 16: Strong Index Expansion
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The George Rules
Let I, Ii - Ik, Ji - Tp, Kx...Kq be index symbols, R, Ri...Rn, Si...Sm be references
(n, m, p, q ( N), and P be a predicate symbol. Then:
We can rewrite an expression of the form
VJi...VJn.VI1.VK1...VKq.[P,Rn,...,R1,R®I,Sm,...,Si]
by dividing the domain of I into k parts, allowing new indices Ix ... Ik to
range over them, and replacing the expression by n copies with Ii ... Ik




This creates a new Bounding Constraint
upb I = upb Ix + upb I2 + ... + upb In
Whenever a strong index partition is performed upon a reference R, a
corresponding entity token partition must also be executed on the token
bound to it.
Rule 17: Strong Index Partition
Let Ri be references and Ij be indices. Let P be a predicate symbol, and D be a
direction, such that D i {left, right}. Then:
An index may be propagated in a direction D from Rx to R2 (denoted by
( D,Rx,R2 )) unless precluded by one of the following:
1. No index may propagate on to a strongly indexed reference.
2. No weak index may propagate on to a simple reference.
3. No strong index may propagate on to a definite reference.
Rule 18: Index Application
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The George Rules
Let E2 ► El be a context extended expression. Let R1 be a reference in El, and R2 a
reference in E2, both before index propagation. Then:
If the set of entities sort consistent with R1 is a superset of the set of entities
sort consistentwith R2, R1 may optionally be indexed with any strong index
associated with or propagating on to R2. The candidate set of R1 is then
j reduced to be the same as that of R2.
I




BNF Specification of GRL Syntax
1. Introduction
There follows a specification in Backus-Naur Form of the syntax of the George
Representation Language. All terms are defined in Chapter 4. Non-terminal symbols are
underlined; terminal symbols are emboldened. Vertical bar (|) denotes disjunction in the
syntactic specification; juxtaposition denotes concatenation; postfixed * means zero or
more repetitions; postfixed + means one or more repetitions (as in Kleene * and +). Curly
braces indicate grouping in the description language (so parentheses and square brackets
are always terminal symbols). Note that "Sentence" and "Quantified-Expression" are
interchangeable. Where non-terminal symbols are modified with arguments (eg Index-
Symbol(n)). the argument is taken to be constant throughout each production.
This specification, like the definition in Chapter 4, is in two parts - first, there is the basic
expression structure, and then there is the quantifier expansion operation which
constructs more convenient and conventional expressions out of the basic ones.
2. Basic Expression Specification
Expression Co-Reference
Closed-Predicate
Closed-Predicate f Predicate {, Reference }+ ]
Predicate Predicate-SvmboK Modifiers )
Predicate-Symbol a member of Pred
Modifiers a member of IIm£]yf0(:iDom(m)
Co-Reference coreff Reference , Reference )
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Index-Declaration(n). Reference <S> Index(n)
Index-Deelaration(n). Reference x Index(n)




V Index-Symbol(n) < Number |





a member of Sort
3. Quantifier Expansion
Sentence = Quantified-Expression
Quantified-Expression ::= Expansion! Expression)
where Expansion is an operation which moves Index-Declarations and Context-
Extensions to the front of the argement Expression, yielding a syntactic object of the form:
{Index-Declaration . }* {Context-Extension ►} + Expression
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